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There is a large and ongoing debate on whether the Annual General Meeting of shareholders 
(hereinafter: AGM1) is the appropriate corporate body to have decision-making powers in 
corporate governance2 (for example, see Bainbridge, 2002, 2012, and Bebchuk, 2005, for opposite 
points of view). One of the key questions is whether decision-making by the AGM is optimal, or 
just a matter of legal formality instead. AGMs are often portrayed in the media as joyful day trips 
for seniors and retirees, who are offered delicious refreshments and drinks and some interesting 
goodies. For instance, Bremmer (2016) quotes a private shareholder attending the 2016 AGM of 
Unilever NV: ‘[f]or me, the main reason to attend AGMs is the nice atmosphere and the snacks. 
For example, the [Dutch] construction company Koninklijke BAM: they perform badly, but they 
have nice food and drinks, and organised a trip to the sealock in IJmuiden. The best snacks are 
catered at Acomo in Rotterdam, you can even get champagne there. I also enjoy the catering at the 
meetings of Ahold and ING. Walking is more difficult for me lately, but for as long as I am able 
to do so, I will visit these meetings’ (translated by the author). The above state of affairs in (Dutch) 
AGMs, or ‘circuses’ per Bremmer (2016), does not correspond to their role as prescribed in 
corporate law.  
Besides the apparent reputation for offering entertainment, the AGM faces other obstacles. 
Small shareholders in particular consider the costs of participating in the AGM too high and are 
reluctant to vote according to economic theory. Thus, turnout rates, especially of small 
shareholders, are generally considered to be quite low. Is advocating for enhanced shareholder 
participation still expedient? The European Commission (EC) seems to think so, following its 
proposal to amend the Shareholder Rights Directive (Directive 2007/36/EC3). With this proposal, 
which was adopted in March 2017 in an amended version, the EC is aiming at increasing 
shareholder participation in AGMs. The proposal also increases the decision-making rights of 
shareholders at the European level, as it includes, inter alia, a shareholder say on pay and large 
related party transactions.4  
In short, the goal of this research is investigating the apparent discrepancies between the legal 
theoretical role (cf. infra, section 2 of this introduction) and the practical role of the AGM of listed 
companies, and whether and how its functioning may be enhanced. For this, we focus on 
shareholder turnout in particular. In this introduction, we provide an elaborated introduction to 
                                                     
1 An EGM (i.e., Extraordinary General Meeting) can also be called. Please refer to chapter 1, section 3 of 
this study. In this study, we generally use the terms ‘AGM’ and ‘general meeting’ to denote the (annual) 
general meeting of shareholders.    
2 There are many (slightly) different definitions of corporate governance that are used. For example, the 
Cadbury Code (1992, section 2.5) states that ‘[corporate] governance is the system by which companies are 
directed and controlled’. The OECD uses the more specified definition of the European Central Bank in 
its ‘Glossary of Statistical Terms’, and states that corporate governance contains the ‘procedures and 
processes according to which an organisation is directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure 
specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among the different participants in the organisation 
– such as the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders – and lays down the rules and 
procedures for decision-making’ (OECD, 2005).  
3 Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the exercise of certain rights of 
shareholders in listed companies, 2007 O.J. L 157/87. 
4 Although we have to add that the European Parliament (EP) has substantially changed this proposal in 
the summer of 2015 regarding the latter (cf. infra, chapter 1 of this research).  
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the discussion of the role of AGMs and shareholder decision-making, starting with the agency 
theory. We subsequently outline our research, including our research questions and methods 
(sections 5-7 of this introduction).   
 
1. THE AGENCY THEORY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Virtually every study to date in the field of corporate governance refers to the agency theory. This 
study is no exception in this respect. Agency theory lies at the heart of corporate governance, but 
relationships between principals and agents exist in many other situations as well:  agency theory is 
directed at any relationship in which one party – the principal – delegates work to another one – 
the agent. Employment contracts are common examples. Sappington (1991) notes that some tasks 
are too complicated or too costly to do oneself, and thus the principal needs to hire an agent, who 
has specialised skills or knowledge to perform the specific task. As Sappington points out, the 
central question in these kinds of relationships is how the principal can motivate the agent to 
perform as the principal would prefer, while keeping in mind that monitoring is generally costly. 
In these agency relationships two problems may occur: i) an agency problem because of conflicting 
goals of the principal and agent that arises because it is difficult or costly for the principal to 
monitor whether the agent is acting in the principal’s interest, and; ii) a problem that stems from 
risk sharing when the principal and agent have different risk preferences and hence prefer different 
actions (Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency theory focuses on the optimal structure of a contract to govern 
such a relationship and has frequently been used in many fields, often accompanied by economic 
models to study behaviour (e.g., Ross, 1973; Harris and Raviv, 1979, 1978; Holmstrom, 1979; 
Gausch and Weiss, 1981; Amihud and Lev, 1981).5  
There is also an agency relationship between owners and managers in large public corporations. 
Shareholder decision-making regarding corporate strategy would be largely inefficient due to 
coordination failures, and hence these powers are usually delegated to a board of directors (also 
described as the fourth fundamental characteristic of corporations by Hansmann and Kraakman, 
2009). Nonetheless, economists have paid no attention to the internal organisation and decision-
making of companies for quite a long time. Only in the 1930s did economists consider looking 
inside the corporate ‘black box’. Before this time, standard (micro- and macro)economic theory 
focused on optimal production and supply; firms determined their supply on the market using the 
intersection of their marginal costs and marginal benefits for a given price. They used production 
factors such as capital and labour. How and why firms operated in the market in the first place and 
how decisions were made was not considered to be important. This thinking changed when 
economist Ronald Coase developed his theory on transaction costs in his seminal article ‘The 
Nature of the Firm’ in 1937. Per Coase (1937), ‘economists in building up a theory have often 
omitted to examine the foundations on what it was erected’ (p. 386). It was about time to consider 
the meaning of the term ‘firm’, as price theory offered ‘a very incomplete picture of our economic 
                                                     
5 Although this theory is widely recognized, one may note that the strategic delegation theory (industrial 
organisation) somewhat counters the agency theory. The theoretical model of strategic delegation, which 
was developed in industrial organisation theory, suggests that the principals (i.e., the shareholders) may 
actually gain from delegating decision-making to agents (i.e., the directors/managers) an sich. The theory 
predicts that the competitive environment depends on whether delegation is actually beneficial or not. Thus, 
delegation may be beneficial when it is strategic to delegate decision-making, i.e., strategic delegation. To 
learn more about the strategic delegation theory, see for example Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd 
(1987), Sklivas (1987), and Christiansen (2013).    
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system’ (Coase, 1937, p. 387). Accordingly, Coase made a distinction between transactions via 
markets and organisations and argued that transactions take place within an organisation if the 
transaction costs of the market are too high (i.e., when the price is far from a sufficient statistic, also 
see Williamson, 1981; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Per Coase, the question 
is always whether it will pay to bring an extra exchange transaction under the organising authority. 
At the margin, the costs of organising within the firm will be equal either to the costs of organising 
in another firm or to the costs involved in leaving the transaction to be ‘organised’ by the price 
mechanism. 
This theory of transaction costs was the first theory that dealt with the existence of firms or 
other organisations and their internal structure. Firms had become more than just a ‘black box’ in 
academic literature. In their seminal article Jensen and Meckling (1976) further developed the 
theory of the firm. According to these authors, a theory that explained how the conflicting 
objectives of individual actors within a firm were brought into equilibrium did not yet exist. Prior 
to Jensen and Meckling’s research in 1976, a consensus already existed regarding the fact that 
because of the separation of ownership and control as described by Berle and Means (1932),6 in 
public companies the interests of shareholders did not completely overlap with those of directors 
and managers, and that managers did not always serve shareholder interests. For example, Adam 
Smith referred to this matter in his famous ‘The Wealth of Nations’ in het following way:  
‘The directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other people’s money 
than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same 
anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their 
own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not 
for their master’s honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. 
Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of 
the affairs of such a company’ (Smith, 1776, p. 439).  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) brought the agency theory in the corporate field to the next level and 
explained in their research that the principals (i.e., shareholders) and the agent(s) (i.e., the director 
or board of directors, or in economic literature often referred to as managers) generally will incur 
positive monitoring and bonding costs. Next, there will be some remaining divergence between 
the agent’s decisions and those decisions which would maximize the welfare of the principal. Jensen 
and Meckling call this cost to the principal the ‘residual loss’ (p. 308).   
Firms were not alone in being considered black boxes for a long time as ownership structures 
were not entirely discussed too, especially in civil law countries. Although the world seem to have 
assumed for a very long time that the model of dispersed ownership of American companies as 
described by Berle and Means (1932) was the prevalent corporate model,7 i.e. ‘quasi-public’ 
                                                     
6 In their seminal book, Berle and Means (1932) refer to firms as ‘economic empires’ that have become 
‘means whereby the wealth of innumerable individuals has been concentrated into huge aggregates and 
whereby control over this wealth has been surrendered to a unified direction’. According to the authors 
‘ownership is so widely scattered that working control can be maintained with but a minority interest. [...] 
In such a case the greater bulk of ownership is virtually without control.’ Berle and Means use the term 
‘quasi-public’ for these widely dispersed ownership structures.  
7 Although scholars often refer to this widely dispersed ownership structure, Berle and Means (1932) already 
refer in their first chapter, ‘Property in Transition’, to companies with one or more de facto controlling 
shareholders: ‘Such separation may exist in varying degrees. Where the men ultimately responsible for 
running a corporation own a majority of the voting stock while the remainder is widely diffused, control 
and part ownership are in their hands. Only for the remaining owners is there separation from control. 
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companies like the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, nowadays scholars seem to 
agree that this is not a common model in every country. The fact that ownership patterns in 
continental Europe and Asian countries are more concentrated than in Anglo-Saxon countries (e.g., 
Van der Elst, 2008) is considered a stylized fact. About two decades ago, Franks and Mayer (1995) 
already described two types of ownership structures; the ‘outsider system’, like Berle and Means’ 
model of dispersed ownership, and the ‘insider system’, where ownership concentration is 
remarkably higher (Franks and Mayer, 1995). In addition, also in the studies of La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleiffer and Vishny (1997, 1998) and in the study of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleiffer (1999) the authors find that ownership is more concentrated around the world than the 
Berle and Means model indicates when expanding the Franks and Mayer study to more countries.8 
The studies conclude that the insider system appears to dominate in a large part of the world. 
Although these two studies suffer from ‘serious methodological problems’ per Barca and Becht 
(2001) as their coverage is limited (where Franks and Mayer use many firms in a very small number 
of countries, the studies of La Porta et al. have a small number of firms in many countries), the 
differences in ownership structures are nowadays widely recognized and have important 
implications for corporate governance. One can identify problems of conflicting goals and 
opportunistic behaviour not only between managers and shareholders, but also in the relationships 
between small shareholders and controlling blockholders. As Becht and Roëll (1999) put it: ‘while 
in the USA the main agency problems seem to stem from conflicts of interest between managers 
and dispersed, insufficiently interventionist shareholders, in much of continental Europe there are 
generally large blockholders present who can and do exercise control over management. Instead, 
the main potential conflict of interest lies between controlling shareholders and powerless minority 
shareholders’ (p.1052).  
The presence of blockholders can add agency costs due to an increased risk of private benefit 
extraction. Blockholders may have incentives to use their majority stake to maximize their private 
benefits instead of the total value for all shareholders: for example, these shareholders may have 
incentives to forego profitable investment opportunities if for these investments additional external 
funds are required because this would mean a dilution of their controlling stake.9 Another example 
of opportunistic behaviour that is often mentioned by scholars is the situation where a large 
shareholder negotiates a cheap loan with the company, for example with an interest rate below the 
market rate (also referred to as ‘tunneling behaviour’). It is important to note that the smaller the 
de facto controlling stake of the blockholder is, the larger the benefits of opportunistic behaviour at 
the company’s expense. Thus, minority shareholders need to monitor not only the behaviour of 
the board of directors, but also of blockholders to be able to counter or prevent this possible 
opportunistic behaviour.  
                                                     
Frequently, however, ownership is so widely scattered that working control can be maintained with but a 
minority interest. […] In such case the greater bulk of ownership is virtually without control’ (p. 4). 
8 La Porta et al. link the concentration of ownership to investor protection and state that larger stakes are 
necessary in markets with low investor protection to serve as an internal monitoring device; in markets with 
better investor protection these larger stakes are redundant, since these markets provide for external 
monitoring devices.  
9 For example, according to Leech (1987): ‘[e]xisting shareholders may be unable or unwilling to supply this 
additional capital either because of limitations to their personal wealth or their need to maintain a sufficiently 
diversified portfolio. Expansion therefore entails new shareholders and a consequent loss of control, in 
some sense, by the initial controlling group.’  
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Nevertheless, the conclusion that concentrated ownership equals inefficient opportunistic 
behaviour is certainly not correct in every case. When the risk of opportunistic behaviour is lower, 
the presence of blockholders may decrease small shareholders’ agency costs since these small 
shareholders may be able to free-ride on the monitoring efforts of the large shareholders in terms 
of management action. In this case, the public good problem of shareholder monitoring is (partly) 
internalized by the blockholder (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1980).  
 
2. THE AGM’S THEORETICAL ROLE  
Corporate law aims at mitigating agency problems in the corporate setting, thereby raising the 
willingness of investors to invest. First, the supervisory board or the non-executive directors 
monitor the management board or executive directors on behalf of the shareholders.10 Second, the 
external auditor plays a large role in the corporate checks and balances. Third, a large part of direct 
(collective) shareholder monitoring takes place during the (A)GM.11 12 Though often only 
shareholder voting is taken into consideration, the role of the AGM in corporate law can be divided 
into three functions.13 First, AGMs have an information function as the board provides its shareholders 
with (financial) information about the company. Secondly, these shareholder meetings serve as a 
platform for shareholders to ask questions and to engage in discussions with the board about 
corporate matters (forum function).14 Thirdly, the AGM serves the legal decision-making of 
                                                     
10 Or, in continental European countries such as Germany and the Netherlands, a broader scope is usually 
applied that includes other stakeholders as well, like employees. The corporate board needs to act in the 
interest of the company (in German: unternehmensinteresse). In contrast, section 172(1) the UK CA 2006 
stipulates that ‘a director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely 
to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole’’. But, one may note that 
the interests of the stakeholders also need to be taken into account, such as section 172(1)(b) the interests 
of the company's employees; paragraph (1)(c) the need to foster the company's business relationships with 
suppliers, customers and others, and; (1)(d) the impact of the company's operations on the community and 
the environment. The UK model is therefore often referred to as the ‘enlightened shareholder model’ 
(Siems, 2008, p. 179). 
11 Cf. supra, nt. 1. EGMs can also be called. Please refer to section 3 of the first chapter of this research for 
an explanation. 
12 Also the market for corporate control is often mentioned as a disciplinary device. There is a large literature 
base on this matter, but one may for example refer to the seminal article of Manne (1965), and also 
Grossman and Hart (1980) and (1988), and Jensen and Ruback (1983).   
13 Van den Hoek (1998) uses four different categories to define the functions of AGMs: i) accountability; ii) 
information to the extent that it does not belong in category i); iii) discussion and iv) decision-making. In 
Dutch: ‘i) verantwoording; ii) informatieverstrekking voorzover al niet onder i begrepen; iii) overleg; iv) besluitvorming.’ We 
follow the approach of the three previously mentioned functions since accountability, the first category of 
Van den Hoek, can be part of both the information and forum function. Not only are directors accountable 
when they provide information, but also when they have to answer shareholders’ tough ad hoc questions. 
Van den Hoek (1998) refers to article 2:107(2) DCC that holds that (translation), ‘the management board 
and supervisory board shall provide [the AGM] with all requested information, unless a substantial interest 
of the company opposes to this.’’ As we will see in the next chapter when we discuss the legal framework, 
and as Van den Hoek already recognizes, the notion ‘requested information’’ also entails the right of 
shareholders to ask questions. In addition, Van den Hoek duly notes that the company’s management is in 
practice not only accountable to its shareholders, the investors of capital, but also to a wider public. The 
media puts large focus on AGMs and there are often press representatives present. He calls it a ‘public 
relations event’ (p. 7).  
14 The following quote of the Dutch Supreme Court shows the theoretical importance of this forum 
function: ‘dat de betekenis van een bepaling in de statuten van een rechtspersoon, voorschrijvende dat een besluit moet uitgaan 
van een orgaan van die rechtspersoon, in het geval waarin dat orgaan uit meer personen is samengesteld in het bijzonder hierin 
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shareholders regarding decisions that are outside the board’s discretion (decision-making function). The 
decision-making function of AGMs is often considered to be the core function of the AGM 
(Strand, 2012). In effect, the other functions serve the decision-making function: shareholders need 
to be able to make an informed voting decision, and hence need access to information. Although 
(regularly) disclosed information is usually very detailed – annual reports usually contain hundreds 
of pages – companies simply cannot provide all information about every corporate engagement to 
interested shareholders: there is an incomplete information problem, i.e., complete disclosure is 
usually far too expensive and, most of all, just not feasible. In addition, shareholders may ask for 
clarifications of the disclosed information. Hence, these three theoretical functions of AGMs are 
closely linked (cf. infra, chapter 1, section 1).  
The theoretical importance of the AGM in corporate governance is widely recognized by 
scholars. For instance, in many corporate law books, the AGM is considered one of the most 
important corporate bodies and corporate diagrams often show shareholders at the top of 
corporate structures. According to De Jong, Mertens and Roosenboom (2005) the AGM is an 
integral part of the corporate governance model and plays a crucial role in the realization of the 
powers of shareholders. Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) even state that ‘if limited liability is the 
most distinctive feature of corporate law, voting is second’ (p. 63). They explore the relation 
between the residual claim and the right to vote and conclude that voting rights flow to the holders 
of the residual claim as they need to be able to influence decisions by voting, which explains the 
function of voting rights. 
 
3. THE AGM IN PRACTICE 
Despite its large theoretical importance, the functioning of the AGM is largely criticized. Whereas 
some scholars even argue that the board is not a mere agent of shareholders, but serves as the 
nexus for corporate contracts (Bainbridge, 2002, 2012) and that shareholder voting only 
undermines the role of the board as a central decision-making body (Bainbridge, 2012), others 
question the position of the AGM as a means to shareholder primacy. In the next sections, we 
provide a brief overview of the different (economic) problems that are mentioned in the literature 
regarding AGMs, including rational apathy and free-rider problems, lack of dialogue and side-
stepping behaviour.  
 
3.1. Rational Apathy and Free-Rider Problems 
Low attendance rates, especially of small shareholders, usually referred to as ‘shareholder 
absenteeism’, are often mentioned as a point of criticism. Economic theory provides several 
explanations for low shareholder attendance. Shareholders can express their discontentment with 
the corporate state of affairs by selling their shares and investing elsewhere (often referred to as 
the ‘Wall Street Walk’, for example see Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009). This ‘exit strategy’ is feasible 
for small shareholders since a small amount of shares is unlikely to have an effect on the price of 
the stock in a liquid market (e.g., Chakravarty and Hodgkinson, 2001). Whereas widely dispersed 
                                                     
is gelegen, dat het besluit tot stand komt als vrucht van onderling overleg van alle leden van dat orgaan die, na daartoe in de 
gelegenheid te zijn gesteld, aan dat overleg wensen deel te nemen’ (Wijsmuller-case, Hoge Raad 15 July 1968, NJ 1969, 
101. Also see Overkleeft, 2013, p. 20). For more information on the shareholder’s forum rights, please refer 
to section 2.1.3 and section four of the first chapter and chapter 6.  
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ownership contributes to the liquidity of the market, it also causes problems since no individual 
small shareholder has incentives to engage in direct monitoring (Becht, 1999; Chakravarty and 
Hodgkinson, 2001). The outcome of the vote will be the same regardless of whether a small 
individual shareholder participates or not. In other words, the marginal effect of a small 
shareholder’s vote on the outcome will be insignificant. Rational shareholders weigh the marginal 
costs of voting against the marginal benefits and invest the amount of effort for which these 
benefits exceed the costs. When the benefits of voting are small (approximately zero), and voting 
comes at a cost, no individual shareholder would be willing to incur this cost of voting; in this case, 
their optimal monitoring investment will be zero (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991). Cahn and 
Donald (2010) refer to this behaviour as ‘rational apathy’ (pp. 474-475), stating that shareholders 
may have to ‘sit down after work some evening and read a 150-page proxy statement’ (p. 474). 
These information costs and other costs (for example, see Zetzsche, 2008) are assumed to 
contribute to low attendance rates of (small) shareholders.   
A second related economic problem is the free-rider problem. In (partly) widely dispersed 
(‘oceanic’) ownership structures (Leech, 2002), shareholder monitoring can be considered a public 
good. Public goods are i) non-rival, which means that one player consuming the good does not 
prevent another player from doing so as well, or does not lower the benefits of consumption for 
this other player, and; ii) non-excludable, which means it is impossible or extremely expensive to 
prevent another player from using the good. In other words, a public good enhances the welfare 
of all. In his seminal work, Samuelson (1954) was the first to describe public goods (‘collective 
consumption goods’): goods ‘which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual’s 
consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other individual’s consumption of 
that good’ (pp. 387-389). Due to the non-excludable and non-rival characteristics of shareholder 
monitoring, i.e. a shareholder cannot prevent other shareholders from benefiting from his 
monitoring efforts and consuming the benefits from monitoring does not affect the benefits for 
other shareholders, other shareholders are able to (partly) free-ride on the monitoring efforts of an 
individual shareholder and therefore, no individual shareholder would be willing to incur the (full) 
costs of monitoring if these are non-zero. This free-rider problem results in a sub-optimal amount 
of the public good; the actual monitoring level is lower than the monitoring level that maximizes 
the collective welfare of all shareholders.  
We consider the following simple theoretical example to illustrate this matter. There is a public 
company that has 100 identical shareholders who hold a 1% stake each (N=100). For a moment, 
assume there is a complete contract in place between these shareholders and they collectively 
determine the optimal amount of monitoring so that the sum of their marginal benefits equals the 
marginal cost (denoted as the aggregate effort E). For example, let’s assume that the benefits to 
shareholder i can be described by:  
 
B = 3ei
2 - 10ei,  
 
and its costs by:  
 
C = -2ei
2 + 50ei  
 
where ei is the effort of shareholder i.  Hence, its marginal benefits (MB) and marginal costs (MC) 




MB = 6ei – 10;  
 
MC =-4ei + 50.   
 
Accordingly, whereas the MB are increasing when shareholder i spends more effort, MC are 
decreasing. Hence, there are some economies of scale involved in shareholder monitoring. Of 
course, one would expect that at a certain point, the marginal benefits of spending an extra unit of 
effort would actually decline, hence, perhaps MB is better described as a concave function. 
Nonetheless, in this simple example, we will just focus on the increasing part of the MB function. 
Setting MB equal to MC, one obtains ei = 6. Since every shareholder is identical (see assumption 




In practice, shareholders will independently determine their own amount of monitoring. The 
monitoring amount is now determined by the Nash Equilibrium of the game between these 100 
identical shareholders, where the amount of monitoring of shareholder i is the best response to the 
monitoring efforts of the other 99 shareholders and vice versa.15 In case the other 99 shareholders 
would not engage in shareholder monitoring, shareholder i would engage in monitoring until his 
marginal cost of monitoring equalled its marginal benefit, which results in ei = 6. However, if 
shareholder i expects that the other shareholders would invest in monitoring as well, his amount 
of monitoring would be less than in the previous situation, since he would take into account certain 
amount of benefits as spill over effects from the monitoring of the other shareholders as well. In 
other words, the aggregate monitoring efforts of all shareholders will be lower, since each 
shareholder expects that he will receive some benefits from the monitoring of other shareholders 
as well. The effort a shareholder expends on monitoring for a given cost of monitoring will 
therefore be its marginal benefits minus the expected positive spill over effects he receives from 
                                                     
15 The Nash Equilibrium contains the monitoring amounts of all shareholders in such a way that an 
individual shareholder is not able to increase its benefits by changing its monitoring efforts.   
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other shareholders. Assume that shareholder i expects to receive spill over effects of other 
shareholders’ monitoring efforts of 10. Setting MB plus expected spill over effects equal to MC 
results in ei = 5 and aggregate effort E = 5 * 100 = 500.  As a result, shareholder monitoring is less 
than optimal. Each shareholder is free-riding on the public good produced by the other 
shareholders. This is shown in figure 2:  
 
FIGURE 2 
Shareholder Monitoring with Spill-over Effects 
 
Note that in cases where the expected spill over effects of the positive externality are sufficiently 
high, shareholder monitoring will be (approximately) zero. In our situation, if shareholder i assumes 
to receive 60 or more of the monitoring effort by other shareholders, this shareholder will not 
engage in any monitoring activity.  
 
3.2. Lack of Dialogue 
Another apparent problem is the lack of (meaningful) dialogue between shareholders and board 
members. According to some scholars, accommodating participation of numerous shareholders 
within a limited amount of time and to keep discussions and questions meaningful to corporate 
matters (for instance, Klaassen, 2011; Strand, 2012) is an important issue. Shilling (2001) used 
results from a study that interviewed over 100 supervisory board members of large German 
corporations to evaluate the state of affairs in German AGMs. Per Shilling, many board members 
recognized that German AGMs are ineffective. Many AGMs are ‘long, tedious’ processes ‘where 
relevant issues are rarely discussed and where the management board is seldom subject to persistent 
questioning and constructive criticism’ (p. 149). Apostolides (2007) used an ‘AGM scorecard’ to 
analyse and rank the effectiveness of 22 UK AGMs since 2001. This scorecard includes 12 items16 
and on each item a company scored either 1, 0 or -1. A score of 1 for a particular item indicates 
that the proceedings concerning this item favour shareholders, whereas -1 indicates that ‘directors 
appear to be prioritizing their own interests’. For example, BP Plc received a -1 on their 2003 AGM 
agenda, because ‘[they] started at 11.00 am, [and] placed [the item to accept the year’s accounts] as 
                                                     
16 These items are: ‘agenda’, ‘venue’, ‘refreshments’, ‘materials’, ‘security’, ‘balance of board’, ‘address’, 
‘remuneration’, ‘control’, ‘voting procedure’, ‘questions’ and ‘proxies’.  
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the last of its 13 resolutions, possibly to deter persistent, awkward or frivolous questioners as the 
two-and-a-half-hour meeting encroached on everybody’s lunch time’ (p. 1282). Apostolides assigns 
a high score to the 2002 AGM of Lastminute.com Plc because the meeting was ‘informal and 
friendly, held at the cosy rather than overwhelming Westminster Theatre, with directors mingling 
with shareholders before and after the meeting. The meeting was conducted in an open and honest 
way, with most of the content of the presentation and questions concerning strategy rather than 
petty detail. Undoubtedly the whole atmosphere was helped by the fact that the attendance was 
smaller (about fifty shareholders) and more youthful than usual.’ (p. 1281). Apostolides (2007) 
compares the AGM of Lastminute.com Plc with the 2005 AGM of GlaxoSmithKline Plc and 
describes completely different circumstances: ‘[s]trict control was exercised, from the airport-style 
security at the entrance, to the retaining of the microphone at question time, voting by poll rather 
than show of hands, screens showing only board members not questioners, and so on. All aspects 
meant that control was retained by the board throughout, without making many concessions to the 
shareholders’ (pp. 1281-1282). Accordingly, Apostolides assigns the meeting of Lastminute.com 
Plc a score of 11, the highest score, whereas the meeting of GlaxoSmithKline Plc received the 
lowest score of -7. Although it is probably debatable that the criteria in his analysis are the right 
ones, Apostolides is one of the very first scholars that actually addresses the state of affairs during 
AGMs. We will investigate the state of affairs of Dutch AGMs in chapter 6 of this study (cf. infra, 
also see section 5 of this introduction).  
 
3.3. Side-Stepping Behaviour and Other Problems 
Side-stepping behaviour of large shareholders may also cause impediments to the functioning of 
AGMs (Van der Elst, 2011; Tiemstra and De Keijzer, 2008). This behaviour is also claimed to be 
one of the explanations for low (physical) attendance rates of (small) shareholders (Strand, 2012; 
Strätling, 2003; Hodges, Macniven and Mellett, 2004). Although the AGM is the place where all 
shareholders, including small private investors, have the opportunity to ask questions and formal 
decision-making takes place, large shareholders often negotiate on important decisions during 
private meetings outside AGMs, for example during conferences, roadshows or one-on-ones 
(Tiemstra and De Keijzer, 2008). These ways of shareholder monitoring may be less costly and 
more efficient to large shareholders than the static annual gathering in AGMs, making the actual 
AGM less relevant. Moreover, according to Strätling (2003), institutional investors may prefer to 
approach the corporate board not at AGMs, but directly at these private meetings ‘in order not to 
tarnish the reputation of the companies they invest in’ (p. 76). Thus, small shareholders may 
perceive the AGM irrelevant, since important discussions and de facto decision-making do not take 
place anymore, making the AGM perhaps just a formality.  
In addition, we see that resolutions are often approved with extremely large majorities and 
seldom dismissed (Van der Elst, 2012a, 2011), which probably is partly caused by the 
aforementioned side-stepping behaviour of large shareholders and institutional investors. And 
whereas the use of proxy voting can increase voter turnout rates, it may also hinder the functioning 
of the AGM as a forum for shareholder dialogue; the same may hold for the use of proxy advisors. 
In its Green Paper ‘The EU Corporate Governance Framework’ (2011a)17 the EC mentions other 
reasons for low engagement on the part of institutional investors in particular (in terms of active 
                                                     
17 EC (2011a) Green Paper The EU Corporate Governance Framework, COM (2011) 164 final. 5 April 2011. 
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participation during AGMs), such as portfolio diversification, and conflicts of interests. Winter 
(2011) even uses the notion ‘extreme diversification’ in relation to institutional investor portfolio 
diversification, which indicates the high costs of monitoring all companies extensively. 
 
3.4. ‘Dull Rituals’ 
These problems make the practical functioning of AGMs extremely difficult. Apostolides (2007) 
states that passing resolutions in accordance with the wishes of directors is often a fait accompli due 
to these problems. Moreover, Aggarwal (2001) argues that:  
‘[a]nnual shareholder meetings of publicly held companies are usually very dull affairs. They 
generally focus on a brief review of corporate financial performance and a speech by the 
CEO indicating the company’s future direction. In most cases, the review of corporate 
performance glosses over or provides a positive spin on any difficulties or poor 
performance, and the CEO's speech tends to be bland and self-serving and any discussion 
of the future is hemmed in by legalistic fears of making specific projections. Oh yes, and 
the election of the new board of directors is also announced, with most of the votes having 
already been cast by mail and counted prior to the annual meeting. Most shareholders tend 
to sell their stock if not satisfied with a company’s management or its prospects and 
corporate elections generally tend to have unsurprising results with most votes cast as 
recommended by management. The most worrisome part of an annual meeting for the 
presiding CEO is usually the question and answer period which is mercifully kept very brief. 
In any case, embarrassing or difficult questions, if any, generally get a brief response 
accompanied by the suggestion that the questioning shareholder get together with a senior 
manager for additional details after the formal meeting. Thus, most corporate annual 
meetings are dull rituals held mostly because they are required by law’ (p. 347). 
That there are some problems with the performance of its theoretical roles may be clear, but to call 
AGMs ‘dull rituals held mostly because they are required by law’ may be perhaps a bit radical. Or 
is it? Is the AGM indeed obsolete (Strätling, 2003) and the right to vote close to worthless 
(Zetzsche, 2008)? Or is the AGM just ‘the worst form of governance apart from all the others that 
have been tried out?’ (Zetzsche, 2008, p. 17). Although the aforementioned problems probably 
cause impediments to the practical functioning of AGMs, this does not necessarily mean that 
AGMs are completely irrelevant. For instance, AGMs make monitoring the corporate board 
possible for all shareholders, a function which cannot be executed by private meetings such as the 
aforementioned one-on-ones.  
Other scholars claim that AGM’s powers need to be increased (for instance, see Klaassen, 
2007).18 Bebchuk (2005) also advocates for enhanced shareholder rights. He argues that 
shareholders should have intervention powers in i) “rules-of-the-game” decisions, e.g. decisions to 
amend the corporate charter or to change the company’s state of incorporation, and ii) other 
important corporate decisions. The latter category consists of two types of decisions, “game-
                                                     
18 For instance, Klaassen argues that decision-making should not be dependent on another corporate body 
than the AGM in Dutch law: ‘[B]esluiten zoals statutenwijziging, ontbinding, omzetting, kapitaalverhoging en –
vermindering, fusie en splitsing niet langer in de statuten afhankelijk te stellen van een van een voorstel en/of goedkeuring van 
een ander orgaan. […] Door de verruiming van de bestuursbevoegdheid moet de algemene vergadering van aandeelhouders eerder 
‘beschermd’ worden tegen het bestuur en andersom. Vanuit het wenselijk geachte machtsevenwicht tussen organen moet daarop 
niet langer inbreuk kunnen worden gemaakt’ (pp. 291-292). 
12 
 
ending” decisions, e.g. decisions to merge or sell all assets, and “scaling-down” decisions, e.g. 
decisions to reduce the size by ordering distributions.  Bebchuk argues that shareholders should 
have more power to intervene in specific corporate issues to increase the effectiveness of corporate 
governance, which in turn enhances shareholder and firm value. In line with Bebchuk’s 
argumentation (2005), Harris and Raviv (2010) show in a theoretical model that, although 
shareholders should not control every corporate decision, shareholder decision-making is optimal 
in many situations, even in situations where shareholders do not possess relevant information or 
they have private information.19  
These conflicting viewpoints raise relevant, yet unanswered, questions. As Strand (2012) puts 
it, the AGM ‘to a large extent remains a black box of unstudied events’ (p. 15). And research that 
addresses these issues remains merely theoretical and descriptive. This research combines legal and 
economic research to study the actual role of the AGM in the current European corporate 
governance framework and evaluates whether and to what extent its theoretical role is feasible in 
practice. Hence, the central object of this research is to assess the current practical relevance of 
AGMs of listed companies in Europe and thus, in the words of Strand, the unravelling of these 
black boxes.  
 
4. SHAREHOLDER CONTROL? 
In the previous sections we have seen that shareholders have control rights (we discuss the content 
of these rights in chapter 1), but we have not yet discussed why shareholders have these rights. 
Below we briefly outline the different viewpoints in the literature on shareholder control rights. 
 
4.1. The Efficiency Argument 
Easterbrook and Fischel already noted that shareholders are the residual claimants of the 
corporation: shareholders are considered to have the same interests (Easterbrook and Fischel, 
1983; also see Alchian and Demsetz, 1972, who were the first to mention monitoring by ‘residual 
claimants’).20 And, since shareholders want to maximize the value of this residual claim, they are 
assumed to have the right incentives to make corporate decisions (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1996). 
As such they differ from creditors that have a fixed claim and are usually able to negotiate their 
own terms.21 Corporate theory suggests that shareholders (generally) aim at maximizing the value 
of this residual claim, and hence have – at least in theory – the right incentives to be involved in 
corporate decision-making (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1996). As a result, investor ownership is 
considered one of the five fundamental characteristics of the modern corporation in Hansmann 
and Kraakman (2009).22 The authors describe two key elements in ownership: the right to control 
                                                     
19 The authors provide the example of dividend distribution, board elections and executive remuneration 
decisions.  
20 Greenwood (1996) refers to this as ‘fictional shareholders’, as shareholders are very different in practice. 
Many other scholars also refer to the differences between shareholders. For example, one may refer to 
Raaijmakers (2005) and Kemp (2015). Small shareholders may have different incentives compared to large 
shareholders, and institutional investors may have other incentives than family members. In chapter two, 
section 5, we discuss the differences in ownership stake, and in section 8, the different types of shareholders.  
21 Although this argument usually does not hold for tort victims, and also smaller creditors have less means 
to negotiate, for example see Hansmann and Kraakman (1991). 
22 In this respect, one may also refer to the famous article of Milton Friedman in the New York Times (1970), 
with the title ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits’. The other fundamental 
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the firm and the right to receive the firm’s net earnings. In ‘investor-owned firms’, ownership, and 
thus control, is tied to its investors, the shareholders. The authors argue that, although other forms 
of ownership exist, the dominant role of investor ownership in (large) corporations reflects its 
efficiency advantages. Although we generally agree with their statement, it is important to note that 
investor ownership differs substantially between countries and companies. In continental Europe 
in particular, shareholders often do not have one vote per share. For example, in France 
shareholders are automatically granted double voting rights to shares registered for more than two 
years since the Florange law (provided that the use of double voting rights is not prohibited in the 
articles of association, cf. infra, chapter 2, section 5).23 In the Netherlands companies sometimes use 
depository receipts (cf. infra, chapter 2, section 5.1.2). Furthermore, in some continental European 
countries ownership is not only tied to capital, but also to labour: for instance, note the German 
co-determination (mitbestimmung) regulations and the binding right of the employees’ council in the 
Netherlands to nominate one-third of the members of the supervisory board.  
The Hansmann and Kraakman’s viewpoint (and that of Easterbrook and Fischel) merely stems 
from the contractual theory of corporations. The concept of ‘nexus of contracts’ was introduced 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The authors state that ‘it is important to recognize that most 
organisations are simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships 
among individuals’ (p. 310).24 In contrast, the institutional theory (in Dutch: institutionele visie or 
institutionele opvatting) suggests that the corporation is an independent institution instead of a nexus 
of contracts between shareholders (see Dodd, 1932, 1935).25 The corporate board, but also other 
stakeholders like employees, plays a larger role in this theory.26 However, also in these legal systems, 
shareholders usually have important control rights.   
Also, Schouten (2012) points out that shareholders are not the only corporate actors who can 
be characterised as residual claimants: other stakeholders, such as employees and creditors may 
also qualify as residual claimants.27 For example, employees may benefit from the profits of a 
company (promotion or higher salaries) in good times, but may risk their jobs and face lower 
salaries in bad times (Kemp, 2015). In addition, Schouten (2012) argues that shareholder control 
may not be efficient if this would mean a wealth transfer from other stakeholders to shareholders.  
 
                                                     
characteristics are: legal personality, limited liability, transferable shares, and centralized management under 
a board structure. 
23 LOI n° 2014-384 du 29 mars 2014 visant à reconquérir l'économie réelle. 
24 Also see Alchian and Demsetz (1972). Kemp (2015) duly notes that ‘contract’ is probably not the best 
term from a legal perspective. He argues that it should be considered ‘mutual obligations’ (in Dutch: 
wederkerige verplichtingen).  
25 Kemp (2015) describes the discussion between Berle and Dodd in the period 1931-1935, where Berle 
argued that the powers granted to the corporate board were only for the benefit of all shareholders (Berle, 
1931, p. 1049). Dodd (1932) pointed out that the corporation is an institution and that the powers granted 
to the corporate board must be directed to this institution (p. 1163). Following Kemp (2015, pp. 80-83).   
26 One may also refer to the Dutch Forum Bank case, Hoge Raad 21 January 1955, NJ 1959, 43 (Forumbank), 
which was often considered to be the turning point in the contractual viewpoint of corporation in the 
Netherlands. See for example Raaijmakers (2003) for a discussion of the institutional theory and the 
differences between open and closed corporations (in the Netherlands, the NV and the BV).  
27 The author refers to, inter alia, Blair and Stout (1999); Greenfield (2006). See also Stout (2002) and (2012).  
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4.2. Doctrinal Theory and Shareholder Democracy 
Besides this ‘efficiency argument’, there are also other arguments for the special position 
shareholders enjoy. Cahn and Donald (2010) mention the rights-based or doctrinal reasoning. 
According to the authors, in accordance with this theory, which is, for example, prevalent in 
German jurisdictions, the right to vote can be seen as a ‘logically inherent characteristic of 
membership’: i.e., membership ‘creates an entitlement to vote, because the right to exercise 
influence in an association is an essential component of membership’28 (p. 469). In addition, 
shareholder powers are also often explained from a political viewpoint. For instance, Dunlavy 
(2006) explains that the corporation can be seen as a ‘body politic’. She states that the vice-president 
of the English Board of Trade already observed in 1856 that corporations are ‘little republics’ (p. 
1353, retrieved from Hunt, 1936). Dunlavy argues that voting rights can be seen as the ‘foundation 
stone’ of corporate governance that is necessary to ‘define a baseline of power relations’ among 
individuals (p. 1354).  Linked to this political viewpoint is the appellation ‘shareholder democracy’. 
This popular term is advocated not only by politicians but also by many scholars who use this term 
to show the importance of shareholder voting in AGMs (e.g., Van der Schee, 2011). For example, 
according to Poulsen, Strand and Thomson (2010) ‘for the decision-making process to be 
representative and democratic, it is important that as many votes as possible are represented’ (p. 
334). Kemp (2015) writes that the simple majority rule in shareholder voting constitutes a 
democratic element.29  
Shareholder democracy is often linked to the one-share-one-vote principle. The principle that 
all shares of the same nominal value have the same voting rights attached to them (i.e., shareholder 
equality) is also known as the proportionality principle (McCreevy, 2007). However, Clerc (2009) 
argues that shareholder democracy should actually be called ‘shareholder plutocracy’ since control 
is linked to capital instead of ‘one man one vote’ (p. 16, also see Bartman, 2009). The comparison 
between shareholder voting and political democracy and representation is at least remarkable. 
Heringa (2009) poses the question: ‘[c]an the notion of democracy, originating from constitutional 
law, inspire and focus our thinking about (the role and position of) shareholders and their proper 
influence within the company?’ (p. 7). Intuitively, shareholder voting and political democracy may 
have little in common. For example, shareholders can (relatively) easily exit the company by selling 
their shares if they do not agree with the course of events in the company; this exit strategy is less 
present in a constitutional setting. Nonetheless, one may argue that shareholders, like citizens, elect 
a representative body on a more or less regular basis that makes daily and basic decisions (indirect 
democracy); shareholders may also vote directly on specific corporate matters (direct democracy). 
Whether this parallel drawn between shareholder voting and political democracy is accurate on 
theoretical grounds is at least doubtful. More importantly, the term ‘shareholder democracy’ is a 
normative one, which makes the use of it dangerous; can one ever be against democracy? (Clerc, 
2009).  
 
4.3. Shareholder Control and Efficiency 
One may note that neither the doctrinal theory nor the political theory provides a satisfying answer 
to the question of why shareholders have control rights. It should be clear that shareholder voting 
                                                     
28 Cahn and Donald refer to Brändel (1992, section 12) in Großkommentar zum Aktiengesetz.  




in and of itself is not an end, but a means to maximizing the size of the economic pie. Bebchuk 
(2005) duly writes: ‘[s]ome supporters of greater shareholder power might regard increases in 
‘shareholder voice’ and ‘corporate democracy’ as intrinsically desirable. I should therefore stress at 
the outset that I do not view increasing shareholder power as an end in and of itself. Rather, 
effective corporate governance, which enhances shareholder and firm value, is the objective 
underlying my analysis. From this perspective, increased shareholder power would be desirable 
only if it would operate to improve corporate performance and value’ (p.842). The real question 
therefore is whether it is efficient for shareholders to have control rights, i.e., the efficiency theory. 
But is shareholder control efficient, given that shareholders with (exactly) the same interests are 
only ‘fictional shareholders’ (Greenwood, 1996)?  
As we have seen, the link between ownership and the effectiveness of its control has, for 
example, been studied by Bebchuk (2005) who makes claim for increasing shareholder power. This 
connection has also been explored by Mallin and Melis (2006), Yermack (2010) and the recent work 
of Iliev, Lins, Miller and Roth (2015). Schouten (2012, pp. 100-116) distinguishes among ‘four 
mechanisms of voting efficiency’: informed voting, which implies that shareholders have 
information on which their vote is based; rational voting that holds that the information on which 
the decision is based is processed rationally; independent voting, wherein shareholders base their 
decision on their own cognitive skills; and sincere voting, which implies that shareholders aim to 
maximize shareholder value (and not their private interest). The author argues that none of these 
mechanisms will operate perfectly in practice – for instance, people, including shareholders, are 
boundedly rational – and that trade-offs may exist. For example, he states that if all shareholders 
vote independently, experts opinions may not be considered, which could adversely affect 
informed voting. Thus, efficient shareholder control is not an easy goal to establish.  
What would be the alternative to shareholder control? In the past researchers explored labour 
(co-)control (‘labour-oriented model’ in Hansmann and Kraakman, 2000), but also the control of 
other stakeholders (for instance, Tirole, 2001) such as bondholders (for instance, one may refer to 
the recent article ‘Bank bondholders need rights like shareholders’ by Jenkins, 2016).30 31 Despite 
the apparent shortcomings of shareholder control, Hansmann and Kraakman draw attention to 
the fact that the other models of control have even more weaknesses and are generally inefficient, 
which has led to a convergence on the ‘shareholder-oriented model’, according to the authors:  
‘[t]he triumph of the shareholder-oriented model of the corporation over its principal competitors 
is now assured, even if it was problematic as recently as twenty-five years ago’ (p.33).32 If 
shareholder control is indeed efficient, the subsequent question is whether the AGM is the 
                                                     
30 A much older example is an article in the Chicago Law Review by John Evarts Tracy from 1935 that already 
explored the case for granting voting rights to corporate bondholders. The author evaluates a proposal to 
grant creditors controlling voting rights at corporate elections in the event of a default, in order to enhance 
the protection of these creditors. The proposal entails the following: ‘The proposal is that a corporation 
which is about to put out an issue of fixed obligations, whether they be mortgage bonds or unsecured 
debentures, be required to grant to the holders of such securities, in the event of a default, the right to vote 
at corporate elections and to have the controlling vote, so that they will then have the complete management 
of the corporation, with the right to operate the business and to apply the income therefrom to the payment 
of the amounts due on such obligations until all defaults shall have been made good, whereupon the right 
of security holders to vote will cease and the voting control will revert to the shareholders’ (p. 211).  
31 See also Stout (2002) and (2012).  
32 The Hansmann and Kraakman article has been influential, but also has been largely criticized. For 
example, one may refer to a recent article of Welsh, Spender, Fannon and Hall (2014).  
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appropriate organ to exercise these control rights. For instance, are shareholders in large listed 
companies willing to take part in corporate decision-making in AGMs, or are they merely passive 
investors? 
In contrast to the link between shareholder voting and efficiency, the role or position of the 
AGM is usually neither addressed nor challenged, which is exactly the focus of this research. This 
thesis starts from the premise that shareholder control is indeed generally efficient – or, at least the 
lesser evil of all options – and focuses on the AGM as a platform for exercising shareholder control 
rights. In particular, the research contains an extensive analysis of shareholder needs and 
requirements to participate in AGMs. We evaluate the legal framework of shareholder voting in 
Europe in the first chapter. Then we evaluate its practical position in several (empirical) analyses. 
The next section provides a more detailed outline of this research.   
 
5. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OUTLINE  
The research focuses on the AGM of listed companies in Europe. In these companies there 
(potentially) is the largest gap between shareholders and the company’s management, and the 
needed data are publicly available (but not extensively researched). Hence, the core question that 
will be answered in this research is: 
 
To what extent does the AGM of listed companies in Europe fulfil its important theoretical 
role as presumed in the currently practiced European legal framework, and how and to 
what extent can this role be enhanced or should it be repositioned? 
 
In the words of Strand, our aim is unravelling ‘the black boxes’. To answer this broad research 
question, we evaluate the characteristics of AGMs in Europe in practice. This research also hopes 
to show that simple economic research methods can be adopted in legal research. For example, in 
chapter 2 and 3 we show that data collection and analyses do not involve complex mathematical 




As a preliminary step, chapter 1 provides an in-depth comparative legal analysis of the current 
framework of AGMs in listed companies in Europe. Studies in the field of economics usually 
explore causal relationships, but as soon as the law gets involved, their research often lacks 
profound legal foundation (for example regarding the coding of variables).33 We first investigate 
                                                     
33 For example, the methodology of studies in law and finance is sometimes criticized. For instance, Cahn 
and Donald (2010) state that: ‘[o]ne must be careful, however, in formulating conclusions on the basis of 
presumed effects of company law rules in jurisdictions whose legal system one does not fully understand. 
A failure clearly to understand the nature and function of sometimes quickly changing and often functionally 
interrelated company law rules can lead to distorted results. […] For an example of what we mean, take a 
look at the otherwise insightful paper by Professors Bruce Seifert and Halit Gonenc, which bases itself on 
previously performed ratings of German corporate governance by other financial economists. Seifert and 
Gonenc draw conclusions on differences between US and German capital structure relying in part on a 
2006 paper rating German and US securities law, a study that apparently failed to take EU law (which 
dominates the securities law area in Europe) into account. For example, with respect to the disclosure of 
information in prospectuses in connection with the offering of securities – which in the European Union is 
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the procedural rights, information rights, discussion and question rights and decision-making rights 
of shareholders in Europe that are related to AGMs. The following question will be answered:  
 
What corporate (decision-making) rights do shareholders have in listed companies in the 
European Member States and how do these rights compare?  
 
CHAPTER 2 
In chapter 2, we take a closer look at voter turnout and the behaviour of (small) shareholders during 
AGMs in Europe to see whether and to what extent shareholders make use of their powers in 
practice. We establish a dataset and provide a descriptive analysis of the AGM in Europe. We 
answer the following question: 
 
What are the main characteristics of AGMs in the European Member States in practice? 
 
CHAPTER 3 
In this chapter we use the dataset that is established in chapter 2 for multivariate analyses regarding 
(small) shareholder voting behaviour. We investigate which factors contribute to (small) 
shareholder participation in AGMs of listed companies in Europe. As we have seen, shareholder 
absenteeism is considered one of the main problems related to the AGM. Low attendance rates 
not only undermine the theoretical monitoring function of the AGM, but can also provide large 
shareholders with a minority stake with a de facto majority stake. Especially in continental Europe, 
where it is often considered that ownership is more concentrated, this can be a huge problem. 
Accordingly, we answer the question:   
 
Which factors contribute to (small) shareholder attendance? 
 
CHAPTER 4 
In this chapter we focus on the costs side of the voting decision, and evaluate the impact of the 
Shareholder Rights Directive (2007/36/EC) in an empirical difference-in-differences framework. 
We investigate whether the Shareholder Rights Directive increased the voter turnout in the 
Netherlands, France and Belgium, following Aldrich’s theory (1993) in political elections, who 
argued that turnout is a ‘low-cost low-benefit action’ (p.261). Accordingly, we evaluate the question:   
 
Did the introduction of the Shareholder Rights Directive, which aimed at lowering the cost 
of voting, positively affect (small) shareholder turnout rates in the Netherlands, Belgium 
and France? 
 
                                                     
minutely governed by a framework directive and very detailed regulation – the authors of the study rated 
the UK disclosure rules at 0.83/1 and the Austrian rules at 0.25/1, although the two countries apply the 
same EU regulation on prospectuses and have implemented the same EU directive on disclosure’ (pp. 194-
195). The authors refer to Seifert and Gonenc (2008) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2006). 




In this chapter we take a closer look at small shareholder decision-making in concentrated 
ownership structures. We evaluate the (practical) relevance of the AGM to small shareholders in 
this chapter. As we have seen, shareholder monitoring is considered a public good that suffers 
from free-rider problems. Small shareholders may be willing to challenge large blockholders that 
try to extract private benefits. However, due to the public good problem, coordination may be 
difficult. More specifically, the payoff function of a small shareholder depends on how many other 
shareholders are expected to take a certain action as well. These games are called ‘coordination 
games’. The general (and often indicated as the only) solution to free-rider problems in the 
production of a public good is to exclude the players that do not contribute from enjoying its 
benefits or punish them. In this chapter, we evaluate whether the only solution to the shareholder 
coordination game is the exclusion or punishment of inactive shareholders or that other (less 
rigorous) regulatory tools may increase small shareholder voting as well. New corporate governance 
tools such as the UK rule E.2.234 and the Australian two-strikes rule35 are also considered in this 
chapter. We have the following question: 
 
How do small shareholders determine their decision to attend AGMs in concentrated 
ownership structures and how can small shareholder coordination problems be solved? 
 
CHAPTER 6 
Besides the supposed lack of interest on the part of small shareholders, criticism also includes the 
lack of dialogue and fruitful discussion between shareholders and board members. Thus, in the 
sixth chapter the AGM minutes of Dutch listed companies are analysed to address the forum 
function. In the first sections of this chapter we conduct a descriptive analysis to investigate how 
the forum rights are used. Afterwards we evaluate which factors may contribute to the use of these 
rights. The central question in this chapter is:  
 
How and to what extent does the AGM serve as a platform for questions and discussions 
between shareholders and board members?  
 
CHAPTER 7 
The final chapter of this project brings together the findings of the previous chapters in a 
conclusion and provides policy recommendations on how to, if needed, increase the relevance of 
the AGM in the European corporate governance framework, based on the outcomes of the 
analyses in the previous chapters. 
 
                                                     
34 This provision holds that ‘[w]hen, in the opinion of the board, a significant proportion of votes have been 
cast against a resolution at any general meeting, the company should explain when announcing the results 
of voting what actions it intends to take to understand the reasons behind the vote result.’’ 
35 This rule was introduced in Australia in 2011. When the remuneration report receives 25% or more 
opposition for two years in a row, shareholders vote during the second AGM on whether all directors need 
to stand for re-election. If this resolution passes with a simple majority, a new meeting is held within 90 
days. See Monem and Ng (2013). 
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6. RESEARCH METHODS AND SAMPLE 
Our research methods include classical comparative legal research, empirical analyses and simple 
economic modelling. The project uses a wide range of different sources; besides legal rules, case 
law, soft law – such as corporate governance codes and policy documents for extensive classical 
comparative legal research – this project will use hand-collected data from AGM voting results 
documents, minutes, annual reports, ownership disclosure documents and others that are disclosed 
by companies that are part of the main listings of seven European countries (Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK) over a recent period of five years (2010-
2014) for chapters 2-3 (and partly for chapter 4).36 The total sample that we use in these chapters 
consists of 251 companies, which resulted in 1,255 AGM observations. We also use databases like 
Thomson Reuters for financial information. In chapter 5 we use a simple analytical model that 
provides insights on small shareholder voting behaviour in concentrated ownership structures. 
And, for the sixth sub-question the minutes of 556 AGMs of a sample of 78 Dutch listed 
companies over an unbalanced panel data sample period of 12 years are examined.37  
The research generally focuses on seven European Member States: Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK. These countries form a balanced sample that 
reflects the differences in corporate law approaches, but also in, for instance, ownership 
concentration rates. Whereas the legal systems of the UK and Ireland originate from the English 
common law system according to the legal origins theory, the legal system of many countries in 
continental Europe is often described as a civil law system. Moreover, some scholars (i.e., La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleiffer and Vishny, 1998) make a distinction between the German civil law 
system (for example the legal system in Germany, the Netherlands and Austria) and the French 
civil law system (for example the one in France and Belgium). Although the question of whether 
the legal origins theory adequately describes practice (to date) is still widely debated, the sample 
used in this research is nonetheless to some extent balanced according to this theory.38 Other, more 
practical reasons for the selection of the aforementioned seven countries include the availability of 
the necessary information for the empirical analyses, including for example voting result 
statements, and the language of these documents.  
                                                     
36 Directive 2007/36/EC requires companies to disclose information such as the number of voting rights 
prior to the AGM (article 5) and the voting results (article 14) and to publish this information online. 
Ownership structure information is available pursuant to articles 9 and 10 of Transparency Directive 
2004/109/EC (Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are 
admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending Directive 2001/34/EC, 2004 O.J. L 390/38). The 
sample composition is based on practical and theoretical considerations. Notwithstanding the large criticism 
of the legal origins theory, it is well-balanced including a large variety of companies of English, German and 
French legal origin. Practical reasons include the availability of voting information on the websites of the 
companies (see ‘Opt-out’ possibility for Member States, article 14(1) second line). 
37 Not all companies have their minutes available for the full sample period. Our sample requirements are 
discussed in chapter six.  
38 Although there is no central corporate law in the European Union, the corporate laws of the Member 
States are partly harmonized by European law. Moreover, scholars have predicted that corporate governance 
models would converge to one dominant model. See for example Hansmann and Kraakman (2000). 
However, there are still some major differences in corporate law across Europe. For example, in Germany 
corporate law follows the practice of co-determination or mitbestimmung, which enables employees to elect 
part of the supervisory board members. In this regard, one can also refer to the research of Bebchuk and 
Roe (1999). These authors developed a theory of the path dependence of corporate structure.  
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CHAPTER 1 - THE LEGAL CHARACTERISTICS OF AGMS OF LISTED COMPANIES IN 
EUROPE 
ABSTRACT 
In this chapter we explore the legal framework of AGMs of listed companies in Europe, which forms the foundation 
for the empirical analyses in the subsequent chapters. We consider the decision-making rights, information rights 
(including forum rights) and procedural rights of shareholders at the European level and in the national laws of seven 
Member States (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK). We find that, since 
only a small part of the legal framework of AGMs is harmonized at the European level, there are numerous 
differences in shareholder rights among national laws. To be able to conduct empirical research in the remaining 
chapters, we develop a categorization framework of fifteen voting item categories.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As we have seen in the introduction of this research, shareholders can exercise their control rights 
in the (A)GM. AGMs have three theoretical functions:  i) the information function, ii) the forum 
function, and iii) the decision-making function. Shareholder decision-making rights are directly 
connected to the AGM’s decision-making function. These formal rights are arguably collective 
shareholder rights, as the (special or qualified) majority of the shareholders – sometimes subject to 
a quorum – determines whether a proposal is adopted. Moreover, only the AGM as a corporate 
body has these decision-making rights, not individual shareholders. Closely linked to the decision-
making function are the forum and the information function: for a shareholder to make a(n) 
(informed) decision, access to information is key. Shareholder information rights in listed 
companies include regular disclosure (routine), ad hoc disclosure on significant events, and 
information requests (Cahn and Donald, 2010).39 Disclosure requirements for listed companies are 
generally stipulated in financial securities law, which is largely harmonised at the European level.40 
This study focuses on the disclosure of information in – and related to – AGMs. AGMs serve as 
platforms for shareholders to ask questions (i.e., request information) and to engage in discussions 
with the board about corporate matters. These forum rights, which usually include the right to ask 
                                                     
39 In addition to these disclosure requirements, one may also distinguish ‘initial disclosure’ requirements in 
an IPO (prospectus Directive, 2003/71/EC and prospectus regulation 809/2004/EC).  
40 The FSAP introduced, inter alia, uniform disclosure requirements for listed companies in Europe. This 
resulted in the Market Abuse Directive (Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse), 2003 O.J. L 96/16), Prospectus 
Directive (Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prospectus to be 
published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and amending Directive 
2001/34/EC, 2003 O.J. L 345/64), Prospectus Regulation (Commission Regulation 809/2004/EC 
implementing Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards information 
contained in prospectuses as well as the format, incorporation by reference and publication of such 
prospectuses and dissemination of advertisements, 2004, O.J. L 149/1), and the Transparency Directive 
(Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of 
transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading 
on a regulated market and amending Directive 2001/34/EC, 2004 O.J. L 390/38, cf. infra, section 2.3 of this 
chapter). See also the introduction of the IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards), laid down in 
the International Accounting Standards Regulation (IAS Regulation). The financial accounts need to be 
prepared in accordance with these standards. Directive 78/660/EC (Directive 78/660/EC based on Article 
54 (3) (g) of the Treaty on the annual accounts of certain types of companies, 1978 O.J. L 222), and Directive 
83/349/EC (Directive 83/349/EC based on the Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty on consolidated accounts, 
1983 O.J. L 193) also contain rules on the (consolidated) accounts.  
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questions and the right to speak at AGMs, can be considered special information rights that may 
be exercised at AGMs, and hence, these rights are part of information rights in this research. These 
special information rights are usually considered individual shareholder rights that can be exercised 
by every shareholder at the AGM (although usually subject to some constraints as we will see in 
section 4 of this chapter). 41 42  
Besides these two categories of rights linked to the three theoretical roles of the AGM (i.e., 
decision-making rights and information rights, including forum rights as special information 
rights), we also consider provisions that determine ‘procedural rights’, i.e., provisions that lower 
the costs of attending AGMs for shareholders as well as provisions that organise the proper 
functioning of the meeting. The latter category does not contain any rights per se, but contributes 
to the ability to exercise shareholder rights.  
  
1.1. Outline of this Chapter 
In this first chapter of this study, we identify the legal position of AGMs within the current 
corporate governance framework of the seven European countries that we investigate in the 
subsequent chapters of this research: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands 
and the UK. This chapter aims to construct the legal outline for analyses in the subsequent chapters 
of this research, thereby showing the similarities and differences in shareholder rights in these seven 
Member States. We focus our research on the three functions of AGMs and the shareholder rights 
connected to these functions. Since the seven countries are all part of the European Union and 
some aspects of shareholder meetings are harmonized at the European level, we first provide an 
overview of shareholder rights that can be exercised during the AGM which are determined at the 
European level. This section also discusses the European Commission’s (hereinafter: EC) proposal 
to amend the Shareholder Rights Directive (Directive 2007/36/EC), which was adopted in an 
amended version in March 2017. Next, we take a closer look at the national laws that stipulate the 
shareholder rights: we first consider the procedural rights (section 3), and (special) information 
rights (including the right to request information) that are exercised during AGMs (section 4). 
Afterwards we discuss shareholder decision-making rights (section 5). Section 6 provides 
concluding remarks.  
 
2. THE EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK OF SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS 
The EC has made several rather unsuccessful attempts to (fully) harmonize corporate law in 
Europe. The differences among Member States, especially between Germany and the UK, are 
simply too great.43 Hopt (2015), as a member of the European Company Law Experts (hereinafter: 
                                                     
41 In practice this right is often also exercised outside the AGM by individual shareholders in one-on-ones, 
or by a small group of shareholders in roadshows. Often, shareholders send in their questions by email 
before the AGM, and answers to these questions are also sometimes provided by email (for example, 
following the minutes of Dutch AGMs, used in chapter 6 of this research).  
42 However, one may note that the right to ask questions is also provided to proxy holders.  
43 The discrepancies clearly emerged during the failed harmonization effort of the Fifth Directive (EC (1972) 
The Fifth Directive. COM (72) 887 final. 27 September 1972). With this directive, the EC tried to harmonize 
the internal affairs of all public corporations. The draft was withdrawn on January 9, 2004, due to 
disagreement on two controversial articles that followed the German system. First of all, the proposal 
required companies to have a two-tier board structure that consists of a management board and a 
supervisory board. The supervisory board appoints the members of the management board. Article 4 of the 
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ECLE),44 states that the ECLE have argued that harmonization was only needed in some core areas 
of corporate law, contrary to capital markets law. Hopt (2015) provides two ‘significant reasons’ 
(p. 25) for this: i) the freedom of choice of companies and their shareholders and; ii) substantial 
differences across Member States in shareholding structure and employee protection. Although 
governance practices show large convergence, for example in board structures (for instance, 
Hansmann and Kraakman, 200145), the German corporate law system still requires far-reaching 
labour involvement with its co-determination rules (following the Mitbestimmungsgesetz), whereas 
this would be unthinkable for the UK (see also in this respect, cf. supra, nt. 38, the theory of path 
dependency).  
Although extensive European harmonization efforts failed in corporate law, some issues in this 
field are partly harmonized by various European Company Law directives. These directives mainly 
focus on public companies, but some Member States adopted certain rules for private companies 
as well.46 The goal of establishing a single market for financial services (i.e., financial markets law47) 
has largely contributed to the creation of several universal shareholder rights in the European 
Union (Xiangxing Hong, 2009). Directives such as the Shareholder Rights Directive (2007/36/EC) 
and the Second Company Law Directive (also called the Capital Directive, Directive 
2012/30/EU48) have introduced some common shareholder (decision-making) rights in Europe.  
In this section, we provide an overview of the current European framework of corporate law 
with respect to AGMs. It is important to keep in mind that whereas the Shareholder Rights 
                                                     
draft of the Fifth Directive also required mandatory labour participation at the supervisory board level: 
companies which employed five hundred employees or more were required to have at least one third of the 
members of the supervisory organ appointed by employees or employee representatives. These highly 
controversial requirements led to strong opposition in Member States such as the UK, highlighting the 
significant differences between the German and the Anglo-Saxon system (following Van der Schee, 2011, 
p. 141). Note that in the German two-tier board system, the supervisory board appoints the management 
board. In 2012, the European Parliament (EP) stated regarding the ‘future of European company law’ that 
she ‘[b]elieves that due consideration should be given to the resumption of work on the Fifth Company 
Law Directive [by the EC] with regard to the structure and operation of public limited companies’ (EP 
(2012) European Parliament resolution of 14 June 2012 on the future of European company law. 
2012/2669(RSP)).  
44 For more information on this group of experts, please refer to 
(<https://europeancompanylawexperts.wordpress.com/>). Accessed in December, 2016. 
45 Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) argue that ‘[m]andatory two-tier board structures seem a thing of the 
past; the weaker and less responsive boards that they promote are justified principally as a complement to 
worker codetermination, and thus share indeed, constitute one of the weaknesses of the latter institution’ 
(p. 19). However, according to the authors, one-tier board systems will increase the role of independent or 
outside directors, which is a typical aspect of a two-tier board structure. We indeed experience some 
convergence towards one-tier board structures. For example, the Netherlands recently adopted the one-tier 
board structure (1 January 2013). 
46 For example, the voluntary adoption of capital minimum requirements for private companies by Germany 
and the Netherlands. Dutch private companies (‘BV’’) were required to have a minimum capital of EUR 
18,000. This rule was recently abolished by the implementation of the Dutch Flex BV (in 2013).  In 
Germany, GmbHs require a minimum capital of EUR 25,000. Also the German legislature introduced a 
new legal form, the UG, which has less strict capital requirements.  
47 In contrast to company law, financial markets law is largely harmonized at the European level. 
48 Directive 2012/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on coordination of safeguards 
which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of 
companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 54 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union, in respect of the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance 
and alteration of their capital, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent, 2012 O.J. L 315/74. 
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Directive, the Transparency Directive (Directive 2004/109/EC,49 amended by Directive 
2013/50/EU50) and the Takeover Directive (Directive 2004/25/EC51) are applicable to listed 
companies, the Capital Directive, Third Company Law Directive (Directive 2011/35/EC52) and 
article 37 of the Audit Directive (Directive 2006/43/EC53, revised by Directive 2014/56/EU54) are 
also applicable to public non-listed companies. These directives contain minimum harmonization 
requirements, which means that Member States may exceed the terms of the provisions in the 
directives.  
 
2.1. The Shareholder Rights Directive 
Europe has been focusing on improving shareholder rights in the past decade. One of the key 
policy objectives of the EU action plan to modernize company law and enhance corporate 
governance in 2003 was – as a response to the High Level Group of Company Law Experts report 
– the strengthening of shareholder rights (EC, 2003).55 With this plan the EC intended to ‘establish 
a real shareholder democracy’ (p.14) in Europe. In its Communication, the EC (2003) announced 
the implementation is an ‘integrated legal framework to facilitate efficient shareholder 
communication and decision-making (participation in meetings, exercise of voting rights, cross-
border voting)’ (p.24), which we now know as the Shareholder Rights Directive. 
Procedural impediments to shareholder participation in AGMs were widely recognized during 
the Impact Assessment of the Shareholder Rights Directive in 2006 (EC, 2006b)56. For example, 
the EC recognized that access to notice material relevant to the (A)GM on the internet would lower 
shareholders’ information costs for voting, probably leading to higher shareholder participation.  
Share blocking, e.g. the obligation to deposit shares a few days prior to the AGM in order to be 
                                                     
49 Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of 
transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading 
on a regulated market and amending Directive 2001/34/EC, 2004 O.J. L 390/38. 
50 Directive 2013/50/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council  amending Directive 
2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of transparency 
requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated 
market, Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prospectus to be 
published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and Commission Directive 
2007/14/EC laying down detailed rules for the implementation of certain provisions of Directive 
2004/109/EC, 2013 O.J. L 294/13.  
51 Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on takeover bids, 2004 O.J. L 
142/12. 
52 Directive 2011/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning mergers of public 
limited liability companies, 2011 O.J. L 110/1. 
53 Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on statutory audits of annual 
accounts and consolidated accounts, amending Council Directives 78/ 660/EEC and 83/349/EEC and 
repealing Council Directive 84/253/EEC, 2006 O.J. L 157/87.  
54 Directive 2014/56/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2006/43/EC 
on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts, 2014 O.J. L 158/196.  
55 EC (2003) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: 
Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union - A Plan to 
Move Forward, COM (2003) 284 final. 21 May 2003.  
56 EC (2006b) Impact Assessment. Annex to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the exercise of voting rights by shareholders of companies having their registered office 
in a Member State and whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending Directive 




able to vote, also limited shareholder engagement. And with respect to foreign shareholders, the 
EC argued that ‘the complexity of cross-border voting mechanisms across the EU not only 
discourages institutional shareholders from voting […], but it also translates directly into higher 
voting costs (compared to domestic voting) charged by intermediaries to shareholders in case they 
vote’ (EC, 2006b, p.13). The EC (2006b) Impact Assessment proposed new provisions to reduce 
the costs of shareholder voting, including 1) the introduction of minimum standards regarding 
proxy voting, thereby removing all existing restrictions in national laws; 2) the prohibition of share 
blocking and to replace it by a record date; and 3) minimum standards regarding disclosure of 
information related to GMs. After this Impact Assessment and two rounds of public consultation 
the Shareholder Rights Directive was formally adopted on 11 July, 2007. Most of the provisions in 
the Shareholder Rights Directive are procedural ones in accordance with the assessment’s findings. 
It also introduced the right to place voting items on the agenda, to call a general meeting, and the 
right to ask questions. Below we first briefly discuss the main procedural rights and then we move 
on to these more material rights.  
 
2.1.1. Procedural Rights 
Article 5 of the Shareholder Rights Directive requires Member States to ensure that the 
convocation of the general meeting is issued at least 21 days before the meeting. Member States 
may provide the possibility of a reduction to 14 days in the case of a general meeting (which is not 
an AGM), where the company makes voting by electronic means accessible to all shareholders. 
Such a resolution needs a qualified majority of at least two thirds of the votes. This authority only 
holds until the next annual general meeting at the latest. Pursuant to article 5(4) of the Shareholder 
Rights Directive, Member States need to ensure that the convocation of the general meeting, the 
total number of shares and voting rights at the date of the convocation, the documents to be 
submitted to the general meeting, a draft resolution and the forms to be used to vote by proxy and 
correspondence be published on the company’s website for a continuous period that starts at least 
21 days before the general meeting. Article 5(3) stipulates the minimum content of the convocation 
of the meeting.  
The obligation to deposit shares for a few days before the general meeting to be able to vote 
(share blocking) is banned under article 7(1)(a). Accordingly, the second paragraph of article 7 
introduces a record date of maximum 30 days.57  
Article 8(1) of the Directive stipulates that Member States shall permit companies to offer to 
their shareholders any form of participation in the general meeting by electronic means, notably 
any or all of the following forms of participation: (a) real-time transmission of the general meeting; 
(b) real-time two-way communication enabling shareholders to address the general meeting from 
a remote location; (c) a mechanism for casting votes, whether before or during the general meeting, 
without the need to appoint a proxy holder who is physically present at the meeting. Paragraph 2 
                                                     
57 A record date is a cut-off date for shareholders to register for the general meeting. The share-blocking 
ban may have lowered the costs of voting substantially in several Member States (cf. infra, chapter four of 
this research). Record dates may also create other problems, however. In particular, they make empty voting 
possible (‘record date capture’). See, for example, Ringe (2012). Ringe explains that the period between the 
record date and the date of the general meeting makes it possible for general meeting voters not to be 
shareholders (p. 18). However, as we will see in chapter five of this study, empty voting may also reduce 




of article 8 adds that electronic participation may only be made subject to requirements when those 
are necessary to ensure the identification of shareholders and the security of electronic 
participation. This paragraph also adds that these requirements need to be proportionate to their 
purposes. 
Article 10 and 11 of the Directive provide shareholders with the right to appoint a proxy holder 
to attend the AGM (or other general meeting), also by electronic means.  This proxy holder, who 
votes in the shareholder’s name, can be a natural person or a legal person. This person may not 
only vote, but also enjoys the same rights as the shareholder such as the right to ask questions 
(discussed below) and engage in discussions. 
Article 14 of the Shareholder Rights Directive mandates the disclosure of voting results. The 
company is required to establish for each resolution the number of shares for which votes have 
been validly cast, the proportion of the share capital represented by those voters, the total number 
of votes validly cast and the number of votes cast in favour, against and abstentions. The voting 
results must be published no later than 15 days after the general meeting on the company website, 
but Member States may also set a shorter period. However, the second line of the first paragraph 
of article 14 stipulates that Member States may allow companies to establish the voting results only 
to the extent needed to ensure that the required majority is reached for each resolution if no 
shareholder requests a full account of the voting.  
 
2.1.2. Shareholder Proposals and Calling a Meeting 
A more material European shareholder right can be found in article 6 of the Shareholder Rights 
Directive: this article allows shareholders to put items on the agenda of the general meeting 
(accompanied by a justification or a draft resolution) or to table draft resolutions. The minimum 
threshold that Member States may set for this right cannot exceed 5% of the share capital. 
Shareholders may put voting items on the agenda where such an item falls within the decision-
making powers of the general meeting. Items outside the purview of the AGM’s decision-making 
powers may still be included on the agenda, but are only considered as a discussion item (also see 
Timmermans, 2012). Although the threshold for shareholders to put an item on the meeting’s 
agenda in Europe is generally higher than in the US,58 shareholders generally have more 
opportunities to initiate shareholder proposals in Europe: shareholder proposals are subject to 
                                                     
58 In the US the threshold for adding a shareholder proposal to the proxy materials is only 1% or $2,000 in 
market value.  
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many rules in the US,59 and are often precatory or very costly.60 In contrast, the Shareholder Rights 
Directive does not place any of those restrictions on this right. Nevertheless, US shareholders 
generally place more items on the agenda than their European counterparts (e.g., Cziraki, 
Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2010; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2013).61 Consequently, there are more US 
legal and economic studies on these proposals, their contents and effectiveness.62 Cziraki et al. 
(2010) is a good example of a European study on this matter. The authors use a sample of 290 
shareholder proposals submitted in nine Member States between 1998 and 2008. This small sample 
size already indicates that shareholder proposals in (continental) Europe are relatively rare. 
Renneboog and Szilagyi’s (2013) also demonstrates that shareholder proposals are not very 
common: the authors examine 42,170 management proposals and 329 shareholder proposals 
submitted to general meetings in seventeen European countries between 2005 and June 2010 (cf. 
infra, chapter 2 of this research also shows that there are few shareholder proposals in Europe).   
In addition to the right to put items on the agenda, article 6 grants shareholders another right. 
It states that if Member States provide that shareholders may only put items on the agenda of 
AGMs and no other general meetings, shareholders have the right to call, or to require the company 
to call, a general meeting which is not an AGM with an agenda including at least all the items 
requested by those shareholders. We evaluate this right at the national level in section 5.1 of this 
chapter. 
 
2.1.3. The Right to Ask Questions 
In its Impact Assessment (cf. supra, section 2.1) the EC recognized that shareholders have the right 
to ask questions in every Member State, but, when shareholders were granted this right, it was 
sometimes too limited.63 The EC stresses the importance of the right to ask questions: for example, 
                                                     
59 Although in the US the threshold for adding a shareholder proposal to the proxy materials is lower, these 
proposals may not fall under one of the thirteen so-called substantive grounds for exclusion. The grounds 
on which corporate boards may refuse shareholder proposals in their proxy statements include, for example, 
matters related to board elections, company’s ordinary business operations and any opposition to a 
management proposal that is on the agenda. Thus, US shareholder proposals that are included in corporate 
proxy materials are often precatory, which means that corporations are not obliged to adopt these proposals 
even when it is passed by shareholders. Non-binding proposals are merely considered as recommendations 
by the SEC, being ‘not a proper subject for action by shareholders’’ (Rule 14a-8(i)(1)) and thus usually 
allowed. Following the 2010 amendments ‘eligible’ shareholders with at least 3% of the total voting rights 
for at least three years may now include nominees for directors. However, this rule is only applicable if state 
law and the company’s certificate of incorporation (articles of association) do not prohibit shareholders 
from nominating directors. Rule 14a-8 allows company proxy statements to include a shareholder proposal 
concerning an amendment to the certificate of incorporation regarding the possibility to adopt the right for 
shareholders to nominate directors (SEC, 2010). In case US shareholders want to add a (binding) proposal 
to the agenda that would be refused in the company’s proxy materials, shareholders may engage in proxy 
contests. These are shareholder proposals that are solicited using shareholder’s own proxy materials and 
hence, very costly. 
60 Shareholders may also file written consents. This right may be excluded in the certificate of incorporation 
and are subject to strict requirements. For an example, see Delaware § 211(b) DGCL and § 228 DGCL.   
61 For a comparison between the UK and the US, see Buchanan et al. (2012).  
62 For example, one may refer to Black (1998); Karpoff (2001); Romano (2001); Gillan and Starks (2000); 
Cotter and Thomas (2007), Thomas and Martin (1998). 
63 For example, in France, shareholders were only able to pose questions in writing prior to the AGM.  And 
in Slovenia, the question only needed to be answered ‘if the information is important for an assessment of 
the item on the agenda’ (EC (2006b) Impact Assessment. Annex to the Proposal for a Directive of the 
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section 8 of the preamble of the Shareholder Rights Directive states that ‘[e]very shareholder 
should, in principle, have the possibility to ask questions related to items on the agenda of the 
general meeting and to have them answered, while the rules on how and when questions are to be 
asked and answered should be left to be determined by Member States’. Accordingly, article 9 of 
the Directive grants shareholders the general right to ask questions. Paragraph 1 of this article 
indicates that ‘every shareholder shall have the right to ask questions related to items on the agenda 
of the general meeting. The company shall answer the questions put to it by shareholders’.64 In 
accordance with the preamble, this paragraph thus limits the right to ask questions to the items on 
the agenda of the (A)GM. However, as we will see in section 4 of this chapter – since many Member 
States already included the right to ask questions in their national laws prior to the introduction of 
the Shareholder Rights Directive, and this Directive contains minimum harmonisation – for 
instance in the Netherlands – shareholder may also pose questions that are not (directly) related to 
the agenda of the AGM. Article 9(2) includes some other potential restrictions as well; Member 
States can take measures, or can allow companies to take measures to ensure the identification of 
shareholders, the good order of general meetings and their preparation, and protection of 
confidentiality and companies’ business interests. Member States may also allow companies to 
provide one overall answer to questions that have the same content, and they may consider 
questions answered if the relevant information is available on the company’s website in a ‘question 
and answer’ format. 
 
2.2. Capital Directive 
The Capital Directive (Directive 2012/30/EU), which is also referred to as the Second Company 
Law Directive, provides shareholders with decision-making rights concerning the company’s share 
capital. With the Capital Directive, the Europe Union has introduced a framework of capital 
protection rules, including rules on constituting the company’s capital, capital maintenance and 
capital increases (for example, see Cahn and Donald, 2010, pp. 165-259). Article 29(1) of the Capital 
                                                     
European Parliament and of the Council on the exercise of voting rights by shareholders of companies 
having their registered office in a Member State and whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated 
market and amending Directive 2004/109/EC, SEC (2006) 181. 17 February 2006, Appendix 3, Question 
7.1).  
64 In an earlier version of article 9(1) of the Shareholder Rights Directive, the EC proposed: ‘1. Shareholders 
shall have the right to ask questions orally at the general meeting and/or in written or electronic form ahead of the general 
meeting’ (EC (2006a) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
exercise of voting rights by shareholders of companies having their registered office in a Member State and 
whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending Directive 2004/109/EC. COM 
(2005) 685 final. 5 January 2006. Emphasis added by the author). In amendment 28 the EP changed this 
provision to: ‘Every shareholder shall have the right to ask questions related to items on the agenda of the general meeting. 
The company shall respond to the questions put to it by shareholders.’ Furthermore, the third paragraph of 
the proposed article 9 saying, ‘Responses to shareholder questions referred to in paragraph 1 shall be made 
available to all shareholders through the Internet site of the issuer’ was removed by this amendment 
(European Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the exercise of voting rights by shareholders of companies having their registered office 
in a Member State and whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending Directive 
2004/109/EC). As we will see in section 4 of this chapter, in some Member States the right to ask questions 
prior to the meeting is explicitly allowed in the national laws. Article 9 of the directive does not explicitly 
allow for written questions, but also does not exclude this possibility. Preamble 8 of the Shareholder Rights 
Directive states that the rules on how and when questions are to be asked and answered is left to be 
determined by Member States.  
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Directive stipulates that any increase in capital must be decided upon by the general meeting. 
Paragraph 2 of this article adds that the articles of association or the general meeting may authorise 
an increase in the subscribed capital up to a maximum amount within the boundaries of the national 
laws. The authorisation is for a period of 5 years and may be renewed by the general meeting, each 
time for a maximum period of 5 years.  
The Capital Directive also requires shareholder approval for the waiver of pre-emption rights. 
Pre-emption rights are rights of existing shareholders to purchase newly issued stock in proportion 
to their current shareholdings. Article 33(4) explicitly states that shareholder pre-emption rights 
may not be restricted or withdrawn by the articles of association. Member States need to require a 
majority of at least two thirds of the votes for the restriction or cancellation of pre-emption rights 
pursuant to article 44 of this Directive. The second line of article 44 stipulates that Member States 
may provide for a simple majority in case at least half of the subscribed capital is present at the 
general meeting.  
Article 21 of the Capital Directive includes rules for the repurchase of shares. Just like 
dividends, share repurchases are distributions to shareholders: when a company repurchases its 
shares it transfers company assets (the purchase price) to the shareholders from whom the shares 
are purchased. The general meeting may provide authorisation for share repurchases for a 
maximum term of five years. Member States may limit the amount of shares that can be bought 
back by the company, but this limit may not be lower than 10% of the subscribed capital.  
Lastly, article 13(1) of the Capital Directive includes a post-incorporation rule that holds that 
if the company acquires any asset belonging to an incorporator within a period of not less than two 
years after the company is incorporated or authorised to commence business for a consideration 
of not less than one-tenth of the subscribed capital, the acquisition shall be audited and shareholder 
approval is required (nachgründung). The second paragraph includes exception grounds that include 
i) acquisitions effected in the normal course of the company's business, ii) acquisitions effected at 
the instance or under the supervision of an administrative or judicial authority, and iii) stock 
exchange acquisitions. 
 
2.3. Other Directives 
Article 37 of the Audit Directive (2006/43/EC, revised by Directive 2014/56/EU) requires a 
shareholder vote on the appointment of the auditor. However, the second line of article 37 allows 
Member States to permit alternative systems for the appointment of the auditor, provided that 
those ensure its independence from management board or executive directors.  Directive 
2014/56/EU adds: ‘[a]ny contractual clause restricting the choice by the general meeting of 
shareholders or members of the audited entity pursuant to paragraph 1 to certain categories or lists 
of statutory auditors or audit firms as regards the appointment of a particular statutory auditor or 
audit firm to carry out the statutory audit of that entity shall be prohibited. Any such existing clauses 
shall be null and void’. 
The Third Company Law Directive (Directive 2011/35/EC), Directive 2005/56/EC65 and the 
Sixth Company Law Directive (Directive 82/891/EEC66) require a shareholder vote on a merger 
or demerger/division (article 7, article 9 and article 5 respectively). Furthermore, the Takeover 
                                                     
65 Directive 2005/56/EC on cross-border mergers of limited liability companies, 2005, O.J. L 310/1. 
66 Directive 82/891/EEC based on Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty, concerning the division of public limited 
liability companies, 1982 O.J. L 378. 
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Directive (Directive 2004/25/EC) allows shareholders to empower the corporate board in order 
to frustrate a bid (article 9). Without shareholder approval, the board is only able to seek alternative 
bids (white knights). This so-called board neutrality rule stems from UK Rule 21 of the Takeover 
Code (‘non-frustration principle’).67  
Although not directly linked to the AGM, there is an information right that plays an important 
role in the decision-making function, in addition to the aforementioned directives: information 
disclosure rights regarding major shareholdings. The Transparency Directive grants (small) 
shareholders this information right. In the words of the Directive: ‘[t]he disclosure of accurate, 
comprehensive and timely information about security issuers builds sustained investor confidence 
and allows an informed assessment of their business performance and assets. This enhances both 
investor protection and market efficiency’ (preambule, paragraph 1 of Directive 2004/109/EC). 
Articles 9 and 10 set thresholds for disclosure, ranging from 5 to 75%. As we will see further in 
this chapter, many Member States have adopted lower thresholds as well.68 Article 9 further adds 
that ‘voting rights shall be calculated on the basis of all the shares to which voting rights are attached 
even if the exercise thereof is suspended’. The Commission Delegated Regulation (EU 2015/761)69 
provides further detail on the calculations. 
 
2.4. Current European Framework of Shareholder Rights 
In the introduction, we outlined three kinds of shareholder rights linked to AGMs; i) procedural 
rights, ii) information rights (including shareholders’ forum rights as special information rights), 
and iii) decision-making rights. The latter two categories are more substantial rights that represent 
the three theoretical functions of AGMs. In the previous sections we discussed the directives that 
address these shareholder rights. For example, the Shareholder Rights Directive mostly involves 
procedural rights, except for two material rights: the right to put an item on the agenda (and the 
                                                     
67 Although many Member States adopted this rule, the Netherlands and Germany, for example, did not, in 
accordance with article 12. This article allows Member States not to require companies to apply article 9. 
Germany adopted the ‘reciprocity opt-in’ following article 12(3) of this directive. For more information, see 
Clerc et al. (2012). 
68 Paragraph 12 of the Preamble of Directive 2013/50/EU indicates that: ‘[a] harmonised regime for 
notification of major holdings of voting rights, especially regarding the aggregation of holdings of shares 
with holdings of financial instruments, should improve legal certainty, enhance transparency and reduce the 
administrative burden for cross-border investors. Member States should therefore not be allowed to adopt 
more stringent rules than those provided for in Directive 2004/109/EC regarding the calculation of 
notification thresholds, aggregation of holdings of voting rights attaching to shares with holdings of voting 
rights relating to financial instruments, and exemptions from the notification requirements. However, taking 
into account the existing differences in ownership concentration in the Union, and the differences in 
company laws in the Union leading to the total number of shares differing from the total number of voting 
rights for some issuers, Member States should continue to be allowed to set both lower and additional 
thresholds for notification of holdings of voting rights, and to require equivalent notifications in relation to 
thresholds based on capital holdings. Moreover, Member States should continue to be allowed to set stricter 
obligations than those provided for in Directive 2004/109/EC with regard to the content (such as disclosure 
of shareholders’ intentions), the process and the timing for notification, and to be able to require additional 
information regarding major holdings not provided for by Directive 2004/109/EC’.  
69 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/761 supplementing Directive 2004/109/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council with regard to certain regulatory technical standards on major 
holdings,  2015 O.J. L 120/2.  
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right to call a general meeting), and the right to ask questions. Most of the other directives grant 
some specific decision-making rights. We summarize these findings in table 1.70 
 
  
                                                     





Current European Shareholder Rights Framework 
Directive Rights Procedural Information Decision-
making 
Shareholder Rights Directive  
(Directive 2007/36/EC) 
A minimum notice period of 21 days  x   
Reduce minimum notice period of GMs to 14 days   x 
Information right to the publication of relevant 
information on the website 
x x  
Share-blocking ban and introduction of a record date 
of maximum 30 days 
x   
Enhancement of ease of proxy voting x   
Right to put items on the agenda x x x 
Right to call a general meeting x x x 
Right to ask questions  x  
Disclosure of voting results x x  
Second Company Law Directive  
(Directive 2012/30/EU) 
Approval of capital increases    x 
Approval of waiver of pre-emption rights   x 
Approval of the repurchase of shares   x 
Approval of post-incorporation transactions   x 
Audit Directive (Directive 2006/43/EC, amended by 
Directive 2014/56/EU) 
 
Appointment of the auditor 
   
x 
Transparency Directive (Directive 2004/109/EC, 
amended by Directive 2013/50/EU)  
Information right to disclosure of major 
shareholdings  
 x  
Third Company Law Directive  
(Directive 2011/35/EC) 
Approval of mergers   x 
Directive on Cross-Border Mergers  
(Directive 2005/56/EC) 
Approval of mergers   x 
Sixth Company Law Directive  
(Directive 82/891/EEC) 
Approval of Divisions (demergers)   x 
Takeover Directive (Directive 2004/25/EC) Approval of frustrating a takeover bid   x 
32 
 
2.5. Current Developments: Shareholder Rights Directive 
The EC introduced an action plan on 12 December, 2012, which combined corporate law and 
corporate governance rules (Hopt, 2015). Accordingly, on 9 April, 2014, the EC announced a 
package to improve corporate governance for listed companies, hoping to encourage long-term 
shareholder engagement and improve corporate governance reporting (EC, 2014a71; see also 
Johnston and Morrow, 2014). This package includes a proposal to revise the Shareholder Rights 
Directive. According to the EC, the Impact Assessment of the revision of the Shareholder Rights 
Directive has shown that i) institutional investor and asset manager engagement is insufficient; ii) 
the link between pay and director performance is insufficiently strong; iii) shareholders lack 
oversight on related party transactions; iv) there is too little transparency when it comes to proxy 
advisors; and iv) exercising shareholder rights is difficult and costly (EC, 2014b72). The EC argues 
that institutional investors and asset managers are too focused on short-term returns. Accordingly, 
one of the key elements of the proposal is to increase institutional investor and asset manager 
engagement (articles 3f to 3h in the proposal of the EC), requiring those investors to develop a 
policy on shareholder engagement. Regarding the link between pay and performance, the EC 
points to shortcomings in shareholder oversight and the disclosure of information. To strengthen 
this link, the EC proposes the introduction of a European say-on-pay right. The proposal states 
that the remuneration policy shall be submitted for approval by shareholders at least every three 
years. This say on pay is included in the proposed article 9a(1) that stipulates that ‘companies shall 
only pay remuneration to their directors in accordance with a remuneration policy that has been 
approved by shareholders’, which indicates that the approval is binding. In addition to the approval 
of the remuneration policy ex ante, the proposed regulation also includes an advisory shareholder 
vote on the remuneration report ex post, included in the proposed article 9b(1) of the Shareholder 
Rights Directive. In cases where shareholders vote against the remuneration report, the company 
agrees to explain in the next remuneration report whether and, if so, how, the vote of the 
shareholders has been considered. However, the EP made some changes to the provisions in the 
proposed amendments by the EC on 8 July 2015. Inter alia, the EP added that Member States may 
limit the shareholder vote to an advisory one on the remuneration policy. When finalizing this 
research, the EP adopted its amended position on 14 March 2017 in its first reading. The Council 
adopted this version on 22 March 2017, and hence, the adoption of the amended Shareholder 
Rights Directive is completed;73 the next step is the implementation into the Member States’ 
national laws. 
                                                     
71 EC (2014a) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 
2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement and Directive 
2013/34/EU as regards certain elements of the corporate governance statement, COM (2014) 213 final. 
April 9, 2014.  
72 EC (2014b) Impact Assessment Accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-
term shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards certain elements of the corporate 
governance statement and Commission Recommendation on the quality of corporate governance reporting 
('comply or explain'), SWD(2014) 127 final. April 9, 2014.  
73 With respect to the say on pay rights, article 9(a) now contains that ‘Member States shall ensure that 
companies establish a remuneration policy as regards directors and that shareholders have the right to vote 
on the remuneration policy at the general meeting’ (paragraph 1). Next, paragraph 2 stipulates: ‘Member 
States shall ensure that the vote by the shareholders at the general meeting on the remuneration policy is 
binding. Companies shall pay remuneration to their directors only in accordance with a remuneration policy 
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The original proposal of the EC included a shareholder’s say on substantial related-party 
transactions (those with a value of more than 5% of the company’s assets) in article 9c. In the 
adopted version of 14 March 2017, the content of this article was changed, and a shareholder 
approval is not obliged anymore; paragraph 4 now states that ‘Member States may provide for 
shareholders in the general meeting to have the right to vote on material transactions with related 
parties which have been approved by the administrative or supervisory body of the company’ 
(emphasis added by the author).  Besides these proposed provisions on say on pay and related-
party transactions, the EC’s proposal also inter alia includes transparency requirements for proxy 
advisors and an engagement policy requirement for institutional investors.  
In the explanatory memorandum with the proposal the EC argues that cross-border 
shareholders (still) experience difficulties in exercising their shareholder rights because of 
intermediaries. Zetzsche (2008) agrees with the EC that cross-border voting needs to be improved. 
According to the author, voter turnout is inversely proportional to foreign ownership. He admits 
that there is no explicit empirical evidence for this, but argues that data may suggest that a majority 
of passive shareholders are foreign investors. According to Zetzsche, the Shareholder Rights 
Directive already lowers the procedural costs of cross-border voting as it harmonizes certain rules, 
stimulates electronic voting and disclosure of information and abolishes certain obstacles to 
shareholder voting. But it fails to improve the identification and authorisation of shareholders in a 
chain of intermediaries. Davies et al. (2011) also argue that even after the introduction of the 
Shareholder Rights Directive cross-border ‘shareholders often are not informed about forthcoming 
shareholder meetings and cannot ensure that their votes are exercised through the chain of 
intermediaries. Typically, therefore, the voting rights remain unexercised’ (p. 19). Accordingly, the 
EC proposed new rules for shareholder identification (article 3a), the transmission of information 
to shareholders (article 3b) and the facilitation of the exercise of shareholder rights (article 3c) 
which are, though in an amended version, adopted by the EP on 14 March 2017.  
 
2.6. Concluding Remarks 
The previous sections show that although corporate law is not completely harmonized at the 
European level, European directives include several shareholder rights. The Shareholder Rights 
Directive introduced many procedural rights intended to lower the costs of voting. Other 
                                                     
that has been approved by the general meeting. Where no remuneration policy has been approved and the 
general meeting does not approve the proposed policy, the company may continue to pay remuneration to 
its directors in accordance with its existing practices and shall submit a revised policy for approval at the 
following general meeting. Where an approved remuneration policy exists and the general meeting does not 
approve the proposed new policy, the company shall continue to pay remuneration to its directors in 
accordance with the existing approved policy and shall submit a revised policy for approval at the following 
general meeting’. However, paragraph 3 indicates that Member States may limit the say-on-pay right to an 
advisory vote: ‘However, Member States may provide for the vote at the general meeting on the 
remuneration policy to be advisory. In that case, companies shall pay remuneration to their directors only in 
accordance with a remuneration policy that has been submitted to such a vote at the general meeting. Where 
the general meeting rejects the proposed remuneration policy, the company shall submit a revised policy to 
a vote at the following general meeting’ (emphasis added by the author). In addition, one may note that the 
requirement to submit the remuneration policy for approval by the shareholders at least every three years 
was omitted (cf. infra, see also section 5.2.2. of this chapter). Instead, now paragraph 5 states that ‘Member 
States shall ensure that companies submit the remuneration policy to a vote by the general meeting at every 
material change and in any case at least every four years’ (emphasis added by the authors). See also Van der Elst and 
Lafarre (2017): in this article, the authors argue that the 3-year requirement is not desirable.  
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directives, such as the Capital Directive, grant some decision-making rights to shareholders. 
However, these rights are just a small part of the rights shareholders have generally: many of these 
rights are determined at the national level. Besides, as we will see in section 4.1 of this chapter, 
many Member States already provided for the shareholder question right in their national laws prior 
to the introduction of the Shareholder Rights Directive. It may thus come as no surprise that the 
largest part of this analysis is focused on national laws to unravel the many differences in the 
framework of AGMs among European Member States.     
 
3. THE NATIONAL LEVEL: PROCEDURAL RIGHTS  
Table 1 (cf. supra, section 2.4 of this chapter) shows that the Shareholder Rights Directive largely 
harmonizes the procedural rights of shareholders. For example, regarding proxy voting, before the 
implementation of the Shareholder Rights Directive in France, a shareholder was only allowed to 
be represented by another shareholder or by his spouse in accordance with article L.225-106 FCC. 
Nowadays, in accordance with article 10 of the Shareholder Rights Directive, shareholders have 
the right to appoint any other natural or legal person as a proxy holder to attend and vote at a 
general meeting in his name. Despite the harmonization of several procedural aspects in the 
Shareholder Rights Directive, there are also many differences at the national level.74 In this section 
we discuss: the meeting organisation, voting outcome procedures, voting methods that are available 
to shareholders, and participation procedures. 
 
3.1. Meeting Organisation: AGMs and EGMs 
All seven Member States make a distinction between the AGM, which is annually convened, usually 
some period after the end of the financial year – for instance, in the Netherlands and France this 
is within six months after the end of the financial year (respectively article 108(2) DCC and L.225-
100 FCC) – and the EGM.  
In general, EGMs are convened only in special cases, such as a merger or demerger, or a 
fundamental change to the structure of the company. This is the case in the Netherlands, the UK, 
Ireland, Germany, and Austria. In these countries, all proposals are usually submitted to the AGM. 
Some voting items require a special majority and/or a quorum, either stipulated by law or the 
articles of association, but these voting items are all considered in the same meeting. Usually, an 
EGM is only held when a shareholder calls a meeting or when shareholder approval is required 
and a decision cannot be postponed to the next AGM. For example, when shareholders reject the 
discharge of the supervisory board at the AGM in the Netherlands, companies usually organise an 
EGM to put this voting item to a second vote. Such was the case during the Vastned Retail 2009 
AGM: shareholders rejected the discharge of the supervisory board members to respond to 
executive bonus grants that were not put to a shareholders’ vote. In the EGM that was called later 
that year, the board announced that it would request prior shareholder approval before granting 
extra bonuses. In this second meeting, shareholder approval for discharge was granted (Van der 
Elst and Lafarre, 2017). In addition, the UK CA 2006 distinguishes between ordinary resolutions 
(including – but not limited to – receiving the annual accounts, board member (re-)election, 
                                                     
74 For example, provision II.6 of the Austrian Corporate Governance Code 2012 (hereinafter: AGCG) states 
that the resolutions passed at the general meeting and the information required by the Austrian AktG shall 
be disclosed on the company’s website at the latest on the 2nd workday after the general meeting. 
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remuneration report approval, auditor (re-)election, the auditor remuneration, the authorisation of 
the directors to allot shares, and the authorisation of political donations) on the one hand, and 
special resolutions that require a majority of 75% for approval ex section 283 CA 2006 (such as, 
but not limited to, the waiver of pre-emption rights and the authorisation to purchase own shares) 
on the other hand. Similarly, Ireland distinguishes between ordinary and special resolutions in ex 
section 191(2) Irish CA 2014.  
In France, the general meeting is divided into two sections: ordinary (AGM) and extraordinary 
(EGM). Article L.225-96 FCC requires a quorum of 25% on the first call of the EGM and a two-
thirds majority of the votes. At a second meeting, at least 20% of the shareholders (in terms of 
voting rights) is required. Decisions in the ordinary meeting require the presence of at least 20% 
of the voting rights (the first meeting, see Couret, 2011). An example of a resolution that needs to 
be submitted to the extraordinary meeting is any amendment to the articles of association (ex article 
L.225-96). In practice, the ordinary and extraordinary meetings are usually combined into one 
meeting – and thus called via the same meeting notice – which is called a mixed general assembly 
or a combined meeting (or in French: assemblée generale mixte). Besides the combined meeting, an 
EGM can also be called independently of an AGM, for the same purposes as described above for 
the other Member States.  
In Belgium an EGM is required for extraordinary resolutions. Articles 558-560 WvV require 
varying qualified majorities for different extraordinary voting items. These extraordinary voting 
items include amendments to the articles of association ex article 558 WvV: these voting items 
require a quorum of 50% of the capital and a supermajority of 75%. No quorum is required at a 
second EGM that is called if the quorum is not met. In practice, the AGM (or ordinary general 
meeting) and the EGM often take place right after each other (same date, same place), but are 
(formally) not combined. For instance, these meetings have separate convocations, separate 
agendas, and separate minutes. For example, after the 2014 AGM of Befimmo NV which took 
place on 29 April 2014 (closed at 11.50 PM), the EGM was opened at 12.50 PM. In Belgium, an 
EGM can also be called independently of an AGM. 
Besides the somewhat different approaches to the EGM, Belgium and France also have another 
kind of meeting: the special meeting (Belgium: bijzondere algemene vergadering ex article 556 et seq. WvV, 
France: assemblée spéciale ex article L.225-99 FCC). In Belgium the special meeting covers all 
decisions that do not coincide with the AGM and do not contain amendments to the articles of 
association. Article 556 WvV stipulates that the purpose of this special meeting is to grant rights 
to third parties that have an impact on the capital of the company, including a public takeover bid 
or change of control. In France, these special meetings are meetings for shareholders who hold a 
particular class of shares, rights to which are subject to change. Germany also has a type of special 
meeting: in accordance with section 141(3) AktG the holders of preferred shares need to approve 
any restriction or revocation of preference rights of these shares at a separate meeting (with a 
special majority of 75%).  
 
3.2. Participation Procedures  
Participation procedures also differ widely across Member States. For instance, the seven Member 
States require different minimum notice periods and record dates. Table 2 summarizes these 
different terms. Member States differ greatly on terms. In the Netherlands, the minimum notice 
period and the period between the record date and the meeting are the longest, whereas in the UK 
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and Ireland, these periods are relatively short (cf. infra, section 3 of chapter 6).  In the next sections 
we discuss other relevant procedural rules that differ at the national level, including voting outcome 
procedures and different voting methods.  
 
TABLE 2 
Minimum notice period and record date 
Country Minimum notice period Record date 
Austria 28 days (or 21) 10 days 
Belgium 30 days 14 days 
France 35 days 3 business days 
Germany 30 days 21 days 
Ireland 21 days (or 14 for GMs if 
some requirements are met) 
48 hours 
Netherlands 42 days 28 days 
UK 21 days (or 14 for GMs if 




at least 21 days (or 14 for 
GMs if some requirements 
are met) 
30 days maximum 
 
As we have seen in section 2.1.1 of this chapter, the Shareholder Rights Directive grants 
shareholders the right to appoint a proxy holder. Companies may now also allow electronic 
participation in AGMs. However, in many Member States electronic participation was already 
possible (at least to some extent) before the introduction of the Shareholder Rights Directive. In 
the Netherlands, electronic participation was introduced with the law of January 2007, Wet 
elektronische communicatiemiddelen in articles 2:117a DCC and 2:117b DCC. The articles of association 
can determine that electronic participation is possible (article 2:117a(1) DCC), and that 
shareholders are able to exercise their voting rights by electronic means prior to the AGM (article 
2:117b(1) DCC). Article 2:117a(1) DCC stipulates that the articles of incorporation have the option 
of granting shareholders the right to use, either in person or through a representative acting by 
means of a written proxy, electronic means of communication to participate in the general meeting, 
to address the general meeting and to exercise his voting right. Hence, article 2:117a(1) DCC also 
offers the opportunity to introduce live webcasts with the possibility of real-time voting in order 
to participate in the AGM.  
In France, the articles of association were also already empowered to make electronic 
participation – via video conferencing – possible prior to the introduction of the Shareholder 
Rights Directive (article L.225-107(II) FCC). Article 145-2 of the Decree no. 2002-80375 stipulates 
that the video conference as mentioned in article L.225-107(II) FCC needs to satisfy technical 
conditions that guarantee the effective participation in the AGM that is continuously broadcast.  
In the UK, electronic proxy voting has been provided for by ex section 333(2) CA 2006 since 
January 2007. This section stipulates that when a company has given an electronic address (either 
in an instrument of proxy sent out by the company in relation to the meeting, or in an invitation 
to appoint a proxy issued by the company in relation to the meeting), it is deemed to have agreed 
                                                     
75 Décret n° 2002-803 du 3 mai 2002 portant application de la troisième partie de la loi n° 2001-420 du 15 mai 2001 
relative aux nouvelles régulations économiques. 
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that any document or information relating to proxies for that meeting may be sent by electronic 
means to that address (subject to any conditions or limitations specified in the notice). With the 
implementation of the Shareholder Rights Directive, section 360A CA 2006 was added, stating that 
that companies may conduct ‘a meeting in such a way that persons who are not present together 
at the same place may by electronic means attend and speak and vote at it’ (paragraph 1). The new 
section 322A CA 2006 was also introduced to enable companies, in their articles of association, to 
make advance voting on a poll possible.  
Other countries did not yet allow electronic participation and/or electronic proxy voting. In 
Ireland, the ‘Shareholders’ Rights (Directive 2007/36/EC) Regulations’ amended section 136 Irish 
CA 1963, in order to allow for proxy voting by electronic means, and section 138 Irish CA 1963, 
in order to accommodate votes cast in advance. In Germany, electronic proxy voting was 
introduced in the amended section 134(3) AktG (also see section 135 AktG regarding asset 
managers) with the ARUG (Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Umsetzung der Aktionärsrechterichtlinie). And in 
Austria, the 2009 Stock Corporation Amendment Act (Aktienrechts Änderungsgesetz; AktRÄG) gives 
the opportunity to include electronic participation in the articles of association ex section 102(3) 
Austrian AktG. More specifically, this article lists the following forms of electronic participation 
that closely resemble the three forms of participation that are mentioned in article 8 of the 
Shareholder Rights Directive: satellitenversammlung (i.e., realtime transmission), fernteilnahme (i.e., 
realtime transmission with the opportunity to address the meeting), and fernabstimmung (i.e., remote 
voting). Lastly, in Belgium the Shareholder Rights Directive was implemented with the ‘Wet 
betreffende de uitoefening van bepaalde rechten van aandeelhouders van genoteerde vennootschappen’ of 20 
December 2010, amended by the ‘Wet 5 april 2011 tot wijziging van de wet van 20 december 2010 betreffende 
de uitoefening van bepaalde rechten van aandeelhouders van genoteerde vennootschappen’ of 18 April 2011 in 
order to delay its enactment to January 1, 2012. The new law introduced article 538bis WvV, which 
made the inclusion of electronic participation in the articles of association (for which a qualified 
majority is required, article 538bis) possible.76  
One may note that votes cast prior to the AGM without the use of a proxy are generally 
irrevocable, and thus cannot be changed as a result of a discussion during the general meeting, 
whereas electronic proxy voting still gives shareholders the opportunity to attend the AGM and 
exercise their voting right personally (see for instance Van der Grinten and Kortmann, 2004). 
Moreover, it is possible for a shareholder watching a live webcast to contact his proxy holder to 
change his vote: according to Zetzsche (2008, p. 33), in this situation the proxy function is limited 
to that of a messenger. Hence, there is an important difference between these two voting methods. 
In this respect, the UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills has indicated that the 
introduction of advance voting in the UK has little impact in practice, as shareholders will 
continuously make use of electronic proxy voting (following Ashurst London, 2009, cf. infra, 
chapter 4 of this research). 
Today, all seven Member States offer some form of electronic participation in general meetings. 
A whole step further is the introduction of the virtual general meeting (Boros, 2004). The virtual 
                                                     
76 Article 538bis WvV stipulates that: ‘Voor de toepassing van het eerste lid moet het elektronische communicatiemiddel 
de aandeelhouder, onverminderd enige bij of krachtens de wet opgelegde beperking, ten minste in staat stellen om rechtstreeks, 
gelijktijdig en ononderbroken kennis te nemen van de besprekingen tijdens de vergadering en om het stemrecht uit te oefenen met 
betrekking tot alle punten waarover de vergadering zich dient uit te spreken. De statuten kunnen bepalen dat het elektronische 
communicatiemiddel de aandeelhouder bovendien in staat moet stellen om deel te nemen aan de beraadslagingen en om het recht 
uit te oefenen om vragen te stellen’ 
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general meeting replaces the physical AGM completely; the entire meeting is conducted solely 
online (Krans, van der 2009, p. 10). These kinds of meetings are often mentioned as a solution to 
practical problems such as shareholder absenteeism (Krans, van der 2009, p. 11, also see Zetzsche, 
2008). However, to date, none of the seven Member States we studied have addressed the virtual 
general meeting in their legislation.   
 
3.3. Voting Procedures  
In this section we discuss a particular category of procedural rights that genuinely differ in the 
national laws of Member States: voting outcome procedures. For instance, one may ask whether 
there is a requirement for the presence of a minimum share of all shareholders with voting rights 
in order for a resolution to be valid. Is there a supermajority required for particular resolutions? 
And, are abstentions considered when determining whether or not a resolution received enough 
yes-votes to pass the majority criterion (Van der Schee, 2011)? In the previous section we already 
discussed some voting items which require special majorities in national laws. For example, in the 
UK and Ireland, special voting items require a majority of at least 75%. And in France, any 
amendment to the articles of association requires an extraordinary meeting and a two-thirds 
majority of the votes. In section five we discuss the different majority and quorum rules per voting 
item category for the seven Member States. In this section we focus on an important procedural 
aspect of AGMs. In particular, we focus on the question of how votes are counted in order to 
determine the voting outcome. 
In order to answer this question for each Member State, we first need to determine the actions 
of the shareholders: shareholders may – when already attending the AGM – either i) vote in favour, 
ii) vote against, iii) abstain from voting or withhold their vote(s). In many Member States voting 
results do not take into account abstentions. In the UK and Ireland, abstentions (or votes withheld) 
are not considered to be votes in law and will not be counted in the calculation of the proportion 
of the votes for and against the resolution.77 In Germany and Austria the number of abstentions 
(zahl der enthaltungen) does not play a role in the calculation of the voting results (ex section 133 
AktG, Aktiengesetz Heidelberger Kommentar, 2008, p. 874). In Belgium the amount of abstentions 
(onthoudingen) are not taken into account either when the voting result is calculated for ordinary 
resolutions. However, an amendment of the articles of association (extraordinary resolution) 
requires that the amount of abstentions be added to the amount of votes against (De Backer, 2015, 
p. 107). 
Article 2:120 DCC provides that a resolution (for which the law and/or articles of association 
do not require any qualified majority) is approved by volstrekte meerderheid van de uitgebrachte stemmen 
(absolute majority of the votes cast). Dutch legal scholarship agrees that a cast vote implies a 
declaration of intention, and hence, abstentions are generally not included in the number of votes 
cast. In earlier days, scholars sometimes distinguished blanks from abstentions. A statutory 
provision stating that blanks be included with the amount of votes against was not inconceivable 
(Schwarz, GS Rechtspersonen, article 2:120 DCC). Nowadays many large listed companies have 
                                                     
77 For example, see the UK Corporate Governance Code (UKCGC), provision E.2.1. The Listing Rules of 
the Irish Stock Exchange (ISE) require that Irish incorporated listed companies on the Main Securities 
Market apply to the UKCGC on a comply or explain basis. The Irish Corporate Governance Annex 
(hereinafter: Irish CGA) states that the ISE recognizes that this Code has ‘set the standard for corporate 
governance internationally’’ (p. 1 of Appendix 4). 
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explicitly adopted in their articles of association that these blanks not be included in the number of 
votes cast (ASMI NV, ASML NV and Koninklijke BAM Groep NV are some examples).    
In contrast, in France the number of abstentions is included in the votes against ex article L.225-
107 FCC. This can have a large impact on the voting outcome. For instance, assume that there is 
an absolute majority rule in place and a resolution receives 40,000 votes in favour, 30,000 votes 
against and 25,000 abstentions. In the case that abstentions are not taken into account, this 
resolution will be adopted: (votes in favour) / (votes in favour + votes against) = 40,000/ 
(40,000+30,000) * 100% = 57.1% majority. However, when abstentions are included in the 
calculation, we have: (votes in favour) / (votes in favour + votes against + abstentions) = 40,000/ 
(40,000+30,000+25,000) * 100% = 42.1% minority. It is important to keep this in mind for the 
empirical analysis in the next chapters.  
Lastly, in France since the Florange law78  (cf. infra, chapter 2, section 5.1.2), shareholders are 
automatically granted double voting rights to shares registered for more than two years (provided 
that the use of double voting rights is not prohibited in the articles of association). The law went 
into effect in April 2014. Some French listed companies had already granted these double voting 
rights to shareholders before the introduction of this law, usually after ‘two years, although 
sometimes as long as ten’ (Schumpeter Columnist, 2010).  
 
3.4. Other Voting Methods 
There are several ways shareholders can vote when they physically attend AGMs, but typically 
shareholders exercise their vote by either using the voting system, usually with electronic voting 
boxes (i.e., voting by poll), or by acclamation. In the UK, there is a particular way of voting: voting 
by ‘a show of hands’ (section 320 UK CA).79 When this default voting method is used, each 
shareholder has one vote, regardless of its stake. This method completely restricts the power of 
blockholders. These blockholders, and directors, however, are able to call a poll instead of a vote 
by hands (section 321 UK CA). The UKCGC stipulates that where a vote has been taken on a 
show of hands, companies also need to disclose the amount of votes in favour, against and withheld 
(rule E.2.2).  
How many UK companies use this ‘show of hands’ option? We analysed the voting results of 
FTSE-100 companies (505 AGMs, period 2010-2014, cf. infra, chapter 2 of this research), and found 
that this voting method was only used in 55 AGMs of 14 different companies (around 11% of our 
sample). Five of these companies only used this method during their 2010 and 2011 AGMs. G4S 
Plc, one of the companies that switched to voting by way of poll indicates in its 2012 notice of the 
meeting: ‘[v]oting on all Resolutions will be conducted by way of a poll rather than a show of hands. 
This is a more transparent method of voting as shareholders’ votes are to be counted according to 
the number of shares held.’ And GKN Plc states that ‘[t]his year the Board has determined that all 
resolutions will be decided by way of a poll instead of a show of hands’.80  As we have seen in 
                                                     
78 LOI n° 2014-384 du 29 mars 2014 visant à reconquérir l'économie réelle. 
79 In Ireland, this voting manner is explicitly allowed under national law in section 59 of Table A, First 
Schedule, Irish CA 1963. Besides the UK and Ireland, this voting method is used in other countries that are 
not included in our sample, including (but not limited to): Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and Australia.   
80 One may note that the second paragraph of article 14(1) of the Shareholder Rights Directive states that 
Member States may provide or allow companies to provide that if no shareholder requests a full account of 
the voting, it shall be sufficient to establish the voting results only to the extent needed to ensure that the 
required majority is reached for each resolution. Section 341 CA 2006 only requires listed companies to 
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section 2.1.1, the Shareholder Rights Directive requires that companies establish the number of 
shares for which votes have been validly cast, and the number of votes cast in favour, against and 
abstentions for each resolution. It thus may not come as a surprise that more companies started to 
use voting by poll after the implementation of the Shareholder Rights Directive.81   
 
3.5. Concluding Remarks 
In this section we have seen that, although the Shareholder Rights Directive harmonizes part of 
the shareholder procedural rights related to AGMs, there are still many differences between 
countries. We have considered the meeting organisation, voting outcome procedures, voting 
methods and shareholder participation procedures. For example, regarding the meeting 
organisation, in Belgium and France the annual meeting is divided in an ordinary part, often 
referred to as the AGM, and an extraordinary part for certain resolutions, often referred to as the 
EGM. In contrast, in the Netherlands, Austria, Germany, the UK and Ireland the AGM considers 
all resolutions and EGMs are convened only in special cases. Furthermore, minimum notice 
periods and record dates differ substantially between Member States (cf. supra, table 2 in section 
3.2) and participation and voting procedures are different as well.  
 
4. THE NATIONAL LEVEL: INFORMATION RIGHTS  
As we have seen in the introduction of this chapter, a shareholder needs access to information to 
make an informed voting decision. Shareholders have myriad information rights, stipulated in the 
company acts and in financial securities law to ensure well-functioning capital markets. Companies 
need to regularly disclose information, including (but not limited to) the publication of the financial 
statements and the annual report within a certain period after the ending of the financial year (in 
France, listed companies also provide the ‘annual registration document’). These documents are 
made available prior to the general meeting via the company’s website (cf. supra, following article 5 
of the Shareholder Rights Directive).  
In this section we first discuss special information rights which are related to the AGM by 
starting with shareholder forum rights (section 4.1). In section 4.2 we outline the national rules 
regarding mandatory ownership disclosure requirements, which are special information rights for 
(small) shareholders regarding company ownership structure. These information rights are closely 
linked to the decision-making function of AGMs, and reveal important information about voting 
structure and voting power.  
 
4.1. Forum Rights 
As we have seen in section 2 of this chapter, the Shareholder Rights Directive provides 
shareholders with the right to ask questions. However, since some countries had already adopted 
this right in their national laws before the implementation of this Directive and the Directive 
                                                     
publish the voting results when a poll is taken. However, in practice a majority of the companies that use 
voting by a ‘show of hands’ publish the voting results of the proxy votes. This is relevant for the analyses 
in the second chapter of this research (cf. infra, section 2 of chapter 2).  
81 For example, under Dutch law, when voting by acclamation is used, the chairman of the meeting counts 
the amount of votes against and abstentions. The remainder of the shareholders attending the meeting are 
included in the number of votes in favour. The Dutch company Accell Group NV uses this method.  
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contains minimum harmonisation requirements, there are significant differences across Member 
States. In addition to the right to ask questions (or to request information) during the AGM, many 
Member States also give the shareholder the right to speak in AGMs. One may note that this 
shareholder right goes beyond the right to request information that is required at the European 
level. However, in practice these two rights are largely intertwined (cf. infra, chapter 6 of this 
research). In the introduction chapter of this research we broached the question of how to involve 
as many (small) shareholders as possible to establish a ‘shareholder democracy’ while keeping 
AGMs to reasonable durations and discussions and questions meaningful to corporate matters (for 
example, Klaassen, 2011). Hence, we discuss not only the right to ask questions and to speak, but 
also the possible restrictions to these rights as stipulated in the national laws and by case law. In 
section 4.2 we consider the company’s statutory provisions in a small empirical framework.  
 
4.1.1. The UK 
In the UK, the right to ask questions is, with the implementation of the Shareholder Rights 
Directive, incorporated in section 319A CA 2006 for traded (i.e., listed) companies. Before the 
implementation of the Directive the right to ask questions was already recognized in practice,82 
although there was no statutory obligation to answer them. National Dwellings Society v Sykes (1984) 
established that: ‘[u]nquestionably it is the duty of the chairman, and his function, to preserve order, 
and to take care that the proceedings are conducted in a proper manner, and that the sense of the 
meeting is properly ascertained with regard to any question which is properly before the meeting’ 
(p. 162, following Mayson, French and Ryan, 2016, p. 402). This phrase not only indicates that 
questions are allowed, but also considers the role of the chairman of the meeting (see below). 
Section 319A(1) CA 2006 states that ‘the company must cause to be answered any question relating 
to the business being dealt with at the meeting put by a member attending the meeting’. Birds et 
al. (2013) clarifies that this section requires ‘a traded company to answer any question put by a 
member at a general meeting’ (p. 385). In addition, the UKCGC provides that the chairman of the 
board arranges for the chairmen of the audit, remuneration, and nomination committees to be 
available to answer questions at the AGM (provision E.2.3).  
In accordance with article 9(2) of the Shareholder Rights Directive, paragraph two of section 
319A UK CA 2006 stipulates the circumstances under which no answer need be given: ‘(a) if to do 
so would – (i) interfere unduly with the preparation for the meeting, or (ii) involve the disclosure 
of confidential information; (b) if the answer has already been given on a website in the form of an 
answer to a question; or (c) if it undesirable in the interests of the company or the good order of 
the meeting that the question be answered’. Siems (2013) explains that the chairman of the meeting 
in the UK should generally attempt to answer all questions that are posed during the general 
meeting. When the chairman is not able to answer a certain question, he or she can nominate a 
representative or a full answer could be deferred until after the general meeting. In the latter case, 
however, the shareholder who asked the question is not able to (immediately) respond and/or start 
a discussion, which undermines the forum function of the AGM. In this respect written questions 
– which are explicitly allowed under French and Belgian law as outlined below, but also common 
practice in other jurisdictions, including for instance, the Netherlands and the UK – contribute to 
the exercise of forum rights as answers can be prepared in advance. The chairman needs to be sure 
                                                     
82 National Dwellings Society v. Sykes 1984 3 Ch 159. Following Van der Elst (2012b).   
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that one of the exceptions listed in section 319A CA 2006 applies when he refuses an answer to a 
question. In cases where a question is not in a company’s interests or interferes with the good order 
of the meeting, the chairman should objectively explain why this is the case. Siems argues that if, 
for example, a shareholder intends to ask 100 questions (asked by ‘Prof X’ in Siems’s hypothetical 
case study), it would certainly be valid to refuse to answer more than 30 questions to safeguard the 
good order of the meeting. Siems adds that courts in the UK are usually reluctant to challenge the 
chairman’s decision to refuse an answer to a question, unless there is evidence of bad faith (also 
see the case Re Piccadilly Radio Plc83). 
Lastly we note that section 319A CA 2006 only (explicitly) provides the right to ask questions 
to shareholders (‘member attending the meeting’). However, section 324(1) CA 2006 states that ‘[a] 
member of a company is entitled to appoint another person as his proxy to exercise all or any of 
his rights to attend and to speak and vote at a meeting of the company’.  Provision 40(2) of the 
Model Articles also allows the chairman of the meeting to permit other persons who are not 
shareholders to speak at the AGM. From this one may derive that shareholders also have the right 
to speak in AGMs. Moreover, the Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 (ex section 19 
UK CA 2006) stipulate the right to speak in AGMs in provision 29(1): ‘[a] person is able to exercise 
the right to speak at a general meeting when that person is in a position to communicate to all 
those attending the meeting, during the meeting, any information or opinions which that person 
has on the business of the meeting’. Accordingly, provision 29(3) provides that ‘[t]he directors may 
make whatever arrangements they consider appropriate to enable those attending a general meeting 
to exercise their rights to speak or vote at it’.84  
 
4.1.2. Ireland 
The Irish CA also needed to be amended to implement the Shareholder Rights Directive. The right 
to ask questions is now included in section 1107 of the Irish CA 2014. This section states that ‘a 
member of a traded Plc has the right to ask questions related to items on the agenda of a general 
meeting and to have such questions answered by the Plc subject to any reasonable measures the 
Plc may take to ensure the identification of the member’. Paragraph two of this section outlines 
the situations wherein an answer would not be required: ‘(a) to give an answer would interfere 
unduly with the preparation for the meeting or the confidentiality and business interests of the Plc; 
(b) the answer has already been given on the Plc's website by means of what is commonly known 
as ‘a question and answer forum’; or (c) it appears to the chairperson of the meeting that it is 
undesirable in the interests of good order of the meeting that the question be answered’. 
Shareholders also have the right to speak at the AGM in Ireland (this follows for example from 
section 1103 Irish CA 2014, which covers shareholder rights). The Irish provisions are similar to 
the provisions in the CA 2006 as both closely resemble the Shareholder Rights Directive. 
 
                                                     
83 In this case, it was made clear that applicants had to have clear and compelling grounds before challenging 
a general meeting of a company or any resolution passed at that particular meeting in court (Siems 2013, p. 
277). 
84 One may note that in contrast to the Model Articles, Table A does not explicitly contain the right to 
speak. From 1 October 2009, the Model Articles have replaced Table A as the default set of articles. 
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4.1.3. The Netherlands 
Under Dutch law, the right to request information has been incorporated in article 2:107(2) DCC 
since 1971 (Deraedt, 2001). This provision states that the management board and supervisory 
board must provide the general meeting of shareholders with all requested information, such 
information would run contrary to a substantial company interest. According to the Dutch 
legislature this article already includes the right to ask questions as stipulated in article 9 of the 
Shareholder Rights Directive and hence, no new provision was adopted.85 Since the Dutch 
provision includes the phrase ‘unless a substantial interest of the company opposes this’, it already 
entailed the second paragraph of article 9 of the Directive as well. In a parliamentary document, 
the Dutch legislature provides an example of a ‘substantial interest’ (in Dutch: zwaarwichtig belang):  
information that may harm the competitiveness of the company.86 This example is in line with the 
‘business interests’ as mentioned in the Shareholder Rights Directive. Whether the term ‘substantial 
interest’, should be interpreted in a broad or narrow way is not entirely clear. Scholars generally 
argue that the refusal of an answer should only be exceptional,87 which corresponds to practice in 
the UK. Whether shareholders are able to file a claim on the grounds of article 2:107 DCC is yet 
unclear (see Deraedt, 2001, p. 167 for this discussion).88 One may note that the right to ask 
questions is also provided to proxy holders that hold written proxies ex article 2:117 DCC (in 
Dutch: ‘bij een schriftelijke gevolmachtigde’).89  
Article 9(1) of the Shareholder Rights Directive grants the right to ask questions to every 
shareholder, which is not explicitly stated under Dutch law (‘[e]very shareholder shall have the right 
to ask questions related to items on the agenda of the general meeting’ versus ‘must provide the 
general meeting of shareholders with all requested information’). The Dutch attorney general 
(‘advocaat-generaal’) concluded that the Dutch law should be interpreted in compliance with the 
Shareholder Rights Directive, and that each individual shareholder indeed may request information 
in AGMs under Dutch law.90 Besides, he argues that, if the latter were not the case, shareholders 
would first need to discuss what information they would like to request together before requesting 
this information. This might be feasible in smaller, private companies, but not in (listed) public 
companies with a large shareholder base. Accordingly, whereas the Court of Amsterdam in an 
earlier verdict ruled that a shareholder has no individual right to request information (Rechtbank 
                                                     
85 Kamerstukken II (2008-2009) 31 746, no. 3 (Memorie van Toelichting), p. 15. The parliamentary document 
refers to, inter alia, Maeijer (2000). Also see Vletter-Van Dort (2001). 
86 Kamerstukken II (2008-2009) 31746, no. 3 (Memorie van Toelichting), p. 15. 
87 For example, refer to Van Solinge and Nieuwe Weme (2009) (2-II*), no. 327.  
88 Corporate law disputes are litigated before the Enterprise Chamber (Ondernemingskamer) of the Amsterdam 
Court of Appeals under an investigation procedure. Shareholders that fulfil particular requirements may 
request an investigation if there is reasonable ground to doubt a proper course of affairs (in Dutch: ‘reden om 
aan een juist beleid te twijfelen’). This procedure is called the ‘enquêteprocedure’ (articles 2:344 up to 2:359 DCC). 
Article 2:107 DCC may play a role in such procedure (for instance, one may refer to the Hoge Raad VIBA-
case, 2003). 
89 This follows from the Shareholder Rights Directive: proxy holders enjoy the same rights as shareholders, 
such as the right to ask questions (discussed below) and engage in discussions (provision 10(1) of the 
directive). 
90 Hoge Raad 9 July 2010, JOR 2010, 228, 3.6.2 (ASMI-case). In the HBG-case the right to request information 
also played a significant role (Hoge Raad HBG, 2003). For an overview of the discussion among Dutch 
scholars, one may refer to Dereadt (2001:165). For example, some Dutch scholars argue that this right is 
only a collective right of the AGM, but that on the grounds of reasonableness and fairness individual 
shareholders also have the right to request information (i.e., Van Schilfgaarde, 2013, no. 64). Others argue 
that in practice, individual shareholders usually exercise this information right (i.e., Vletter-van Dort, 2001). 
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Amsterdam 15 June 1988, KG 1988/276), the Hoge Raad ruled that every shareholder has this right 
(ASMI-case, Hoge Raad 9 July 2010, JOR 2010, 228).91 With the ASMI-verdict and implementation 
of the Shareholder Rights Directive under Dutch law there remains no uncertainty regarding the 
individual right to request information.  
The first sentence of article 9(1) of the Shareholder Rights Directive limits the scope of the 
questions to the items on the agenda of the AGM. In contrast, article 2:107(2) DCC does not limit 
this scope, and hence there may be reason to assume that individual shareholders will also have the 
right to request information about matters other than agenda items under Dutch law.92 It is the 
general consensus that the shareholder questions be bounded by article 2:8 DCC. This article 
provides that shareholders (and other corporate actors) act in accordance with standards of 
reasonableness and fairness (‘redelijkheid en billijkheid’). In this respect, article 2:107(2) DCC provides 
shareholders with a broader right than the Directive.  
One may also recognize that Dutch law does not (explicitly) limit shareholders’ right to request 
information during the AGM. Whereas Timmermans argues that individual shareholders have no 
right to request information outside the general meeting,93 Van Schilfgaarde (2013, p. 217) suggests 
that individual shareholders may exercise their question right outside the general meeting under 
particular circumstances, but he does not explain how.94  
Like in the UK, there are no legal provisions under Dutch law that explicitly allow the chairman 
to limit shareholders’ question rights.95 The role of the chairman is also not defined in the DCC. 
However, it is common practice that the chairman of the AGM, in accordance with standards of 
reasonableness and fairness, may limit the shareholder speaking time during the meeting (Klaassen, 
2011, p. 67)96, and may even refuse a shareholder’s right to request information in particular cases 
(Huizink, GS Rechtspersonen, article 2:13 BW, no. 11). As we will see in section 4.2 of this chapter, 
some Dutch corporations adopted provisions regarding the limitation of speaking time for 
shareholders in their articles of association (cf. infra, next section). In the next section we discuss 
the German law: one may note that, in contrast to the jurisdictions discussed so far, Germany law 
provides the opportunity to arrange the authority of the chairman of the meeting to restrict 
shareholder forum rights in the articles of association.  
                                                     
91 One may also refer to Deraedt (2001). He also argues that not granting the right to ask questions to 
individual shareholders is not practical (‘[…] een aandeelhouder eerst zijn medeaandeelhouders om toestemming zou 
moeten vragen om namens de AVA inlichtingen te mogen vragen, lijkt mij weinig praktisch’, p. 165). 
92 In the ASMI-case, the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) ruled that this is indeed the case (r.o. 4.6): ‘Iedere 
aandeelhouder heeft voorts ter vergadering zelfstandig het recht vragen te stellen — ongeacht of deze betrekking hebben op 
punten die op de agenda zijn vermeld.’ (Hoge Raad 9 July 2010, JOR 2010, 228). One may also refer to Dereadt 
(2001), pp. 165-167; Schwarz, GS Rechtspersonen, article 2:107 DCC, no. 5.  
93 This opinion was adopted by the Hoge Raad in the ASMI-case (Hoge Raad 9 July 2010, JOR 2010, 228, r.o. 
4.6).  
94 Van Schilfgaarde (2013) refers to article 2:8 DCC. In the ASMI-case, the Hoge Raad decided that the 
corporate board may decide whether or not to engage in discussions with (outsider) shareholders outside 
the AGM. (r.o. 4.6). Van Schilfgaarde also refers to the Butôt-case (Hof Amsterdam (OK) 17 February 2009, 
JOR 2009, 19) to explain that the claim of individual shareholders to this right does not have the same power 
as the claim of the AGM as a corporate body (p. 217, no. 64).  
95 In an earlier version of the revised DCGC (2008) the provision that the chairman of the meeting could 
limit the speaking time of shareholders was explicitly included. In a later stage this provision was again 
removed. Nowak (2009) claims that this provision was not important, as it included already common 
practice.  
96 Klaassen refers to: Van Solinge (1994); Van der Heijden and Van der Grinten (1992).  
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In addition to article 2:107 DCC, article 2:117(1) DCC provides individual shareholders (‘every 
shareholder’) with the right to speak during general meetings.  
 
4.1.4. Germany 
In Germany, the implementation of the Shareholder Rights Directive also did not require any 
amendments regarding the right to ask questions. In contrast to the general wording of the Dutch 
provision, the right of shareholders to request information is included in section 131 AktG in a 
detailed manner. Paragraph one of this provision stipulates that each shareholder shall be provided 
upon request with information in the general meeting regarding the company’s affairs, to the extent 
that such information is necessary to permit a proper evaluation of the relevant item on the agenda. 
This wording an sich is stricter than the European provision. With the implementation of the 
Shareholder Rights Directive under Germany law this provision ‘must be construed as simply 
meaning that the questions asked must be related to items on the agenda’ (Kersting, 2009, p. 1, for 
a more advanced analysis see Köhlner Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz, no. 113, and no. 125 et seq.). Thus, 
this shareholder right has broadened with the introduction of the Shareholder Rights Directive. In 
an earlier version of the AktG, section 112 AktG 1937 granted the right to ask questions on all 
company matters (‘allen Angelegenheiten der Gesellschaft’). It was recognized, however, that the board 
could refuse information on grounds of abuse of rights (‘Rechtsmissbrauchs’, Köhlner Kommentar zum 
Aktiengesetz, no. 379). It is the consensus that rechtsmissbrauchs already is contained in the necessity 
requirement (erforderlich) in the current section 131 AktG.   
Section 131(3) AktG lists seven grounds on which information may be refused, including that 
the provision of information is likely to cause material damage to the company, that information 
is related to tax valuations and amounts, that provision of information would render the 
management board criminally liable, and that the information is continuously available on the 
company’s website 7 or more days prior to the shareholders’ meeting or during the general meeting. 
The last line of this paragraph indicates that these seven reasons are exhaustive grounds for denial 
of information. Paragraph four contains the right to request information outside the general 
meeting. If the information is provided to a shareholder outside the general meeting, this 
information should upon request be provided to the other shareholders during the general meeting. 
Paragraph five of section 131 AktG indicates that shareholders that did not receive an answer to 
their question have the right to request that the question and the reason the information was denied 
be included in the meeting’s minutes. There is no justification duty in the particular situation that 
the board decides not to grant requested information, when this justification could trigger ‘dies 
Spekulationen des Publikums’ that would have a detrimental effect to the company (Köhlner Kommentar 
zum Aktiengesetz, no. 507).  
Of note is paragraph 2 of section 131 AktG. This paragraph explicitly states that the articles of 
association or the meeting’s bylaws (section 129 AktG) may authorise the chairman of the meeting 
to limit the number of questions and shareholder speaking time as appropriate and may specify 
general rules regarding this matter.97 The meaning of section 131(2) AktG has been clarified in case 
law. In the case Karl-Walter Freitag/Biotest AG (2010) the BGH confirmed that the chairman can 
indeed limit the shareholder speaking time. In this case, an active shareholder, Karl-Walter Freitag, 
                                                     
97 Besides, the GCGC (Kodex) provision 2.2.4 says, ‘[t]he chair of the meeting provides for the expedient 
running of the General Meeting. In this, the chair should be guided by the fact that an ordinary general 
meeting is completed after 4 to 6 hours at the latest.’’ 
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challenged a statutory provision that allowed the chairman of Biotest AG to limit shareholder 
speaking time under particular circumstances. More specifically, the provision stipulated that: 
- the chairman may restrict the right to speak of shareholders in order to ensure that the 
meeting does not take more than six hours, or, in case there are some special items on the 
agenda, not more than ten hours in accordance.  
- the chairman may restrict a shareholder’s speaking time to fifteen minutes, or ten if at 
least three other speakers have registered for a particular agenda item. 
- the total speaking time of a particular shareholder during the entire meeting can be 
limited to 45 minutes.   
- the chairman can announce these restrictions at any time during the meeting, including 
at the beginning.  
- the chairman may close the discussion at 10.30 PM in order to start with the voting. 
Karl-Walter Freitag argued, inter alia, that the provision was too rigid, and that there should be 
a distinction between the right to ask questions and the right to speak. The BGH decided that the 
provision was in line with section 131(2) AktG and hence, allowed the statutory clause. The BGH 
concluded that the distinction between the right to ask questions and the right to speak is not 
necessary in accordance with the wordings of the law and the aim of the legislature (paragraph 31 
of the verdict), and in practice such a distinction would not be easy: ‘Angesichts dieser 
Abgrenzungsproblematik ist es nicht nur zulässig, sondern sachgerecht, die Einschätzung und eine ggf. entsprechend 
abgestufte Behandlung dem pflichtgemäß auszuübenden Ermessen des Versammlungsleiters im konkreten Einzelfall 
zu überlassen’ (paragraph 32 of the verdict). The BGH also agreed with the time limits that are 
mentioned in the statutory provision (paragraphs 32-35 of the verdict). With respect to paragraph 
two of the statutory provision that stated that the chairman can announce these restrictions at any 
time during the meeting, the BGH concluded that this is not a violation of section 131(2) AktG, in 
agreement with the prevailing opinion in the literature. The BGH noted that it sometimes only 
becomes clear during a meeting that this meeting cannot be carried out in an adequate and 
reasonable time. This does not mean that the chairman can always limit the speaking time of 
shareholders: the BGH emphasizes that arbitrary and inappropriate restrictions are not permitted 
under section 131(2) AktG and limitation is only allowed and lawfully announced after the 
chairman recognizes that there is sufficient evidence carrying out the AGM in an adequate and 
reasonable time is in danger.  
In another case a decision to discharge was annulled by the Landgericht München (Munich District 
Court) because the chairman of the meeting restricted the speaking time of shareholders to five 
minutes prior to the meeting (LG München I, 2008). This meeting only took two hours and only 
two shareholders used their right to speak, and the court ruled that the authority to limit the 
speaking time of shareholders was not exercised in accordance with the proportionality principle 
(verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz) and its objective. 
Lastly, based on the wording of section 131(2) AktG and the verdict of the BGH we can 
conclude that in Germany shareholders also have the right not only to ask questions, but also to 
speak at general meetings.  
 
4.1.5. Austria 
The legal situation in Austria is very similar to Germany’s (Köhlner Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz, no. 
86). The right to request information is included in section 118 of the Austrian AktG. Paragraph 1 
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of this section closely resembles article 9(1) of the Shareholder Rights Directive but extends it by 
including the duty to provide information regarding the legal and business relationships of a 
company with an affiliated company. There are two grounds for refusal in paragraph three of 
section 118: i) significant commercial harm based on reasonable judgment, and ii) when the 
provision of information results in a criminal offence. Similar to German and UK law, and in line 
with the Directive, paragraph four adds that information may also be refused if it has been 
continuously available on the website in the form of a question and answer for at least seven days 
prior to the general meeting. 
Unlike section 131(2) AktG in Germany, section 118 Austrian AktG does not explicitly allow 
the chairman of the meeting to restrict shareholder speaking time of shareholders. It also does not 
explicitly allow shareholders to speak in AGMs. However, as we will see in section 4 of this chapter, 
in practice a number of companies have adopted similar provisions in their articles of association. 
The right to speak in AGMs for shareholders seems to be common practice.98  
 
4.1.6. France 
In France, any shareholder has the right to submit written questions (questions écrites) after the date 
on which the relevant documents are made available, that are answered during the general meeting 
in accordance with article L.225-108(3) FCC. This right precedes the implementation of the 
Shareholder Rights Directive. Viandier (2004) argues that this right cannot be used to advocate a 
goal unrelated to the common interest (‘d’un étranger à l’intérêt social’).  Besides this right, there are 
also two other provisions regarding written questions:  shareholders – acting individually or in 
concert – that have at least a particular voting stake99 are able to submit written questions to the 
chairman of the (management) board regarding company or subsidiary operations at all times ex 
article L.225-231 jo L.225-120 FCC. The questions must be answered within a month ex L.225-
231(2) FCC and the reply must be sent to the registered auditor as well: if the questions are not 
(satisfactorily) answered, shareholders may require the appointment of one or more experts. 
Similarly, article L.225-232 jo L.225-120 FCC stipulates that these shareholders are also able to 
address the chairman of the (management) board with written questions regarding any matter that 
threatens the company’s affairs. According to this provision, the reply to these questions must also 
be sent to the auditor. These provisions are likely to cause impediments to the forum function of 
the AGM – in addition to those that we described in the introduction chapter of this study – as 
shareholders have more means to exercise their forum rights. One may note that the voting rights 
thresholds are not particularly high for larger companies.100      
The Shareholder Rights Directive added two provisions: i) companies are allowed to provide 
one answer to similar questions (in French: ‘une réponse commune peut être apportée à ces questions dès lors 
qu'elles présentent le même contenu’), and; ii) the answer to a written question is considered to have been 
provided when it is on the Q&A section of the company’s website (‘la réponse à une question écrite est 
réputée avoir été donnée dès lors qu'elle figure sur le site internet de la société dans une rubrique consacrée aux 
                                                     
98 One may, for example, refer to the meeting invitations of Österreichische Post AG or CA Immo AG.  
99 5% of the voting rights for capital less than 750,000 euros; 4% for over 750,000 euros and up to 4,500,000 
euros; 3% over 4,500,000 euros and up to 7,500,000 euros; 2%over 7,500,000 euros and up to 15,000,000 
euros; 1% over 15,000,000 euros. 
100 These lower thresholds provide more opportunities for other shareholders, not being blockholders, to 
voice their concerns.  
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questions-réponses’). The right to ask oral questions during the general meeting cannot be found in 
the FCC, but is stipulated in article 1844 of the French Civil Code. Although in France proxy 
holders also have the same rights as shareholders, the right to ask questions is not explicitly 
provided to these participants of AGMs (but follows from the Shareholder Rights Directive).  
Siems (2013, p. 264) explains that in France, the chairman of the general meeting has the right 
to end a long list of questions by one single shareholder to give the other shareholders the 
opportunity to ask questions. A French 1985 case decreed that a shareholder could not use the 
right to ask questions when a shareholder has other motivations for this question than obtaining 
needed information (CA Paris, 23 April 1985, following Siems, 2013, p. 264).  
In contrast to the previously discussed Member States, shareholders generally do not have the 
(formal) right to speak in AGMs in France. However, as the German BGH observed, the right to 
ask questions and the right to speak are usually intertwined in practice.  
 
4.1.7. Belgium 
Belgium already gave shareholders the right to ask questions prior to the implementation of the 
Shareholder Rights Directive in article 540 WvV, but amended this provision by adding the right 
to submit questions in writing before the meeting. In addition, the Belgian legislature included the 
possibility to provide one overall answer to questions that have the same content. Article 540 WvV 
requires directors to reply to shareholder questions related to the agenda items or to the director’s 
report to the extent that information is not confidential or harmful to company business interests 
(article 540 WvV, see below for the grounds for refusal). This right includes questions that are 
posed during the general meeting or written questions. Belgium is the only country in our sample 
that formally allows shareholders to not only question directors, but also auditors on their reports 
ex article 540 WvV (registered accountants, in Dutch: commissarissen). Board members and 
commissarissen are allowed to provide only one answer to questions that are related to the same 
subject, in accordance with the Directive. Like in France, the last section of article 540 now 
explicitly allows written questions. This would enhance the quality of the answers and the speed of 
answering per Hellemans (2011). Hellemans states that although this possibility is now formally 
adopted under Belgian law, in practice shareholders already submitted written questions before the 
introduction of the Directive. In Belgium proxy holders with written proxies may also ask questions 
(article 547bis WvV).  
Shareholders have the right to ask questions ex article 540 WvV during the general meeting. 
Like their French counterparts (cf. supra, section 4.1.6), Belgian shareholders do not have the formal 
right to speak in AGMs. Refusal to answer is allowed when information is harmful to the business 
interests of the company or confidential. With the implementation of the Shareholder Rights 
Directive the formulation under Belgian law became: ‘voor zover de mededeling van gegevens of feiten niet 
van dien aard is dat nadelig zou zijn voor de zakelijke belangen van de vennootschap of voor de vertrouwelijkheid 
waartoe de vennootschap of haar bestuurders zich hebben verbonden’ (following Hellemans, 2011, pp. 1335-
1336, the emphasised words are changed in comparison with the older provision, also see 
Hellemans, 2001). With these two grounds of refusal the Belgian law resembles the Directive, but 
the legislature made clear that there was no change in the content of this provision (Memorie van 
Toelichting, 2010-2011, p. 35, following Hellemans, 2011). Hellemans argues that the Belgian 
provision is stricter than the one in the Directive.  
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The company may also refuse to answer questions in cases of misuse of the right to pose 
questions (Bénichou, Vanraes and Roseleth, 2013, p. 141, see also Braeckmans and Houben, 2012). 
The authors write that too many questions or questionable objectives can qualify as misuse. The 
Belgian Barco-case considered the right to request information. During the Barco NV AGM in 
1998, peace activists that obtained a small minority stake asked questions about the involvement 
in the production of weapons. According to these activists not all their questions were (sufficiently) 
answered during this meeting and they claimed that they were hindered in exercising their right to 
request information. More specifically, in this meeting the board decided to close the question-and-
answer session by a majority vote of the meeting. The Court of Appeals ruled that the right to 
request information cannot be limited by a majority vote of the general meeting, and that these 
questions about the involvement in the production of weapons should have been answered during 
the meeting. Initially it would seem that, other than the statutory restrictions that are provided in 
the law including the scope of the questions (questions should concern the agenda of the meeting 
or the report), shareholders’ question rights generally cannot be limited in Belgium, which differs, 
for instance, from the German practice. However, we should add that according to Byttebier, 
Feldkamp and Janssens (2007) the main problem in this case was that the meeting’s minutes did 
not go into sufficient detail about the misuse of the question right by these activist shareholders. 
Moreover, Belgian legal scholars have widely discussed this decision of the Court of Appeals. For 
instance, the question rights of shareholders should include at least a duty of loyalty (Byttebier, 
Feldkamp and Janssens, 2007). Baert (2002) argues that in this case, the question right was not 
exercised to request information, or at least, to discuss a difference in opinions in this case, but to 
intentionally slow down the decision-making process during the AGM. Wyckaert and Van Gerven 
(2002) question whether interest groups may use the right to question to promote their own goals, 
instead of the corporate interest. Moreover, these authors question whether it is fair that a small 
shareholder, promoting a goal that is unrelated to the corporate interest, be allowed to dominate 
the general meeting with questions that are irrelevant to a majority of the shareholders (Wyckaert 
and Van Gerven, 2002, following Byttebier, Feldkamp and Janssens, 2007). 
 
The analysis of the national laws has shown that although shareholders have the right to request 
information in all seven Member States, the national provisions differ substantially. For instance, 
Belgian and French law explicitly allow for written questions. And in Germany the articles of 
association may contain detailed provisions regarding the authority of the chairman to limit 
shareholder forum rights. In the next section we take a further look at the corporate charters of 
companies from the seven Member States in order to further explore the shareholder forum rights.  
   
4.1.8. Charter Provisions 
In order to see whether companies regularly provide the chairman of the meeting with the explicit 
authority to limit the right to ask questions (and the right to speak) – and to what extent – we 
investigate the latest versions101 of the articles of association of the companies in our sample that 
we also use in the remainder of this study (for the sample cf. infra, section 2 of chapter 2). As 
expected, in accordance with the national statutory provisions, companies that are listed in the UK, 
                                                     
101 Our research ended in the summer of 2015.  
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Ireland and Belgium do not authorise the chairman of the meeting to limit the question right in 
their articles of association. We provide an overview of these findings in the following table:  
 
TABLE 3 
Provisions to Limit Speaking and Question Time per Country 
Country # companies # companies with 
limiting provisions 
Austria 22 5 
Belgium 17 0 
France 37 1 
Germany 32 31 
Ireland 18 0 
Netherlands 24 5 
UK 101 0 
Total 251 42 
 
Of the 24 Dutch companies in our sample, only a few companies explicitly mention the power of 
the chairman of the meeting to limit shareholder speaking time. Only three companies have 
adopted a general clause. These are: Philips NV, Ahold NV, and Wolters Kluwer NV. For example, 
provision 28(1) of the articles of Philips NV stipulates that ‘[d]e voorzitter kan de spreektijd rantsoeneren 
indien hij zulks met het oog op een goed verloop van de vergadering gewenst acht’ (translation: ‘[t]he chairman 
may restrict the time for which shareholders may speak, if he considers this to be desirable with a 
view to the orderly conduct of the meeting’). Just like the statutory provision of Philips NV, the 
articles of association of Ahold NV and Wolters Kluwer NV do not provide specific circumstances 
and time limits102, unlike the statutory provisions of Biotest AG (section 4.1.4 of this study). The 
three companies speak of an ‘orderly’ progress, manner or conduct. What this ‘orderly’ progress 
entails, is for the chairman to determine. Wolters Kluwer NV adds that on the proposal of the 
chairman or of a shareholder the meeting may resolve to order a speaker to stop. And Ahold NV 
explicitly indicates that the chairman needs to take into account the agenda of the meeting when 
deciding to restrict the speaking time.  
Besides these three companies, there are two other Dutch companies that implicitly allow the 
chairman to restrict shareholder speaking time. SBM Offshore NV stipulates that ‘[a]ll issues 
concerning admittance to the General Meeting, concerning the exercising of the voting right and 
the outcome of votes, as well as all other issues relating to the proceedings at the meeting,103 shall 
                                                     
102 Wolters Kluwer stipulates that ‘[t]he chairman of the meeting may limit the speaking time at the meeting 
or take such other measures that the meeting proceeds in an orderly manner. On the proposal of the 
chairman or of a shareholder the meeting may resolve to order a speaker to stop.’ (article 37(9), available via 
<http://www.wolterskluwer.com/Corporate-
Governance/Documents/StatutenWolters_Kluwer_NV_ENG.pdf>). (accessed in March 2015). The 
articles of Ahold NV state that ‘the chairman shall determine the order of proceedings at the meeting with 
due observance of the agenda and he may restrict the allotted speaking time or take other measures to ensure 
orderly progress of the meeting’’ (article 30(2), available via  
<https://www.ahold.com/web/file?uuid=6a5710fa-fd5b-4940-883a-ceb58160ad9c&owner=f6216a8f-
4a2d-494f-8168-ae6cd1765756&contentid=2096>). (accessed in March 2015). 
103 In Dutch: ‘zomede alle andere kwesties, welke verband houden met de gang van zaken in de vergadering’.  
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notwithstanding the provisions of section 2:13 subsection 4 [DCC], be decided by the chairman of 
the meeting in question.’ (provision 33(2), emphasis added by the author). Similarly, Koninklijke 
BAM Group NV writes: ‘all matters relating to admittance to the General Meeting, exercising 
voting rights and the results of the votes and all other matters relating to the proceedings of the 
meeting104 shall be decided upon by the Chairman of the meeting concerned, without prejudice to 
the provisions of Article 2:13, paragraphs 3 and 4 [DCC]’ (provision 27(6)).  
In contrast, 31 of the 32 DAX-30 companies in our sample included a provision in their articles 
of association that endowed the chairman of the meeting with the authority to place some 
reasonable limits to shareholder speaking and question rights. Some of these provisions are more 
elaborate than others. For example, provision 19(3) of the charter of E.ON AG stipulates that: 
‘[t]he Chairman of the General Meeting may reasonably restrict, in terms of time, the right of shareholders to 
put questions and to speak. At the beginning or in the course of the General Meeting, he may, in particular, 
determine an appropriate framework, in terms of time, for both the course of the General Meeting 
and the discussion on individual items on the agenda as well as for individual questions and speaking contributions. 
In determining the time available for the individual questions and speaking contributions, the 
Chairman of the General Meeting may distinguish between first and repeated contributions and in accordance 
with further appropriate criteria’ (emphasis added by the author). Several elements are noteworthy. First, 
text specifies the timing for limiting the speaking and question rights: the chairman has the power 
to put a limit to these rights at the beginning and during the meeting. Next, the chairman may 
determine an appropriate duration for the AGM. He may also limit the duration of individual 
questions and ‘speaking contributions’. Lastly, the chairman may distinguish between first and 
repeated contributions. These four elements are rather similar to the contested provisions of 
Biotest AG, except that they do not set specific time limits, but leave the exact duration to the 
discretion of the chairman of the meeting. None of the companies in our sample provide specific 
time slots. Note that the BGH has allowed each of these elements in the Karl-Walter 
Freitag/Biotest AG case. 
While the provision of E.ON AG consists of several elements and is relatively elaborate, 
provision 10(4) of the articles of association of Salzgitter SA only states: ‘er kann das Frage- und 
Rederecht des Aktionärs zeitlich angemessen beschränken’. Translation: ‘he may limit the question and 
speaking time of shareholders as appropriate’, where ‘he’ (or ‘er’) refers to the chairman of the 
meeting. 22 of the companies in our sample explicitly authorise the chairman to limit the speaking 
and question time of shareholders at the beginning or during the meeting. Besides these 22 
companies, Fresenius Medical Care AG and Volkswagen AG use the wording ‘from the beginning’. 
Only 7 of the companies that has a provision in their articles of association to be able to limit the 
speaking and question time, do not indicate any specific moment.105 Only 3 companies explicitly 
include in their provisions that the chairman may distinguish between first and repeated speaking 
contributions. These are: Allianz AG, E.ON AG and Muenchener Rueckversicherungs AG. All 31 
companies included terms such as ‘reasonably’ or ‘appropriately’ in their provisions, in 
correspondence with the phrasing of section 131(2) AktG.   
5 Austrian companies in our sample authorise the chairman to limit speaking and question time 
in their articles of association. These companies are: CA Immobilien Anlagen AG, Erste Group 
                                                     
104 The same wording is used in the Dutch version of the articles of association as SBM Offshore NV.   
105 These companies are; BMW AG (Bayerische Motoren Werke), Continental AG, Deutsche Telekom, 
MAN SE, Metro AG, Salzgitter AG and SAP SE. 
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Bank AG, Raiffeisen Bank AG, Flughaven Wien AG and Strabag SE. Three of these explicitly 
stipulate that the chairman may limit the speaking and question time at the beginning and during 
the meeting. Provision 19(2) of Strabag SE’s articles of association is the most detailed one, holding 
that: ‘ferner kann er das Frage- und Rederecht der Aktionäre zeitlich angemessen beschränken. Er kann 
insbesondere zu Beginn oder auch während der Hauptversammlung eine maximale Redezeit von 10 Minuten 
festlegen. Dabei ist es ihm gestattet, die Wortmeldungen zu den Tagesordnungspunkten oder einzelne Frage- und 
Redebeiträge zu ordnen sowie die höchst zulässige Redezeit pro Redner je nach Bedarf weiter zu verkürzen und die 
Rednerliste vorzeitig zu schließen. Der Vorsitzende der Hauptversammlung kann bei Festlegung der für den 
einzelnen Frage- und Redebeitrag zur Verfügung stehenden Zeitrahmen auch zwischen erster und wiederholter 
Wortmeldung sowie nach weiteren sachgerechten Kriterien unterscheiden. Weiters ist es dem Vorsitzenden der 
Hauptversammlung gestattet, zur Sicherung des Laufes der Hauptversammlung gegen einzelne Aktionäre 
individuelle, unbedingt notwendige Maßnahmen zu setzen’ (emphasis added by the author). This provision 
is relatively strict and empowers the chairman to restrict speaking and question time to ten minutes. 
Moreover, the chairman is allowed to close the list of speakers in advance and may distinguish 
between first and repeated contributions. The last sentence of provision 19(2) allows the chairman 
to take the required measures against a particular shareholder in order to ensure the orderly 
progress of the meeting.  
Of the 17 Belgian companies in our sample, none has included a provision in their articles of 
association to restrict shareholder speaking and question time of shareholders. The only ‘French’106 
company that explicitly provides the chairman with the authority to restrict the speaking and 
question time is in fact a Dutch company: St Microelectronics NV. Provision 30(1) of its articles 
holds that the general meeting of shareholders may lay down rules regulating, inter alia, the length 
of time for which shareholders may speak. When these rules do not apply, the chairman may 
regulate the time for which shareholders may speak if he considers this to be desirable with a view 
to the orderly conduct of the meeting. 
None of the ISEQ-20 and FTSE-100 companies that are included in our sample (explicitly) 
gave the chairman the authority to limit shareholder question rights either. However, some 
companies have adopted provisions in their articles that are in line with national statutory laws 
(‘good order of the meeting’). The second line of provision 67 of the articles of association of CRH 
Plc (Irish) holds that ‘the Chairman of a general meeting may interrupt or adjourn such meeting 
without the consent of the meeting where he decides it is necessary to do so in order to (a) secure 
the proper and orderly conduct of the meeting; (b) allow people entitled to do so a reasonable 
opportunity of speaking and voting at the meeting or (c) ensure that the business of the meeting is 
properly disposed of” (emphasis added by the author). This provision permits the chairman to 
interrupt the meeting – for example, when a shareholder is engaging in a monologue – in order to 
provide (other) shareholders a reasonable opportunity to speak.107 Some FSTE-100 companies 
include in their articles of association that the inability for any reason of any member present in 
person or by proxy at such a venue to view or hear all or any of the proceedings of the meeting or 
to speak at the meeting shall not in any way affect the validity of the proceedings of the meeting.108   
 
                                                     
106 St Microelectronics NV was listed to the CAC-40 until the end of 2013, but is established in Amsterdam. 
For the sample selection requirements, one may refer to chapter two of this study. 
107 Other companies that included a similar provision in their articles of association are, inter alia, BHP 
Billiton Plc, HSBC Holdings Plc and GKN Plc.  
108 Phrasing is taken from provision 70 of the articles of association of Vedanta Resources Plc.  
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4.2. Ownership Disclosure 
In this section we discuss an important information right for actors in the financial markets, 
including (small) shareholders: the disclosure of major holdings. As we have seen when discussing 
the European framework of shareholder rights, this information right is not directly linked to the 
AGM. Disclosure of ownership stakes plays a large albeit indirect role in the decision-making of 
(small) shareholders as the disclosed information may shape their expectations regarding the voting 
results and their voting power (cf. infra, subsequent chapters). Disclosure obligations for major 
holdings stem from the Transparency Directive (amended in 2013 with Directive 2013/50/EU,109 
and originally from Directive 88/627/ EEC), but leave room for additional national requirements. 
The lowest disclosure threshold mentioned in Directive 2013/50/EU (and Directive 
2004/109/EC) is 5%.  Member States are allowed to set more stringent rules than those provided 
for in Directive 2004/109/EC regarding i) lower and additional thresholds for notification of 
holdings of voting rights and capital holdings, and ii) the content of the disclosure (the Directive 
provides the example of the disclosure of shareholders’ intentions), the process and the timing for 
notification (see paragraph 12 of the Preamble of Directive 2013/50/EU). Hence, here, too, we 
see some differences among Member States. In the analysis below we briefly outline disclosure 
thresholds and calculation methods in different Member States, as these are relevant for our 
empirical analyses in the subsequent chapters of our research.  
In the UK, before the introduction of the Transparency Directive, disclosure rules were 
outlined in sections 198-211 of the UK CA 1985. Today, transparency rules are part of the 
Disclosure and Transparency Rules (DTR) of the FSA. DTR 5.2.1 of the FCA in the UK requires 
a lowest mandatory disclosure threshold of 3%; it requires notification for a shareholding or 
holding of financial instruments that ‘reaches, exceeds or falls below 3%, 4%, 5%, 6%, 7%, 8%, 
9%, 10% and each 1% threshold thereafter up to 100%’110. DTR 5.6.1 states that the company 
must disclose its total number of voting rights and the total number of votes that are attached to 
treasury shares. Under the FCA’s DTR, ‘voting rights must be calculated on the basis of all the 
shares to which voting rights are attached even if the exercise of such rights is suspended and shall 
be given in respect of all shares to which voting rights are attached’ (DTR 5.8.7, in line with article 
9(1) of the Transparency Directive, Directive 2004/109/EC).  
In Ireland, in accordance with article 14(4) of the Transparency Regulations 2007 (amended in 
2015), shareholders are obliged to disclose their shareholding if it reaches, exceeds or falls below 
the threshold of 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 30%, 50% and 75%. The Transparency Rules of the Irish 
Central Bank require shareholders and holders of financial instruments of listed companies111 to 
disclose their shareholding if it reaches, exceeds or falls below 3%, 4%, 5%, 6%, 7%, 8%, 9%, 10% 
and each 1% threshold thereafter up to 100% as a result of an acquisition or disposal of shares or 
financial instruments, or ’as a result of events changing the breakdown of voting rights and on the 
basis of information disclosed by the issuer in accordance with Regulation 20’.112 Article 19(2) of 
                                                     
109 Member States had two years to implement the changes as a result of this Directive and hence, the new 
rules do not apply to our empirical analyses in chapters 2-4 (cf. infra, chapter 2, nt. 250). Inter alia, the changes 
contain the notification requirements for financial instruments. 
110 In the case of a non-UK issuer the thresholds 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 50% and 75% apply.   
111 In particular, Rule 7.0 refers to ‘issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market 
and whose Home Member State is the State and to issuers whose shares are admitted to trading in a market 
prescribed by the Minister in accordance with Section 24 of the Act of 2006’. 
112 Similar to UK rules, in case of a non-Irish issuer the thresholds 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 50% 
and 75% apply.  
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the Transparency Regulations stipulates that the shareholding percentage should be calculated on 
the basis of the total number of shares to which voting rights are attached. 
Shareholders are required to disclose their substantial shareholdings and short positions ex 
article 5:38 et seq. Wft (Dutch Act on Financial Supervision, in Dutch: Wet op het financieel toezicht) 
under Dutch law. Article 5:38(4) Wft sets the thresholds for the disclosure obligation at 3%, 5%, 
10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 75% and 95%. Disclosure is required when a 
shareholder either actively obtains or loses shares, or passively reaches, exceeds or falls below one 
of these thresholds in terms of his share capital stake (ex article 5:38(1) Wft and article 5:39(1) Wft), 
in terms of his voting rights stake (ex article 5:38(2) Wft) or in terms of his financial instruments 
with a short position (percentage of the share capital, ex article 5:38(3) Wft and 5:39(2) Wft). Next, 
article 5:40 Wft stipulates that a shareholder who obtains or loses shares with a special statutory 
control right also needs to disclose this shareholding, if not yet reported under article 5:38(1) Wft 
(this requirement is not subject to any threshold).  
The calculation of major holdings is more complex in the Netherlands than in the other six 
countries in our sample. The analysis above already indicates that three kinds of major holdings 
subject to disclosure thresholds exist: i) share capital stakes, ii) voting rights stakes, and iii) share 
capital stakes that follow from short positions113. As Dutch law stipulates that a notification of a 
shareholding must offer insights into the composition of this holding, a distinction must be made 
between direct (Dutch: rechtstreeks) and indirect (Dutch: middelijk) disposal share capital stakes 
and/or voting rights stakes. These two categories are subdivided into actual (Dutch: reëel), i.e., when 
there is an actual disposal, and potential (Dutch: potentieel), i.e., when there is a right to acquire the 
stake. The share capital holding is calculated as the nominal value of the shares to be allocated to a 
person divided by the total issued (nominal) share capital of the company. The share capital stake 
is calculated as: (the nominal value of the shares to be allocated to a shareholder)/(the total issued 
(nominal) share capital of the company)*100%. The voting rights stake is calculated as: (the number 
of votes a shareholder is entitled to cast at an AGM)/(the theoretical, maximum number of votes 
to be cast with respect to company shares)*100%.114 Although the Dutch financial markets 
authority (AFM) recognizes that the voting rights of treasury shares may not be exercised, treasury 
shares must be taken into account in the calculations of the shareholdings in accordance with the 
Shareholder Guideline and with Directive 2013/50/EU (and Directive 2004/109/EC). The AFM 
explains that shareholders need to disclose both stakes, i.e., share capital stake and voting rights 
stake, as the one-share-one-vote principle is often not adhered in practice.  
Under German law, a shareholder must disclose his or her shareholding when he or she 
acquires, or the shareholding exceeds or falls below 3%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 50% or 
75% of the voting rights according to section 21 Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (WpHG). Section 22(1) 
WpHG stipulates the voting rights that need to be counted additionally. Paragraph two of this 
section adds that these additional voting rights must be indicated separately in the notifications. 
Treasury shares must also be taken into account. As of January 2013, the Austrian Stock Exchange 
Act (BörseG) contains an additional disclosure requirement for shareholders reaching, exceeding or 
falling below the 4% ownership threshold in a publicly traded company. In addition to this 4% 
                                                     
113 We will not address the calculation of a short position in this study, as this would be outside its scope. 
In the Shareholder Guideline of the Dutch financial markets authority (AFM) one may find a detailed 
description of the calculation method, including a simple calculation example (pp. 29-31). Financial 
Supervision Act Guideline for Shareholders is available via <www.afm.nl>. 
114 Shareholder Guideline, p. 28. 
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threshold, shareholders must also disclose when reaching, exceeding or falling below a threshold 
of 5%, and all multiples thereof. Companies can lower the lowest threshold in their articles of 
association to 3%. Paragraph 91 BörseG stipulates that ‘the percentage of voting rights […] shall be 
calculated based on the total number of shares with voting rights, even if the exercise of such 
voting rights has been suspended’, which includes own shares, in accordance with the Transparency 
Directive.  
The General Regulation of the French Financial Markets Authority (Autorité des Marchés 
Financiers, AMF) requires that ‘the total number of voting rights [be] calculated on the basis of all 
the equities to which voting rights are attached, including equities whose voting rights have been 
suspended’ (article 223-11). In addition to this number, most companies report the total number 
of voting rights that can be exercised as well.115 The lowest mandatory disclosure threshold in 
France is 5% (article L.233-7 FCC)116, but the articles of association may stipulate additional 
disclosure thresholds, which may not be less than 0.5% of the capital or voting rights.  
In Belgium, the Transparantiewet117 stipulates that the disclosure thresholds are 5%, 10%, 15%, 
20% and each 5% threshold thereafter up to 100% are obligatory for shareholders (article 6 
Transparantiewet). Besides these legal thresholds, companies can require additional thresholds in 
their articles of association of 1%, 2%, 3%, 4% and 7.5% (article 18 Transparantiewet). According 
to article 9 Transparantiewet, shareholders must use total voting rights including treasury shares as 
the denominator for the calculation of their voting stake.118  
 
4.3. Concluding Remarks 
In the previous sections, we have provided an overview of shareholder information rights, 
focussing on shareholder forum rights and disclosure obligations in particular. We have seen that, 
in accordance with European law, shareholders have the right to ask questions in all seven 
European Member States, but that there are many differences among the national provisions. Many 
Member States already guaranteed some forum rights to shareholders before the introduction of 
the Shareholder Rights Directive. For example, in the Netherlands, the right to request information 
was already implemented in 1971. And since the Directive contains minimum harmonisation 
requirements, many countries did not adapt these existing shareholder rights to the Directive.  
Thus, national laws sometimes offer shareholders broader rights. For instance, in the Netherlands, 
the shareholder question right is not limited to the agenda of the meeting. And, for example, in 
France, the FCC offers shareholders more formal possibilities to submit written questions. As we 
have seen, in all Member States the chairman of the meeting has, at least to some extent, the 
authority to limit shareholders’ forum rights in (the exceptional) case that the good conduct of the 
                                                     
115 For example, see the annual reports of Vallourec (section breakdown of share capital and voting rights). 
116 Article L.233-7 FCC states: ‘[…]qui vient à posséder un nombre d'actions représentant plus du vingtième, du dixième, 
des trois vingtièmes, du cinquième, du quart, des trois dixièmes, du tiers, de la moitié, des deux tiers, des dix-huit vingtièmes 
ou des dix-neuf vingtièmes du capital ou des droits de vote informe la société dans un délai fixé par décret en Conseil d'Etat, à 
compter du franchissement du seuil de participation, du nombre total d'actions ou de droits de vote qu'elle possède.’ 
117 ‘Wet op de openbaarmaking van belangrijke deelnemingen in emittenten waarvan aandelen zijn toegelaten tot de 
verhandeling op een gereglementeerde markt en houdende diverse bepalingen’ (Wet van 2 mei 2007).   
118 Article 9(1) Transparantiewet: ‘[v]oor de berekening van de stemrechtenquota bedoeld in artikel 6 worden de 
stemrechtverlenende effecten in aanmerking genomen a rato van het aantal bestaande stemrechten waarop zij recht geven; en 
worden de stemrechten verbonden aan stemrechtverlenende effecten in aanmerking genomen niettegenstaande de gebeurlijke 
opschorting van de uitoefening ervan’. 
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meeting is undermined. The analysis of the articles of association shows that German listed 
companies include detailed provisions on this matter. This is not very surprising as the AktG 
explicitly provides for this. For Austria and the Netherlands, we found that some companies have 
also included some provision in their articles. In the other countries, this is not common practice. 
In chapter 6 of this research we will further consider the use of shareholders’ forum rights in Dutch 
AGMs and, inter alia, investigate whether the explicit possibility to limit shareholder forum rights 
in the articles of association under German law would be recommended for the Netherlands as 
well.  
We have seen that ownership disclosure obligations differ (to some extent) at the national level 
as well. For instance, some countries add a minimum disclosure threshold of 3%, whereas the 
minimum disclosure threshold in the Transparency Directive is 5%. Although this (small) 
shareholder information right is not directly linked to AGMs, it plays an important role in the 
empirical analyses in the subsequent chapters. Before we turn to these empirical analyses in the 
next chapters, we first provide an outline of shareholder decision-making rights in the next section.  
 
5. THE NATIONAL LEVEL: DECISION-MAKING RIGHTS  
In section 3 of this study we already have seen that the content of AGM agendas is not harmonized 
at the European level, except for capital resolutions and merger approval (to some extent). In this 
part of the research we consider the national framework of shareholder decision-making rights. We 
consider regular decision-making rights separately, among these; approval of director elections, say 
on pay resolutions, capital resolutions and amendments to the articles of association. Besides these, 
we also consider other (non-recurrent) voting items. The findings from the analysis in this section 
are used for the empirical research in the subsequent chapters of this thesis.  
Before we discuss these decision-making rights it is important to note that these decision-
making rights are merely approval rights: in practice, shareholders usually decide whether to approve 
a resolution prepared by the corporate board.119 This is not the case for shareholder proposals (cf. 
infra, next section). In some cases, shareholders also have special rights, e.g., different classes of 
shares, attached to priority shares, or shareholder committees (in the Netherlands: article 2:158(10) 
DCC in companies that fall under the structuurregeling, cf. infra, section 5.2.1).  
 
5.1. Shareholder Proposals 
The rights to put items on the agenda and to call a general meeting are included in the Shareholder 
Rights Directive. Although we are classing these two particular shareholder rights under ‘decision-
making rights’, these are not only decision-making rights, but may also be considered information 
rights as shareholders may only add voting items to the meeting’s agenda that do not interfere with 
the decision-making powers of other corporate bodies. Items that are outside the decision-making 
authority of the AGM can be placed on the agenda solely as discussion items.  
Few substantial differences across our seven Member States regarding the right to put items 
on the agenda or to call a general meeting exist. Some countries have set a lower threshold than 
                                                     
119 For instance, in the Netherlands, article 2:133(1) DCC states that the articles of association may provide 
that the general meeting shall appoint a Director based on nomination (in Dutch: bindende voordracht). 
Paragraph two of the article provides that the general meeting may at all times overrule the binding effect 
of such nomination by means of a resolution passed with two-thirds majority that represent more than half 
of the issued share capital.  
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5% for the agenda right. For example, the Netherlands currently uses a threshold of 3% of the 
share capital having used a threshold of 1% in the past.120 Belgium and Ireland also require a capital 
stake of 3%, ex article 533ter WvV and section 1104 Irish CA 2014, respectively. In Austria only a 
1% capital stake is required ex section 110 Austrian AtkG. Other Member States such as France 
(article L.225-105 FCC), Germany (section 122(2) AktG), and UK (section 338 CA 2006) use a 
threshold of 5%, but Germany and France require 5% of the share capital and the UK of the total 
voting rights. Section 338(3)(b) UK CA 2006 also allows ‘at least 100 members who have a right 
to vote on the resolution at the annual general meeting to which the requests relate and hold shares 
in the company on which there has been paid up an average sum, per member, of at least £100’ to 
put a resolution on the agenda. This latter option is likely to entail collective action problem (cf. 
infra, chapter 5 of this research). In Germany, this is a shareholder or a group of shareholders that 
‘represent an amount of the share capital corresponding to 500,000 euros’ in accordance with 
section 122(2) AktG.  
Article 6 of the Shareholder Rights Directive states that Member States can allow shareholders 
to add items only to AGM agendas. Where this is the case, shareholders have the right to call a 
general meeting which is not an AGM that contains at least the items that are requested by these 
shareholders. In the Netherlands, shareholders can add items to AGMs and other general meetings, 
and the threshold for calling a meeting is set at 10% of the share capital pursuant to article 2:110 
DCC. In France, Austria, Germany, Ireland and the UK this threshold is 5% ex article L.225-103(2) 
FCC, section 115(3) Austrian AktG, section 122(1) AktG, section 1101 Irish CA 2014 and section 
303 CA 2006, respectively (in the UK, this is 5% ‘of such of the paid-up capital of the company as 
carries the right of voting’). In contrast, in Belgium one-fifth of the share capital is needed to call 
a general meeting ex article 532 WvV.  
Other restrictions to shareholder proposals in Europe only hold in exceptional cases. For 
instance, in the UK only shareholder proposals that are either a) ineffective when passed (whether 
by reason of inconsistency with any enactment or the company's constitution or otherwise), b) 
defamatory of any person, or c) frivolous or vexatious cannot be added to the meeting agendas 
pursuant to section 338(2) UK CA 2006. Moreover, in Germany, any shareholder has the right to 
file a counter motion to a proposal of the management board and supervisory board ex paragraph 
126 AktG. Also, according to paragraph 127 AktG, the right to file a counter motion shall apply 
analogously to a nomination by a shareholder for the election of a member of the supervisory 
board or to external auditors.121  
 
5.2. The Agenda of the AGM 
In section 2 of this research we already have seen that the content of AGM agendas is not 
harmonized at the European level, except for capital resolutions and merger approval (but also 
only to some extent). In this section we consider the national framework of shareholder decision-
making rights. We discuss director elections, say on pay resolutions, capital resolutions, 
amendments to the articles of association and other voting items in the next sections.  
 
                                                     
120 the Netherlands increased its threshold to 3% due to activist shareholder behaviour such as in the ABN 
Amro case where the activist shareholder the Children’s Investment Fund Management (TCI) acquired only 
1% of the share capital of ABN Amro and requested a split-up of the banking group. 
121 Shareholders also have the right to file countermotions in Austria. 
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5.2.1. Corporate Elections 
Some rules regarding corporate elections are harmonized at the European level. For instance, article 
39 of Directive 2014/56/EU, amending Directive 2006/43/EC (Audit Directive) requires that the 
audit committee consist of a majority of independent directors. However, a large majority of the 
provisions are country-specific. Rules on independent directors in European Member States are 
usually not of statutory nature but are established in corporate governance codes. For example, the 
Austrian Corporate Governance Code (provision IV.54) states that if companies have a free float 
of more than 20%, the members of the supervisory board (elected by the AGM or delegated in 
accordance with the articles of association) shall include at least one independent member who is 
not a shareholder with a stake of more than 10% or who represents such a shareholder’s interests. 
And, in the case of companies with a free float of over 50%, at least two members of the 
supervisory board need to meet these criteria. In contrast, the German Corporate Governance 
Code (Kodex, hereinafter: GCGC) states that the supervisory board shall include what it considers 
an adequate number of independent members (following provision 5.4.2.) And, in the Netherlands, 
provision III.2.1. of the Dutch Corporate Governance Code 2008 (hereinafter: DCGC 2008122 123) 
stipulates that ‘[a]ll supervisory board members, with the exception of not more than one person, 
shall be independent’. In the UK Corporate Governance Code (hereinafter: UKCGC) rule E.1.2 
requires that, except for companies below the FTSE-350124, at least half the board, excluding the 
chairman, should comprise non-executive directors determined by the board to be independent.125 
In France, too, the independent directors should account for half the members of the board, but 
in controlled companies the sharer falls to a third (AFEP/MEDEF Corporate Governance 
Code126, rule 9.2, hereinafter: FCGC). Controlled companies are defined in article L.233-3 FCC. 
Section II of this article states that control is presumed when holding more than 40% of the voting 
rights and no other partner or shareholder directly or indirectly holds a larger fraction. Lastly, in 
Belgium, the Belgian Corporate Governance Code (hereinafter: BCGC) states that the majority of 
the nomination committee (rule 5.3./1) and the remuneration committee (5.4./1) also needs to be 
independent.  
These rules in the national corporate governance codes already show large differences. For 
instance, the previously mentioned Dutch, German and Austrian corporate governance provisions 
(generally)127 concern supervisory board members, whereas the provisions in the other countries 
                                                     
122 A version of the DCGC was introduced in December 2016. This research mainly refers to DCGC 2008 
as this version was still applicable during our research period in the next chapters, but we provide references 
to the provisions in DCGC 2016.  
123 The independency requirements for supervisory board members were somewhat amended in new pro-
visions 2.1.7 and 2.1.8 of the DCGC 2016. For example, the independency requirements are split, and only 
at least half of the supervisory board members is now not allowed to have a stake of at least 10% of the 
share capital in the company.  
124 These ‘smaller companies’ should have at least two independent non-executive directors. 
125 The Irish Stock Exchange recognizes the UKCGC. Irish listed companies thus follow the UKCGC on a 
comply-or-explain basis.  
126 One must note that the FCC provides the opportunity to follow the MiddleNext Code (instead of the 
AFEP-MEDEF) that targets small- and midcap companies. Since our research focuses on CAC-40 
companies, and most other companies also follow the AFEP-MEDEF code, this code is less relevant for 
our purposes. However, the rules (for example regarding remuneration) differ between these corporate 
governance codes. 
127 Paragraph 15 of the preamble of the DCGC (2008) states that ‘[t]he Code is based on the system in which 
a separate supervisory board exists alongside the management board, whether under the statutory two-tier 
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mention directors.  Hence, to explore the rights of shareholders to appoint directors, we first need 
to make a distinction among the Member States in our sample that require a two-tier board system 
and the ones that require a one-tier board system. Germany and Austria have a two-tier board 
system, including the Vorstand (the management board), and the Aufsichtsrat (the supervisory 
board). Dutch listed companies typically also have a two-tier board structure that consists of the 
Raad van Bestuur (management board) and the Raad van Commissarissen (supervisory board). Until 
recently, the two-tier board structure was mandatory for NVs classified as ‘large’ corporations 
under the so-called Dutch structuurregeling (structure regime)128. With the introduction of the Wet 
bestuur en toezicht (Board and Governance Act)129, which went into effect on January 1, 2013, Dutch 
companies may now determine in their articles of association whether they follow a one-tier or a 
two-tier board structure.130  
Companies in the UK, Ireland, Belgium and France usually follow a one-tier board system. In 
the UK, Ireland and Belgium this structure is required by law.131 In Belgium, the WvV also allows 
for a “mixed board structure” (following Gerner-Beuerle, Paech and Schuster, 2013, p. 4). The 
articles of association may determine that the board of directors transfer some of its power to a 
directiecomité (afdeling Ibis, article 524bis and 524ter WvV).132 This direction committee may comprise 
directors and non-directors. French law allows for a one-tier board or a two-tier board system, so 
like in the Netherlands it allows companies to choose their structure133 A majority of the French 
companies follows the default rule and have a one-tier board structure.134  
In a one-tier board system, usually all directors (executive and non-executive directors) are 
elected (and dismissed) by the general meeting. In the UK the appointment of directors is stipulated 
in the articles of association, which typically grant this right to the general meeting as an ordinary 
resolution (Davies, 2013, p. 744; Mayson, French and Ryan, 2016, p. 439). The CA 2006 requires 
the first directors to be appointed by a statement signed by, or on behalf of, the subscribers of the 
                                                     
rules (structuurregime) or otherwise. Chapter III.8 contains several specific provisions for companies that have 
a one-tier structure.’ In provision III.8.4 says that the majority of the members of the management board 
shall be non-executive directors and independent. In the new DCGC 2016, the one-tier board structure is 
more extensively outlined in the new chapter 5.  
128 A corporation is considered large if it meets the size criteria are stipulated in article 2:153(2) DCC. 
129 Wet van 6 juni 2011 tot wijziging van boek 2 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek in verband met de aanpassing van regels over 
bestuur en toezicht in naamloze en besloten vennootschappen. Staatsblad 2011, 265. 
130 The legal foundation for the Dutch NV is article 2:129a DCC; article 2:239a DCC articulates the legal 
foundation for Dutch BVs. Large companies that adopted a mandatory two-tier board structure in 
accordance with the structuurregeling are now also allowed to choose between these two board structures ex 
article 2:164a DCC. 
131 Actually, in the UK, the CA 2006 remains silent about the board system. However, UK companies 
operate with a one-tier board system, and this is also the system that the CA 2006 assumes to be in place. 
Following Davies, 2013:723.  
132 In particular, article 524bis(1) WvV stipulates that ‘[d]e statuten kunnen de raad van bestuur toestaan zijn 
bestuursbevoegdheden over te dragen aan een directiecomité, zonder dat deze overdracht betrekking kan hebben op het algemeen 
beleid van de vennootschap of op alle handelingen die op grond van andere bepalingen van de wet aan de raad van bestuur zijn 
voorbehouden. Wanneer een directiecomité wordt ingesteld is de raad van bestuur belast met het toezicht op dat comité.’ Despite 
the mixed board structure there is some convergence towards the two-tier board structure, as the board has 
the duty to monitor this direction committee.  
133 Article L.225-57 FCC states that the memorandum and articles of association of public companies may 
stipulate that they shall be governed by the provisions of the subsection on the two-tier board structure 
(L.225-57 to L.225-90-1). The default rule is the one-tier board structure. See also Hansmann & Kraakman 
(2009), p. 21. 
134 Dorresteijn, et al. (2009), p. 162.  
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memorandum (sections 9(4)(c), 12(1)(a) and 12(2)(a) of the CA 2006). In the absence of any 
provision in the articles of association, the directors are appointed by the ‘members’ of the 
company.135 The UKCGC requires FTSE-350 to re-elect their directors every year.136 Section 168 
CA 2006 stipulates that the general meeting can remove any director at any time by ordinary 
resolution without providing any reason in the UK, as well as in cases when the(se) director(s) are 
not appointed by the shareholders (Davies, 2013, p. 745). The UKCGC adds that ‘[n]on-executive 
directors should be appointed for specified terms subject to re-election and to statutory provisions 
relating to the removal of a director. Any term beyond 6 years for a non-executive director should 
be subject to particularly rigorous review, and should take into account the need for progressive 
refreshing of the board’ (provision B.2.3). Following new Listing Rules (introduced in May 2014), 
LR 9.2.2AR jo 9.2.2ER, independent shareholders may vote separately on the election of 
independent directors in companies that have a controlling shareholder in the UK. The threshold 
for control is set at 30% and includes acting in concert. If the resolution is not approved, the 
company may propose a further resolution to elect or re-elect the proposed independent director. 
This proposal can only be voted on in the 30 days from the end of the waiting period of 90 days. 
This second resolution must be approved by the shareholders of the company ex LR 9.2.2FR. 
In Ireland, the appointment of directors is also stipulated in the articles of association. Section 
144 (3)(a) Irish CA 2014 sets the default rule that directors are appointed by the general meeting.137 
However, since the Listing Rules of the Irish Stock Exchange (ISE) require that Irish incorporated 
listed companies on the Main Securities Market comply to the UKCGC on a comply or explain 
basis138, Irish listed companies will also usually put their directors up for (re-)election by the AGM 
every year. Section 146 Irish CA 2014 stipulates that directors can be removed by the general 
meeting by ordinary resolution. This decision also requires no justification and can be made at any 
time.  
In Belgium, directors are also appointed and dismissed by the AGM under a simple majority 
rule. In accordance with article 518(3) WvV, the maximum term is six years, but the BCGC reduces 
this term to 4 years (principle 4.6). Article 518(3) WvV also stipulates that directors can be removed 
at any time by the AGM without reason. And in France, the appointment right for a one-tier board 
structure is stipulated in article L.225-18 FCC: this article states that this resolution is adopted at 
the ordinary general meeting, and hence, requires a normal majority. The maximum term of office 
is 6 years in accordance with article L.225-18 FCC, but provision 14 of the FCGC requires a 
                                                     
135 Case law: Woolf v East Nigel Gold Mining Co Ltd (1905) 21 TLR 600; Harman v Energy Research 
Group Australia Ltd (1986) WAR 123. Following Mayson, French & Ryan (2016) p. 439.  
136 Provision B.7.1. states that: ‘[a]ll directors of FTSE 350 companies should be subject to annual election 
by shareholders. All other directors should be subject to election by shareholders at the first annual general 
meeting after their appointment, and to re-election thereafter at intervals of no more than three years. Non-
executive directors who have served longer than nine years should be subject to annual re-election.’ 
137 Section 144(3)(a) holds that: ‘subsequent directors of a company may be appointed by the members in 
general meeting, provided that no person other than a director retiring at the meeting shall, save where 
recommended by the directors, be eligible for election to the office of director at any general meeting unless 
the requirements of subsection (4) as to his or her eligibility for that purpose have been complied with’. 
138 The Irish CGA states that the ISE recognizes that this Code has ‘set the standard for corporate 
governance internationally’ (p. 1 of Appendix 4). 
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maximum term of four years.139 Article L.225-18 further specifies that the ordinary general meeting 
can dismiss the directors at any time (without reason).  
In contrast, in a two-tier board structure, the supervisory board is usually appointed by the 
AGM and has the legal duty to appoint, to supervise and to remove members of the management 
board. In France, the two-tier board structure provisions are stipulated in article L.225-57 FCC et 
seq. Article L.225-59 FCC requires that the supervisory board members appoint the management 
board members. In accordance with L.225-61, the AGM may dismiss the management board 
members. Article 225-27 FCC stipulates that the bylaws may provide that up to four directors (five 
for non-listed companies) be elected by employees, as long as this number does not exceed one-
third of the other directors (one-tier board structure). Article L.225-79 FCC requires this for a two-
tier board structure (also see Pietrancosta, Dubois and Garcon, 2013, p. 225). Moreover, article 
L.225-23 FCC (one-tier board structure) and L.225-71 FCC (two-tier board structure) require that 
in listed companies, employee shareholders who hold more than 3% of the share capital have the 
right to appoint one or more directors among them (following Pietrancosta, Dubois and Garcon, 
2013, p. 187).140 
In Germany, the AGM has the right to partly elect the members of the Aufsichsrat. The other 
members of the Aufsichsrat are elected by employees under the German co-determination 
(mitbestimmung) regulations. Paragraph 7 of the Mitbestimmungsgesetz requires that in large companies 
(more than 2,000 employees) a supervisory board consists of an even number of members of which 
half are elected from among employee representatives.141 The chairman of the supervisory board 
is (usually) a shareholder representative,142 providing the shareholders with decisive power via a tie-
breaking vote. In companies with 500 to 2,000 employees, one third of the members are elected 
from among employee representatives. The right to remove supervisory board members is 
stipulated in section 103(1) AktG: only those supervisory board members appointed by the AGM 
may be removed at any time by the AGM. This requires a special majority of 75% (although the 
articles of association may set another higher majority and additional requirements). The term of 
office for management and supervisory board members may not exceed 5 years: for management 
board members this limitation is stipulated in section 84(1) AktG. For supervisory board members, 
there is no explicit term stated in the AktG, but section 102 AktG stipulates that ‘[t]he members 
                                                     
139 Paragraph 1 of provision 14 affirms that: ‘[w]ithout affecting the duration of current terms, the duration 
of directors' terms of office, set by the by-laws (‘statuts’)13, should not exceed a maximum of four years, so 
that the shareholders are called to express themselves through elections with sufficient frequency.’ 
140 Companies that have stipulated in their articles of association that one or more directors be elected by 
employees ex L.225-27 or L.225-79 FCC are excluded from this requirement. 
141 Section 7 of the Mitbestimmungsgesetz requires that companies with less than 10,000 employees have a 
supervisory board with six shareholder representatives and six employee representatives. For companies 
with more than 10,000 employees but less than 20,000 the supervisory board should consist of eight 
shareholder representatives and eight employee representatives and for companies with more than 20,000 
employees this amount is ten (twenty supervisory board members in total). As a result of the 
Codetermination regime, corporate boards in Germany are usually larger than in other companies. One may 
for example refer to the table presented by Hansmann and Kraakman (2009, p. 70). The authors find that 
whereas many boards have more than 20 board members in Germany, in the US, UK, France and Italy this 
number is substantially lower (around eleven members).   
142 Following Cahn and Donald (2010, p. 310). The authors write that the chairman is elected by two thirds 
of the supervisory board in the first round. Since the required two-thirds majority is often not reached, a 
second round is usually held. During this second round the shareholder representatives elect the chairman 
by simple majority voting. The employee representatives elect a deputy chairman.  
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of the supervisory board may not be appointed for a period of time extending beyond the 
adjournment of the shareholders’ meeting resolving on ratification of the acts of management for 
the fourth fiscal year following the commencement of their respective term of office. The fiscal 
year in which such term of office commences shall not be taken into account’143. Legal scholars 
generally argue that this term also holds for re-appointments of supervisory board members (Roth, 
2013, p. 319). The GCGC states in provision 5.4.4. that the members of the management board 
may not become supervisory board members of the company within two years after the end of 
their appointment, unless they are appointed upon a motion presented by shareholders holding 
more than 25% of the voting rights in the company. 
Section 87(1) of the Austrian AktG stipulates that the members of the supervisory board are 
elected by the AGM. However, employee representatives make up one-third of the supervisory 
board in Austria ex section 110 ArbVG (the Gesamte Rechtsvorschrift für Arbeitsverfassungsgesetz). The 
maximum term of office for management board members is 5 years ex section 75 Austrian AktG. 
For the supervisory board members a similar provision as in section 102 AktG (Germany) applies 
to their term of office ex section 87(7) Austrian AktG.144 In accordance with section 87(8) AktG 
the AGM may remove the members of the supervisory board at any time: for this a majority of at 
least three fourths of the votes is required. Here too, the articles of association may replace this 
majority by another (higher) threshold and establish other requirements.  
In the Netherlands, the members of the management board and the supervisory board are 
elected by the AGM ex articles 2:132 jo 2:134 DCC and 2:142 jo 2:144 DCC. However, the 
supervisory board has the authority to (re-)elect and dismiss members of the management board 
under the structuurregeling ex article 2:162 DCC (two-tier) and 2:164a DCC (one-tier)145.146 
Furthermore, the employees’ council147 has, in companies ‘with labour-codetermination’148, the 
binding right to nominate one-third of the members of the supervisory board. The AGM has the 
right to remove the directors that are appointed by the AGM at any time and without reason ex 
article 2:134(1) DCC, but one may note that all resolutions must be in accordance with a standard 
of reasonableness and fairness ex article 2:15(1) DCC (following Nowak, 2013, p. 471). Article 
2:134(2) DCC stipulates that if the articles of association stipulate a qualified majority for the 
removal of directors, this majority may not exceed two thirds of the votes cast which represent 
                                                     
143 The wordings are taken from <http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/german-stock-corporation-
act-109100.pdf>. (accessed in June 2015). 
144 This provision holds: ‘(7) Kein Aufsichtsratsmitglied kann für längere Zeit als bis zur Beendigung der 
Hauptversammlung gewählt werden, die über die Entlastung für das vierte Geschäftsjahr nach der Wahl beschließt; hiebei wird 
das Geschäftsjahr, in dem das Aufsichtsratsmitglied gewählt wurde, nicht mitgerechnet.’ 
145 For a legal analysis of article 2:164a DCC, please refer to Melchers (2013).  
146 Large corporations with mainly international activities are subject to a less strict version of this regime, 
following article 2:155(1) Dutch Civil Code. Under this regime, the shareholders’ meeting retains the 
authority to (re-)elect and dismiss the members of the management board. 
147 Companies that employ at least fifty employees must establish an employees’ council. This council is 
composed of employees’ representatives. The number of representatives lies between 3 and 25, depending 
on the total number of employees. Article 6 of the Wet op de Ondernemingsraden van 28 januari 1971 [Law of 
28 January 1971 on the Employees Council], Staatsblad 1971, p. 1.  
148 This wording is taken from Nowak (2013), p. 475. It should be noted that the Dutch approach of labour 
codetermination is less far reaching than the German codetermination system. In the Netherlands, 
companies which must comply with the co-determination rules must provide the employees’ council with 
the right to nominate one third of the supervisory board. Next, the supervisory board provides the binding 
nomination of its own members. The general meeting elects the members but can also reject the nominated 
supervisory board members, which initiates a specific procedure (article 2:158(9) DCC).  
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more than half of the share capital. The maximum term of office is four years with no limit for re-
election.   
The analysis above shows that there are large differences in shareholder decision-making rights 
regarding board elections that one needs to consider in an empirical comparative framework (the 
next chapters in this research). We provide an overview of director (re-)elections for the seven 
Member States in table 4:  
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TABLE 4  
Director elections 
Voting items:  
Director elections 
Austria Belgium France Germany Ireland Netherlands UK 
Board structure? Two-tier One-tier Both (one-tier most 
common) 
 
Two-tier One-tier Both (two-tier most 
common) 
One-tier 
(Re-)election right? Supervisory 
board members 






Directors Supervisory board 




 Needed majority for 
appointment? 
50% + 1 50% + 1 50% + 1 50% + 1 50% + 1 50% + 1 50% + 1 





50% + 1 50% + 1 75% (only 
supervisory board 
members, those 
appointed by AGM) 
50% + 1 50% + 1 
(those appointed by the 
AGM) 
50% + 1 




4 years Every year 
up for re-
election 
Employee involvement? Yes No149 Yes Yes No Yes, but only binding 
nomination of one-third 
No 
                                                     
149 With the exception of some state-controlled companies.  
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5.2.2. Say-on-pay Resolutions 
Executive remuneration is a quintessential topic in corporate governance that is a subject of 
extensive debate. Executive remuneration packages consist of several components, usually 
including; i) fixed pay or salary that is usually defined as a fixed amount of cash; ii) short-run and 
long-term variable pay in cash, shares, and/or options on shares; iii) retirement plans; iv) severance 
pay; v) loans, guarantees, and other grants;150 and vi) other benefits or ‘perquisites’ (Cahn and 
Donald, 2010, p. 418). Since this section of the study concerns shareholder decision-making rights, 
and shareholders do not have a say on all aspects of the remuneration packages in all Member 
States, we only focus in the next sections on shareholder approval rights about pay matters.  
Executive pay is usually associated with incentive pay. In the introduction chapter, we have 
considered the principal-agent relationship between directors and shareholders. The central 
question in these relationships is how to motivate the agent to perform in the interest of the 
principal. The principal generally lacks information about the agent’s performance (moral hazard 
problem) and monitoring is considered costly. Incentive pay is one of the mechanisms that can be 
used to induce the agent to act in the interest of the principal. For example, consider the simple 
model introduced by Sappington (1991, pp. 46-47): there is a principal and an agent, and both 
parties are risk neutral. These two parties share the same beliefs about the critical random 
productivity parameter that Sappington denotes by θ (Sappington mentions as an example the 
amount of rainfall). The agent’s effort is denoted by e, and both the agent’s efforts e and θ affect 
the level of expected performance. Next we have the realised performance that is denoted by X. 
Sappington assumes that the agent can observe θ before he determines how much efforts he exerts. 
The principal however, cannot observe the level of effort nor the realization of θ. The principal’s 
valuation of the performance level X is noted by V(X), an increasing function of X with 
diminishing returns. In this game, first, the principal determines the payments P that the agent will 
receive, depending on the observed performance X. Then, the agent accepts or rejects the contract. 
Sappington assumes that if the agent rejects, there will not be another offer (‘take-it-or-leave-it’). 
The agent will only accept the contract when the expected utility of accepting the contract exceeds 
his opportunity costs, denoted by ?̅?. This reservation level is presumed to be known by both 
parties. Sappington argues that the solution to this game is a simple contract that provides the agent 
with payment P that is equal to the principal’s valuation of the performance of the agent minus the 
fixed constant k: P(X) = V(X) – k. Sappington argues that the constant k can be considered as a 
franchise fee that is paid by the agent to work for the principal. This fee equals the expected total 
surplus from efficient operation, i.e., the efficient level of effort e*(θ). In this example, the level of 
effort maximizes the expected surplus, which can be defined as the difference between the expected 
value of the agent’s performance and the cost of effort, including opportunity cost ?̅?.  In 
Sappington’s example, the agent has become the residual claimant, acting as if he were the principal.  
The message derived from this simple model is clear: without information problems,151 well-
designed incentive payments can be used to align the interests of the parties in a principal-agent 
relationship. However, in practice there are information asymmetries and the principal actually 
                                                     
150 Words are partly taken from Van der Laan et al. (2010). Following Van der Elst and Lafarre (2015, p. 
230).  
151 In this simple situation, the principal would never have to pay to obtain information about the working 
environment or the magnitude of the agent’s efforts (Sappington, 1991).  
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benefits from an increased ability in monitoring and disclosure.152 Sappington demonstrates this 
reality in his paper using some extensions of the aforementioned model.  
Practice shows that badly designed incentive pay and lack of good monitoring can result in 
undesirable situations. As Van der Elst and Lafarre (2015) describe, there has been a lot of criticism 
of performance-linked compensation systems. Executive pay is often considered excessive and the 
gap between executive pay and employee earnings continues to grow (for instance, one may refer 
to Fleming and O’Connor, 2015, following Van der Elst and Lafarre, 2015). For instance, Bebchuk 
and Fried have complained about overpaid executives ‘without performance’ (Bebchuk and Fried, 
2004). The authors argue that in practice performance-linked compensation is not in line with the 
arm’s-length contracting model and the role of ‘managerial power’ in the compensation setting 
process needs to be considered. According to many, particularly in the financial sector, 
performance-linked pay has actually worsened the agency problem, leading to short-term incentives 
and excessive risk-loving behaviour (for instance, see Ferrarini and Ungureanu, 2014). For many 
years this discussion took place in the UK and the US. However, during the last decade continental 
Europe, including the Netherlands, experienced increasing executive pay and larger social 
opposition as well. In the Netherlands, the discussion of the share bonus and severance pay 
package of Rijkman Groenink, former CEO of ABN Amro, at the end of 2007 was especially fierce 
(Smit, 2008). The discussion of (how to structure) executive pay has involved not only shareholders, 
politicians and academics, but also the media, which has drawn significant attention to high levels 
of executive pay for so-called ‘fat cats’,153 thereby turning this discussion into a social one.154 
Many countries introduced new disclosure requirements as well as some form of say on pay in 
recent years to strengthen executive compensation as a corporate governance mechanism. These 
say-on-pay regulations vary widely across the world, and within Europe, too.155 As we have seen in 
the previous sections of this research, the EC has proposed a European say on pay that includes a 
say on the remuneration policy every three years and the yearly approval of the remuneration 
report. These and other proposed amendments to the Shareholder Rights Directive have not yet 
been implemented.  
To structure the large variety of say on pay decision-making rights and to be able to compare 
them, we divide the say on pay resolutions into different categories. First, we distinguish resolutions 
                                                     
152 Another example of a principal-agent problem and the effect of variable pay is the following (Fan, 2013, 
p. 27): principal Y wants to sell a particular good, for example a car. He hires car dealer X to do this. We 
assume that dealer X has extensive experience in selling cars and is definitely more experienced than 
principal Y. Car dealer X knows that, if he spends a little bit more time, there will always be a buyer willing 
to pay more. For example, at t =1 he will be able to sell the car for 1,000€ and at t =2 for 1,200€. 
Furthermore, assume that the car dealer incurs 50€ of costs every period t (e.g., effort to find a buyer, stalling 
costs etc.). If the principal pays the car dealer a fixed fee of, say, 100€, the car dealer will always sell the car 
at the lower price in the first period. However, given variable pay, for instance a fixed fee of 100€, plus an 
extra amount of 100€ if the car is sold for a price higher than 1,000€, you may perhaps conclude that the 
car dealer may be incentivized to sell the car in the second period: after all, selling the car in the second 
period would provide him with an extra gain of 50€. However, with private information in the market for 
second-hand cars and without proper monitoring of the principal, the car dealer will be better off buying 
the car in period one and selling it to another buyer in the second (which violates the fiduciary duty, i.e., the 
duty of loyalty).  
153 The term ‘fat cat’ is often used in the press. One may refer to the article in The Economist (2003). This 
article starts with the sentence: ‘NOTHING in business excites so much interest in the wider world as the 
pay of top executives’. 
154 This text was partly taken from Lafarre and Van der Elst (2015).  
155 Thomas and Van der Elst (2015). 
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concerning the remuneration report (ex post say on pay). Other resolutions may include the approval 
of (amendments to) the remuneration policy, approval of incentive schemes and share (option) 
grants, (non-)executive and supervisory board remuneration, and related party transactions. These 
resolutions merely involve ex ante say on pay rights. One may note that not only the content of the 
say on pay right may differ, but also its nature. Some forms of say on pay are binding and thus have 
legal consequences, whereas others are non-binding. Besides, some say on pay rights are 
mandatory, whereas other forms of say on pay are not. An example of a non-mandatory say on pay 
right is the shareholder approval on the remuneration system in Germany, as the German AktG 
stipulates that shareholders can have a vote, which we will discuss – together with other say on pay 
rules – discuss in the following sections. Besides these forms of rules, one may also find say on pay 
provisions in, for instance, the national corporate governance codes.   
 
5.2.2.1. Remuneration Report 
As of 2003 in the UK and 2012 in Belgium, shareholders have a mandatory, but non-binding vote 
on the remuneration report ex section 422 CA 2006 and article 96(3) jo article 554 WvV,156 
respectively. The Irish CA and the Listing Rules of the Irish Stock Exchange do not require such 
a say-on-pay right. However, many Irish companies nowadays put the remuneration report to a 
shareholders’ vote. In 2009, Manifest, a European proxy voting agency, requested an ex post say on 
pay at several Irish companies, including Bank of Ireland Plc, DCC Plc, C&C Group Plc and 
Independent News & Media Plc (Manifest, 2009). Accordingly, these four companies have put 
their remuneration report to a shareholders’ vote ever since.  In the Netherlands, France, Germany 
and Austria shareholders have no legal right to a say on pay regarding the remuneration report 
(yet). Moreover, companies usually do not provide this right to their shareholders in practice.  
 
5.2.2.2. Remuneration Policy 
To date, only the Netherlands and the UK have a shareholder say on the remuneration policy that 
(somewhat) resembles the proposed article 9a(1) of the Shareholder Rights Directive. In the 
Netherlands, article 2:135(1) DCC stipulates that the general meeting is the only corporate body 
that can adopt the remuneration policy. Although the law remains silent on this issue, it is assumed 
that the AGM must adopt any amendments to the remuneration policy (Van der Elst and Lafarre, 
                                                     
156 The second paragraph of article 554 WvV was implemented at 3 May 2010 with the act W 2010-04-
06/21 (article 9) and states (in Dutch): ‘Eveneens beslist de algemene vergadering van de vennootschap waarvan de 
aandelen zijn toegelaten tot de verhandeling op een in artikel 4 bedoelde markt, bij afzonderlijke stemming, over het 
remuneratieverslag.’ This article also stipulates a shareholders’ say if the severance pay in the executive service 
contract of an executive director (or the daily manager) is higher than twelve months fixed pay (or when 
motivated by the remuneration committee higher than eighteen months fixed pay): ‘Indien een overeenkomst 
met een uitvoerend bestuurder, een lid van het directiecomité, een andere leider bedoeld in artikel 96, § 3, laatste lid, of een 
persoon belast met het dagelijks bestuur van een vennootschap waarvan de aandelen zijn toegelaten tot de verhandeling op een 
in artikel 4 bedoelde markt voorziet in een vertrekvergoeding die hoger is dan 12 maanden loon of, op gemotiveerd advies van 
het remuneratiecomité, hoger dan 18 maanden loon, moet die afwijkende bepaling over de vertrekvergoeding vooraf worden 
goedgekeurd door de eerstvolgende gewone algemene vergadering. Elk hiermee strijdig beding is van rechtswege nietig.’ 
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2015, 2017).157 158 The remuneration policy must include the elements as described in articles 2:383c 
DCC up to and including article 2:383e DCC to the extent that these concern the board of 
directors. These elements include “all aspects of remuneration”159. In the UK, companies need to 
put the remuneration policy to a shareholders’ vote as of 2013.160 This rule was introduced in 
section 439A UK CA 2006.161 In contrast to the Netherlands, approval is required every three years, 
including cases where the remuneration policy is not amended. Van der Elst and Lafarre (2017) 
show that the Dutch approach spontaneously results in a vote at least every three years in many 
companies,162 but also allows other companies to keep a satisfying compensation policy for a longer 
period:  these companies would face unnecessary extra costs if the remuneration policy required, 
for example, a triennial approval, as in the UK (and the proposal for the European say on pay, cf. 
supra, section 2.5). 
In Germany, shareholders can have a say regarding the remuneration system.163 Tröger and 
Walz (2014) state that this say on pay ‘pertains only to the general compensation scheme and 
attaches practically no legal sanctions to the vote’164. Section 120(4) AktG states that ‘[d]er Beschluss 
begründet weder Rechte noch Pflichten’. Hence, this German say on pay is non-binding and non-mandatory. 
There is some discussion whether shareholders’ approval of the remuneration system can be seen 
as an ex post or ex ante say on pay resolution and what it actually entails.165 It seems that the Germany 
                                                     
157 Derived from Kamerstukken II (2009-2010), 31877, nr.5 (Nota naar aanleiding van het verslag), p. 25. One may 
also refer to Kamerstukken II (2009-2010), 31877, no. 3, p. 9. In an early parliamentary document about the 
introduction of say on pay legislation, the Dutch legislature proposed that the general meeting adopt ‘the 
general lines of the remuneration policy’; later in the parliamentary discussion this was changed into ‘the 
remuneration policy’. Hence, under the current article 2:135(1) DCC the general meeting does not just adopt 
the general outline of the remuneration policy but the full remuneration policy. 
158 Article 2:135 DCC does not address the consequences in case the individual remuneration package is in 
breach of the remuneration policy. According to some Dutch legal scholars a decision that is not accordance 
with the remuneration policy should be void ex article 2:14(1) DCC. For example, one may refer to Huizink, 
GS Rechtspersonen, article 2:135 DCC, no. 6.3. Also see Meijer-Wagenaar (2006). Conversely, others argue 
that it is possible to deviate from the remuneration policy if the decision is based on convincing arguments 
(i.e., Van Slooten & Zaal, 2008). Nonetheless, in practice the remuneration policy is often broadly 
formulated, making it unlikely that individual remuneration contravenes the remuneration policy. 
159 This includes fixed pay, annual bonuses, shares, options on shares, executive loans, severance pay, and 
other elements that may be part of executive remuneration (following Kamerstukken II (2002-2003), 28179, 
no. 41. 
160 More specifically, UK companies should put the remuneration policy to a shareholders’ vote at the AGM 
held in the first financial year that commences on or after 1 October, 2013.  
161 ‘Quoted companies: members’ approval of directors’ remuneration policy’ under the Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform Act 2013, section 79. 
162 The authors find that for a sample of Dutch listed AEX-25 and AMX-25 companies in the period of 
2004-2014, shareholders are invited to approve (the amendments to) the remuneration policy on average 
3.5 times during an average period of 9.1 years. 
163 Section 120(4) AktG. This paragraph states that the general meeting of shareholders may (kann) decide 
on the remuneration system of the management board members. 
164 Tröger and Walz (2014), p. 2. The authors explain that this resolution on the remuneration system does 
not entail any rights or obligations and the obligations of the supervisory board pursuant to section 87 AktG 
shall remain unaffected. Moreover, the resolution shall not be voidable pursuant to section 243 AktG. 
165 Vesper-Gräske (2013), pp. 770-771. According to this author, the remuneration system includes ‘the 
principles of various payment components that constitute the overall remuneration package and their 
relation to each other’ including fixed and variable pay and performance criteria. 
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say on pay is comparable to shareholders’ say on the remuneration policy in other Member States.166 
For example, one may refer to the 2012 AGM of SAP AG that states in its agenda of the meeting: 
‘the previous system of Executive Board compensation was replaced as of January 1, 2012, by a 
new, more competitive compensation system that places greater focus on the achievement of 
strategic objectives. This new compensation system is to be presented to the General Meeting of 
Shareholders for approval in accordance with section 120(4) AktG’.167 Although one may argue 
that this German say on pay entails some aspects of an ex post shareholder decision-making right,168 
given the previous statements we consider the German shareholder approval of the remuneration 
system to be an ex ante say on pay that is practically comparable to a non-mandatory and non-
binding say on the remuneration policy.     
During the empirical research period 2010-2014 that we use in the subsequent chapters, 
shareholders had no legally required say on the remuneration policy in France. However, because 
of a new version of the FCGC (January 2014), shareholders may be able to annually vote on the 
individual remuneration of the company’s executive officers ex provision 24.3 FCGC as from the 
2014 AGMs.169 This vote is non-binding, however. When the AGM ‘issues a negative opinion’ (i.e., 
a majority of the shareholders votes against such a proposal), the corporate board must discuss this 
matter at one of the next meetings (advised by the remuneration committee), and immediately 
publish on the company's website a notice detailing how it intends to deal with the expressed 
opinion of the AGM (provision 24.3).  In 2016, new legislation on say on pay was proposed (called 
Loi Sapin-2, for example, see GlassLewis, 2016). French National Assembly adopted this bill that 
contained an annual mandatory and binding vote on the pay packages of chief executive directors 
on 14 June 2016, and on 8 December 2016 Le Conseil Constitutionnel declared the bill in conformity 
with the French constitution. One may note that few weeks before the adoption of the bill by the 
National Assembly, shareholders rejected the Renault CEO’s pay package at the 2016 AGM. The 
                                                     
166 One may also refer to Powell and Rapp (2015, p. 5) who state that ‘[d]ifferences are reflected in the 
substance of the vote, i.e. individual compensation packages vs. the compensation of the board or the matter 
put to vote (the compensation reports as opposed to the compensation system)’ (p. 5, emphasis added). 
167 SAP AG, Invitation to the 25th Annual General Meeting of Shareholders Wednesday, 23 May 2012, p. 
7.  
(<http://www.sap.com/corporate-en/about/investors/governance/meetings.html>). (accessed in March 
2015). Another random example of a resolution regarding the remuneration system was put on Adidas’s 
2012 AGM agenda. Adidas provided the following information: ‘[t]he Annual General Meeting held on May 
6, 2010 approved the compensation system for the members of the Executive Board which formed the 
basis for the determination of the Executive Board compensation for the financial years 2009 to 2011. Since 
the Long Term Incentive Plan 2009/2011, the LTIP 2009/2011 expired on December 31, 2011, the 
supervisory board resolved upon a compensation plan with a long-term incentive effect covering the years 
2012 to 2014 and with new criteria and targets, the LTIP 2012/2014, at its meeting on March 6, 2012. It is 
thus intended to make use of the possibility of a resolution of the Annual General Meeting on the 
compensation system for the members of the Executive Board as set out in § 120 section 4 German Stock 
Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz – AktG)’ (p. 2). Adidas AG, 2012 AGM Agenda Annual General Meeting 
(<http://www.adidas-group.com/media/filer_public/2013/07/31/einlad_2012_en.pdf>). (accessed in 
March 2015).   
168 For example, see Vesper-Gräske (2013), pp. 770-771. Also note that the Adidas compensation system 
was approved in 2010, but formed the basis for the determination of compensation in financial year 2009 
as well (cf. supra, nt. 167). 
169 Provision 24.3 states that ‘[i]t is recommended that at the shareholders' vote, one resolution is presented 
for the Chief Executive Officer or the Chairman of the Management Board and one resolution for the 
Deputy Chief Executive Officers or for the other members of the Management Board.’ One may note that 
the MiddleNext Code does not contain this provision.  
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vote, however, made when it was still advisory, was ignored by the board (Chassany, 2016). With 
the introduction of the new rules, shareholders nowadays have a yearly binding say-on-pay vote in 
France.170 
In Belgium, Austria and Ireland there are no legal requirements for a shareholders’ say on pay 
regarding the remuneration policy (yet). However, the remuneration report usually contains 
significant information regarding the remuneration policy as well. Moreover, in Belgium, 
shareholders have a mandatory non-binding vote on this report (cf. supra, section 5.2.2.1).171  
 
                                                     
170 Articles L.225-37-2 (one-tier board structure) and L.225-82-2 FCC (two-tier board structure) contain this 
new French binding, annually say on pay (see also Sénat, 2016). In addition, article L.225-100 FCC is 
amended. The first paragraph of new rule states that shareholders at least have a yearly say regarding the 
principles and criteria for determining and allocating the all different components of executive pay (i.e., one 
may note that this rule is rather similar to an ex ante shareholders’ say on the remuneration policy). The 
second paragraph of the new rule states that the proposed remuneration should be presented in a detailed 
report that indicates that the variable and exceptional elements of the pay are conditional upon the AGM’s 
approval. The third paragraph adds that any amendments in the remuneration (first paragraph) require 
shareholder approval. In case the remuneration policy is not approved (first paragraph), the previously 
approved will still apply. And, in case there are no agreed principles and remuneration cirteria, remuneration 
will be determined in accordance with executive pay awarded in the previous year or, in absence of 
remuneration awarded in the previous year, in accordance with existing practices in the society. The full 
French text of this new say-on-pay rule is the following (article L.225-37-2 (one-tier board structure) and 
L.225-82-2 FCC):  
Dans les sociétés dont les titres sont admis aux négociations sur un marché réglementé, les principes et les critères de 
détermination, de répartition et d'attribution des éléments fixes, variables et exceptionnels composant la rémunération totale et 
les avantages de toute nature, attribuables aux président, directeurs généraux ou directeurs généraux délégués, en raison de leur 
mandat, font l'objet d'une résolution soumise au moins chaque année à l'approbation de l'assemblée générale des actionnaires 
dans les conditions prévues à l'article L. 225-98 et au deuxième à avant-dernier alinéas du présent article.  
Les projets de résolution établis par le conseil d'administration en application du premier alinéa du présent article sont 
présentés dans un rapport joint au rapport mentionné aux articles L. 225-100 et L. 225-102. Ce rapport détaille les éléments 
de rémunération mentionnés au premier alinéa du présent article et précise que le versement des éléments de rémunération 
variables et exceptionnels est conditionné à l'approbation par une assemblée générale ordinaire des éléments de rémunération de 
la personne concernée dans les conditions prévues à l'article L. 225-100.  
L'approbation de l'assemblée générale est requise pour toute modification des éléments mentionnés au premier alinéa du 
présent article et à chaque renouvellement du mandat exercé par les personnes mentionnées au même premier alinéa.  
Si l'assemblée générale n'approuve pas la résolution, les principes et critères précédemment approuvés dans les conditions 
prévues aux trois premiers alinéas du présent article continuent de s'appliquer. En l'absence de principes et critères approuvés, 
la rémunération est déterminée conformément à la rémunération attribuée au titre de l'exercice précédent ou, en l'absence de 
rémunération attribuée au titre de l'exercice précédent, conformément aux pratiques existant au sein de la société.  
Les conditions d'application du présent article sont déterminées par décret en Conseil d'Etat. 
171 In Belgium, article 91(3) WvV stipulates that the remuneration report has to contain detailed information 
on eleven remuneration items: ‘(i) the process the board used in developing the remuneration policy, (ii) a 
statement of how the directors applied the remuneration policy during the accounting period, (iii) the remuneration 
package of each individual non-executive board member, (iv) the remuneration that senior executive officers 
receive for their role as directors, (v) the criteria and procedure to grant performance related pay to executive board 
members and senior executive officers, (vi)a detailed description of the individual remuneration package of 
the chief executive officer, (vii) a detailed description of the global remuneration package of the other senior 
executive officers, (viii) the number and main characteristics of shares, options and other rights granted, 
vested and/or executed, (ix) severance pay commitments, (x) the applied severance pay in case an executive 
board member or senior executive officer departed, and (xi) claw back provisions for variable pay based on 
misleading financial information’. Cited from Thomas & Van der Elst (2015, p. 677), emphasis added by 
the author.  
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5.2.2.3. Incentive Schemes and Share Grants 
In the Netherlands, contrary to the adoption of the remuneration policy as stipulated in article 
135(1) DCC, the compensation package of the individual members of the management board 
and/or of the executive board members can be delegated to another corporate body in the articles 
of association ex article 2:135(4) DCC, which is usually the supervisory board.172 Article 2:135(5) 
DCC requires shareholder approval on pay schemes in the form of shares and options in case the 
articles of association designate another body than the general meeting to determine the individual 
remuneration packages for executive or management board members (article 2:135(4) DCC).173 
The last phrase of article 2:135(5) DCC states that the absence of the approval of the general 
meeting does not affect the power of representation to grant these shares or options. In other 
words, the flawed approval does not hinder the legal consequences of such an award.174  
In case the articles of association empower another body than the general meeting to determine 
the individual remuneration package (following article 2:135(4) DCC) then article 2:135(5) DCC 
conditions that the general meeting must approve pay schemes in the form of shares or options 
(Van der Elst and Lafarre, 2015). Dutch practice shows that within Member States say on pay 
resolutions may also differ substantially among companies. There is some uncertainty as to whether 
separate approval of the general meeting is needed for these incentive plans or whether these plans 
may be included in proposals to adopt (amendments to) the remuneration policy ex article 2:135(1) 
DCC.175 Accordingly, Dutch companies consider the implementation of these incentive plans part 
of the remuneration policy while other companies use separate agenda items.176 Dutch 
parliamentary history explains that article 2:135(5) DCC contains a specific requirement for 
schemes in the form of shares or options on shares, which further elaborates on the general 
provision in article 2:135(1) and article 2:135(4) DCC. Article 2:135(5) DCC requires specific 
approval of the general meeting for granting (special) share or option grants to (individual) board 
members ex article 2:135(4) DCC in accordance with the current remuneration policy. In contrast, 
the Dutch remuneration policy already includes ‘all aspects’ of executive remuneration, and 
consequently also plans and options on shares (Van der Elst and Lafarre, 2015, 2017).  
                                                     
172 Kamerstukken I (2003-2004), 28179, B, p. 15. One may also refer to the Case Docherty/ SBM Offshore (2011), 
following Assink (2013), p. 769. It is considered best practice for the supervisory board to set the individual 
remuneration package (Principle II.2.9.) 
173 The rationale behind this rule is, according to the Dutch legislature, that shareholders may have special 
interests in decisions regarding share capital changes. Granting shares and options on shares may dilute the 
stakes of incumbent shareholders and may change the composition of the share capital. See also Van der 
Elst and Lafarre (2015).  
174 According to Dutch Law, the decision to grant shares or options to directors is a direct external decision 
(‘direct extern werkend besluit’) ex article 2:16(2) DCC. Although the decision is void ex article 2:14(2) DCC 
without approval of the general meeting, the lack of approval cannot be invoked against third parties 
following the last phrase of article 2:135(4) DCC. Also see Van Solinge and Niewe Weme (2009).  
175 For this discussion one may also refer to Eumedion (2012). 
176 During Heineken’s general meeting 2011, shareholders separately voted for i) adjustments of the 
remuneration policy, ii) amendments related to the short-term incentive plan, and iii) amendments related 
to the long-term incentive plan. In contrast, during the general meeting 2014 of KPN, shareholders could 
only vote for the proposal ‘to approve amendments to the LTI plan and to amend the remuneration policy’ 
(item 15). During SBM Offshore’s extraordinary general meeting 2010, shareholders could vote for ‘the 
amendment to the remuneration policy 2011’ (item 2) that included amendments to both the short-term 
incentive plan and long-term incentive plan.   
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A say on the implementation of (long-term) incentive schemes is also required by the 
UKCGC.177 Accordingly, Irish companies also need to put long-term incentive schemes to a 
shareholders’ vote as well.178 And in Belgium, shareholders have a say on variable pay pursuant to 
article 520ter WvV. According to this provision, Belgian companies need to put proposals to a 
shareholder vote if the variable part of the remuneration package is granted over a period of less 
than three years, if the variable part that is based on performance criteria measured over less than 
two years exceeds 25% of the variable remuneration, or if more than 75% of the variable 
remuneration is based on performance criteria measured over less than three years. However, if 
the articles of association allow these practices, a shareholder vote is not required. 
In Germany and Austria, resolutions regarding incentive schemes that include share (option) 
grants to directors also require a conditional capital increase to subscribe new shares (cf. infra, 
section 5.2.3). Under French law we can find a similar requirement regarding the authorisation to 
grant (free) shares or share options to directors or company staff (ex article L.225-197-1 and L.225-
185 jo L.225-186-1 FCC, for company’s staff: L.225-177 FCC).  
 
5.2.2.4. Supervisory and Non-Executive Remuneration 
In the Netherlands, the remuneration of supervisory board members is determined by AGM ex 
article 2:145 DCC. Whereas the division of powers to determine the remuneration of the 
management board members and supervisory board members in a two-tier board structure is clear, 
there is discussion regarding the authority to determine the remuneration package of non-executive 
directors in a one-tier board structure.179 The majority of the Dutch scholars tend to agree that the 
remuneration package of non-executive directors is determined by the AGM.180 Provision III.7 of 
the DCGC 2008 states that ‘ [t]he remuneration of a supervisory board member is not dependent 
on the results of the company’181. Rule D.1.3. of the UKCGC also states that ‘remuneration for 
non-executive directors should not include share options or other performance-related elements. 
If, exceptionally, options are granted, shareholder approval should be sought in advance and any shares 
acquired by exercise of the options should be held until at least one year after the non-executive 
                                                     
177 Code provision D.2.4. of the UKCGC.  
178 Following Annex 4 - The Irish CGA, the Irish Stock Exchange (ISE) follows the rules of the UK 
Corporate Governance Code as it ‘recognises that the UK Corporate Governance Code (formerly the 
Combined Code) has set the standard for corporate governance internationally’. 
(<http://www.ise.ie/Products-Services/Sponsors-and-Advisors/Irish-Corporate-Governance-
Annex.pdf>). (accessed in May 2015). 
179 For this discussion, refer to Assink (2014).  
180 This corresponds to the Dutch corporate governance framework. Dutch statutory law and the Dutch 
Code indicate that the role of the supervisory board and of non-executive directors is similar. It is explicitly 
determined in (the parliamentary history of) statutory law that the general meeting determines the 
remuneration of the supervisory board members. Following the same line of reasoning, the general meeting 
will determine the remuneration of non-executive board members. See Assink (2014). 
181 This is specified in III.7.1-III.7.3, stating that: ‘III.7.1 [a] supervisory board member may not be granted 
any shares and/or rights to shares by way of remuneration; III.7.2 [a]ny shares held by a supervisory board 
member in the company on whose board he sits are long-term investments; III.7.3 [t]he company may not 
grant its supervisory board members any personal loans, guarantees or the like unless in the normal course 
of business and after approval of the supervisory board. No remission of loans may be granted.’ Also in the 
DCGC 2016, these provisions are contained (principle 3.3.2, 3.3.3 and 2.7.6). 
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director leaves the board’182 (emphasis added by the author). Hence, shareholders have a say on 
incentive pay for non-executive directors in the UK, and also, accordingly, in Irish listed companies.  
In Germany, the remuneration of the supervisory board shall be determined by the shareholders’ 
meeting or the articles of association pursuant to section 113(1) AktG. In contrast to the 
Netherlands and the UK, section 113(3) AktG allows for performance related pay for supervisory 
board members. In Austria, the remuneration of the supervisory board members is determined by 
the shareholders’ meeting ex section 98 Austrian AktG. Paragraph 3 of this section also allows for 
variable remuneration. In Belgium, the BCGC provides in provision 7.7. that ‘[n]on-executive 
directors should not be entitled to performance-related remuneration such as bonuses, stock 
related long-term incentive schemes, fringe benefits or pension benefits’. Article 554 WvV 
stipulates that any arrangement that includes variable pay to non-executive directors shall be 
approved by the subsequent AGM.  
In France, too, non-executive directors are not allowed to receive stock options or stock grants 
as compensation (article L. 225-177 FCC). The shareholders’ meeting determines the total amount 
of fees pursuant to article L.225-47 FCC (one-tier board) and L.225-83 FCC (two-tier board). 
 
5.2.2.5. Other Say-on-pay Rights 
In France, article L.225-38 FCC contains rules on related-party transactions linked to director 
remuneration (also see Magnier et al, 2006). These include agreements between the company and 
its chief executive officer and (managing) directors. Persons subject to this procedure are listed in 
article L.225-38 FCC.  Termination agreements and additional retirement agreements are subject 
to the rules on related-party transactions and thus require shareholder approval.183 In the UK, 
section 190(1) CA 2006 stipulates that a substantial property transaction with a director or a shadow 
director of the company or holding company, or a person connected with such a director requires 
shareholder approval (special resolution, hence 75% majority). Sections 197, 198, 200, 201 and 203 
CA 2006 contain rules regarding the approval of credit transactions and loans and quasi-loans to a 
company or holding company director or shadow director, or to a person connected with such a 
director; here also a 75% majority is needed. Sections 217-219 CA 2006 require shareholder 
approval for compensation as a result of a loss of office for a director or a shadow director of the 
company or holding company. In Ireland, similar provisions can be found in section 251 Irish CA 
2014 (loss of office), section 252 Irish CA 2014 (transfer of property). These resolutions seem to 
require a simple majority.    
Thomas and Van der Elst (2015, p. 678) explain that in Belgium severance pay arrangements 
with executive directors and senior executive officers that exceed 12 months (or 18 months)184 of 
                                                     
182 Irish listed companies also adhere to this code (following the rules of the Irish Stock Exchange, cf. supra, 
section 5.2.1).  
183 Transactions that may involve conflicts of interests are also regulated in the other Member States. For 
example, in Belgium these transactions are contained in article 523 WvV and article 524 WvV. The latter 
provision specifies that, under a mixed-board structure (cf. supra, section 5.2.1), when the articles of 
association do not contain rules for determining the compensation of the direction committee, the board 
of directors has the power to set the remuneration package. We discuss the rules on related-party 
transactions for the other Member States in section 5.2.10. 
184 Belgian law states ‘een vertrekvergoeding die hoger is dan 12 maanden loon of, op gemotiveerd advies van het 
remuneratiecomité, hoger dan 18 maanden loon’. Thomas and Van der Elst (2015, p. 678) state that whether the 
legislation requires the approval of the general meeting of shareholder from twelve months onwards or 18 
months onwards is a subject of Belgian doctrine debate.  
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‘wage’ (in Dutch: loon) require the preapproval of the general meeting of shareholders following 
article 554 WvV. 
 
5.2.2.6. Overview 
All Member States require some shareholder approval regarding share (option) schemes and/or 
individual share (option) bonuses. However, as we have seen, some Member States require a vote 
on the remuneration policy while others require a vote on the remuneration report. Only the UK 
requires both a vote on the remuneration report and on remuneration policy. Since say-on-pay 
resolutions are even more different among Member States than director (re-)elections, table 5 
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Remuneration report  No Mandatory and non-
binding (554 WvV) a. 
No No Non-mandatory 
and non-binding, 























No Amendments need 
approval, mandatory 
(2:135(1) DCC)a. 
Every three years, 
mandatory and binding a. 
Incentive plans & share  
option grants 
 
Resolution on  
conditional capital  
increase. 
Only for certain 
agreements if not allowed 
in AoA, mandatory and 
binding 
(520ter WvV)a. 
Mandatory and binding 
for agreements stipulated 
in L.225-197-1 and 
L.225-185 jo L.225-186-
1, L.225-177 FCC. 







(2:135(5) DCC)a, but 
rejection does not 
effect the power of 
representation. 
Following the UKCGC a. 
RPT regarding executive 
pay and other provisions 
 
No Some severance pay  
arrangements with 
executive directors and 
senior executive officers  
(554 WvV)a. Mandatory 
and binding. 
Yes, L.225-38 FCC. 
Mandatory and binding.  
 
No Loss of office 
section (251 Irish 
CA 2014);  
transfer of 
property section 
(252 Irish CA 
2014)a. Mandatory 
and binding. 
No Substantial property 
transaction (190 CA 
2006); approval of loans, 
quasi-loans, and credit 
transactions (197, 198, 
200, 201, 203 CA 2006); 
compensation regarding 
a loss of office (217-219 
CA 2006). Mandatory 
and binding. 







Mandatory and binding 
only for variable pay (554 
WvV)a. 
Board fees (L.225-47 for 
one-tier board and 
L.225-83 for two-tier).  
Mandatory and binding. 
Yes, 
mandatory and binding 
(113(1) AktG)a. 






No, except for 
performance pay, 
UKCGCa. 
a These resolutions usually require a simple majority (amount of votes required: 50% + 1 vote)  
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5.2.3. Share Capital Resolutions 
As we have seen in section 2 of this chapter, shareholders’ decision-making rights on capital matters 
are partly harmonized at the European level. Accordingly, in a majority of the Member States these 
shareholder decision-making rights are comparable.  Nevertheless, there are still some major 
differences between the Member States in our sample. Below we briefly outline these differences 
for resolutions on capital increases, waiver of pre-emption rights, buyback of own shares, and 
cancellation of own shares. This analysis mostly serves as a preliminary step to the empirical 
analyses in the subsequent chapters of this study.185  
 
5.2.3.1. Capital Increases 
Article 29(1) and (2) of the Capital Directive (Directive 2012/30/EU) state:  
1. Any increase in capital must be decided upon by the general meeting. Both that decision 
and the increase in the subscribed capital shall be published in the manner laid down by the 
laws of each Member State, in accordance with Article 3 of Directive 2009/101/EC; 2. 
Nevertheless, the statutes or instrument of incorporation or the general meeting, […], may 
authorise an increase in the subscribed capital up to a maximum. […] The power of such 
body in this respect shall be for a maximum period of five years and may be renewed one 
or more times by the general meeting, each time for a period not exceeding five years.  
Several forms of these two provisions can be found in the laws of the Member States. Whereas the 
laws in UK, Ireland and the Netherlands adhere closely to the Capital Directive, in other Member 
States the laws are somewhat different. Below we outline the rules on capital increases in each 
Member State.  
In Germany, in accordance with section 202 et seq. AktG, the AGM may authorise the 
management board to increase capital (and issue shares) in advance, limited to a 50% increase of 
the capital and a 5-year period. Such a proposal requires a majority of 75%.186 The 5-year period 
stems from article 25(2) of the Capital Directive (cf. supra, section 2.2 of this chapter). Next, the 
AGM may decide on a conditional increase of capital that may be used only for the three purposes 
listed in section 192 AktG.187 This resolution also requires a qualified three-quarter majority. 
Section 192(3) AktG stipulates also this capital increase may not exceed 50% of the share capital. 
To grant rights to employees to subscribe to new shares against the contribution of amounts due 
to such employees under a profit-sharing plan, the par value of the conditional capital may not 
exceed 10% of the share capital. Since the authorised capital is stated in the articles of association, 
the Satzung, an authorized capital increase and a conditional capital increase usually also require an 
amendment to the articles of association. It follows from our data (cf. infra, the data that is used in 
                                                     
185 For an in-depth analysis of the different share capital rules in these seven Member States, one may for 
instance refer to Mayson, French and Ryan (2016) for the UK; Cahn and Donald (2010) for the UK and 
Germany, Van Solinge and Nieuwe Weme (2009) for the Netherlands; Dorresteijn et al. (2009) for Belgium, 
France, the Netherlands, Germany, and the UK; Wyckaert et al. (2015) for Belgium; Thuillier (2015) for 
Ireland; Köhlner Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz for Germany; and Linde (Doralt/Nowotny/Kalss Kommentar) zum 
Aktiengesetz (Österreich) for Austria. 
186 The articles of association may set a larger majority or set additional requirements.  
187 Paragraph 192(2) AktG lists the following purposes: i) to grant conversion rights or stock warrants to 
holders of convertible bonds or warrant bonds, ii) to prepare a merger of enterprises, iii) to grant rights to 
employees of the company to subscribe to new shares against the contribution of amounts due to such 
employees under a profit-sharing plan established by the company.  
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chapter 2 of our research) that capital resolutions and the corresponding amendments to the articles 
of association are usually put to a shareholder vote simultaneously in practice (both require a 
qualified majority of 75%).188 In addition to these two option, shareholders may also decide on a 
capital increase against contributions in cash (ex section 182 AktG) or in-kind (ex section 183 
AktG).189 These resolutions also require a 75% majority and an amendment to the articles of 
association.  
In Austria, a similar system of rules applies to increasing the share capital. Section 169 of the 
Austrian AktG authorizes increasing capital and issuing shares in advance up to a period of 5 years. 
Section 159 Austrian AktG contains rules about conditional (or contingent) capital increase, and 
sections 149 and 150 Austrian AktG stipulate capital increases against contributions and in-kind, 
respectively. In Austria, each proposal also requires a three-quarters majority. They also mandate 
amendments to the articles of association and limit the increase of the authorised or conditional 
capital to half of the share capital (10% for the purpose to grant rights to employees).  
Capital increases in the UK require an ordinary resolution ex section 551(1) CA 2006. Directors 
may also be authorised for a period of up to five years to allot shares ex section 551(2) and (3)(b) 
CA 2006. A resolution must state the maximum amount of shares that may be allotted under the 
authorisation or the amount remaining to be allotted under it, and the date on which the (renewed) 
authorisation will expire ex section 551(3) or (5) CA 2006.190 In practice, the authority to allot shares 
is usually granted for less than 5 years. Interestingly, since the authorised capital is no longer 
required in the UK,191 an increase of the share capital usually does no longer require an amendment 
to the articles of association.192 Similar rules apply in the Netherlands and Ireland, although these 
countries still require the authorised capital. In Ireland, section 1021(1) Irish CA 2014 stipulates 
that a capital allotment requires the authorisation by the general meeting, by ordinary resolution, 
or by the articles of association.  Section 1021(3) and 1021(4) Irish CA 2014 cover the provision 
and the renewal of such an authorisation, respectively, and require that the term of the authorisation 
be specified and not exceed 5 years. In the Netherlands, article 2:96 DCC stipulates that an increase 
in the capital needs the approval of the shareholders’ meeting under a simple majority rule. In the 
Netherlands, the AGM may equally provide the board of directors with the authority to increase 
the share capital for a period of up to 5 years. In practice, the authorisation is often provided for a 
shorter period in listed companies, and usually for a maximum of 10% of the issued capital: this is 
also often the case for the listed companies in the UK and Ireland. In both the Netherlands and 
Ireland, a capital increase that would lead to a higher capital than the authorised capital requires an 
increase in the authorised capital first by amending the articles of association. The authorised capital 
usually offers enough space for capital increases, however.  
                                                     
188 See also Cahn and Donald (2010), pp. 197-198. 
189 Ex section 182(1) AktG the articles can provide for a different capital majority. In the case of the issue 
of non-voting preferred shares this may only be a larger majority. 
190 Section 551(5) CA 2006 renews the authorisation to allot shares. The maximum five-year period applies 
here as well.  
191 As from the 1 October, 2009, when the CA 2006 came into full effect. 
192 Shareholders that wish to restrict the board’s power in this respect may amend the articles of association 
by ordinary resolution ex section 42 of schedule 2 of the CA 2009 Order 2008. There is therefore no 
requirement to state the authorised capital in the articles of association, but with any change in capital, a 
company needs to file a statement of capital regarding the total number of shares (following section 555 CA 
2006, form SH01) on the return of share allotment. 
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In Belgium, the articles of association may provide the board of directors with the authority to 
increase the authorised capital up to a predetermined amount over a specific period of up to 5 years 
ex article 603 WvV: this amount may not exceed the amount of the authorised capital. Hence, also 
in Belgium, this authorisation requires an amendment to the articles of association, which entails 
an extraordinary resolution that is presented to the EGM. Article 604 WvV stipulates that the board 
provide the shareholders with a detailed report that contains a description of the purposes for the 
capital increase: this report should be mentioned in the AGM agenda. Article 581 WvV also grants 
the AGM the ability to decide to increase the share capital, either financed by contributions in cash 
or in kind. One may note that article 606(1) WvV does not allow a capital increase through a 
contribution in kind by a shareholder who holds more than 10% of the voting rights in the 
company. 
Lastly, in France, article L.225-129 FCC stipulates that only an extraordinary general meeting is 
competent to decide an immediate or eventual capital increase, on the basis of a report from the 
board of directors or the executive board, which must be effected within five years.193 It may 
delegate this ability to the management board or the executive board ex article L.225-129-2 FCC 
for a predetermined amount: this article states that this delegation’s duration shall not exceed 26 
months.194 The article further empowers the board of directors or the executive board to determine 
the conditions of issue, to declare the completion of the resultant capital increases and to make the 
appropriate amendment to the articles of association, albeit within the limits of the delegation that 
was provided to them. Article L.225-129-2 FCC also stipulates that the issues referred to in the 
articles L.225-135 to L.225-138-1, L.225-177 to L.225-186, L.225-197-1 to L.225-197-3, and L.228-
11 to L.228-20 (the latter articles refer to preference shares), require special resolutions. For 
instance, article L.225-138 FCC entails a capital increase reserved for one or more persons 
designated by name, or for persons who meet certain criteria. Paragraph three of this article 
stipulates that the maximum term for this capital increase is eighteen months. Article L.225-138-1 
FCC relates to capital increases that are reserved for members of a company savings plan. And, 
article L.225-177 FCC stipulates that the extraordinary general meeting may authorise the 
management board or the executive board to grant stock options to the company’s staff. 
Consequently, article L.225-180 FCC determines to which employees these options may be 
granted. Lastly, articles L.225-197-1 to L.225-197-3 FCC contain rules about the empowerment of 
the management board or the executive board by the EGM to make a free allotment of existing or 
new shares to (certain categories of) the company’s staff. 
 
5.2.3.2. Waiver of Pre-emption Rights 
Pre-emption rights protect incumbent shareholders against dilution of their stakes. Since pre-
emption rights can be costly for companies,195 proposals to allot shares or increase company share 
                                                     
193 This time limit does not apply to capital increases made subsequent to the exercise of a right attached to 
a transferable security giving access to the capital or subsequent to the exercise of options as envisaged in 
Article L. 225-177. Furthermore, article L.225-129-1 FCC holds that when the extraordinary general meeting 
decides to effect a capital increase, it may delegate the power to determine the terms and conditions of the 
issue of securities to the board of directors or the executive board. 
194 Ex article L.225-129-5, the management board or executive board is required to draw up a supplementary 
report for the next ordinary general meeting in the manner determined in a ‘décret en Conseil d'Etat’.  
195 For example, Cahn and Donald (2010) describe the obstacles to a company’s access to financial markets 
caused by these pre-emption rights. During the 14-day period that shareholders are allowed to exercise or 
79 
 
capital usually go hand in hand with proposals to the cancel the incumbent shareholders’ pre-
emption (or pre-emptive) rights. Article 33(4) of the Capital Directive (Directive 2012/30/EU) 
states that pre-emption rights may not be restricted in the articles of association, but only be a 
shareholders’ decision. Article 44 of the Directive requires for this decision at least a two-thirds 
majority. The Member States may also allow for a simple majority when at least half the subscribed 
capital is represented. 
When we look at our sample (cf. infra, chapter 2), we notice that in some Member States, the 
waiver of pre-emption rights is presented at the shareholders’ meeting as a separate resolution 
(Ireland, the UK, and the Netherlands), while other Member States add this waiver to capital 
increase proposals (Austria, Belgium, France, and Germany). As we have seen in the previous 
section, the latter countries require a qualified majority for capital increases. In contrast, in Ireland, 
the UK and the Netherlands, these proposals require a simple majority, and hence, the waiver of 
pre-emption rights, which requires a higher majority as stipulated in the Capital Directive, needs a 
separate vote.  
In Austria196, Belgium197, France198, Germany199, Ireland200, and the UK201 require a 75% majority 
for the cancellation of pre-emption rights. the Netherlands requires a qualified two-thirds majority 
if less than 50% of the capital is present during the meeting; otherwise only a simple majority vote 
is required (ex article 2:96a(7) DCC).  
 
5.2.3.3. Buy-back Own Shares 
Company share capital is affected not only by the allotment of new shares and the waiver of pre-
emption rights, but also by share buybacks or share repurchases. In accordance with article 21 of 
the Capital Directive, Member States may set a limit for share buybacks that may not be lower than 
10% of the subscribed capital. Some Member States have implemented this limit for treasury shares 
(i.e., Austria202, Belgium203, Germany204, France205, and Ireland206). The UK has repealed the limit 
that was previously in place in section 725 CA 2006,207 and the Netherlands has increased the limit 
to 50% in article 2:98(2) DCC. In a majority of the Member States, the authorisation to repurchase 
shares requires a simple majority of the votes. In the UK, market purchases of own shares only 
                                                     
trade their pre-emption right to a third party according to article 33(3) of Directive 2012/30/EU, the price 
of the stock can fluctuate substantially. This volatility presents a pricing problem and accordingly, Cahn and 
Donald argue that the existence of pre-emption rights causes issuers to set issue prices at a substantial 
discount of up to 25%. Cahn and Donald (2010, p. 201).   
196 Section 153(4) Austrian AktG, section 170(2) Austrian AktG. 
197 Article 605 WvV stipulates that the authorisation explicitly needs to state the waiver of pre-emption 
rights. 
198 Article L.225-135 FCC, L.225-138 FCC. 
199 Section 186(3) AktG, section 203(2) AktG. 
200 Section 1023(3) Irish CA 2014. 
201 Section 283 CA 2006. 
202 Section 65(2) Austrian AktG. 
203 Article 322(1) WvV requires a limit of 20 percent.  
204 Section 71(1) and (2) AktG. 
205 Article L.225-210 FCC.  
206 Section 109(1) Irish CA 2014.  
207 The amendment came into force on 1 October, 2009. Section 5 Treasury Shares, Companies, The 
Companies (Share Capital and Acquisition by Company of its Own Shares) Regulations 2009, Statutory 
Instruments 2009 no. 2022. 
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require an ordinary resolution whereas off-market purchases required a special shareholders’ 
resolution before 2013.208 In Ireland, section 1074(1) Irish CA 2014 requires a normal resolution 
for market purchases of own shares: off-market purchases still require a special resolution ex 
section 1075 Irish CA 2014. In Austria209, Germany210, France211, and the Netherlands212, a simple 
majority is also required. In contrast, in Belgium, the authorisation to repurchase own shares is an 
extraordinary resolution that requires a qualified majority of 80% of the voting rights.213 214 
 
5.2.3.4. Cancelling Shares and Reducing Share Capital 
Companies may also cancel their own shares. Whereas the law in France215 and the Netherlands216 
requires shareholder approval for the cancellation of shares, in the UK and Ireland treasury shares 
may be cancelled at any time pursuant to article 726 et seq. CA 2006 and article 209 Irish CA 1990 
(only a notification to the shareholders’ meeting is required). In Germany and Austria, the authority 
to cancel treasury shares, without further resolution by AGM, is included in the authorisation to 
buy back own shares ex section 71(8) AktG and 65(8) Austrian AktG respectively. In Belgium, 
article 621 WvV stipulates that the acquisition of treasury shares in order to cancel these shares 
immediately for capital reduction purposes does not require a shareholders’ vote.   
The decision to reduce share capital usually requires an amendment to the articles of association 
(for instance, see article 2:99(1) DCC in the Netherlands, article 612 WvV in Belgium). In France, 
the reduction of share capital requires an extraordinary resolution ex L.225-204 FCC. In Germany 
and Austria, a share capital reduction also requires a qualified majority of three-quarters ex section 
                                                     
208 The requirement of a special resolution was omitted with Regulations 2013, Amendment of Part 18. 
209 Section 65(1)(6) Austrian AktG. 
210 Section 71(6) AktG. 
211 Article L.225-210 FCC.  
212 Article 2:98 DCC. 
213 Article 208 of the royal decree of 31 January, 2001 Koninklijk besluit tot uitvoering van het wetboek van 
vennootschappen jo article 620 WvV jo article 559 WvV. Article 559 requires a quorum of 50% of the capital 
and 80% majority of the votes. For an example one may refer to the 2014 AGM of AB Inbev.  
214 One may note that share redemptions differ from normal share buybacks. Companies may issue shares that 
are redeemable (thus can be repurchased or called) at the option of the company or the shareholder. Article 
43 of the Capital Directive contains some rules about redeemable shares. However, these shares do not exist 
in every Member State (although mechanisms with preference shares may resemble these shares). In Ireland 
and the UK redeemable shares exist. Chapter three of Part 18 of the UK Companies Act regulates 
redeemable shares. Section 684(3) CA 2006 stipulates that public limited companies may only issue 
redeemable shares if they are authorised to do so by their articles of association. The articles of association 
or a shareholders’ resolution may authorise the board to determine the terms, conditions and manner of 
share redemption (section 685). Section 688 states that redeemed shares are treated as cancelled shares. In 
Ireland, share redemptions are regulated under section 211 of the Companies Act 1990. Although one 
should keep in mind that share redemptions are not the same as normal share buybacks, in our research we 
include both type of resolutions in the category ‘share buybacks’. Furthermore, the shareholders’ meeting 
often authorises the board to ‘trade in the company’s shares’. 
215 Article L.225-109 FCC states that in the event of the cancellation of purchased shares, capital reduction 
is authorised or decided by an extraordinary general meeting. In this respect, also see article L.225-207 FCC: 
this article stipulates that the general meeting which has decided on a capital reduction not motivated by 
losses may authorise the board of directors or the executive board, as applicable, to purchase a specified 
number of shares to cancel them. 
216 Article 2:99(1) DCC, simple majority voting rule.  
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222(1) AktG and 175(1) Austrian AktG respectively. This is also the case in Ireland (ex section 
1252(1) Irish CA 2014) and in the UK (ex section 645(1) CA 2006).217   
 
5.2.3.5. Overview 
Table 6 provides an overview of the different majority rules that are required for capital resolution 
in the seven Member States.  
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5.2.4. Amendments to the Articles  
In the previous sections (3.1, the nature of the general meeting, and 5.2.3, share capital resolutions) 
we considered resolutions containing specific categories of amendments to the articles of 
association. In this section we outline the general rules regarding these voting items.  
Usually resolutions regarding amendments to the articles of association require a qualified 
majority. In Germany and Austria, respectively, paragraph 179(2) AktG and paragraph 146(1) 
Austrian AktG require a majority of 75% of the capital represented at the shareholders’ meeting 
for any amendment to the satzung, but the articles of association may set a different capital 
majority.218 In the UK and Ireland the alteration of the company’s articles requires a special majority 
of 75% pursuant to section 21 CA 2006 and section 15 Irish CA 1963. In France and Belgium an 
amendment to the articles of association requires an extraordinary resolution. As we have seen in 
section 3.1 of this chapter, in France, requirements for extraordinary resolutions follow from article 
L.225-96 FCC, which mandates a quorum of 25% on the first call of the EGM and a two-thirds 
majority of the votes. In Belgium, article 558 et seq. WvV requires different qualified majorities for 
different extraordinary voting items. For an amendment of the articles of association not related to 
a change of the purpose of the enterprise a quorum of 50% on the first call and a majority of 75% 
of the votes is required ex article 558 WvV. An amendment to the articles association that is related 
to the change of the purpose of the enterprise requires 80% majority of the votes pursuant to article 
559 WvV.  In the Netherlands a statutenwijziging does not require a qualified majority ex 2:121 et seq. 
DCC, but the articles of association may require a higher majority.219  
Required majorities are not the only element to differ across Member States and companies; 
variation in how items are placed on the agenda also exists. Whereas UK companies usually put 
one combined voting item for all proposed amendments to the articles of association to a 
shareholders’ vote, some (French) companies in continental Europe use separate voting items for 
each amendment (also see Van der Elst, 2011, p. 10). Examples of companies that use separate 
agenda items for different modifications to the articles are Pernod Ricard SA (2012 AGM) and 
Vienna Insurance Group AG (2010 AGM).  
 
5.2.5. Annual Accounts 
Van der Elst (2012, p. 9) describes the significant differences among agenda items in terms of 
approval of the annual financial statements. For instance, in the UK and Ireland, the accounts and 
reports are approved by the board and signed by a director after which both the accounts and 
reports are “laid before” the general meeting pursuant to section 414 jo 437 UK CA 2006 and 
section 431 Irish CA 2014, respectively. In Germany, management submits the annual financial 
statements and the annual report to the supervisory board, which reviews both, ex section 170 jo 
171 AktG, respectively. Section 172 jo 173(1) AktG states that the annual financial statements shall 
be approved by the supervisory board or by the shareholders’ meeting if the management board 
and the supervisory board have resolved that the annual financial statements are to be approved 
by the shareholders’ meeting or if the supervisory board has not approved the annual financial 
                                                     
218 In the case of an amendment of the purpose of the enterprise the articles may only provide in a larger 
capital majority.  
219 One may refer to article 2:120 DCC, stating that all resolutions for which no greater majority is required 




statements. Section 96(1) Austrian AktG states that these documents are reviewed by the 
supervisory board, and are reported to the AGM.  Paragraph 4 of this article asserts that the 
supervisory board determines the financial statements, unless the boards decide on a determination 
by the AGM. In the Netherlands, the management board and supervisory board (or, in case of a 
one-tier board structure, the executive and non-executive directors) must sign the accounts ex 
article 2:101(2) DCC. The AGM adopts the accounts ex article 2:101(3) DCC (simple majority). In 
France, article L.225-100 FCC stipulates that AGM ‘deliberates and rules’ (Van der Elst, 2012, p. 
9) on all matters related to the annual accounts and, where applicable, the consolidated accounts, 
for the previous financial year of the FCC. In Belgium, the AGM approves the accounts ex article 




The distribution of dividends is also (partly) harmonized in the Capital Directive (article 17),220 but 
this voting item nonetheless somewhat differs among Member States. The directive does not 
require shareholder approval for the distribution of dividends, but some Member States require a 
shareholder vote. For example, section 174(1) AktG states that the shareholders’ meeting “shall 
resolve on the appropriation of distributable profits” (in German: ‘Die Hauptversammlung beschließt 
über die Verwendung des Bilanzgewinns’). In Austria, section 104(2) Austrian AktG states that the 
agenda of the AGM shall include, inter alia, a resolution on the use of the balance sheet profit, if 
this information is disclosed in the financial statements (‘die Beschlussfassung über die Verwendung des 
Bilanzgewinns, wenn im Jahresabschluss ein solcher ausgewiesen ist’). This provision also refers to section 
104(4) Austrian AktG. And in France, shareholders may approve the allocation of income and 
dividend. Article L.232-18(1) FCC states that shareholders may also decide whether they receive 
these dividend payments (partly) in cash or in shares. In contrast, for instance the Netherlands does 
not require this choice by law and hence, many public companies do not offer this choice to their 
shareholders.221 222 And, for instance in the UK, dividends must be in cash, unless the articles of 
association state otherwise (Wood v Odessa, Waterworks Co Case, 1889, following Mason, French and 
Ryan, 2016, p. 287). the Netherlands, UK, Belgium, and Ireland do not require shareholder 
approval for dividends, but in practice, companies usually put this agenda item to a vote (cf. infra, 
data in the second chapter of this study). One may note that the DCGC 2008 requires that ‘[a] 
                                                     
220 Article 17 contains two tests for dividend distributions. Paragraph one of the article states that ‘[e]xcept 
for cases of reductions of subscribed capital, no distribution to shareholders may be made when on the 
closing date of the last financial year the net assets as set out in the company's annual accounts are, or 
following such a distribution would become, lower than the amount of the subscribed capital plus those 
reserves which may not be distributed under the law or the statutes.’ In addition, paragraph three adds that 
‘[t]he amount of a distribution to shareholders may not exceed the amount of the profits at the end of the 
last financial year plus any profits brought forward and sums drawn from reserves available for this purpose, 
less any losses brought forward and sums placed to reserve in accordance with the law or the statutes’. Next. 
Article 18 of the directive states that ‘[a]ny distribution made contrary to Article 17 must be returned by 
shareholders who have received it if the company proves that those shareholders knew of the irregularity 
of the distributions made to them, or could not in view of the circumstances have been unaware of it’. 
221 When analysing the minutes of Dutch AGMs for our research in chapter six of this dissertation, we noted 
that many private investors ask about the possibility to provide this ‘keuzedividend’. 
222 One may also note that, for example, in Germany no more than half of the annual net profit may be 
transferred to other profit reserves (section 58(1) AktG). 
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resolution to pay a dividend shall be dealt with as a separate agenda item at the general meeting’ 
(provision IV.1.5, in DCGC 2016 this is included in provision 4.1.3 sub iv.). 
 
5.2.7. Discharge 
In continental Europe shareholders usually discharge their directors for conduct in the past 
financial year. In general, discharge is an act of the AGM, which declares that the shareholders will 
not have the intention to hold the directors liable for actions in a particular financial year. In 
Belgium, shareholders may also discharge the auditor (commissaris) ex article 554 WvV. Discharge 
is binding in the Netherlands,223 but in Germany and Austria it only constitutes an expression of 
trust,224 and in France, discharge is not binding.225 In Belgium, the effect of the discharge is similar 
to the Netherlands, but one should note that when the AGM approves the decision to discharge 
its directors, minority shareholders that did not vote in favour of the discharge may still claim 
damages (minderheidsvordering ex article 562 WvV).226  
In the UK, discharge of directors is void pursuant to section 232(1) CA 2006: ‘[a]ny provision 
that purports to exempt a director of a company (to any extent) from any liability that would 
otherwise attach to him in connection with any negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of 
trust in relation to the company is void.’ Section 239 allows that the general meeting can ratify 
‘conduct by a director amounting to negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust in relation 
to the company’ (section 239(1) CA 2006). This is, in contrast to the decision to discharge, a case-
based ratification of the director’s behaviour. Discharging directors is also void in Ireland ex article 
235(1) CA 2014. Paragraph 3 of this article states that ‘a company may, in pursuance of any such 
provision as is mentioned in that subsection, indemnify any officer of the company against any 
liability incurred by him or her— in defending proceedings, whether civil or criminal, in which 
judgment is given in his or her favour or in which he or she is acquitted; or (b) in connection with 
any proceedings or application referred to in, or under, section 233 or 234 in which relief is granted 
to him or her by the court’.  
 
5.2.8. External Auditor 
The (re-)appointment of the auditor is also a common agenda item in a majority of the seven 
Member States, pursuant to article 37(1) of the Audit Directive (2014/56/EU, which amended 
                                                     
223 Generally, directors cannot be held liable for conduct in the financial year they are discharged for by the 
AGM. The decision to discharge only limits internal liability for the conduct that was known upon approval 
of the annual accounts. 
224 Section 120(2) AktG states that ratification shall not constitute a waiver of claims for compensation of 
damage. Following Manifest (2008). 
225 The companies in our sample that are incorporated in France did not put this voting item on the agenda. 
226 Article 562 WvV stipulates (in Dutch): ‘[e]en vordering tegen de bestuurders kan voor rekening van de vennootschap 
door minderheidsaandeelhouders worden ingesteld. Deze minderheidsvordering wordt voor rekening van de vennootschap 
ingesteld door één of meer aandeelhouders die, op de dag waarop de algemene vergadering zich uitspreekt over de aan de 
(bestuurders) te verlenen kwijting, effecten bezitten die ten minste 1 % vertegenwoordigen van de stemmen verbonden aan het 
geheel van de op die dag bestaande effecten, of op diezelfde dag effecten bezitten die een gedeelte van het kapitaal vertegenwoordigen 
ter waarde van ten (1 250 000 EUR). […] Voor de aandeelhouders met stemrecht, kan de vordering slechts worden ingesteld 
door personen die de kwijting niet hebben goedgekeurd en door personen die de kwijting wel hebben goedgekeurd maar waarvan 
blijkt dat zij ongeldig is. Voor de aandeelhouders zonder stemrecht, kan de vordering bovendien slechts worden ingesteld in de 
gevallen waarin zij hun stemrecht hebben uitgeoefend overeenkomstig artikel 481 en dit voor de daden van bestuur die 
betrekking hebben op de beslissingen genomen in uitvoering van hetzelfde artikel’. 
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2006/43/EC).227 Paragraph 2 of this article states that Member States may allow other ‘systems or 
modalities for the appointment of the statutory auditor or audit firm’. In Ireland, Section 160(2) of 
the Irish CA 1963 provides that the auditor of an Irish company shall be automatically re-appointed 
at a company’s annual general meeting without any resolution being passed unless (a) the auditor 
is not qualified for reappointment, or (b) a resolution has been passed at that meeting appointing 
somebody instead of him or providing expressly that he shall not be reappointed, or (c) he has 
given the company notice in writing of his unwillingness to be re-appointed. As a result, the AGM 
usually does not vote on the reappointment of auditors in Ireland.228 In contrast, the authorisation to 
fix the remuneration of the auditors requires a shareholders’ vote pursuant to section 160(8)(b) of 
the Irish CA 1963 as is the case for UK companies, ex section 492 CA 2006. In Belgium, a 
shareholders’ vote on the remuneration of the commissaris is required ex article 134(2) WvV. AGMs 
in other continental European companies usually do not vote on auditor remuneration.  
 
5.2.9. Notice Period for General Meetings (UK and Ireland) 
In the UK and Ireland companies usually put proposals regarding the notice period for general 
meetings on the agenda. In accordance with section 307A CA 2006, a special resolution can reduce 
the notice period to a minimum of fourteen days for the first general meeting after the annual 
general meeting at which the special resolution was passed (section 307A(4) CA 2006, 75% 
majority). In Ireland a special resolution is also required to shorten the notice period for general 
meetings.229  
 
5.2.10. Related-Party Transactions 
Related-party transactions (or related-party agreements) are described by the EC as ‘transactions 
between a company and its management, directors, controlling entities or shareholders, [that] create 
the opportunity to obtain value belonging to the company to the detriment of shareholders, and in 
particular minority shareholders’ (EC, 2014, p. 5230). Articles L.225-38 et seq. FCC regulates ‘related 
agreements’ in France. Related agreements are defined as agreements between the company and 
its chief executive officer, one of its deputy managing directors, one of its directors, one of its 
shareholders holding more than 10% of the voting rights or, in the case of a corporate shareholder, 
the controlling company pursuant to article L.233-3 FCC. The auditor must present a report on 
                                                     
227 The Audit Directive (2014/56/EU) of 14 April 2014 adds a new paragraph to article 37: ‘[a]ny contractual 
clause restricting the choice by the general meeting of shareholders or members of the audited entity 
pursuant to paragraph 1 to certain categories or lists of statutory auditors or audit firms as regards the 
appointment of a particular statutory auditor or audit firm to carry out the statutory audit of that entity shall 
be prohibited. Any such existing clauses shall be null and void’. 
228 An exception is the 2014 AGM of CRH Plc. The company explains in its meeting notice: ‘The Auditors, 
Ernst & Young, Chartered Accountants, are willing to continue in office. Having had regard to recent 
developments in corporate governance practice, the Directors have decided to provide shareholders with 
an opportunity to have a say on the continuation in office of Ernst & Young by way of an advisory, non-
binding vote.’ (p. 12). (<http://www.crh.com/docs/annual-report-2013/agm-circular-14-03-
14.pdf?sfvrsn=2>). (accessed in May 2015). 
229 Section 133 jo 141 Irish CA, 1963.  
230 EC (2014a) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 
2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement and Directive 
2013/34/EU as regards certain elements of the corporate governance statement, COM (2014) 213 final. 
April 9, 2014.  
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these agreements to the general meeting ex article L.225-40 FCC. Also a shareholder vote is 
required ex L.225-41 FCC (ex post approval). In Germany, shareholder approval is required for 
those transactions that require the supervisory board’s consent but this consent is withhold, ex 
section 111(4) AktG.  
In addition to the provisions in the CA 2006 regarding the approval of the agreements that we 
considered in section 5.2.2.5., chapter 11 of the UK Listing Rules contains more general rules on 
related party transactions. Paragraph 3 of LR 11.1.7 requires shareholder approval of these related 
party transactions (larger than a percentage ratio of 5%).  
 
5.2.11. Enterprise Agreements (Germany) 
Konzern Recht in Germany requires shareholder approval for enterprise agreements (section 291 et 
seq. AktG). For approval of these agreements a 75% majority of the represented capital is needed 
pursuant to section 293(1) and (2) AktG231 (the articles may mandate a larger capital majority and 
additional requirements).   
 
5.2.12. Other Resolutions 
Many other (categories of) resolutions can be found on the agendas of AGMs (and EGMs) in 
Europe in addition to the ones already discussed. Major decisions or transactions usually also 
require shareholder approval. For instance, in the Netherlands, resolutions by the board of 
directors that lead to changes in the identity or character of the company must be approved by the 
shareholders’ meeting pursuant to article 2:107a DCC, including, for instance, important joint 
ventures (b) and participation or disposal of capital that amounts to at least one-third of the value 
of the balance sheet (a). In contrast, the CA 2006 does not set out any specific rule for shareholder 
approval regarding major transactions, but Rule 10 of the UK Listing Rules requires prior 
shareholder approval for class 1 transactions.232 Furthermore, 179a AktG requires approval with a 
majority of 75% of the share capital for a contract by which a company binds itself to transfer the 
entirety of its assets that do not fall under the provisions of the Umwandlungsgesetz (UmwG, 
translation: Reorganisation Act). Moreover, the conversion or liquidation of the company needs 
separate shareholder approval in all seven Member States (different majorities are required). In the 
Netherlands, shareholders must authorise the management board to file for bankruptcy ex article 
2:136 DCC. However, the articles of association may determine another procedure. Lastly, in 
Germany, ex section 327a(1) AktG, the AGM may resolve, upon request of a major shareholder 
that holds at least 95% of the share capital, the transfer of the other shareholders’ shares to this 
major shareholder against the payment of ‘adequate’ cash compensation.  
The aforementioned resolutions are not often placed on the agenda of the meeting. In contrast, 
a recurrent, country-specific resolution category concerns political donations and expenditures in 
the UK: for these donations and expenditures a shareholder vote is required ex section 366 CA 
2006. 
 
                                                     
231 Paragraph 1 of this article stipulates enterprise agreements, paragraph two control agreements and profit 
transfer agreements. 
232 ‘A transaction where any percentage ratio is 25% or more’. Percentage ratios result from applying the 
class test calculations that are set out in Annex 1 of the Listing Rules to a transaction.  
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5.3. Concluding Remarks 
Sections 5.2.1-5.2.12 show that there are large differences in shareholder decision-making rights in 
the European Member States. Although there are already some differences – for example in 
shareholder forum rights as a result of minimum harmonization – shareholder decision-making 
rights are generally not harmonized at the European level, and hence, differ substantially. 
Shareholders may generally (re-)elect board members in all seven Member States (supervisory 
board members under a two-tier board structure), but there are differences, namely in the terms of 
office, the employee involvement, and the requirements for the election of independent directors. 
Say-on-pay resolutions probably differ most of all resolutions among Member States. Some 
Member States (UK, Belgium) require companies to put the remuneration report to a shareholder 
vote. Other countries require a vote for the remuneration policy (Netherlands, UK, Germany 
[remuneration system]). In France, new say-on-pay legislation is on its way that probably also 
contains a vote on the remuneration policy. Besides these say-on-pay provisions, Member States 
have also adopted different rules concerning shareholder approval of incentive schemes, bonuses, 
related-party transactions, and other pay-related decisions. Proposed amendments to the 
Shareholder Rights Directive include a European say on pay (cf. supra, section 2.5 of this chapter). 
The introduction of the European say on pay could significantly contribute to harmonization of 
this shareholder right. In contrast, resolutions related to the company’s capital are already 
harmonized at the European level, though here too we found some major differences. In addition 
to these three large categories of shareholder decision-making rights –director elections, say on 
pay, and capital resolutions – we also outlined the differences for i) amendments to the articles of 
association, ii) annual accounts, iii) dividends, iv) discharge, v) the auditor, vi) notice period of 
general meetings, vii) related-party transactions, viii) enterprise agreements, and ix) a remainder 
category of ‘other’ resolutions. In order to provide an overview of these different decision-making 
rights in the seven Member States, and importantly, to provide a framework for the empirical 
analyses in the next chapters, we have determined fifteen different resolution categories. These 





Fifteen Resolution Categories 
Resolution Category Explanation 
 
Where do shareholders have these 
rights (in practice)? 
 
Statutory right or best 
practice? 
Required majority? 
i. Director (re-)elections  (re-)election of management board 
member and supervisory board 
members in a two-tier board structure, 
and executive and non-executive 
directors in a one-tier board system. 
All seven countries. 
Differences: listed companies in the 
UK and Ireland (FTSE-350, Irish 
listing rules) are required to put 
directors up for (re-)election every 
year.  
In Austria, Germany , the 
Netherlands (and France): 
shareholders elect supervisory board 
members (but note co-determination 
rules). 
Generally, the right is 
statutory, but in the UK it 
follows from the articles of 




ii. Say on Pay  Overall All resolutions regarding executive pay 
(including supervisory board members 
and non-executive directors).  
All seven countries in the sample 
have some form of say on pay, but 
these rights are very different.  
Statutory and/or best 





Resolutions regarding the 
remuneration report. 
UK, Belgium, Ireland. UK and Belgium: statutory 
requirement. 
Ireland: no statutory 
requirement, but some 
companies follow this best 
practice. 
Simple majority. 
Say on Pay Other All resolutions that concern pay 
matters other than the remuneration 
report, including approval of the 
remuneration policy, authorization of 
share and share option grant, etc. 
All seven countries in sample have 
some form of say on pay.  
 
Statutory and/or best 





All resolutions that concern 
(amendments to) the remuneration 
policy and the remuneration system 
(the latter for Germany).  
The Netherlands, UK, Germany (the 
latter, shareholders have a vote on 
the ‘remuneration system’). 
France: as per December 2016 ex ante 
say-on-pay rules (cf. supra, section 
5.2.2).    
Statutory. Simple majority. 
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All proposals regarding (long-term) 
incentive plans.  
All seven countries in sample 
(Austria and Germany a conditional 
capital increase that requires an 
amendment to the articles of  
association). 
The Netherlands, France, 
Belgium, Germany and 
Austria: statutory. 
UK and Ireland: UKCGC. 
Simple majority, except for Austria 
and Germany regarding the 




Approval of bonuses or other forms of 
special pay granted to a particular 
director such as retention bonuses.  
 
France (new legislation December 
2016, cf. supra, section 5.2.2.), the 
Netherlands. 
France: FCGC, as per 
December 2016 statutory. 
The Netherlands: statutory. 
Simple majority. 
 
RPT regarding Say 
on Pay 
Related party transactions concerning 
say on pay. 
France  
UK, Ireland: loss of office, 
substantial property and loans (latter 
UK only). 
Belgium: particular severance pay 
arrangements. 
Statutory.  Simple majority. 
 
Supervisory and  
non-executive pay 
Remuneration and remuneration policy 
for supervisory board members and 
non-executive directors, including 
board fees. 
All seven countries in sample.  Statutory (rules regarding 





iii. Capital increase234 All resolutions related to (the 
authorisation of) a capital increase, 
which are not contained in the 
category incentive plans.  
All seven countries in sample. Statutory. Austria, Belgium, Germany, France: 
75% 
The Netherlands, UK, Ireland: 
simple majority. 
iv. Waiver of pre-emption rights All resolutions related to the waiver of 
pre-emption rights. If a capital increase 
proposal also includes the waiver of 
these rights, the proposal is included in 
both categories. 
All seven countries in sample. Statutory. Qualified majority of 75% in all 
countries except for the 
Netherlands, two-thirds majority if 
less than 50% turnout, otherwise 
simple majority. 
                                                     
233 Although this category is not a separate category in this chapter’s analysis, when analysing the meeting documents of the companies in our sample, we recognized 
that this distinction can be made in practice. Hence, we included an additional voting item category in our analysis.    
234 Including convertible bonds.  
91 
 
v. Share buybacks All resolutions related to share 
buybacks. 
All seven countries in sample. Statutory Simple majority for all countries, 
except for Belgium (80%). 
Remark: in the UK a 75% majority 
was required for off-market 
purchases before 2013 (now 
repealed). 
vi. Cancel treasury shares All resolutions related to the 
cancellation of treasury shares. 
France, the Netherlands, Germany, 
Austria. 
NB: capital reduction usually requires 
amendments to articles of 
association, see category vii below.  
Statutory (in Germany and 
Austria it is included in the 
authorization to buyback 
own shares) 
France, Germany, Austria: 75%. 
the Netherlands: simple majority. 
vii. Amendments to the articles  All resolutions related to any 
amendment of the articles that are not 
already contained in either a capital 
resolution category or a say-on-pay 
resolution category.  
All seven countries in sample. Statutory  75% majority, but: 
the Netherlands: simple majority 
Belgium: either 50% quorum and 
75% majority, or 80% majority. 
France: 25% quorum first call and 
two-thirds majority 
viii. Financial statements All resolutions related to the adoption 
of the financial statements. 
The Netherlands, UK, Ireland, 
France, Belgium 
Statutory  Simple majority 
 
ix. Dividends All resolutions related to dividends. All seven countries in sample. In Austria, Germany and 
France: Statutory.  
Nonetheless, common 
practice in all Member 
States (for the Netherlands: 
provision in DCGC). 
Simple majority. 
x. Discharge All resolutions related to discharging 
directors (supervisory and 
management board members). 
The Netherlands, Belgium (also the 
statutory auditor), Germany, Austria, 
France. 
Statutory. Simple majority. 
 
xi. Auditors All resolutions related to the external 
auditor, including the appointment and 
pay.  
Appointment: all Member States in 
sample (except for Ireland, usually 
not a voting item) 
Remuneration: Ireland, UK, 
Belgium. 




xii. RPT All resolutions related to related party 
transactions, not included in the say-
on-pay category. 
UK, France, Germany (the latter 
only those transactions that require 
the supervisory board’s consent, but 
is withhold) 
France, Germany: statutory 
UK: Listing Rules. 
Simple majority. 
 
xiii. Enterprise agreements 
 
All resolutions related to enterprise 
agreements. 
Germany Statutory. Simple majority. 
xiv. GM 14 days All resolutions related to decreasing 
the notice period for general meetings 
other than AGMs to fourteen days. 
UK, Ireland Statutory. 75% majority. 
xv. Political donations All resolutions related to political 
donations. 




6. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
We outlined the legal position of AGMs from a comparative perspective. For this, we focused our 
research on the three functions of AGMs and the shareholder rights connected to these functions.  
We have seen that few aspects of shareholder meetings are harmonized at the European level. 
Hence, a large part of our analysis in this chapter focuses on the national level. There are many 
(sometimes subtle) differences among the countries. First of all, the organisation of the general 
meeting an sich differs among Member States: whereas in the Netherlands, Austria, Germany, the 
UK and Ireland the AGM is convened on an annual basis and considers all resolutions, and EGMs 
are convened only in special cases, in France and Belgium the annual meeting is divided in an 
ordinary part (often referred to as the AGM) and an extraordinary part for particular resolutions 
(the EGM). In Belgium these are formally two different meetings, with separate minutes, but, in 
practice, the AGM and the EGM usually take place on the same day. Participation and voting 
procedures may also differ (i.e., majority rules, quorum, the calculation of voting outcomes, etc.). 
For example in France, long-term shareholders often have double voting rights. 
With the Shareholder Rights Directive the right to ask questions was introduced at the 
European level. Prior to this Directive, many Member States already guaranteed this shareholder 
right. As a result, there are some (minor) differences in the national laws. For instance, in Germany 
the right to ask questions is incorporated in the AktG in a detailed manner and explicitly states that 
the articles of association may authorise the chairman of the meeting to limit the shareholders’ 
forum rights. This is not stated in the national laws of other the countries, and analysis of the 
articles of association of the companies in our sample has shown that these provisions in the articles 
of association are not (very) common in the other Member States either. Nonetheless, since the 
chairman of the meeting has the general task of managing the proper conduct of the meeting, in 
these countries, he or she has some capacity to limit the question rights as well, but usually only in 
exceptional cases. In chapter 6 of this study we investigate the use of the forum rights for a sample 
of Dutch companies.  
The comparative analysis of the resolutions contains fruitful insights. In contrast to forum 
rights, shareholder decision-making rights differ largely among the Member States, which increases 
the difficulty of doing empirical research. Adopting the annual accounts might seem a rather 
straightforward resolution, but as we have seen, the legal implications of this resolution in the 
different countries are completely different. And then we have the large variety of say-on-pay 
resolutions, the differences regarding director elections, etc.  Consequently, to be able to conduct 
comparative empirical analyses in the subsequent chapters, we developed a framework of fifteen 
resolution categories. Information problems are severely present and may cause biases. One also 
must consider the substantial differences among AGMs and the legal mechanisms behind them.  
The question of whether these large differences are desirable remains. On the one hand, a 
(partly) harmonised regime may contribute to the functioning of the European capital market, for 
example by lowering the information costs for international investors wishing to exercise their 
voting rights in different Member States. On the other hand, there are large differences, not only 
in ownership concentration and company governance structures as we will see in the second 
chapter, but also in the general perspective on corporate law (for example, the German 
Mittbestimmung rules compared to the Anglo-Saxon system) in the European Union, which makes 
the harmonisation of particular shareholder rights difficult and, in some situations, undesirable. 
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For the near future, we see the national implementation of the European say on pay, which may 
bring us one step closer to a more uniform framework of shareholder decision-making rights.    
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CHAPTER 2 - THE AGM IN PRACTICE 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this chapter we assess the practical characteristics of AGMs in an extensive empirical analysis. For this, we 
consider the AGMs of seven European Member States between 2010 and 2014. We show that, although there are 
large differences in total and small shareholder turnout rates among Member States, there is an overall increasing 
trend in the 2010-2014 period. Next, we find that, in line with previous studies, ownership concentration and voting 
power of large shareholders is generally higher in continental European countries. Regarding shareholder voting 
behaviour, our research shows that certain voting items receive higher dissent rates than others, especially when only 
considering the outsider shareholder base. These voting items include inter alia director (re-)elections and say-on-pay 
resolutions. It seems that shareholders are genuinely more interested in these voting items.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter of this study we established the legal framework for AGMs in Europe. We 
considered the national frameworks of seven European countries: Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the UK. In this part of our research, we establish the 
practical features of AGMs in these countries, based on these regulatory frameworks. The 
Shareholder Rights Directive (2007/36/EC) requires companies to disclose the voting results and 
to publish this information on their website. This creates an opportunity to examine the functioning 
of the European AGM in two ways: i) shareholders’ attendance,235 i.e. the decision to attend the 
meeting and generally vote, or not; and ii) shareholder voting behaviour, i.e. shareholder voting 
decisions on specific agenda items. With the use of the publications on the companies’ websites 
and other data, we present new evidence on turnout rates and shareholder voting behaviour at 
AGMs. Afterwards, in the next chapter of this research we use this dataset to empirically examine 
the attendance determinants of (small) shareholders.  
Only a few scholars have investigated shareholder turnout so far. De Jong, Mertens and 
Roosenboom (2006) studied 245 AGMs of 54 Dutch companies between 1998 and 2002. They 
find that the shareholder turnout at Dutch AGMs for companies without depository receipts was 
relatively low with only a 30% average (cf. infra, the use of depository receipts is explained in section 
5.1.2 of this chapter).  Van der Elst (for instance, 2013, 2012, 2011, 1997236) has studied shareholder 
voter turnout in the past years in several studies, often focussing on Belgian companies. In an 
OECD research paper, Hewitt (2011) studies the shareholder voter turnout in OECD countries 
(cf. infra, section 2 of this chapter). Others, including ISS (Institutional Shareholder Services), also 
publish voter turnout reports.237  
 
                                                     
235 In this study, we use the words ‘to participate’ and ‘to attend’ (or ‘shareholder attendance’ and 
‘shareholder participation’) as synonyms; both wordings include the situations that shareholders either 
physically attend the again, or vote by proxy or by mail.  
236 Research of Van der Elst and Wymeersch (1997).  
237 In chapter 3 we discuss studies that focus on shareholder turnout and voting behaviour (cf. infra, section 
2 of chapter 3). 
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1.1. Outline of this Chapter 
This chapter is organised as follows: in the next section, we introduce our sample of companies 
that are listed in the seven European Member States. In the remaining sections, we outline the 
empirical framework for our research and provide descriptive findings per category. Section 3 
describes the findings for total shareholder turnout and section 4 for small shareholder turnout. In 
section 5, we examine the ownership structures of the companies in our sample. Afterwards, in 
section 6 we evaluate shareholder voting power separately, because, as we will explain, voting power 
and ownership stakes may differ significantly. In section 7 we discuss shareholder voting behaviour 
in AGMs, including dissent rates and the content of the meeting agendas. Section 8 describes the 
types of shareholders and section 9 evaluates the behaviour of ‘outsider’ shareholders, i.e., 
shareholders not considered corporate insiders. Finally, section 10 provides conclusions and 
discussion of the findings.   
 
2. SAMPLE AND DATA COLLECTION 
This study makes (besides other data sources such as DataStream) use of hand-collected panel data 
from the websites of companies listed at the national stock exchanges of various countries in the 
European Union. We use voting information that is reported in documents disclosed by companies 
on their websites. These documents include AGM minutes, voting results statements and 
convening notices. The convening notices usually contain many pages of information, as required 
by the national laws of the Member States (ex article 5 of the Shareholder Rights Directive), 
including, inter alia, the place and time of the AGM, the proposed agenda, a detailed description of 
how shareholders can participate and vote in the general meeting, including a description of the 
shareholders’ rights and the proxy voting procedure, the record date, etc. The convening notice 
must also explain how the documents need to be submitted to the meeting and the draft resolutions 
can be obtained by the shareholders. In practice, companies often include the draft resolutions in 
their meeting notices. Disclosure of the voting results statements is also required by the 
Shareholder Rights Directive (article 14). The Shareholder Rights Directive does not require 
companies to disclose minutes, but some companies publish them on their websites in accordance 
with the national corporate governance framework.  For example, the Dutch Corporate 
Governance Code (DCGC 2008) requires companies to provide their shareholders with reports of 
the general meetings (principle IV.3.10 of DCGC 2008; principle 4.1.10 DCGC 2016). Accordingly, 
many Dutch companies disclose extensive minutes of the general meetings on their websites. In 
addition to these documents, we also use ownership structure data provided in the company annual 
reports and national registers.  
We use the data of companies that are listed to the main indices in the UK (FTSE-100), the 
Netherlands (AEX-25), France (CAC-40), Germany (DAX-30), Austria (ATX-20), Belgium (BEL-
20), and Ireland (ISEQ-20) over a period of five years since the implementation of Directive 
2007/36/EC (2010-2014). According to ISS reports in 2010 and 2011, not all firms in all European 
countries disclose (complete) information about voting results on their websites. This may come 
as no surprise, as there is no sanction for not disclosing this information (also see Cremers, 2011). 
ISS observes some big differences when analysing the available information; whereas in 2010 in 
Denmark, only 23.5% of the companies disclose the required information (OMXC-20), for 
example in Belgium (BEL-20), Norway (OBX-25) and Luxembourg (Lux-X) all companies disclose 
this information for this year. In its 2011 report, ISS reports a 62.5% disclosure rate for 
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Luxembourg (Lux-X), 100% for (amongst others) Ireland (ISEQ General), UK (FTSE 350) and 
Greece (ASE-20) and 97.5% for the Netherlands (AEX-25 and AMX-25).238 Although Member 
States were obliged to implement Directive 2007/36/EC by August 2009, some Member States 
did not fulfil this obligation in a timely fashion. For example, for the Netherlands, this Directive 
was implemented through the Wet Ter Implementatie van de Richtlijn Aandeelhoudersrechten, which went 
into effect on July 1, 2010 (cf. infra, chapter 4 of this research). In contrast, the UK managed to 
transpose the Shareholder Rights Directive in a timely manner. Moreover, under the UK CA 2006, 
firms were already required to publish the result of any voting poll on their websites, although not 
in as much detail as described in the Directive.239 But late implementation does not fully explain 
why not all firms publish the results of their voting polls. For example, in Belgium, the Shareholder 
Rights Directive was implemented in January 2012 (cf. infra, chapter 4), but Belgian companies had 
to disclose information related to the AGM as of April 2010 following the BCGC (Van der Elst, 
2013). Van der Elst (2013) reports an increasing disclosure of Belgian firms in the period 2007-
2012, but notices that approximately 1 out of 5 firms in Belgium still does not comply with the 
regulation for the year 2012. 
Comparison of ISS’s findings with Hewitt’s report (2011) amply illustrates that voter turnout 
rates reported by scholars may substantially depend on sample selection. Hewitt collects data using 
a ‘minimum of thirty meetings over the last two financial years [2009 and 2010] per country […] 
by selecting companies that were incorporated and in the main listing segment in the country in 
question’ (p. 8). At first sight, the findings might look similar to the ISS reports, but a closer look 
at the percentages reported for specific years reveals discrepancies of around 6% or more (the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Finland for example). This difference indicates that a sound reporting 
of sample selection in this kind of studies important. 
When collecting the data for this research,240 we saw that although many firms disclose the 
required information for the year 2014, the information for previous years was sometimes no 
longer available. Consequently, e imposed the following sample requirements: i) the company must 
belong to one of the aforementioned indices in one or more years between 2010 and 2014, and ii) 
AGM information, including voter turnout and voting behaviour, and ownership information need 
to be available for the company for the complete period 2010-2014. In case the company belongs 
to more than one of the seven indices, the location of the company’s registered office of the 
company determines to which country it belongs in our sample. For example, Delta Lloyd NV is 
part of the AEX-25 and Bel-20. Since it has its registered office in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 
Delta Lloyd NV is considered a Dutch company in our sample. Gemalto NV was listed to the 
AEX-25 and CAC-40; since this company also has its registered office in Amsterdam it is also 
considered a Dutch company. Companies with a dual structure, i.e., Reed Elsevier Plc and Reed 
Elsevier NV (currently named ‘RELX’), and Unilever Plc and Unilever NV, are included in the 
sample for both the UK and the Netherlands.  
                                                     
238 ISS 2011 and ISS 2010. 
239 In chapter 1 of this research we have seen that around 10% of the FTSE-100 AGMs in our sample used 
‘show of hands’ voting method. However, one may note that the UKCGCG stipulates that where a vote 
has been taken on a show of hands, companies also need to disclose the amount of votes in favour, against 
and withheld (rule E.2.2).  Few companies in our sample only disclosed their proxy voting results. Since 
usually only a (insignificantly) small part of the shareholders physically attends AGMs, these proxy voting 
results provide us important information about the voting results.  
240 The data collection mostly took place in the end of 2014 and the beginning of 2015.  
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Our initial sample consisted of 279 companies, but not all companies disclose complete AGM 
information for our five-year period on their websites.241 We contacted the investor relations 
departments of the companies for the missing information, and deleted the companies from our 
sample if the information was unavailable or we failed to get a response from the investor relations 
departments. Our final sample contains data for 251 companies over five years, which brings the 






Number of companies Number of AGMs 
Austria 22 110 
Belgium 17242 85 
France 37 185 
Germany 32 160 
Ireland 18 90 
Netherlands 24 120 
UK 101 505 
Total 251 1,255 
 
Most of the companies in our sample are in industrial goods and services (39 companies). Other 
popular super-sectors are insurance and banks, with 19 and 15 companies respectively. Only one 
company is in the equity/non-equity investment instruments business. The complete list of 
companies can be found in the appendix to this chapter. For France, we report all resolutions of 
the combined general meetings (both ordinary and extraordinary resolutions). And for Belgian 
companies, we report both the voting results from the ordinary general meetings and the 
extraordinary meetings in case these two meetings take place on the same day and at the same 
location: the extraordinary meeting usually takes place right after the ordinary one and hence, the 
distinction is a legal formality, similar to France’s (cf. supra, chapter 1).243  During these 1,255 
(combined) AGMs over 21,000 resolutions were put to a shareholder vote.   
 
3. TOTAL SHAREHOLDER VOTER TURNOUT 
3.1. Methodology 
We defined total shareholder turnout, denoted by TURNOUT, as follows:  
  
 
                                                     
241 Of these 28 companies, 3 companies are AEX-25 companies, 3 companies are CAC-40 companies and 
3 companies are BEL-20 companies. The remaining 19 companies were (or still are) either part of the FTSE-
100 or the ISEQ General.  
242 For Befimmo NV we recorded the results of the 2011 EGM that was held on 22 June, 2011. For GBL 
NV (Groupe Bruxelles Lambert) the shareholder voter turnout of the 2010 AGM was not disclosed. We 
contacted the investor relations department but did not get a response. 
243 Unfortunately, there are no voting results reported for the 2012 and 2014 EGM of Elia NV, nor for the 
2010 EGM of Telenet NV.  
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TURNOUT    
= (Total Number of Votes Casted)/(Total Amount of Votes Outstanding)  
* 100%, 
 
where the total amount of votes outstanding is corrected for treasury shares: since we investigate 
the actual attendance behaviour of (small) shareholders, the reported voter turnout and stakes in 
this research are corrected for treasury shares if possible. Treasury shares are shares held by the 
company itself, and the voting rights attached to them cannot be exercised.244  
 
3.2. Descriptive Analysis 
Total voter turnout differs widely across the 251 companies in the sample. The mean or average 
voter turnout for all companies in the sample is 65.6% with a standard deviation of 14.8%. The 
median voter turnout is slightly higher than the mean with 67.6%. Since the median voter turnout 
is higher than the average voter turnout the distribution is somewhat skewed to the right; there are 
more values larger than the average value, but the values that are smaller than the average value are 
(much) lower. The lowest voter turnout is measured for the AGM in 2010 for the Austrian 
company CA Immobilien Anlagen AG and amounts to 15.2%, whereas the highest voter turnout 
is almost 100% for ING NV between 2010 and 2014. ING NV has issued depository receipts (cf. 
infra, section 5.1.2 of this chapter) for almost all shares with voting rights, and ING’s trust office 
votes with all shares for which depository receipt holders have not requested proxies. The voter 
turnout for Allied Irish Banks Plc was also remarkably high at first sight with 99.8%, but the 
National Pensions Reserve Fund Commission (Irish government) holds 99.8% of the shares in 
Allied Irish Banks Plc; at the end of 2010 Allied Irish Banks Plc was effectively nationalized by the 
Irish Government. The mean and median of the voter turnout shows an increasing trend:  
 
                                                     
244 In France, some companies report the number of voting rights including and excluding treasury shares 
on their website. For other companies, we used information retrieved from annual reports, meeting 
notification documents, and other disclosure documents. In case treasury shares were included in the total 
number of voting rights reported by the company, the number of treasury shares was deducted from total 
voting rights. Since it is important to take into account that some voting results disclosures include treasury 
shares when reporting the number of voting rights present at a meeting, the actual submitted votes (votes 
in favour, votes against, votes withheld etc.) are summed where possible, to take into account only the 






Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
mean TURNOUT (%) 62.3 64.8 67.2 66.4 67.2 
median TURNOUT (%) 63.6 66.2 68.7 69.2 69.1 
 
The mean voter turnout per country over these five years differs substantially (figure 2). In Belgium, 
the mean voter turnout over five years is the lowest with 52.5%, whereas in the UK and Ireland, 
the mean voter turnout is 70.4 and 69.0%, respectively. France reports the highest voter turnout 
of continental Europe on average with a percentage of 66.2, closely followed by the Netherlands 
with 63.9%. Austria has a mean voter turnout of 61.6% and the average voter turnout of Germany 
is 58.6%.  The mean and median voter turnout differ the most in Belgium: whereas the mean is 
only 52.5%, the median voter turnout is 57.4%. This discrepancy indicates that there are more 
observations with a higher voter turnout than 52.5%, but the observations with a lower voter 
turnout than the mean have a (much) lower value. A one-way ANOVA shows that the mean voter 
turnout is significantly higher in 2011 compared to 2010 (statistically significant at the 10% level), 
the mean voter turnout is significantly higher in 2012 compared to 2011 (also at the 10% level). 
The means in other subsequent years were not statistically significantly different.   
 
FIGURE 2 































Table 2 shows the trend of average voter turnouts per country over 2010-2014. Belgium reported 
the lowest voter turnout in 2010, 2011 and 2012, but in 2013 and 2014, average total voter turnout 
was lower in Germany. Either the UK or Ireland reported the highest total turnout in every year.  
 
TABLE 2 
TURNOUT per country per year (%) 
Year Austria Belgium France Germany Ireland Netherlands UK 
2010 58.3 46.4 63.2 59.8 59.9 56.8 67.9 
2011 58.8 45.8 67.7 59.4 66.5 62.9 70.0 
2012 60.8 54.4 68.3 62.2 72.9 64.8 71.6 
2013 65.1 56.3 65.4 53.6 73.2 66.8 71.6 
2014 65.1 59.2 66.3 57.9 72.3 68.3 71.1 
 
In France and Germany total voter turnout decreased from 2012 to 2013. Whereas in France this 
difference is only 3.4%, in Germany this decrease is substantial at 8.6%. In 2014, the mean voter 
turnout decreased in Ireland (0.9%) and in the UK (0.5%). Over the reported period, the voter 
turnout of the Netherlands and Ireland experienced the largest growth: 11.5% in the Netherlands 
and 12.4% in Ireland. There was a large jump in shareholder turnout in the Netherlands in the 
2010-2011 period; the Shareholder Rights Directive was implemented in Dutch law prior to the 
2011 AGM season, which may have caused this increase (we will explore whether there is a causal 
link in chapter four). Similarly, we observe a sharp increase in Belgian turnout rates in 2012, which 
was the first year Belgian companies needed to comply with the implemented provisions from the 
Directive (cf. infra, chapter 4). If we exclude the Dutch companies Fugro and ING, which did not 
list (almost) all their shares but issued non-voting depository receipts (cf. infra, section 5.1.2 of this 
chapter), and thus accordingly had a turnout of over 99%, the average voter turnout of Dutch 
AEX-companies was only 60.7% over the 5-year period. Nonetheless, this is still higher than the 
average voter turnout in Germany and Belgium.    
In some cases, turnout rates were clearly significantly higher in one country than in the other 
country. For instance, the turnout rates in Belgium were significantly lower than in the UK for all 
years. In other cases, it is less clear whether significant differences exist. When we compare the 
means for the Netherlands and Ireland using a one-way ANOVA (or a two-sample t test) we note 
that these mean turnout rates were only significantly different for the year 2012 (but only at the 
10% level). Similarly, we conducted tests for the other combinations of countries and found the 








































2010 3.10†  not sign. not sign. not sign. not sign. 5.43* not sign. 8.47** 15.08*** 
2011 4.68* not sign. 7.43† not sign. not sign. not sign. not sign. not sign. 7.25** 
2012 not sign. not sign. 3.68† not sign. not sign. 3.06† 3.19† not sign. 7.42** 
2013 not sign. 4.31* 7.64** not sign. 3.94† 9.09** not sign. not sign. 3.72† 
2014 not sign. not sign. 6.22* not sign. 3.47† 7.86** not sign. not sign. not sign. 
Note: the table reports the F-ratios. The notion ‘not sign.’ means that there was not significant difference 
between the two means.  
†p < 0.1,  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
Table 3 shows that voter turnout means for the UK and Ireland were not statistically significantly 
different (except for the year 2010). In contrast, turnout rates in the UK were significantly higher 
than in all the other continental European Member States in our sample. The voter turnout rates 
for, for example, the Netherlands and France are rather similar, but compared to Germany, the 
voter turnout rates in France were significantly higher. Turnout rates in Belgium and Austria also 
did not differ significantly in the period 2012-2014.   
 
3.3. Concluding Remarks 
In sections 3.1-3.2 we discussed the descriptives of total shareholder turnout in the seven Member 
States. We have seen that shareholder turnout rates are increasing in the 2010-2014 period in all 
countries, but the rates differ largely. Interestingly, a large jump can be noted in turnout rates after 
the introduction of the Shareholder Rights Directive at the national level in the Netherlands, France 
and Belgium. In chapter 4 of this research we explore whether this increase may have a causal 
explanation.  
 
4. SMALL SHAREHOLDER VOTER TURNOUT 
4.1. Methodology 
In order to determine small shareholder turnout rates, we need to define which part of the total 
shareholder turnout rate belongs to the small shareholders. We define small shareholders as all 
shareholders who are not blockholders. A blockholder is defined as a shareholder – or a group of 
shareholders who explicitly act in concert under a disclosed shareholder agreement – that holds at 
least 5% of all voting rights. The 5% cut-off point is in line with the lowest disclosure threshold in 
the Transparency Directive. Since not all Member States have implemented additional lower 
thresholds, 5% is the lowest common threshold in our sample. ISS and Van der Elst (2011) also 
use this threshold to distinguish small shareholders from blockholders. 
Companies are only obliged to disclose the total voting results under European law. Hence, we 
need a method to identify whether small shareholders attended the meeting. Van der Elst (2011) 
recognizes this problem, and assumes that blockholders always attend the AGM. This assumption 
enables the calculation of small shareholder turnout rates. Large shareholders generally have 
significantly more incentives to vote than small shareholders since they will receive a larger share 
of the benefits of better monitoring. Their voting costs will also be relatively lower under the 
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assumption that the costs of voting with one share are the same as the costs of voting with multiple 
shares. Moreover, large shareholders are ‘locked-in’ since easily selling their stakes without 
adversely affecting the share price is usually impossible. As a result, these large shareholders have 
to deal directly with the corporate management, for example through voting at the AGM (Leech, 
1987). Van der Elst (2011) finds support for this premise in his data: voter turnout would be much 
lower without attendance of these blockholders. Attendance lists of several Belgium and Italian 
companies confirm this assumption. This assumption also correlates with Zetzsche’s research 
(2008). And in its analysis of European shareholder behaviour in 2010, ISS published a graph on 
the percentage of free-float at shareholder meetings, thereby ‘assuming that all important 
shareholders exercise their voting rights’ (p. 18). Although one could argue that it is possible that 
not all blockholders would vote with all their shares and that there remains some uncertainty about 
the actual stake of each blockholder, it is still the best available proxy to date to evaluate small 
shareholder voter turnout.245 Apart from irrational behaviour or personal incentives there are no 
convincing arguments to assume that blockholders do not vote with all their shares. In the past, 
this might have been different due to the use of share blocking, but this behaviour was abolished 
with the introduction of the Shareholder Rights Directive. One may note that share blocking was 
still practiced at some Belgian companies in our sample in 2010 and 2011, before the introduction 
of the Shareholder Rights Directive, which may explain the low attendance rates for Belgian 
companies in these years (Van der Elst, 2011). In chapter 4 of our research, we will further explore 
this possibly causal relationship. 
Following the assumption that all blockholders attend the AGM, small shareholder turnout can 
be calculated as (following Van der Elst, 2011, ISS):   
 
TURNOUTsmall   
= (Amount of small shareholders present)/(Total amount small shareholders)*100%  
 
= (TURNOUT-Summed voting block of all blockholders)/(100%-Summed voting block of all 
blockholders)*100% 
 
There is some uncertainty about the actual stakes of blockholders, since blockholders are only 
obliged to notify their issuer of their stakes in case their stake exceeds or falls below the thresholds 
defined by law. Hence, the actual stake of a blockholder can differ from the stake that is disclosed 
when his or her stake increases or decreases without passing another threshold. This unsolvable 
measurement error is observable for 17 of the 1,255 observations in our sample: for these, the total 
turnout was smaller than the aggregate disclosed stakes of the blockholders.246 247 For these cases 
we have set the turnout of small shareholders to zero.  
                                                     
245 One may note that in the US, mutual funds are required to disclose how they vote by their proxies in 
accordance with the regulations of the SEC (Form N-PX).  
246 BWIN Party Digital Entertainment (2011), Immofinanz (2010), Strabag (2014), Uniqa Insurance Group 
(2012), Verbund AG (2014), D’Ieteren (2012), KBC Groep (2011), Telenet Group (2010), UCB (2010 and 
2011), Umicore (2010), Continental (2010), Deutsche Telekom (2013), Metro ST (2011), Independent News 
& Media (2010), Easyjet (2010) and GBL (2010).  
247 Another possible explanation is that some of these blockholders did not vote with their entire voting 
stake for unknown reasons.   
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Because of the incomplete disclosure of information related to the attendance of shareholders 
and their votes, there are three possible measurement errors that may be present in our small 
shareholder turnout analyses: 
- We over-measure the voting stake of a blockholder at the record date; 
- We under-measure the voting stake of blockholder at the record date; 
- We over-measure the amount of votes the blockholder actually uses during the AGM. 
The direction of the aggregate measurement error can go both ways, but since two of the three 
possible measurement errors lead to an overestimation of the blockholder’s voting stake, it may be 
the case that there is some underestimation of small shareholder attendance in more concentrated 
ownership structures.  
 
4.2. Descriptive Analysis 
The mean voter turnout of small shareholders for the whole sample is 49.7% and the standard 
deviation is 18.1%.  The maximum voter turnout of small shareholders is 83.7% for Rio Tinto Plc 
in 2013.  Figure 3 shows the voter turnout trend for small shareholders over the past four years. 





Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
mean TURNOUTsmall (%) 45.1 48.5 51.6 50.8 52.5 
median TURNOUTsmall (%) 48.5 53.0 56.4 57.2 56.7 
 
The mean voter turnout for small shareholders per country over these five years also differs (figure 
4). In Belgium, this percentage is the lowest at 21.3 (and a median of 18.9%) whereas in the UK 
the mean voter turnout is 62.0%. Austria has the second lowest average small voter turnout of 
30.8%. France has the second highest average small shareholder voter turnout with a percentage 
of 50.9. Ireland reports a mean small shareholder voter turnout of 46.5%, the Netherlands 44.6%, 
and Germany 43.1%. A one-way ANOVA shows that the mean small shareholder voter turnout is 


























compared to 2011 (at the 10% level). The means in other subsequent years were not statistically 
significantly different.   
 
FIGURE 4  












Table 4 illustrates the trend for small shareholder voter turnout by country between 2010 and 2014. 
As one can see, Belgium displays the lowest small shareholder voter turnout over the course of the 
whole period. In the UK, the mean small shareholder voter turnout is by far the highest every year. 
The small shareholder turnout rates for the other countries are more equal: in table 5 we investigate 
whether these means are statistically different or not.  
 
TABLE 4 
TURNOUTsmall per Country per Year (%) 
Year Austria Belgium France Germany Ireland Netherlands UK 
2010 27.9 9.9 45.2 45.0 41.3 32.5 58.2 
2011 26.0 9.5 52.3 45.5 46.0 43.7 61.1 
2012 28.9 23.7 53.9 48.2 47.1 45.6 63.7 
2013 35.4 30.1 50.8 35.2 49.4 48.5 63.4 
2014 35.9 32.5 52.3 41.7 47.8 52.7 63.7 
 
The substantial decrease of 13% in voter turnout of small shareholders for Germany in 2013 is 
remarkable, but we did not find any reasons for this significant decrease. Note that total 
shareholder voter turnout also decreased substantially, by with 8.6%, that year (cf. supra, table 2). 
Furthermore, one may note that after the implementation of the Shareholder Rights Directive small 
shareholder turnout substantially increased in the Netherlands (2010-2011), France (2010-2011) 
and Belgium (2011-2012): we will explore whether there is a causal link in chapter 4 of this study. 
In Austria, too, small voter turnout soared, from 28.9% in 2012 to 35.4% in 2013.    
We can also compare the means of small shareholder turnout rates among countries using a 




































2010 20.64***  18.72*** not sign. 14.41*** not sign. 37.30*** not sign. 
2011 18.47*** 23.19*** 5.26* 7.39** 3.14† 22.63*** not sign. 
2012 not sign. 24.00*** 3.84† 6.65* 3.41† 31.80*** not sign. 
2013 not sign. not sign. 16.94*** not sign. not sign. 38.71*** not sign. 
2014 not sign. not sign. 15.68*** not sign. not sign. 59.19*** not sign. 
 Note: the table reports the F-ratios. The notion ‘not sign.’ means that there was not significant 
difference between the two means.  
†p < 0.1,  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
Table 5 shows that statistically, the mean small shareholder turnout rate is significantly larger in the 
UK than in France for all years (this is also the case for all other countries in the sample, not 
reported in table 5).  
 
4.3. Concluding Remarks 
We have seen the descriptives of small shareholder turnout in section 4.2, using the formula that 
was determined in section 4.1. Although it should be considered that our measure remains a proxy, 
we can conclude that there are some substantial differences among the seven Member States. In 
the UK, small shareholder turnout rates are relatively high, with around 60%, whereas especially in 
Belgium and Austria small shareholder turnout rates are significantly lower. In most the countries 
in our analysis, small shareholder turnout rates have increased significantly over the years. This 
implies that, in contrast to economic theory, a significant share of the small shareholders do vote 
(cf. infra, section 10.2 for a further discussion). In the next chapter, we explore small shareholders’ 
voting determinants. Note that also in case of the small shareholder turnout rates a large jump can 
be noted in turnout rates after the introduction of the Shareholder Rights Directive at the national 
level in the Netherlands, France and Belgium (cf. infra, chapter 4).  
 
5. CORPORATE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES 
5.1. Methodology 
In the introduction chapter of this study we covered have considered ownership structure as an 
important element in corporate governance. In this section, we study the practical characteristics 
of ownership more closely. We retrieve the ownership structure data from the annual reports that 
are published prior to the shareholder meetings, but, if available, also from national authorities 
such as the AFM (financial supervision authority of the Netherlands, in Dutch: Autoriteit Financiële 
Markten).   
As we have seen with the calculation method of small shareholder turnout, the lowest common 
disclosure threshold for the countries in our sample is 5% as a result of the Transparency 
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Directive.248 Moreover, due to the very large number of small shareholders in most listed firms and 
the existence of bearer shares, information on stock ownership is necessarily incomplete. Leech 
recognizes this ‘Problem of Incomplete Information’ (Leech, 2002, p. 11). To overcome this 
problem, ownership measures and voting power indices in our research are calculated under the 
assumption of unknown theoretical small shareholders with 1% of the voting rights each. All small 
shareholders are considered symmetric, which implies that the maximum number of shareholders 
of a company would be 100 in this study; this is the case for observations for which no disclosures 
of voting stakes have been reported. Although this method of calculation implies a simplification 
of the real situation given that there are very large numbers of small shareholders in most listed 
firms, this simplification is the best proxy available for our purposes.  
Since this research investigates the actual amount of voting rights shareholders have, the 
reported stakes in this section are corrected for treasury shares for every year, in agreement with 
the reporting requirements of most countries in our sample. Many French companies report the 
number of voting rights excluding treasury shares on their websites, which made it easy to correct 
for these non-voting shares. For other companies, we used information retrieved from annual 
reports, the notification documents of the meetings and other disclosure documents. Ownership 
disclosure in the Netherlands differs from other European countries in two respects for our sample 
period: i) the Dutch financial market authority AFM also includes short positions in substantial 
shareholding disclosures, and ii) depository receipts are also included in these substantial 
shareholding disclosures.249 250 The AFM reports the short positions separately. We can therefore 
quite easily deduct these from the reported voting stakes.  
 
5.1.1. Ownership Measures 
We use the following notation for the ownership measures in this chapter: the percentage stakes 
of the shareholders are denoted in size order w1, w2, ..., wN, where wi  ≥ 1% for all i – following our 
assumption that the smallest shareholder holds a 1% stake –  and ∑ 𝑤𝑖 = 100%, the total number 
of shareholders being N. We use the voting block (%) of the largest shareholder (C1), the 
concentration ratio of the two largest shareholders (C2), the concentration ratio of three largest 
shareholders (C3). The concentration ratio Cx simply measures the percentage of the votes held 
by the x largest shareholders in a company. It can be calculated as follows: 𝐶𝑥 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑥
𝑖=1 , where 
wi is the percentage of votes held by shareholder i. We use the summed voting blocks of all 
blockholders (BLOCK) as well.251  In addition, we also use the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), 
                                                     
248 It is possible that the number of votes in practice differs from the disclosed information. This difference 
is necessarily smaller than the difference between two consecutive disclosure thresholds. In some Member 
States, the first threshold of 5% is lowered or additional disclosure thresholds are used. For a detailed 
description of the thresholds in the Member States, one may refer to section 4.2 of chapter 1.   
249 Just like we assume that blockholders exercise their voting rights during AGMs, we also assume that 
blockholders of depository receipts either request proxies or give a binding voting instruction to the trust 
office that holds the shares.  
250 With the implementation of Directive 2013/50/EU, disclosure of voting rights arising from holdings of 
financial instruments that have similar economic effects to holding shares is also required in the other 
Member States (generally introduced in 2015 in the national laws and hence, not applicable to our empirical 
analyses in chapters 2-4).  
251 In case no holdings in voting rights were reported, i.e. the shareholder structure only consists of small 




which can be calculated as: HHI = ∑ 𝑤𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1 , where wi is the percentage of votes of shareholder i 
and N is the total number of shareholders,252 and the ratio the second largest shareholder to the 
largest shareholder (R12).253  
In addition to the concentration ratios and the HHI, we also use a measure that we name ‘R12’ 
(following the measure ‘First/Second’ by Overland, Mavruk and Sjögren, 2012) which illustrates the 
difference between the stake of the largest and second largest shareholder as a percentage, 
calculated as: 
 
R12 (%)  
= (stake second largest shareholder)/(stake largest shareholder)*100% 
 
If R12 is close to 0%, the largest shareholder’s stake is significantly larger than the second largest 
stakeholder’s and he or she will have a significant voting power; if R12 is close to 100%, the stakes 
of the two largest shareholders do not differ substantially and their voting power will be more 
equal. 
 
5.1.2. Control-Enhancing Mechanisms 
Becht and Barca (2001) argue that an analysis of voting rights of corporations is complex since 
there are often coalitions, voting agreements and pyramid structures involved. Cash flow rights and 
voting rights do not have a one-to-one ratio in every company. For example, as we have seen in 
chapter 1 of this research, in France many companies used to offer double voting rights to long-
term shareholders, also prior to the implementation of the Florange law. Shareholders can also 
form coalitions in order to pass or block a resolution. These coalitions can also be formed prior to 
the AGM with the use of shareholder agreements. Pursuant to article 10(1)(g) of the Takeover 
Directive (2004/25/EC), listed companies must publish these shareholder agreements. Article 
10(2) states that that agreements that impose restrictions on voting rights or the transfer of shares 
must be disclosed in the annual report. Therefore, to completely understand a company’s 
shareholder structure and the voting power of its shareholders, these shareholder agreements must 
be considered.254 According to the ‘Report on the Proportionality Principle in the European Union’ 
conducted by Shearman and Stearling, ISS, and ECGI (2007), ‘[s]hareholders’ agreements are 
generally considered to be at the core of the freedom of contract […]. This CEM [Control-
Enhancing Mechanism] is thus legally available in […] all the countries that participated in this 
Study […] [and] are most common in Italy and Belgium’ (p. 22). This report chronicles how 23 of 
the large companies255 in its sample have disclosed shareholder agreements, including the Belgian 
                                                     
252 One may note that the maximum value of the HHI index is 1 (one shareholder holds 100% of the votes, 
i.e. 12), and the minimum value in this research is 0.01 (as the smallest shareholder has a stake of one 
percent). HHI is commonly used in competition law to measure the concentration in a specific market.  
253 In case only one shareholder’s stake is reported, the second largest shareholder is assumed to hold 1% 
of the votes. When no stakes are reported, R12 takes a value of one.    
254 Unfortunately, our analysis is limited to the disclosure of these agreements in annual reports. We thus 
cannot completely exclude the possibility that some (tacit) agreements are not disclosed in the annual report, 
for example, if the company is not aware of them. Also, one needs to note that Directive 2004/25/EC 
focuses on takeover situations.  
255 This report studies the 20 largest companies of 16 EU countries and also considers some small and 
recently listed companies.   
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companies Bekaert, Colruyt, InBev and KBC, the French companies AXA, L’Oreal and BNP 
Paribas and the Irish company Dragon Oil. Shareholders that act in concert during AGMs 
following a shareholder agreement are considered as one blockholder. For example, in the Belgian 
company Colruyt NV, the Colruyt Family and Groep Sofina act together ‘by mutual agreement’256 
and together hold almost 56% of voting rights.257 There are no other shareholdings reported in the 
annual report. Hence, in our analysis we consider Colruyt to have one blockholder holding almost 
56% of the voting rights. Another example is Strabag AG. The main shareholders of Strabag AG 
(Austria) are Raiffeisen NÖ-Wien Group/UNIQA Group, Rasperia Trading Limited and the 
Haselsteiner Group. There is a syndicate agreement between these large shareholders that provides 
for supervisory board nomination rights, voting coordination, transfer restrictions and other rights 
as outlined in the prospectus of 5 October, 2007.258 Due to this substantial agreement we consider 
these shareholders one large voting block.  
Other agreements limit shareholder voting rights or restrict the exercise of these voting rights. 
For example, the shareholder Wiener Städtische Versicherungsverein still has the right to appoint 
up to one-third of the members of the supervisory board if, and so long as, it holds 50% or less of 
the voting shares of the Vienna Insurance Group.259 Currently this shareholder holds 70% of the 
voting capital. Epoch Two Investment and Tarl Investment waived their voting rights on all the 
shares they hold in Anglo American Plc.260 These shareholders each have a stake of around 3% of 
the voting rights in Anglo American Plc.  
In Austria, the EIWOG261 stipulates that the share capital of the Österreichischen 
Elektrizitätswirtschafts-Aktiengesellschaft (Verbundgesellschaft) must be at least 51% owned by the 
Austrian government. With the exception of regional authorities and companies in which regional 
authorities hold an interest of at least 51%, the voting rights in the AGM are restricted to 5% of 
the share capital.262 
                                                     
256 Colruyt NV, annual report 2013/14, p. 160. 
(<http://www.colruytgroup.com/sites/default/files/financial/annualreports/pdf/SUPER%20LR_CG%
20JR2014_ENG_1.pdf>). (accessed in March 2015). 
257 We corrected for the non-voting treasury shares, leading to a combined stake of 
(50.11+5.44)/0.9974=55.7%.  
258 Strabag AG Prospectus 5 October 2007, p. 140. 
(<http://www.strabag.com/databases/internet/_public/files.nsf/SearchView/DAD2E2AC685D1544C1
25797C0064B22D/$File/STRABAG-KMG-Prospekt.pdf>). (accessed in March 2015). 
259 Vienna Insurance Group, annual report 2013, p. 101. It is stated that: ‘6. The Managing Board must have 
at least three and no more than seven members. The Supervisory Board has three to ten members 
(shareholder representatives). The shareholder Wiener Städtische Versicherungsverein has the right to 
appoint up to one third of the members of the Supervisory Board if, and so long as, it holds 50% or less of 
the Company’s voting shares. General Meeting resolutions are adopted by a simple majority, unless a 
different majority is required by law or the articles of association’. 
260 Anglo American Plc, annual report 2013, p. 145. 
(<http://www.angloamerican.com/~/media/Files/A/Anglo-American-PLC-
V2/investors/reports/annual-report2013.pdf>). (accessed in March 2015). 
261 Elektrizitätswirtschafts-und-organisationsgesetz (EIWOG), Bundesgesetzblatt 1998/143, 18 August 1998. Article 
2(1)(1) states that: ‘Vom Aktienkapital der Österreichischen Elektrizitätswirtschafts-Aktiengesellschaft 
(Verbundgesellschaft) muß mindestens 51 vH im Eigentum des Bundes stehen. Mit Ausnahme von Gebietskörperschaften 
und Unternehmungen, an denen Gebietskörperschaften mit mindestens 51 vH beteiligt sind, ist das Stimmrecht jedes 
Aktionärs in der Hauptversammlung mit 5 vH des Grundkapitals beschränkt.’ 
262 Verbund AG has adopted this rule in provision 19(3) of its articles of association. Otherwise each share 
has one vote. The company has an ownership structure with three large shareholders, holding a stake of 
51% (Austrian government), more than 25% (syndicate of state energy companies) and more than 
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A very particular type of large insider shareholder is the trust office (in Dutch: stichting 
administratiekantoor, or simply ‘STAK’). Some Dutch companies do not list (all) their shares but issue 
non-voting depository receipts. The shares are issued to a trust office that is the legal owner of the 
voting rights, and holders of non-voting depository receipts receive financial rights and 
dividends.263 Voting rights are thus separated from capital rights. Following article 2:118a DCC 
holders of those non-voting depository receipts may submit a request to receive proxies, except in 
takeover situations.264 Depository receipt holders may also give binding instructions to the trust 
office. The Transparency Directive (Directive 2004/109/EC) defines shareholders as ‘any natural 
person or legal entity governed by private or public law, who holds, directly or indirectly […] 
depository receipts, in which case the holder of the depository receipt shall be considered as the 
shareholder of the underlying shares represented by the depository receipts’, which means that 
holders of depository receipts must also disclose information about their major holdings.  In this 
regard, one may also refer to article 5:33(1)(b) Wft, which states that depository receipts are defined 
as shares for the purpose of chapter 5.3 (that includes disclosure requirements) of this act. Since 
holders of non-voting depository receipts may request voting proxies prior to general meetings, we 
need to deduct the percentage of requested proxies from the total voting stake of trust offices in 
order to determine their voting power during the general meetings.  Most of the companies disclose 
this percentage in the minutes or voting results of the AGMs. For two companies in the sample, 
Ahold NV and Randstad NV (only in 2014), this information was not disclosed. We therefore 
assume that the trust offices of these companies are present with their entire voting stake, varying 
from 6 to 11% of all voting rights. Of the 24 Dutch companies in our sample, 5 companies make 
use of a trust office.265 The trust offices of ASML NV were founded in November 2012 and May 
2013 with a total stake of around 20%: the depository receipts of these shares are held by Intel, 
TSMC and Samsung. The trust offices will not exercise their votes unless particular major corporate 
decisions are made as determined in several shareholder agreements.266 The minutes and voting 
                                                     
5%(TIWAG-Tiroler Wasserkraft AG), following the 2013 annual report of Verbund AG Kat. A, (p. 39). 
The convocation of the 2014 AGM states that: ‘[p]ursuant to Section 19(3) of the Articles of Association, 
with the exception of regional authorities and companies in which regional authorities hold an interest of at 
least 51%, the voting rights of each shareholder in the Annual General Meeting are restricted to 5% of the 
share capital, thus to 17,370,784 votes.’ Despite this rule, voter turnout exceeded 78% according to the 
voting results document of the 2014 AGM since around 272.5 million votes (of in total around 340 million 
votes) were exercised, which indicates that the Austrian government exercised its entire voting stake during 
the AGM. Hence, in our analyses we take into account a voting stake of 51%for the Austrian government 
for Verbund AG. The same holds for the AGMs in previous years. 
263 Nowak et al. (2013), pp. 432-433.  
264 In contrast, the DCGC 2008 (Principle IV.2) provides that the trust office shall issue proxies in all 
circumstances and without limitation to the holders of depository receipts who so request. The Dutch Code 
thus prohibits the use of depository receipts as an anti-takeover device (also, DCGC 2016, Principle 4.4).  
265 These companies are Ahold NV, ING NV, Fugro NV, Randstad NV and Unilever NV. Aegon has a 
large insider shareholder (Vereniging Aegon) but it is not considered to be a trust office (no depository 
receipts).  Other companies use trust offices as anti-takeover devices. For example, the trust office of 
Wereldhave NV has a 50% potential stake (current name of this trust office is Stichting Preferente Aandelen 
Wereldhave NV).   
266 These are: i) the authorisation of certain significant share issuances and share repurchases, ii) any 
amendment to the articles of association that would materially affect the specific voting rights of Intel or 
TSMC, iii) any significant change in the identity or nature of ASML or its business, iv) the dissolution of 
ASML, v) any merger or demerger which would result in a material change in the identity or nature of ASML 
or its business. Annual Report 2014 ASML, pp. 41-50.  
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results show that the stakes of these trust offices are included in the voter turnout, but not in the 
voting results. Hence, these blockholders are attending the AGMs of ASML, but are, in accordance 
with their agreements, not exercising their voting rights.  
In addition to these shareholder voting agreements and Dutch depository receipts, the 
Shearman and Stearling, ISS and ECGI report (2007) also considers other mechanisms that may 
influence the control rights of shareholders. These include i) shares with more or special voting 
rights (including golden shares), ii) shares without voting rights, iii) pyramid structures and cross-
shareholdings, and iii) voting right and ownership ceilings.  We calculate the percentage of total 
voting rights for shareholders in companies with ordinary shares and multiple voting shares. For 
example, Unilever NV has four different share classes, and ING NV offers ordinary shares, 7%-
cumulative preference shares and 6%-cumulative preference shares. We calculated ING’s total 
voting stake to be 11.7% following the information in the annual report 2013.267 We also take into 
account ownership ceilings. For example, Aegon NV’s annual report explains that ‘[t]he Voting 
Rights Agreement entered into between Vereniging Aegon and Aegon ensures that under normal 
circumstances, i.e. except in the event of a Special Cause, Vereniging Aegon will no longer be 
allowed to exercise more votes than is proportionate to the financial rights represented by its 
shares’268. Under normal circumstances, when Vereniging Aegon may only cast one vote for every 
40 common shares B, the voting stake of Vereniging Aegon amounts to 14.6%.269 There was no 
‘special cause’ during the AGM and thus we recorded that Aegon’s largest blockholder had a stake 
of 14.6%.  
Lastly, we consider pyramid structures when determining the ultimate shareholder. For 
example, the Heineken family is the ultimate owner of Heineken (holding 88.7% of L’Arche Green 
NV, which holds a 51.6% stake in Heineken Holdings, which in turn holds a 50.0% stake in 
Heineken NV, data from 2014). FEMSA is an allied shareholder of the Heineken family. Although 
it is not explicitly stated in Heineken NV’s annual report that these shareholders vote in concert, 
these shareholders have entered a corporate governance agreement that places a 20% cap FEMSA’s 
shareholding. Moreover, Eumedion classifies both shareholders as insiders that clearly support 
management proposals.270 Another example of a pyramid structure is Rio Tinto Plc. The largest 
shareholder of Rio Tinto Plc is Shining Prospect. The annual report reports a voting stake of 12.7% 
                                                     
(<http://www.asml.com/doclib/investor/annual_reports/2014/asml_20150211_Annual_Report_2014_
on_Form_20-F.pdf>). (accessed in March 2015). See also Abma (2012).   
267 Unilever, annual report 2013, p. 51. We also corrected for treasury shares. 
(<http://www.unilever.com/images/Unilever_AR13_tcm13-383757.pdf>). (accessed in March 2015). 
268 Aegon, annual report 2013, p. 110.  
(<http://corporatereporting.aegon.com/2013/userfiles/pdf/Aegon-Annual-Report-2013.pdf>). 
(accessed in March 2015). A Special Cause include: ‘[t]he acquisition by a third party of an interest in Aegon 
N.V. amounting to 15% or more; [a] tender offer for Aegon N.V. shares; [and] [a] proposed business 
combination by any person or group of persons, whether acting individually or as a group, other than in a 
transaction approved by the company’s Executive and Supervisory Boards’.  
269 Aegon, annual report 2013, p. 309.  
(<http://corporatereporting.aegon.com/2013/userfiles/pdf/Aegon-Annual-Report-2013.pdf>). 
(accessed in March 2015). 
270 Eumedion is a Dutch corporate governance forum for investors, and represents approximately 70 
institutional investors. For more information, one may refer to: <www.eumedion.nl>. Eumedion calls these 
shareholders gelieerde aandeelhouders (translation: allied shareholders) in its yearly report on Dutch AGMs. 
Eumedion (2011).  
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for this shareholder.271 Shining Prospect is an investment vehicle owned by Chinalco (Aluminium 
Corporation of China), a state-owned Chinese enterprise. Hence, the government of China is the 
ultimate owner of the 12.7% voting stake in Rio Tinto Plc.  
 
5.2. Descriptive Analysis 
Table 6 shows that, on average, large shareholders have the largest voting stake in Austria, closely 
followed by Belgium (denoted by ‘C1’). The average voting stake of the second largest shareholder 
in Austria is substantially larger than in Belgium (Stake2), which indicates that the shareholder 
structure in Austria is relatively more symmetric. The average stake of the third shareholder in 
Austria is also relatively large. The UK reports an average largest stake of 15.6%, which is 
substantially lower than other average largest stakes. The standard deviation of the largest average 
voting stake is the largest for Ireland with 25%. These findings on the differences in ownership 
structures are in line with older research of, inter alia, Frans and Mayer (1995), Becht and Barca 
(2001), La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 1999) and Van der Elst (2011).  
Allied Irish Banks Plc (Ireland) reports in 2012, 2013 and 2014 a voting stake of 99.8% for the 
National Pensions Reserve Fund Commission, controlled by the Irish government. This is the 
largest voting stake in the complete sample. In France, the largest stake reported is 84.6% by EDF 
S.A. in 2010; the shareholder is the French state. Uniqa Insurance Group AG (Austria) reports an 
aggregate stake of 91.1% for the blockholders Raiffeisen Zentralbank, Austria Privatstiftung and 
Collegialität Versicherungsverein Privatstiftung in 2013.272 In the UK Fresnillo Plc reports a stake 
of 77.1% for its shareholder Penoles. In Germany, the largest stake is reported by MAN SE; 
Volkswagen is its largest shareholder with a stake of 75.3%. In Belgium, D’Ieteren SA reports the 
largest stake of 65.2%, which is the sum of the stakes of the SPDG Group, the Nayarit Group and 
Cobepa SA since these shareholders act in concert.273 In the Netherlands, the largest stake is 
reported by Fugro in 2010. During this meeting, the Fugro trust office present with 63.5% of the 
voting rights.  
Variables C2 and C3 in table 6 show the average concentration ratios of the two and three 
largest shareholders, respectively.274 The total voting block is defined as the sum of all shareholdings 
that are equal to or larger than 5% of the voting rights excluding treasury shares (BLOCK).275  The 
mean voting block of the whole sample is 28.7% with a standard deviation of 21.9%. Table 6 shows 
the mean voting blocks of the seven countries; Austria reports the highest mean voting block of 
45.1%. Table 6 also displays the average concentration ratios of the two and three largest 
shareholders (not limited to stakes that are higher than 5%).  
                                                     
271 Rio Tinto, annual report 2014, p. 222.  
(<http://www.riotinto.com/documents/RT_Annual_report_2014.pdf>). (accessed in March 2015). 
272 Following the annual report there is a shareholder agreement between these blockholders that binds 
these shareholders to voting commitments. Annual report Uniqa Insurance Group AG, p. 76  
(<http://www.uniqagroup.com/gruppe/versicherung/media/files/V5_20130410_Uniqa_EN_ONLINE.
pdf>). (accessed in March 2015). 
273 For example, one can refer to the Annual Report 2012 of D’Ieteren, Note 29: Equity, p. 58.   
274 Calculated as 𝐶𝑟𝑥 =  ∑ 𝑠𝑖
𝑥
𝑖=1 . In case no holdings in voting rights are reported, i.e. the shareholder 
structure only consists of small shareholders, C2 takes a value of two and C3 a value of three.   
275 The variable ‘BLOCK’ is the concentration ratio for all shareholders with a stake of 5% or more 
(blockholders), calculated as: 𝐶𝑟𝑥 =  ∑ 𝑠𝑖
𝑥
𝑖=1 , where si ≥ 5. ‘BLOCK’ will take a value of zero in case no 
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Both the average stake of the largest shareholder (C1) and the voting block (BLOCK) for the 
complete sample slightly decreased between 2010 and 2014; C1 was 22.9% in 2010, and 21.5% in 
2014. The voting block decreased from 28.6% to 28.0%. We conducted paired samples T-tests to 
see whether these averages were significantly different. Both tests did not show significant results, 
which indicates that the slight decrease in largest average voting stake and voting block is not 
significant.   
Table 7 shows the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) for the companies in our sample. The 
theoretical maximum value of the HHI is 10,000 (absolute percentage value); this is the case when 
there is one shareholder who owns all voting rights (extremely concentrated situation). A relatively 
low HHI indicates a low concentration of ownership. According to the HHI values, Austria has 
the highest ownership structure concentration, closely followed by Belgium. The ownership 




Country HHI HHI3 HHI5 
Austria 2,019 2,019 2,015 
Belgium 1,759 1,759 1,748 
France 1,090 1,085 1,073 
Germany 949 947 935 
Ireland 1,463 1,462 1,441 
Netherlands 881 880 869 
UK  604 604 568 
                                                     
276 HHI is calculated as 𝐻 =  ∑ 𝑠𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1 , taking into account the stakes of all shareholders and where the 
unknown stake of the small shareholders is ε, which is approximately zero; HHI3 is calculated as 𝐻 =
 ∑ 𝑠𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1 , taking into account the stakes of all recorded shareholdings of 3% or more  and where the 
unknown stake of the small shareholders is ε, which is approximately zero; HHI5 is calculated as 𝐻 =
 ∑ 𝑠𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1 , taking into account the stakes of all blockholders and where the unknown stake of the small 




Table 8 shows the mean numbers of the R12 ratio (%). The mean R12 ratio for all companies in 
the sample is 47.9%, with a standard deviation of 33.1%. If one takes a closer look at the R12 at 
the country level, one can conclude that the average voting power of the largest shareholder is 
different by country. Whereas in Belgium the average R12 is the lowest, namely 24.2%, in the UK 
this percentage is the highest with 60.4%. In France and Ireland the R12 is 43.7% and 48.8% 
respectively. In Germany, the mean R12 is 38.6% and in Austria 30.9%; the Netherlands reports 













From these results one can conclude that the stakes of the largest and second largest shareholder 
in the UK are more symmetric than in other countries. In Belgium, the stake of the largest 
shareholder is on average four times higher than the stake of the second largest shareholder.  
Comparison of these outcomes to the average largest stakes by country yields the following insight: 
the average largest stake in France is 24.4%, which is larger than the mean stake of 23.0% reported 
in Germany; however, the R12 in France is 43.7% compared to 38.6% in Germany, which indicates 
that the absolute stake of the largest shareholder in Germany is on average smaller, but its average 
relative stake compared to the second largest shareholder is larger. The same holds for Ireland with 
an average largest reported stake of 26.4% and an average R12 of 48.7.277  
 
5.3. Concluding Remarks 
As expected from previous research (for example, La Porta et al., 1998, 1999, 2008) the ownership 
structures of companies listed in continental European countries are more concentrated than 
ownership structures of UK companies. The HHI shows that ownership structures are relatively 
concentrated in Austria and Belgium. Note that, although ownership is often considered quite 
concentrated by scholars in the Netherlands, the Netherlands has the lowest ownership 
concentration of all continental European countries in our sample. However, it can be noted that 
we only obtained results for the largest companies in the Netherlands, and this may not be 
generalizable to smaller listed companies. Next, not only ownership stakes are less concentrated in 
the UK, the R12 measure also shows that stakes are more symmetric; for Austria and Belgium, we 
recorded the largest difference in ownership stake between the largest and second largest 
shareholder.  
 
                                                     
277 Note that the second largest stakes in France and Ireland are larger than in Germany.  
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6. VOTING POWER MEASURES 
In the previous section we considered ownership concentration, though it is important to keep in 
mind that ownership and voting power are not necessarily equivalent. The power of one 
shareholder can substantially differ from the absolute percentage of the votes he or she possesses 
(Leech, 2002). Consider a company that has two shareholders: one holds 51% of the voting rights 
(shareholder A), and the other holds 49% (shareholder B). If provisions are adopted with a simple 
majority, shareholder A holds all voting power. In contrast, if a special majority is required, 75% 
for instance, both shareholders have the same ability to block a resolution. Next, we consider a 
company that has three shareholders, A, B, and C, who own 47%, 49%, and 4% of the stock, 
respectively. The quota to pass a resolution is 51%. Since any two of shareholders have enough 
votes to pass a resolution, the voting power is actually equally divided among the three shareholders, 
although shareholder A and B have significantly more votes than shareholder C. It should be clear 
that if a shareholder has less votes than another shareholder, this shareholder can never have more 
power. However, this example points out that shareholders with completely different stakes can 
be equally powerful.  
The voting power of a specific shareholder is not only determined by his own stake, but 
depends on the company’s entire ownership structure. This means that a threshold of 20% may be 
sufficient for control in some situations, whereas in other situations this may not be the case.278 We 
consider another example: a company has one large shareholder that holds 20% of the voting rights 
and 80 other small symmetric shareholders that all hold a stake of 1%. In this case, the voting 
power of the large shareholder exceeds 60%. 279 And, in case there are 160 small symmetric 
shareholders that all hold a stake of 0.5%, the voting power of the large shareholder that holds a 
20% stake even exceeds 90%. In contrast, in case there is another large shareholder with 18% of 
the votes and all other small symmetric shareholders with 1%, the voting power of the large 
shareholder with 20% of the votes only amounts to fifteen%.  
 
6.1. Methodology 
We can use power indices to measure the power of an individual shareholder in a voting game. 
There are two classical voting power indices mainly used in the literature; the Banzhaf index, often 
denoted by and the Shapley-Shubik index. Whereas the Shapley-Shubik index reasons from the 
point of view of a player in a sequential coalition that changes the coalition from a losing to a 
winning one, i.e. is the pivotal player (putting the total amount of votes at or over the required 
quota), the Banzhaf index takes into account all players that are critical or decisive in a winning 
coalition. The Banzhaf index was named after John Banzhaf who in 1965 proposed a new voting 
power index besides the Shapley-Shubik index. It was applied by the New York Court of Appeals 
in two 1966 cases and has been used in cases ever since (Straffin, Jr., 1988). Banzhaf argued that 
‘the appropriate measure of a legislator’s power is simply the number of different situations in 
which he is able to determine the outcome’ (Banzhaf, 1965, p. 331).  
                                                     
278 Many researchers use a threshold of 20% to indicate control. Examples are the seminal works of Berle 
and Means, La Porta et al. Following Van der Elst (2010), pp. 3-4. 
279 Normalized Banzhaf Index, calculated with the program Ipmmle.  
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In this research we will not further address the mathematics of these two voting power 
indices.280  Instead, we consider the following simple game to explain the computational difference 
between the Banzhaf index and Shapley-Shubik index. Assume there are three players, with stakes 
of seven, six, and four votes each. The quota is set at eleven votes. The game can then be described 
as: {q: 1, 2, 3} = {11: 7, 6, 4}. First we consider the Banzhaf index. In our example, we take into 
account all winning and blocking coalitions. A blocking coalition is a coalition that has collective veto 
power and thus enough votes to defeat a motion. Since there are three shareholders, we have 23 
coalitions.281 However, as this rule of thumb also includes so-called ‘empty coalitions’, and these 
coalitions have no purpose in our example, there are in total seven coalitions that could be formed 
by the shareholders in our game.282 The winning coalitions are: {1,2}, {1,3} and {1,2,3}. For these 
coalitions, player one is three times critical and players two and three are one time critical.283 With 
respect to the blocking coalitions that need seven votes in order to be able to block a motion284 we 
have: {1}, {1,2}, {1,3}, {2,3} and {1,2,3}. Of these coalitions, player one is three times critical and 
player two and three are one time critical.285 In total, the players are ten times critical in this game. 
The Banzhaf voting power of these players is {1,2,3} = {3/5; 1/5; 1/5}. The Banzhaf voting 
power indices are: 𝛽1 =3/5 ; 𝛽2 = 1/5, and 𝛽3 = 1/5. 
In contrast, as we have seen before, the Shapley-Shubik index considers all sequential coalitions 
that contain all players. As we have three shareholders, we have 3! coalitions: {1,2,3}, {1,3,2}, 
{2,1,3}, {2,3,1}, {3,2,1} and {3,1,2}. In the first coalition, player two is pivotal; in the second 
coalition player three is and in all the other coalitions, player one is pivotal. Hence Shapley-Shubik 
voting power indices are: ∅1 = 4/6;  ∅2 = 1/6, and ∅3 = 1/6.
286  
Scholars generally consider the Banzhaf index more suitable for shareholder voting analyses. 
Leech (2002) calculates these two classical indices for shareholder voting in a cross-section analysis 
of 444 large British companies for the years 1985 or 1986 and compares these indices with some 
‘reasonable criteria which the indices should satisfy’. He concludes: ‘the results are unfavourable to 
the Shapley-Shubik index and suggest that the Banzhaf index much better reflects the variations in 
the power of shareholders between companies as the weights of shareholder blocs vary’. Straffin 
Jr. (1988) provides an example of the difference between these two indices: ‘consider a corporation 
with one stockholder who holds 10% of the stock and a large ‘ocean’ of small stockholders who 
                                                     
280 For more information about the mathematics and a further comparison of the two indices, one may refer 
to Leech (2002, 2003); Rydqvist (1987); Felsenthal and Machover (1998); Straffin Jr. (1988). Another power 
index is the Deegan-Packel Index (Deegan & Packel, 1978). 
281 Using the rule of thumb 2N, where N is the number of shareholders.  
282 These coalitions are {1}, {2}, {3}, {1,2}, {1,3}, {2,3} and {1,2,3}. Hence, the Banzhaf index also takes 
into account ‘coalitions’ that consist of one shareholder. 
283 In other words, if this player leaves the coalition, the coalition turns from a winning one into a losing 
one.  
284 For a blocking coalition, one needs at least (W – q + 1) votes, where W is the total amount of votes, 
which is in this case 17, and q is the quota, which is eleven in this case. Hence, in order to have a blocking 
coalition, one needs to have at least seven votes.  
285 In coalition {1,2,3} none of the shareholders is critical.  
286 For coalitions {1,2,3} and {1,3,2} you may recognize that shareholder 3 and 2 respectively may also have 
a pivotal position in case the second shareholder that joins, shareholder 2 and 3 respectively, decides not to 
join the coalition. These shareholders can then decide to join the coalition and turn it into a winning one. 
However, the Shapley value only considers the first cumulative weight that is equal to or greater than the 
quota; this is the definition of a pivotal voter. In other words, the Shapley Shubik index assumes that each 
player, in turn, votes in favour of the proposal (Leech, 2003). 
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hold the remaining 90%. The Shapley-Shubik index gives 11% of the power to the large 
stockholder; the Banzhaf index gives close to 100% of the power to the large stockholder. Per 
Overland et al. (2012), the Shapley-Shubik indices ‘cluster in the same component as [the estimate 
for] largest owner which clearly does not take other shareholders into consideration, [...] [which] 
lends further support to the analysis made by Leech (2002), that Shapley-Shubik indices to a lesser 
degree than Banzhaf indices capture the power balance between shareholders’ (pp. 32-33). They 
conclude their study by stating that caution is warranted when analysing the effects of ownership, 
but that it could be argued that measures such as Banzhaf indices are to be considered more 
trustworthy than simple measures such as ratios of the largest to the second largest shareholder. In 
contrast, per Rydqvist (1987) the Shapley value ‘seems to be more realistic’ (p. 65) for shareholder 
voting. Although it seems that scholars nowadays generally consider the Banzhaf index more 
suitable for measuring voting power of shareholders (one may also refer to Poulsen, Strand and 
Thomsen, 2010), we also calculate the Shapley-Shubik index to further explore the differences 
between these two indices under different ownership structures. Descriptive statistics are reported 
in section 6.2 of this chapter. To overcome the previously mentioned problem of incomplete 
information, the Banzhaf index and Shapley-Shubik index in this study are calculated under the 
assumption of a theoretical small shareholder that holds 1% of voting rights.287  For the calculations 
of the Banzhaf index the program Ipmmle is used; the Shapley-Shubik index is calculated with the 
Ssmmle program.288   
When using a mathematical model to evaluate the behaviour of real-life actors, one needs to 
keep in mind that such a model always involves some simplification of reality. For example, neither 
the Banzhaf nor the Shapley-Shubik index considers shareholder preferences (Kaniovski and 
Leech, 2009).289 These indices measure a priori voting power and all voting outcomes are equally 
likely. In other words, past behaviour and actual preferences are not considered. Banzhaf (1965) 
briefly dismisses the possibility of abstention from his analysis, stating that ‘[t]his analysis has also 
assumed that all legislators are voting because this is the most effective way for each legislator to 
exercise his power. Naturally, some may choose to exercise their power in a less effective manner 
by abstaining or by being absent from the legislative chamber’ (Banzhaf, 1965, p. 332). Hence, in 
                                                     
287 If the stake of the small shareholders were ε in the dispersed case, which is a number that is approximately 
zero, the Banzhaf index can be obtained as the Banzhaf index for a game that only consists of the large 
shareholders.  This implies that the voting power of small shareholders will automatically be zero, leaving 
us with no means to test hypothesis three. Moreover, the number of possible coalitions would be infinitely 
large. In other words, the stake of small shareholders needs to be larger than ε, which limits the maximal 
number of shareholders in a company (per Dubey & Shapley, 1979; Leech, 2002). One can argue that the 
chosen stake of 1% is completely arbitrary. However, the purpose of using a voting power measurement is 
to be able to consider the relative difference in voting power for different ownership structures, which makes 
this statement less relevant. 
288 It is almost impossible to calculate the Banzhaf index for a game with many players by hand. The number 
of possible coalitions for 100 players is 299, which is approximately 6.34*1029. For this reason, the program 
Ipmmle provided by Leech is used to calculate the index. Per Leech, ‘it can be applied to large voting bodies 
of any size (either in terms of number of players or in terms of votes). The voting weights and quota are 
not restricted to being integers’. The program can be found on  
(<http://homepages.warwick.ac.uk/~ecaae/ipmmle.html>). The appendix provides a further analysis of 
the Banzhaf Index.   
289 The authors refer to Garrett and Tsebelis (1999); Gelman, Katz and Bafumi (2004). Kaniovski and Leech 
also refer to the debate in the Journal of Theoretical Politics in 2004-2005 between Napel and Widgrén and 
Braham and Holler. One may see Napel and Widgrén (2004); Napel and Widgrén (2005); Braham and Holler 
(2005a); Braham and Holler (2005b).  
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shareholder voting games, shareholders generally have three options instead of two – for, against 
and abstain.290 Despite these very relevant shortcomings, voting power indices remain the best 
available measures to consider shareholder voting power in large voting games.291 
In addition, and this is particularly relevant for AGMs, both the Banzhaf index and the Shapley-
Shubik index measure voting power for 100% attendance. This is intuitively correct, since these 
indices are a priori indices that measure voting power ex ante. Poulsen, Strand and Thomsen (2010) 
tried to take into account the probability that a shareholder indeed exercises his voting right (see 
the appendix to this chapter). The authors use a measure that is based on the Banzhaf index, named 
the company’s ‘amenability’. The authors explain this measure as ‘the sensitivity of the largest 
shareholder’s voting power to increased participation by small (1%) shareholders’ (p. 333) and 
calculate the average percentage decrease in the voting power of the largest shareholder when yet 
another small shareholder is successively added to the voting game. The authors first consider only 
large shareholders (these are shareholders with more than 1% of the voting rights) and calculate 
the voting power of the largest shareholder among these shareholders in accordance with the 
Banzhaf index. In this way, the authors assume that large shareholders are always present during 
AGMs, which is in line with Van der Elst (2011) and the assumption in section 2.2. of this chapter. 
Next, the authors add a small shareholder that holds 1% of the voting rights to the game and 
evaluate whether the presence of this small shareholder will affect the voting power of the largest 
shareholder. They continue adding small shareholders until the game includes 100% of the votes. 
If adding small shareholders leads to a decrease in the voting power of the largest shareholder, the 
authors consider the company ‘amendable to small shareholder activism’. For games with players 
who hold less than 100% of the votes, the authors adjust the quota of the game.292 The authors 
argue that their amenability measure would capture the effect that not all small shareholders will 
vote as a result of free-rider problems (Poulsen, Strand and Thomsen, 2010, p. 334).  
When calculating the average percentage decrease in the voting power of the largest shareholder by 
adding another small shareholder to the voting game up to 100%, the authors implicitly assume 
that these small shareholders assign equal probability to being the first small shareholder, the last 
one, and all positions in between.293 Thus, although this measure tries to take into account the 
possibility that not all shareholders will exercise their voting rights, this underlying assumption does 
not accord with past experience.  Furthermore, as the examples in the appendix to this chapter 
                                                     
290 Some authors argue that (institutional) investors rather abstain from voting than vote against. See supra, 
section 3.5. 
291 Kaniovski and Leech (2009) develop a behavioural voting power index that takes into account the 
preferences of the other players when calculating the voting power of a specific player. More specifically, 
the authors propose an empirically informed power measure that relaxes the strong assumption of binomial 
voting and replaces it with probability distributions that reflect real player preferences. The authors base the 
definition of the power index for each individual player on a different probability distribution, which is 
empirically estimated from a relative frequency distribution over the set of all theoretically possible voting 
profiles. The authors apply this method to voting in the US Supreme Court. It would be very interesting to 
apply this method to shareholder voting games, but unfortunately, this is practically not feasible for our 
research due to computational issues, but also due to a lack of empirical information.   
292 The authors calculate the majority rule for a game with n participating shareholders in accordance with 





. Hence, in case the quota Q is 0.51 (simple majority voting, and the 
smallest voting stake is 1%) and a specific game includes five shareholders, in total holding a stake of 0.6, 
the majority rule Poulsen, Strand and Thomsen consider is 0.51 – (0.4/2) = 0.31.  
293 In our two examples, the average percentage decrease in voting power of the largest shareholder is 0.49% 
and 0.72%, respectively. 
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indicate, whether small shareholders vote may be affected not only by the voting power of the 
largest shareholder but also by that of other shareholders in the game. The method used by 
Poulsen, Strand and Thomsen (2010) does not seem to have convincing advantages relative to 
Banzhaf’s.  
 
6.2. Descriptive Analysis 
We calculate the Banzhaf index and Shapley-Shubik index for a simplified game with the 
assumption that a hypothetical small shareholder holds 1% of the voting rights. As one can see in 
table 9, the voting power of a small shareholder with 1% of the votes is the smallest in Belgium, 
with 0.29% of the total voting power (Banzhaf index for small shareholders). In contrast, a small 
shareholder has an average voting power of 0.83% in the UK. In Ireland and France, small 
shareholders have on average a voting power of 0.74% and 0.66% respectively for the companies 
considered in this sample. In Austria and Germany this figure is 0.40% and 0.57%, respectively. In 
the Netherlands, small shareholders have a mean voting power of 0.59%. The average voting power 
of the largest shareholders in the sample is relatively high in Belgium and Austria with 73.31 and 
67.23%, respectively. The largest shareholders have the lowest average voting power in the UK.  
In 222 of the 1,255 observations analysed, the largest shareholder has a de jure majority stake, 
i.e., 50% + 1 vote. For 297 observations, the largest shareholder has approximately all voting power 
(a normalized Banzhaf index of over 99%). A shareholder with (approximately) all voting power is 
present at 40% of the Austrian AGMs in the sample; that number rises to 67% in Belgium. In 
contrast, for the UK this is only 12% of all AGMs in the sample. The smallest stake for a 
shareholder with over 99% of the voting power is 31% (Solvay NV, Schoeller-Bleckmann AG and 
Deutsche Post AG) and the smallest stake for shareholder that has over 99.99% of the voting 
power is 38% (Bekaert NV). In practice, 38% of the voting rights will generally provide full power: 
as we have seen, average turnout is 62.3% in 2010 for our total sample, and increases to 67.2% in 
2014. The highest average voting right was measured for Ireland in 2014, with 72.3%. Also here, 
the largest shareholder that holds 38% of the voting rights usually has all voting power.  
For a few of the 1,255 observations, the Banzhaf index assigned a voting power that larger than 
1% to the small shareholders with a 1% of the voting rights (40 observations in total). The largest 
voting power of a small shareholder in this sample was 1.70%. In this simplified game for the 
shareholders of Bouygues S.A., the largest shareholder (SCDM) had a stake of 29% of the 
exercisable voting rights on 31 December 2012 and the second largest shareholder (shares owned 
by Bouygues employees under a company saving scheme) also had a stake of 29%.294 There were 
42 small shareholders who all held 1% of the votes. The Banzhaf index assigned a voting power of 
14.36% to the largest (and thus also the second largest) shareholder. Another example is the voting 
power for a small shareholder in Telekom Austria AG; on 31 December, 2012, the Republic of 
Austria held 28% of the votes through ÖIAG and América Móvil held 23%.295 We were not able 
                                                     
294 SCDM is a limited company controlled by Martin Bouygues and Olivier Bouygues. The stake of SCDM 
includes shares owned directly by Martin Bouygues and Olivier Bouygues according to the 2012 Registration 
Document of Bouygues, p. 207. Shares owned by employees under a company saving scheme are reported 
as one stake. In this study stakes are reported as integers. The 2012 Registration Document reports a stake 
of 29.2 for SCDM and 28.7 for the employees. The Banzhaf index is 15.29% for SCDM and 13.60% for 
employees, in case stakes are rounded to nearest integers. 
295 Annual Report 2012 of Telekom Austria AG. 
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to find any information about any shareholder agreement or other arrangement between these two 
shareholders, and we therefore assume that these shareholders were not acting in concert. 
In the simplified game for Telekom Austria AG, there were 49 small shareholders all holding 
1% of the voting rights. The Banzhaf index assigned 1.39% of the voting power to these small 
shareholders; the Republic of Austria had a voting power of 24.10%. In practice, shareholder 
turnout rates may be substantially lower than 100%, as we have seen in the previous sections. If 
the total turnout at this AGM had been 56%, the largest shareholder would have had a majority 
stake for normal resolution (no special majority required).  If this were indeed the case (which it 
was not at the Telekom Austria AG AGM, as the turnout rate was around 70%), small shareholders 
would have had virtually no voting power. 
We also calculate the Shapley-Shubik value for all largest shareholders and the hypothetical 
small shareholder that retaining a 1% share of the votes. It follows from Table 9 that these two 
indices yield different results: on average, the Shapley-Shubik index (SHAPLEYsmall) assigns more 
voting power to small shareholders (on average 0.78% for the whole sample, compared to 0.67% 
reported for the Banzhaf index, denoted as BANZHAFsmall) and assigns less voting power to the 
largest shareholders (on average 32.33% compared to 40.72% for the whole sample).  For example, 
in a game where there is one large shareholder holding 38% of the voting rights and 62 small 
shareholders holding each 1% of the voting rights,296 the Banzhaf Index (BANZHAFlarge) reports 
a voting power of 99.99% for this large shareholder when using a quorum of 51%, and assigns 
approximately zero voting power to the small shareholders. In contrast, the Shapley-Shubik index 
(SHAPLEYlarge) assigns only 60.35% of the voting power to the large shareholder and 0.64% to 
each small shareholder. And for a game with one large shareholder that holds 31% of the voting 
rights and 69 small shareholders,297 the Banzhaf index assigns a voting power of 99.18% to the 
large shareholder, whereas the Shapley-Shubik index assigns only 44.30% of voting rights to this 
large shareholder.298  
 
TABLE 9 









Austria 0.38 69.51 0.57 55.25 
Belgium 0.29 73.31 0.49 61.30 
France 0.66 44.15 0.77 34.53 
Germany 0.57 49.09 0.77 35.08 
Ireland 0.74 39.30 0.77 33.94 
Netherlands 0.59 45.67 0.77 33.81 
UK 0.83 24.80 0.88 20.87 
 
                                                     
296 This is the simplified game of NV Bekaert SA where Stichting Administratiekantoor Bekaert holds 
approximately 38% of the total voting rights.  
297 This is the simplified game of Solvay where Solvac SA holds around 31% of the votes. 
298 These findings correspond to the statements of Straffin Jr. (1988). 
299 The percentages of the Banzhaf index and Shapley-Shubik Index are rounded to the second decimal due 
to their size.  
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Figure 5 shows the differences between the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices in relation to the 
voting stakes of the largest shareholders. The values of the Banzhaf index have a wider spread for 
the observations in our sample; the standard deviation of the Banzhaf index for all observations is 
40.0% compared to 34.0% for the Shapley-Shubik index. In general, a large shareholder holding a 
voting stake of around 30% holds all voting power according to the Banzhaf index; this threshold 
is somewhere below 50% for the Shapley-Shubik index.  
 
FIGURE 5 
BANZHAFlarge (dark grey) and SHAPLEYlarge (light grey) compared300 
 
 
Like Leech (2002), we conclude that the Banzhaf index better reflects the voting power of large 
shareholders. Figure 8 shows that the Banzhaf index indeed meets the ‘appraisal criteria’ set by 
Leech (2002), including the criteria that i) the voting power of the largest shareholder should almost 
always be close to 100% whenever the weight of its stake is above 30%, ii) the voting power of the 
largest shareholder should often be close to 100% whenever the weight of its stake is between 20 
and 30%, iii) the voting power of the largest shareholder should sometimes be close to 100% 
whenever the weight of its stake is between 15 and 20%, and iv) the voting power of the largest 
shareholder should virtually never be close to 100% whenever the weight of its stake is less than 
                                                     
300 The Banzhaf index outlier at point (36, 30) shows the voting power for the largest shareholder of Elia 
NV (Belgium) in 2010; at the time, shareholder Publi-T had a voting stake of around 36%, whereas the 
second largest shareholder (Electrabel SA, ultimate owner: GDF Suez) had a stake of around 24% and the 
third shareholder around 10%. The two largest shareholders agreed to transfer around half of the stake a 
few weeks before the 2010 AGM. This agreement was announced in a press release on 31 March, 2010  
(<http://www.elia.be/~/media/files/Elia/PressReleases/2010/EN/20100331_PUBLIT_EBL_EN.pdf
>). (accessed in March 2015). The press release states that the ‘agreement will be proposed for approval to 
the Board of Directors of Publi-T on 31 March. Details of the agreement will be finalised in the near future 
so that the boards of the parties can ratify it in the coming weeks and the offering can be organised before 
June 30.’ Elia’s 2010 AGM took place on May 11.  In the minutes of the Extraordinary General Meeting, 
which took place right after the AGM on May 11, it is clearly stated that Electrabel transferred 6,035,522 
shares to Publi-T after the meeting. The outlier at point (14, 29) shows the voting power of the largest 























15%. The Shapley-Shubik index does not seem to meet these criteria (i.e. for a voting stake of 30%, 
it assigns a maximum voting power of around 45%).  
However, when we look at the voting power for small shareholders, the Shapley-Shubik index 
may be preferable in shareholder voting games in some situations. Consider the example of 
Telekom Austria again: whereas the Banzhaf index assigns a voting power of 1.39% to small 
shareholders, the Shapley-Shubik index only assigns a voting power of 0.99%. Since voter turnout 
rates are in practice never 100%, small shareholders usually have little voting power under normal 
majority rules. Figure 6 below shows the differences between the Banzhaf index and the Shapley-
Shubik index for small shareholders that with 1% of the voting rights: 
 
FIGURE 6 
BANZHAFsmall (dark grey) and SHAPLEYsmall (light grey) compared 
 
 
Figure 6 shows that the Banzhaf index for small shareholders has a larger spread than the Shapley-
Shubik value. Although the Banzhaf index assigns a voting power of zero to some cases in which 
the largest shareholder has an average stake of around 30% (in line with the findings of figure 8), 
it may also assign a voting power of (much) more than 1%. In contrast, the Shapley-Shubik index 
shows a function between 0 and 1%, with some outliers between 1 and 1.2%. It may be the case 
that the Shapley-Shubik index better explains the voting power of small shareholders in practice in 
some situations, for instance in the example of Telekom Austria AG, whereas the Banzhaf index 
is preferable in those cases where there is only one large shareholder that holds a de facto controlling 
stake (between 30-45%). In the next chapter we will evaluate the effect of both indices on (small) 
shareholder turnout rates.  
 
6.3. Concluding Remarks 
In section 5, we have seen that ownership is less concentrated in the UK compared to the other 
Member States. In this section 6, we have considered shareholder voting power and we found that 
small shareholder voting power is significantly higher in the UK as well. In Belgium, the largest 




















voting power to small shareholders in Ireland. In contrast, when using the Shapley-Shubik index, 
we find that small shareholders in France, Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands have, on average, 
the same voting power. Figure 5 and 6 show the differences between the Banzhaf and Shapley-
Shubik indices for our observations. Because of these large differences, we evaluate the effect of 
both indices on the turnout decision in the next chapter.  
 
7. SHAREHOLDER VOTING BEHAVIOUR 
In the previous chapter, we have seen that the agenda of AGMs largely differs among Member 
States and companies. In our empirical framework we consider the content of AGM agendas of 
the companies in our sample and shareholders’ response to particular voting items.  Important 
agenda items include inter alia director (re-)elections and say-on-pay resolutions. According to Van 
der Schee (2011), the appointment and dismissal of board members constitute the most important 
powers of the shareholders in theory; since ‘the board ‘controls’ the strategy and policies of the 
firm, ‘control’ over the board is crucial’ (p. 139). Cools (2011) also argues that ‘[t]he most important 
voting right of shareholders is probably the right to elect and dismiss directors’ (p. 200). The 
number of director elections may thus have a positive effect on shareholder attendance. These 
directors can be executive directors or non-executive directors (one-tier board structure) or part of 
the supervisory board or the management board (two-tier board structure). For example, in 
Belgium, shareholders may also decide upon the independence of several directors (cf. supra, chapter 
one of this study). Conyon and Sadler (2010) state that shareholders are much likelier to vote against 
resolutions related to directors pay compared to other types of non-pay related resolutions. 
Moreover, they find that high executive pay packages obtain more votes against. 
 
7.1. Methodology 
To evaluate shareholder voting behaviour we first need to define the voting item categories. We 
based these categories on the legal analysis in chapter one. Table 9 in this chapter provides an 
overview of the categories. Resolutions that are included in one category are not included in any 
other.  Since shareholders usually need to vote multiple times at the same meeting on voting items 
that belong to a certain voting category – for instance director (re-)elections or discharge – we only 
recorded the highest opposition per voting category per meeting in our analysis. The categories of 
resolutions in table 9 are not comprehensive, as in many Member States shareholders may vote on 
other voting items as well (cf. supra, chapter 1, section 5).  
Besides voting in favour or against, shareholders can also abstain from voting. When 
shareholders abstain from voting, it is not entirely clear what their intentions are. These 
shareholders clearly do not intend to vote against a resolution, but are not in favour either. But 
why are abstentions (or ‘votes withheld’) practiced? One may argue that (institutional) investors 
would like to avoid conflicts during AGMs. In other words, institutional investors may not vote 
against resolutions unless they fiercly disagree with the incumbent corporate management. Per 
Mallin (2012) ‘abstain is not as negative as a vote against but is still seen as a strong signal of an 
institutional investor’s disapproval’ (p. 185). Strätling (2003) argues that institutional investors are 
‘reluctant’ to vote against resolutions put forward by the management and provides the example 
that NAPF (National Association of Pension Funds) asked institutional investors to withhold their 
support, but not vote against, the re-election of a director as a protest of the remuneration policy 
at the 2000 Vodafone Airtouch AGM. According to the author, institutional investors tend to 
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avoid tarnishing the reputation of the companies they invest in. Thus, these shareholders will 
discuss matters with the corporate board prior to AGMs (which is yet another argument against 
the relevance of the AGM). Mallin’s research (2012) indicates that two large institutional investors 
in the UK, Hermes and Aviva Investors more often vote against proposals than abstain from 
voting. For example, Hermes only abstained from voting 14 times in the period 2007-2009, a period 
in which it voted on over 13,000 resolutions at 1,272 meetings. In that same period, it voted against 
more than 120 times. Aviva Investors abstained more often from voting than Hermes but the 
number of resolutions it voted against is still higher (over 1,600 times voted against versus over 
600 times abstained). We do not consider the abstentions in the calculation of the proportion of 
the votes against the resolution. Although the argument that abstentions may signal some dissent 
seem plausible to some extent, we decided to – in contrast to Renneboog and Szilagyi (2013) – not 
include abstentions in our shareholder opposition variables. When a shareholder abstains from 
voting, his or her intentions remain unclear, and there may be a slew of other explanations for why 
a shareholder reached his or her decision to abstain. In contrast, if a shareholder votes against, or 
in favour, intentions are clear.  Moreover, there is no economic rationale to abstain from voting 
for small shareholders as Charléty, Fagart and Souam (unpublished) explain, as this strategy is strictly 
dominated by either voting in line with preferences or not voting in the first place. 
Lastly, article 6 of the Shareholder Rights Directive (2007/36/EC) allows shareholders (acting 
in concert) with stakes of at least 5% to add proposals to the AGM agenda. In case there is an item 
that is put on the agenda by a shareholder, it might be the case that shareholders have a greater 
incentive to attend the AGM as the passage (or the dismissal) of such a resolution might be of great 
importance to them. At the very least, these shareholder proposals are a form of shareholder 
activism.301 Previous cases in the Netherlands such as the ABN Amro case indicate that (the threat 
of) shareholder proposals may have significant consequences.302 Another example is the failed bid 
of Deutsche Boerse AG for the London Stock Exchange Group Plc.303 The Dutch dispute between 
Fugro NV and its large shareholder Boskalis NV shows that, although shareholder proposals may 
not often be placed on the meeting agenda in Europe (cf. supra, chapter 1, section 2.1.2), shareholder 
proposals are still at the heart of corporate power struggles.304 
 
                                                     
301 Van der Elst (2011), pp. 4-5.  
302 Well-known Dutch cases on shareholder activism are the ABN Amro case and the Stork case. In the 
ABN Amro case, the activist shareholder The Children’s Investment Fund Management (TCI) acquired 
only 1% of the share capital of ABN Amro and requested a split-up of the banking group (Hoge Raad 13 
July 2007, JOR 2007, 178; Raaijmakers, 2007a). In the Dutch Stork case, the Dutch Ondernemingskamer 
(translation: Enterprise Chamber, which is part of the Amsterdam Court) states that the management board 
is exclusively entitled to determine the corporate strategy (Hof Amsterdam 17 January 2007, JOR 2007, 42). 
See also Raaijmakers (2007b). 
303 The hedge fund TCI also played a large role in this case. The activist shareholder that owned 5% of the 
stock of Deutsche Boerse at the time requested Deutsche Boerse to abandon its plan to buy London Stock 
Exchange. TCI also requested to hold an EGM in order to vote on replacing the entire supervisory board. 
Eventually Deutsche Boerse was forced by its shareholders to withdraw the takeover plan and on May 9, 
2015, the CEO, Seifert, the non-executive chairman and three other non-executives resigned. See for 
example Jenkins and Cohen (2005).  
304 For example, one may refer to Kooiman and Lalkens (2015).  
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7.2. Descriptive Analysis 
7.2.1. AGM Agenda 
This research examines over 21,000 voting items for 1,255 AGMs during a period of five years. 
Shareholders could vote on 16.9 voting items per meeting on average. The UK and France had the 
highest average number of voting items per meeting (both 19.4 on average).  
When correcting for the number of director (re-)elections and discharge of directors, the 
average number of voting items in France is slightly higher than in the UK; 16.3 as compared to 
15.7. This is because it is common practice in the UK (and also in Ireland) for board members to 
be re-elected every year, whereas this is not the case in the other countries. In France, companies 
usually call a combined meeting, i.e., a meeting with an ordinary part and an extraordinary part (cf. 
supra, chapter 1, section 3). In the extraordinary part, amendments to the articles of association are 
usually presented as separate resolutions for each amendment. The same holds for Belgium.  In 
Austria, the agendas are generally shortest: the average number of agenda items is 9.9 (7.6 when 
corrected for elections and discharge of directors). The results are shown in the figure below. 
 
FIGURE 7 










Voting items were withdrawn prior to twenty of these 1,255 AGMs. Even prior to the AGM of 
Bwin.party Digital Entertainment Plc305 four voting items were withdrawn. These four resolutions 
were shareholder proposals that were initially put on the agenda by SpringOwl Gibraltar Partners 
B Limited. In its press release of May 22, 2014, Bwin.party Digital Entertainment Plc explained 
‘that it has agreed to work closely with SpringOwl on the appointment of its new directors and 
confirms its agreement to consider Michael Fertik, one of SpringOwl’s nominees, as a potential 
candidate. To support this process, SpringOwl has nominated Daniel Silvers to the Board under 
the terms of the Relationship Agreement. Daniel Silvers will take up his position on the Board as 
soon as practicable.’306 SpringOwl holds 5.25% of the share capital of Bwin.party Digital 
Entertainment Plc and added four resolutions regarding the election of directors to the agenda.307 
                                                     
305 Bwin.party Digital Entertainment Plc is included in the sample as an Austrian company. In the beginning 
of 2011, Bwin Interactive Entertainment AG merged with PartyGaming Plc and changed its name into 
Bwin.party Digital Entertainment Plc. To date, Bwin.party Digital Entertainment Plc is a FTSE-250 
company.  
306 Press Release 22 May, 2014, Bwin.party Digital Entertainment Plc, ‘Agreement with SpringOwl’. 
(<https://www.bwinparty.com/Investors/FinancialNews/2014/20140522%20Agreement%20with%20S
pringOwl.aspx>). (accessed in March 2015). 
307 One may refer to ‘2014 AGM Shareholder Letter’ and ‘2014 AGM Further Resolutions (Press Release)’ 
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Apparently, the board and SpringOwl had reached an understanding prior to the AGM. This 
example demonstrates how shareholders may use the AGM pressure the company’s board, but 
that corresponding negotiations can take place outside the AGM behind closed doors. The only 
voting item during the 2010 SA D’Ieteren NV EGM was withdrawn as well: the proposed 
resolution concerned the acquisition of another company, but the legal requirements were not yet 
met at the time of the general meeting.308 The proposed resolutions at the 2011 EGM of Delhaize 
NV to change the company’s articles of association (increase of the authorised capital) were not 
put to a vote due to the low turnout (the quorum was not met, cf. supra, chapter one of this research).  
The ELECT variable was calculated as the total number of board members elected or re-elected 
by the AGM. Germany, Austria and the Netherlands require a two-tier board system309, including 
a Vorstand or Raad van Bestuur (management board) and an Aufsichtsrat or Raad van Commissarissen 
(supervisory board). In contrast to Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, companies in the UK, 
Ireland, Belgium and France usually follow a one-tier board system (cf. supra, chapter one section 
5.2). Hence, the ELECT variable included executive and non-executive board members for 
companies with a one-tier board structure, supervisory board members for companies with a two-




Country ELECT Average re-elected Average elected 
Austria 2.3 0.5 1.8 
Belgium 3.4 2.4 1.1 
France 4.4 2.6 1.9 
Germany 2.5 0 2.5 
Ireland 8.9 8.2 0.6 
Netherlands 3.2 2.2 1.1 
UK 9.3 8.1 1.2 
 
Table 10 shows that the average number of directors the AGM elects or appoints is relatively high 
in Ireland and the UK compared to the other countries; it is common in the UK and Ireland for 
board members to be re-elected every year, unlike in other countries in our sample.  
 
7.2.2. Rejected Voting Items and Shareholder Proposals 
Relatively few voting items did not pass. Of the over 21,000 voting items examined in this study, 
only 166 voting items were dismissed during 96 AGMs. When we exclude (employee) shareholder 
proposals and countermotions, the number of rejected items falls to 67.  Some AGMs experience 
relatively large shareholder opposition. For example, at the 2011 Publicis SA AGM shareholders 
                                                     
(<https://www.bwinparty.com/Investors/2014%20AGM.aspx>). (accessed in March 2015).  
308 The press release on the D’Ieteren website: ‘Het enige punt van de vandaag bijeengeroepen buitengewone algemene 
vergadering – te weten de fusie door overneming van de immobiliëndochtervennootschap N.V. Immonin, eigenares van een 
garage in Audergem, met de S.A. D’Ieteren N.V. – is aan de agenda onttrokken omdat de formaliteiten verbonden aan de 
toepassing van de nieuwe op 1 januari 2010 in werking getreden milieureglementatie inzake overdracht van vaste activa, niet 
binnen de termijn konden worden gerealiseerd’. 
309 As per January 2013, Dutch companies are also allowed to adopt a one-tier board system.  
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rejected six resolutions. And during the 2013 AGM of GlencoreXstrata Plc (currently: Glencore) 
four resolutions were dismissed related to the re-election of board members.  
The right to elect board members is considered one of the greatest shareholder powers in 
theory. However, only in three AGMs did management resolutions on the (re-)election of directors 
not pass: the 2013 GlencoreXtrata Plc310  AGM and the 2011 and 2012 Independent News and 
Media Plc AGMs. During the 2013 GlencoreXstrata Plc AGM four board members’ re-elections 
were not approved. These resolutions concerned the re-election of Sir John Bond, Ian Strachan, 
Con Fauconnier and Peter Hooley as directors. The 2013 AGM was the first general meeting after 
the merger between Glencore and Xstrata and the directors that were not re-elected were former 
Xstrata board members.  Steve Robson has already resigned prior to the AGM and accordingly the 
voting item to re-elect him as one of the non-executive board members was withdrawn from the 
meeting’s agenda. Sir John Bond was GlencoreXstrata Plc’s chairman of the board of directors at 
the time. The Financial Times refers to these events during the 2013 AGM as a ‘boardroom coup 
and shareholder revolt’ that ‘was “unprecedented” in UK corporate life’ (Blas, 2013). According to 
the Financial Times the voting results indicate that Glencore’s executives and employees, holding 
together a stake of around 36%, ‘opposed their re-election en masse’ (Blas, 2013). Although the 
former GlencoreXstrata Plc chairman had already announced his intention to resign after he 
experienced large shareholder resistance to a large package of retention bonuses for Xstrata 
managers before the takeover (Blas, 2013; Riseborough, 2013). 
During the 2011 Independent News and Media Plc AGM, the proposal to re-elect Leslie 
Buckley, representative of shareholder O’Brien, as a director did not pass as it received 58.6% of 
the votes against. The media described this event as a ‘corporate clash’ and a ‘horrific boardroom 
face-off’ (O’Carroll, 2011). At the time, the largest shareholder of Independent News and Media 
Plc Denis O’Brien and the CEO Gavin O'Reilly (the O’Reilly family held a stake of 13%) were 
involved in a power struggle. Gavin O’Reilly resigned in April 2012 as a result of ‘ongoing tensions’. 
During the 2012 Independent News and Media Plc AGM James Osborne and Donal Buggy were 
dismissed by the major shareholder O’Brien;311 at an EGM of 27 August, 2012, Leslie Buckley was 
again elected as board member.  
Say-on-pay resolutions were not dismissed very often either. For example, of the 641 times 
shareholders could vote on the approval of the remuneration report, the proposal did not pass only 
eight times. The William Hill Plc shareholders voted with only a slight majority of 50.11% for the 
approval of the remuneration report. The remuneration policy was not dismissed during any AGM. 
And the proposal for the remuneration system in Germany was dismissed only once, during the 
2010 HeidelbergCement AG AGM. Supervisory board or non-executive remuneration proposals 
were also not rejected. 
An overview of the dismissed say on pay resolutions is provided in table 11. 
 
 
                                                     
310 During the 2014 AGM, the shareholders of GlencoreXstrata Plc voted in favour of changing the name 
into Glencore Plc. 
311 O’Brien increased its stake in Independent News and Media Plc to 29.9% in 2012.  
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TABLE 11  
Say on Pay Resolutions 
Company Country Year Voting item category Opposition 
(%) 
Belgacom (Proximus) Belgium 2013 Remuneration report 70.3 
CAIRN Energy UK 2012 Remuneration report 67.0 
WPP UK 2012 Remuneration report 59.5 
Safran France 2012 Two resolutions on 
RPT312 
56.4, 55.3 
Independent News & 
Media  
Ireland 2012 Remuneration report 56.2 
Aviva UK 2012 Remuneration report 54.4 
Heidelberg Cement Germany 2010 Remuneration System 54.2 
Burberry Group UK 2014 Remuneration report 52.7 
Easyjet UK 2011 Remuneration report 51.6 
Pernod Ricard France 2014 Share option grants 36.0 
Carrefour  France 2012 Two resolutions on 
share (option) grants313 
32.8, 31.9314 
 
During the 2014 Aer Lingus Group AGM almost 50% of the shareholders rejected the 
remuneration report. However, the voting item passed with a small majority. And during the 2011 
Intercell AG (Austria, now Valvena) AGM almost 40% of the shareholders voted against the 
resolution to grant stock options to the members of the supervisory board as remuneration 
pursuant to section 98(3) and 159(2)(3) of the Austrian AktG. 
Van der Elst and Lafarre (2017) show that in the Netherlands, shareholders may refuse to 
discharge the (supervisory) board when they do not agree with how the remuneration policy was 
applied (Corbion NV 2014, Vastned Retail NV 2009, KPN NV 2009, the authors call this ‘indirect 
say on pay’ or ‘figurative use’). As established in the previous chapter, in the Netherland, 
shareholders do not have the right to approve the remuneration report. During the 2014 Corbion 
NV AGM, many shareholders also voted against the re-election of the chairman of the supervisory 
board. The authors argue in favour of the European say-on-pay proposal: the use of the discharge 
of the board or the re-election of a board member shows the importance of an opportunity for the 
shareholders to discuss and express their opinions regarding the remuneration packages of 
directors once the remuneration policy has been adopted.  
                                                     
312 Retirement agreements and termination agreements. Voting item 6: ‘Approbation d’engagements règlementés 
soumis aux dispositions de l’article L. 225-42-1 du Code de commerce, pris au bénéfice du Président-Directeur Général et des 
Directeurs Généraux Délégués en matière de retraite et de prévoyance’ (56.44% against). And voting item 5: ‘Approbation 
d’un engagement règlementé soumis aux dispositions de l’article L. 225-42-1 alinéa 1 du Code de commerce, pris au bénéfice 
du Président-Directeur Général en cas de cessation anticipée de son mandat social’ (55.25% against).  
313 Authorisation to grant share subscription options for personnel or officers of Carrefour and its 
subsidiaries pursuant to articles L.225-177 et seq. FCC and the authorisation to the Board of Directors to 
grant free share allocations which may or may not be subject to performance conditions of the personnel 
or officers of Carrefour and its subsidiaries pursuant to articles L.225-197-1 and L.225-197-2 et seq. FCC. 
314 The percentages of votes against displayed are lower than 33.3%, but this outcome is a result of our 
calculation method; these percentages are calculated in accordance with the method that is, inter alia, used 
in the UK and Ireland: (votes against)/(votes against + votes in favour)*100 percent. Since the voting items 
only received 66.3% and 66.5% of the votes in favour, respectively, the two-thirds quota was not met. These 
resolutions were thus rejected. 
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Next, we discuss the resolutions regarding changes to share capital.  Table 12 shows the rejected 
resolutions linked to share capital.  
TABLE 12 
Capital Resolutions 
Company Country Year Voting item category Opposition (%) 
Ageas (Fortis) Belgium 2011 Capital increase 78.5 
Befimmo Belgium 2014 Acquire and pledge shares,  
authorised capital315 
36.7  






Austria 2014 Capital increase 69.0 
Dragon Oil Ireland 2012 Capital increase 66.4 
K+S Germany 2010 Two resolutions on capital increase 60.7, 43.8 
Gemalto Netherlands 2013 Pre-emption rights, capital 
increase316 
55.5, 50.4 
Immofinanz Austria 2010 Two resolutions on capital increase 53.7, 52.5 
Essilor Intl  France 2011 Capital increase 51.1 
Legrand France 2012 Capital increase 51.0 




Aer Lingus Ireland 2010-2014 Five resolutions on pre-emption 
rights 
Between 37.9 
and 43.0  
Air Liquide France 2010, 2011 Capital increase: anti-takeover 
device318 
35.8, 41.4 
Conwert Austria 2012 Capital increase319 35.9 




Germany 2010 Buy back shares 33.8 
Anglo 
American 
UK 2013 Pre-emption rights 28.7 
                                                     
315 The third agenda item that was dismissed during Befimmo’s extraordinary general meeting was the 
delegation of power in order to complete the formalities (i.e., granting the necessary powers). 
316 Voting item 10a: ‘Extension of the authorization of the Board to issue shares and to grant rights to 
acquire shares in the share capital of Gemalto’ was dismissed with 50.4% votes against.  
317 Statement of the board of EasyJet with the publication of the voting results of the 2012 AGM: ‘The 
board also regrets that Stelios has chosen to block the two special resolutions (which require a 75% 
majority). Both are standard AGM resolutions and as the votes clearly show this is not what other 
shareholders want to see happen.’ 
318 Delegation of authority, granted for a period of 18 months, to the board of directors to issue free share 
subscription warrants in the event of a takeover bid for the company. 
319 ‘The existing authorization in accordance with § 4 paragraph 3 of the articles of association of the 
Company authorizing the Administrative Board to increase the share capital of the Company in accordance 
with § 38 paragraph 2 and § 63 of the SE Act in conjunction with § 169 of the Stock Corporation Act, until 
8 June 2011 by up to a nominal value of EUR 26,674,770 by issuing up to 2,667,477 no-par value bearer 
shares at a minimum issue price of 100% of the proportionate amount of share capital, in one or several 
tranches, also excluding subscription rights completely or partially, also by means of indirect subscription 
rights in accordance with § 153 paragraph 6 of the Stock Corporation Act, for a contribution in cash or in 
kind, and to determine the issue price and the issue conditions (authorized capital), shall be revoked to the 
extent of the unused amount.’ 
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Whereas the voting items on the cancellation of pre-emption rights were dismissed during AGMs 
of EasyJet, Anglo American, Aer Lingus and other companies seen in table 12 with less than 50% 
of the votes against, in the Netherlands these resolutions passed at the Akzo Nobel NV, Fugro 
NV, KPN NV, SBM Offshore NV and Wolters Kluwer NV AGMs with shareholder opposition 
between 26.2 and 47.4%. In contrast to many other countries, in the Netherlands a qualified two-
thirds majority is only required if less than 50% of the capital is present during the meeting. If this 
quorum of 50% is met only a simple majority vote is required. Shareholder attendance rates were 
higher than 50% at these companies’ AGMs.  
Besides voting items related to changes in the company’s capital and say-on-pay resolutions, 
some amendments to the articles of association were also dismissed. During the 2011 AGM of the 
Dutch company SBM Offshore NV, shareholders rejected a proposal containing ‘[a]mendments 
on profit and loss’ (voting item 7.2). The proposal included an increase of the dividends for 
preference shares that are used as a protection device by the SBM Offshore trust office. Other 
examples of resolutions that were dismissed are TNT’s 2010 and 2011 AGMs. In 2011 the 
shareholders’ meeting dismissed the proposal to discharge the supervisory board. And in 2010 the 
proposal to maintain the Dutch structuurregime was defeated with more than 82% of the vote. The 
Aer Lingus Plc proposal to amend its articles of association did not pass for five years in a row, 
with a shareholders’ dissent between 37.6 and 38.7%. In addition to these instances, amendments 
to articles of association were also dismissed at the AGMs of Peugeot SA in 2013, MAN AG in 
2010, Deutsche Boerse in 2011, Conwert in 2013, and the Alstom SA in 2014. 
Between 2010 and 2014, the resolution requiring a 75% majority on the authorisation to call 
general meetings other than AGMs with a minimum 14 days’ notice did not pass 4 of the 518 times 
it was put on the agenda in the UK and Ireland: at the 2012, 2013 and 2014 Easyjet Plc AGMs and 
at the 2011 Hammerson Plc AGM.  
Although relatively few resolutions failed to pass during the observed AGMs, this is not the 
case for (employee) shareholder proposals. In total, there were 106 shareholder proposals including 













Shareholders did not put any items on the agenda at the AGMs in the Netherlands and Belgium. 
In contrast, in France and Germany a relatively high number of shareholder proposals was placed 
on the agenda. In Germany any shareholder may put countermotions on the agenda ex section 126 
AktG. Furthermore, section 127 AktG provides that the right to file a countermotion shall apply 
analogously to a nomination by a shareholder for the election of a member of the supervisory 
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board or of external auditors. And, in accordance with L.225-71 FCC, at least one member is 
elected from among employee representatives in case employees hold more than 3% of the share 
capital.  At French AGMs often more than one employee shareholder representative is up for 
election and only one of these election resolutions is usually adopted by the shareholder meeting.320  
Virtually none of the 106 shareholder proposals passed, except for some French employee 
shareholder proposals to elect an employee representative (which was passed to comply with the 
French legal requirements, cf. supra chapter 1), and one shareholder proposal during the 2011 Safran 
SA AGM. The goal of this shareholder proposal was to bring the clauses of the articles of 
association in compliance with the wording of article L.225-23 FCC and was supported by the 
board. Other shareholder proposals were dismissed. For example, at the Allied Irish Banks Plc 
AGM, Mr. Niall Murphy was nominated by a shareholder to be elected as a board member in 2010 
and 2011, but the item did not pass in both years. Both sporadic exercise of the right to add an 
item to the agenda and their low success rate call into question the relevance of this particular 
shareholder right in Europe.  
A majority of the shareholder proposals concerned board elections. In France, most of the 
(employee) shareholder proposals concerned director elections. Proposals related to dividends and 
amendments to articles of association were also placed on the agenda by shareholders in France. 
The 2012 Société Générale SA AGM agenda included a shareholder proposal regarding a change 
to the board structure (a shareholder proposed to adopt a two-tier board structure).  In Germany, 
a shareholder proposed a motion of no confidence and/or removal of the chairman of the board 
of directors. In addition, there were many proposals to postpone or remove items. The shareholder 
proposals that were put on the agenda in Ireland were either related to director elections or the 
removal of directors; all these shareholder proposals were added to the Allied Irish Banks Plc 
agenda. In the UK two shareholder proposals concerned board elections: the other proposals either 
requested a review of board actions related to a specific project (2010 BP Plc AGM and 2010 Royal 
Dutch Shell Plc AGM) or were about company financial strategy (2012 3i Plc AGM).  
 
7.2.3. Largest Dissent 
The average highest shareholder opposition per AGM for our complete sample was 17.8%. 
However, if one excludes (employee) shareholder resolutions and countermotions, the average 
highest shareholder opposition was 14.6%. When looking at the averages per country in figure 8 – 
excluding the aforementioned shareholder resolutions and motions – one can conclude that 
shareholder opposition is relatively large in France and Ireland, and relatively low in Austria. For 
Germany in particular one can see high shareholder opposition against countermotions since the 
average highest shareholder opposition is 21.9% when taking into account all resolutions, but only 
11.3% when these countermotions are excluded. Since the shareholders of the Dutch and Belgian 
companies in our sample did not add any items to the agenda, both variables yield the same 
average.321 
 
                                                     
320 For example, during the 2012 AXA SA AGM and the 2013 Total SA AGM 8 and 7 employee shareholder 
representatives were up for election, respectively. Only one of these representatives was appointed by the 
AGM. 




Opposition rates excluding shareholder proposals and countermotions (left bar) and including (right bar) per 












In the following analyses of shareholder dissent per voting item category, we excluded shareholder 
resolutions. Director (re-)elections often receive the highest shareholder opposition in Austria: at 
42 AGMs these proposals received the highest percentage of votes against (7.5% on average). And, 
at 29 Belgian AGMs director (re-)elections also receive the highest percentage of votes against with 
an average opposition of 8.5%. Director (re-)elections also receive the highest opposition during 
the most AGMs in Germany: 38 times with a 13.4% average against. Share increases are also often 
opposed in Germany as these voting items received the highest opposition during 36 AGMs with 
11.4% of the votes against. In Ireland director (re-)elections often also receive the highest 
opposition (32 AGMs with an average of 17.0% of the votes against), whereas in the UK the most 
opposed resolution was the proposal to shorten the notice period for the next GM to 14 days: at 
188 AGMs this voting item received the highest opposition with a 9.5% average. Say-on-pay 
resolutions also received relatively often the highest opposition in the UK (at 137 AGMs with an 
average of 19.6%), however. In France resolutions regarding capital increases were the least 
popular: at 45 AGMs these resolutions receive the highest shareholder opposition with an average 
of 26.6%. Besides capital increase resolutions director (re-)elections also received relatively often 
the highest percentage of votes against (during 33 AGMs with 17.9% against on average), just like 
related party transactions and say-on-pay resolutions. The latter voting items received the highest 
opposition at 31 and 33 AGMs in France with an average percentage of 27.2 and 20.5%, 
respectively.  the Netherlands is the only country where shareholders largely oppose the waiver of 
pre-emption rights. In 53 AGMs this item received the highest shareholder opposition with a 
17.5% average.  
Director (re-)elections, say on pay resolutions, capital increases and proposals regarding the 
notice period for GMs often face the highest shareholder opposition. In table 14, the mean and 









Mean shareholder dissent per category in sample322   














i. Director (re-)elections  1,109 6.6 3.5 8.8 
ii. Say on 
Pay  
Overall 1,017 8.3 3.7 11.0 
Remuneration report 641 7.5 3.6 10.3 
Other say on pay 512 8.0 3.1 11.0 
Remuneration policy 
and system 
257 7.3 3.3 9.7 
Incentive plans and 
share (option) grants  
authorization 
161 7.9 3.77 9.4 
Individual 
remuneration 
39 8.8 5.6 9.8 
RPT regarding say on 
pay 
53 22.5 20.2 14.2 
Supervisory and  
non-executive 
194 1.9 0.3 4.8 
iii. Capital increase 936 8.3 5.0 10.5 
iv. Waiver of pre-emption rights 851 6.2 1.6 10.4 
v. Share buybacks 940 1.77 0.4 4.4 
vi. Cancel treasury shares 198 2.2 0.5 5.1 
vii. Amendments to the articles  355 4.2 0.3 11.5 
viii. Financial statements323  999 0.4 0.1 1.2 
ix. Dividends 1,053 0.3 0.0 1.3 
x. Discharge 483 1.6 0.43 4.6 
xi. Auditors 1,002 1.4 0.6 2.9 
xii. RPT 126 6.6 2.2 9.6 
xiii. Enterprise agreements 46 0.2 0.0 0.3 
xiv. GM 14 days 518 7.5 7.1 5.1 
xv. Political donations 264 2.1 1.7 1.7 
Note: the table reports the different resolution categories considered in this study. Column 2 describes the 
number of AGMs in the sample for which a resolution from a particular category was on the agenda and 
column 3 describes the sample average of the highest dissent per AGM per category. Column 4 describes 
the sample median of the highest dissent per AGM per category and the last column displays the standard 
deviation of the sample median (column 3). 
 
Table 14 clearly shows that director (re-)elections, say-on-pay resolutions, capital increases and 
proposals regarding the notice period for GMs are frequently the most controversial. Related party 
transactions and the waiver of pre-emption rights also receive high shareholder opposition. One 
may also notice that the mean opposition to amendments of the articles of association is 
                                                     
322 The table displays the sample average of the highest dissent per AGM per category. 
323 Shareholders in German and Austrian companies as well as the shareholders of the Dutch company 
Royal Imtech NV were not able to vote on the approval of the annual financial statements at the 2013 
AGM: this resolution was put on the agenda as a discussion item. 
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substantially higher (4.2) compared to the median (0.3), and the standard deviation is quite high 
(11.4). Table 15 shows the mean opposition to these most controversial resolutions per country: 
 
TABLE 15 
Average (highest) dissent rates per country (mean dissent in %, # of AGMs between parentheses) 
Resolution 
Category 
Austria Belgium France Germany Ireland Netherlands UK 
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a These observations are from the 2010-2014 AGMs of St Microelectronics NV (incorporated in the 
Netherlands, but listed to the CAC-40), 2010-2014 AGMs of Airbus Group SE (incorporated in the 
Netherlands, but listed to the CAC-40), and the 2010 and 2011 AGMs of Publicis Groupe SA.  
b These observations are from the 2010-2014 AGMs of Aryzta AG, which is listed to the Irish Stock 
Exchange, but incorporated in Switzerland (and also listed on the Swiss Stock Exchange.  
c Due to rounding the same as voting category iv. 
 
Remarkably, proposals to waive pre-emption rights receive the highest average opposition of all 
controversial voting item categories in the Netherlands, whereas in the UK and Ireland, these 
resolutions do not receive that much shareholder opposition. Proposals linked to capital increases 
also receive much less opposition in the UK and Ireland compared to the continental European 
countries. It may be the case that in concentrated ownership structures, large shareholders have 
larger incentives to vote against these capital resolutions, as approval may result in a dilution of 
their (perhaps de facto controlling) stakes. Small shareholders would not have these incentives.  
Whereas director (re-)elections are in theory the most important voting items, in practice these 
resolutions usually do not receive the highest voting dissent. The only country in which this was 
the case was Ireland. Average shareholder opposition to director (re-)elections is however, relatively 
high compared to other, less controversial voting items. In France, average shareholder opposition 
to director (re-)elections is also high, but this is the case for other resolution categories as well, 
especially for say-on-pay resolutions. In fact, say-on-pay resolutions receive high dissent rates in all 
Member States. For instance, in the UK, shareholder opposition to these resolutions is higher on 
average than to other resolutions. It seems that shareholders care about these resolutions.  
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Capital resolutions also receive high opposition rates, especially in Belgium and France. The 
dissent rates for discharging management and supervisory board members are not very high on 
average, but the sample average standard deviation is relatively high (cf. supra, reported in table 14).  
Lastly, in chapter 1 we discussed the implementation of the new UK Listing Rules for the 
election of independent directors in controlled companies (cf. supra, section 5.2.1 of chapter 1). 
These new rules were introduced in May 16, 2014, and as a result, our sample does not contain a 
lot of information on these new rules. Only two controlled FTSE-100 companies in our sample 
reported voting polls excluding controlling shareholders: Associated British Foods Plc and British 
Sky Broadcasting Group Plc. The dissent rates for the voting polls of the outsider shareholders are 
not substantially larger for the latter company (dissent rates range from 0.40-1.88). Associated 
British Foods Plc reports an outsider shareholder dissent rate of 15.2% against the re-election of 
one of the independent directors. The total shareholder dissent rate is only 4.9%. For the other 
independent directors, dissent rates are not substantially larger. We highly recommend further 
research to examine the effects of this new regulation in the UK.  
 
7.3. Concluding Remarks 
Based on the legal framework of shareholder voting rights determined in chapter 1, we evaluated 
shareholder voting behaviour. We found large differences between Member States. The 1,255 
AGMs in our sample had, on average, almost 17 voting items on their agendas, with the highest 
averages in the UK and France. In contrast, in Austria, agendas were relatively short with around 
10 agenda items on average. Shareholders of UK companies may (re-)elect on average more than 
nine directors per meeting. In contrast, in Austria and Germany this is only 2.3 or 2.5 directors on 
average, respectively. In all Member States, only few voting items did not pass; of the over 21,000 
voting items examined in this study, only 166 voting items were dismissed during 96 AGMs of the 
1,255 AGMs (without shareholder proposals and countermotions, this was only 67).  Only three 
director (re-)elections were not approved. The remuneration report was rejected slightly more 
often, namely at eight of the 641 meetings. Resolutions regarding changes to share capital were 
more often dismissed; 33 times in total.  
When looking at shareholder opposition rates, we found that the average highest shareholder 
opposition per AGM was 17.8% in total. Resolutions including director (re-)elections, related-party 
transactions, say-on-pay proposals, capital increases and proposals regarding the notice period for 
GMs face the highest shareholder opposition. However, these voting items do not receive any 
opposition higher than 9% on average. Other voting items such as the approval of the financial 
statements face virtually no shareholder opposition. Note that we only considered the voting 
behaviour of all shareholders in this section. When excluding corporate insiders, and thus only 
focussing on outsider shareholders, these opposition figures may differ. In the next sections of this 
chapter, we first investigate the types of shareholders that are present in the listed companies in 
our sample (section 8). Afterwards, in section 9, we analyse the voting behaviour of outsider 




8. TYPES OF SHAREHOLDERS 
8.1. Methodology 
When analysing AGMs in practice, one also needs to consider the different types of shareholders. 
Although corporate law theory generally assumes that (small) shareholders have the same interests 
(‘fictional shareholders’ per Greenwood, 1996), shareholders are certainly not identical corporate 
actors and they differ not only in their (voting) stake. In most countries, institutional investors have 
some responsibility to monitor management and act as active shareholders. Over the past years, 
the ownership stakes for these investors have significantly increased. The dominant role of 
institutional investors in financial markets is widely recognized.324 The presence of institutional 
investors would even be a solution to the shareholder free-rider problem according to some 
authors.325  
In the US, private pension funds are mandated to vote under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA).326 In Europe, too, institutional investors play an important role in 
shareholder engagement.327 The importance of institutional investors was already recognized in 
section 6.9-6.12 of the UK Cadbury Report (1992), in particular in provision 6.10 (‘[g]iven the 
weight of their votes, the way in which institutional shareholders use their power to influence the standards of 
corporate governance is of fundamental importance […]’), provision 6.11.2 (‘[i]nstitutional investors should 
make positive use of their voting rights’), and provision 6.12. (‘[w]e recommend that institutional investors should 
disclose their policies on the use of voting rights’.328 The Greenbury Report (1995) and the Hampel 
Committee Report (1998) also place emphasis on institutional investor voting. Nowadays, the UK 
Stewardship Code establishes a framework to determine the monitoring role for institutional 
investors, namely asset owners and asset managers.329 Principle 6 of the Stewardship Code states 
that ‘[i]nstitutional investors should seek to vote all shares held’.330 These shareholders should not 
automatically support the board. The DCGC 2008 contains specific rules for institutional investors 
as well,331 but does not require institutional investors to vote, though they must make their voting 
policy public. The BCGC explicitly mentions the important role of institutional investors and one 
of the guidelines of provision 8.5 requires that companies ‘should ask institutional shareholders 
and their voting agencies for explanations on their voting behaviour’. The ACGC mentions 
institutional investors as well. In contrast, the German Kodex (GCGC) and the FCGC of Listed 
Corporations do not discuss institutional investors explicitly. However, in Germany, article 32(1) 
of the former Investmentgesetz stated that institutional investors ‘should’ exercise their shareholder 
rights ‘themselves’. According to German scholars this article implies a general duty to vote, except 
                                                     
324 For example, see the Green Paper on Corporate Governance (EC (2011a) Green Paper The EU 
Corporate Governance Framework, COM (2011) 164 final. 5 April 2011). Also see Van der Elst and 
Vermeulen (2011); Shleifer and Vishny (1986); Gillan and Starks (2007).  
325 For example, see Heard and Sherman (1987); Huddart (1993); Shleifer and Vishny (1997).  
326 See Mallin (2001); McCahery, Sautner and Starks (2014). 
327 In this respect one may also refer to the UCITS (Undertakings for the Collective Investment in 
Transferable Securities) Directive (Directive 2009/65/EC, amended by 2014/91/EU) that stipulates, inter 
alia, monitoring rules regarding these funds that also affect institutional investors.  
328 Cadbury Report (1992) The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1 December 1992, 6.9-6.12. 
(<http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf>) Emphasis added.  
329 The UK Stewardship Code, September 2012, p. 2.  
330 The UK Stewardship Code, September 2012, p. 9. 
331 Best practice principles IV.4.1-IV.4.3 of DCGC 2008. The DCGC 2016 contains some rules for institu-
tional investors as well, including principles 4.3.5-4.3.6. 
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in certain circumstances.332 Since 22 July, 2013, the statutory basis is section 94(1) of the new 
German Capital Investment Code (Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch). In Ireland, Appendix 4 of the Irish CGA 
states that the Irish Stock Exchange (ISE) follows the UKCGC,333 including some additional 
provisions outlined in the Irish CGA. The latter does not make reference to the UK Stewardship 
Code, and it does not contain special provisions for institutional investors. A relatively large 
number of financial institutions have published a statement of support for the Stewardship Code, 
however.334  
In addition to these national corporate governance codes, principle II of the OECD Principles 
of Corporate Governance (2004 edition)335 requires that institutional investors ’disclose their 
overall corporate governance and voting policies with respect to their investments, including the 
procedures that they have in place for deciding on the use of their voting rights’ (principle II.F.1) 
as well as ‘how they manage material conflicts of interest that may affect the exercise of key 
ownership rights regarding their investments’ (principle II.F.2). 
Institutional investors remain the focus in the European Union (or, as Van der Elst and 
Vermeulen (2011, p. 11) call it, ‘corporate governance 2.0’). As we have seen in chapter 1, on April 
9, 2014, the EC proposed a revision to the Shareholder Rights Directive. One of the key elements 
of this proposal was the increased emphasis on the role of institutional investors and asset 
managers.336  For example, proposed article 3f requires institutional investors to have an 
‘engagement policy’, that must contain the various actions mentioned in article 3f(1).  Paragraph 3 
of article 3f adds that ‘[i]nstitutional investors and asset managers shall, for each company in which 
they hold shares, disclose if and how they cast their votes in the general meetings of the companies 
concerned and provide an explanation for their voting behaviour’. The Commission also adds 
definitions of institutional investors and asset managers in article 2(f) and (g), respectively.  
Institutional investors are thus generally likely to exercise their voting rights during AGMs.337 
Zetzsche (2008) even argues that the economic information cost argument (cf. supra, introduction 
chapter) does not hold for institutional investors. However, according to Mallin (2001) evidence 
shows that institutional shareholder voting is lower than might be expected, though the research 
Mallin refers to is quite old.338 However, as Strand (2012) notes, institutional investors prefer private 
                                                     
332 ‘Die Kapitalverwaltungsgesellschaft soll das Stimmrecht aus Aktien von Gesellschaften, die ihren Sitz im Geltungsbereich 
dieses Gesetzes haben, im Regelfall selbst ausüben.’ Following OECD (2011), p. 116.  
333 It states that: ‘[t]he ISE recognises that the UK Corporate Governance Code (formerly the Combined 
Code) has set the standard for corporate governance internationally. It is regarded as being the pre-eminent 
corporate governance code and is widely emulated’. 
334 List can be retrieved from the website of the FRC, <https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-
Standards/Corporate-governance/UK-Stewardship-Code/UK-Stewardship-Code-statements.aspx>. 
(accessed in March 2015). 
335 The ‘Principles of Corporate Governance’ document was updated in 2015 (OECD, 2015). The relevant 
principles are included in Principle III in this new version. 
336 EC (2014a) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 
2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement and Directive 
2013/34/EU as regards certain elements of the corporate governance statement, COM (2014) 213 final. 
April 9, 2014. 
337 Çelik and Isaksson (2014) argue that ownership engagement differs among institutional investors and is 
based on the business models of institutional investors.   
338 The author refers to Pension Investment Research Consultants (1996) PIRC Shareholder Voting 
Guidelines, March 1996, and Pensions Investment Research Consultants (1998) Proxy Voting Trends at 




negotiations, which may actually impede AGMs as a decision-making body as well (i.e. the side-
stepping problem, see Strand, 2012, p. 16). 
Given the above considerations, we distinguish five main categories of (ultimate) shareholders 
in this study; 
i) Corporate insiders, including (close) family, board members, founders and former board 
members, trust offices and parent companies or other holding structures and pyramid 
structures; 
ii) Institutional investors and other funds, including banks, pension funds, investment funds and 
insurance companies, asset managers and other financial institutions or portfolio investors; 
iii) Non-financial companies, including non-financial companies that are not considered 
corporate insiders; 
iv) Governments, including state-owned enterprises and sovereign wealth funds (ultimate 
owner);  
v) Other, including for example individual investors who are not corporate insiders (category 
“i)”).   
We use only one category for institutional investors and other funds, though there are many 
different types of institutional investors and numerous ways to divide them into categories.339 
Renneboog and Szilagyi (2013) distinguish between pressure-sensitive institutional investors, which 
include banks and insurance companies, and pressure-insensitive institutional investors, which 
include pension and labour union funds, investment funds and their managements, and 
independent investment advisors. And, Belcredi, Bozzi and Di Noia (2013) divide, ‘[c]onsistent 
with previous literature’, institutional investors into two categories, i) financial institutions such as 
a bank or insurance company, and ii) private equity funds (p. 384). Whereas these categories seem 
logical, in practice they are not. Big financial institutions often engage in more than one activity 
and have several departments, which means that categories of institutional investors can overlap. 
It is hard to say whether there are ‘Chinese walls’ between departments or business units and to 
identify the ultimate type of institutional investor that holds a particular amount of voting rights.     
In section 3.1 we explain that we assume that blockholders exercise their voting rights in order 
to be able to calculate small shareholder attendance. Blockholders are defined as shareholders 
possessing more than 5% of the voting rights: this is the lowest common disclosure threshold in 
all countries in our sample. Currently, companies in the Netherlands, Germany and the UK must 
disclose voting stakes of 3% or more. In Austria this threshold is four%.340  Moreover, in many 
countries companies may set additional thresholds in their articles of association. In addition, many 
companies provide an overview of the number of shares (an accompanying voting rights) that each 
director has.341 Hence, annual reports may disclose voting stakes of shareholders that are lower 
                                                     
339 See also Çelik and Isaksson (2014). Just a simple example; the definition of institutional investors in the 
UK Stewardship Code also includes asset managers, whereas the European proposal to amend Directive 
2007/36/EC contains a separate definition for asset managers and institutional investors. 
340 Germany: paragraph 21 Wertpapierhandelsgeset (WpHG). UK:  Rule 5.2.1 Disclosure and Transparency 
Rule (DTR). The Netherlands: chapter 5.3 Financial Supervision Act (Wft). Austria: paragraph 91 Austrian 
Stock Exchange Act (BorseG).  
341 Shares are usually part of the (executive) director remuneration package. The Prospectus Directive 
(2003/71/EC) requires companies to disclose the number of ‘securities offered, allotted or to be allotted to 
existing or former directors or employees by their employer which has securities already admitted to trading 
on a regulated market or by an affiliated undertaking’ in their prospectus. Several national laws and soft laws 
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than 5% that are not included in our blockholder measure. We include all shareholdings (larger 
than 1%) that are disclosed in company annual reports in our shareholder type variables to include 
as much information as possible. Unfortunately for some companies these variables are less 
detailed than for other companies.  
 
8.2. Descriptive Analysis 
In the previous section we defined five categories of ultimate shareholders. In this section we will 
further explore the different types of shareholders in a comparative analysis. Selecting the category 
to which a shareholder belongs is not always obvious. For instance, shareholders that exercise 
control over companies in a corporate group structure are considered insiders. And, for example, 
over 91% of the shares of Uniqa Insurance Group AG are hold by the Raiffeisen Zentral Bank, 
Austria Privatstiftung and Collegialität Privatstiftung syndicate. We classified this syndicate of 
shareholders as ‘corporate insiders’. Furthermore, the largest shareholder of Delta Lloyd NV, Aviva 
Plc, is also classed as a corporate insider. The same holds for, inter alia, Legrand SA, where Wendel 
Group (and KKR) held a majority stake in 2010 and 2011. In 2013, Wendel Group sold its 
remaining shares of Legrand SA (Reuters, 2013). 
For 331 observations a corporate insider was the largest shareholder; these shareholders have 
an average stake of 38.2%. Institutional investors are often the largest shareholders in the sample. 
In 649 observations, the largest shareholder was an institutional investor with an average stake of 
9.3%. Non-financial companies were the largest shareholders for 95 observations (average stake of 
35.8%) and in 140 cases, actors from the ‘government’ category had the largest stake with 37.1% 
on average. Only 34 observations showed a different largest shareholder.342 These numbers show 
that the average stake of the largest shareholder is substantially lower when such a shareholder is 
an institutional investor.  
When we look at the largest type of shareholder per country we can conclude that there are 
substantial differences between countries. The most common largest shareholder in Austria is the 
corporate insider (for 53 observations). The same holds for France and Belgium. In contrast, in 
the UK, Netherlands, Ireland and Germany institutional investors often hold the largest stake. 
Hence, institutional investors are often the largest shareholders, but the average stake of these 
shareholders is relatively small with 8.5% for the UK and 13.6% in the Netherlands.  
                                                     
(corporate governance codes) require companies to show the number of shares executive directors are 
rewarded in their remuneration reports.  
342 The total amount of observations is 1,249 since six companies did not disclose any shareholdings.  
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FIGURE 9  
Frequency (%) of type of largest shareholders per country 
 
Further analysis in this section not only takes into account the largest shareholder, but the aggregate 
stake of all shareholders for each type per observation. Institutional investors are present in 966 observations 
and have an average aggregate reported stake of 16.0%. Corporate insiders are present in 441 
observations and have an average total stake of 31.6%. Only 164 observations disclosed 
shareholdings by non-financial companies, with an average aggregate stake of 24.2%. The highest 
aggregate stake is the over 77% stake of Penoles in Fresnillo Plc in 2010-2013. In 2014 Penoles 
reported a stake of 75%. The last large category of shareholders is ‘Governments’ and can be found 
in 228 observations with an average stake of 26.6%. The largest aggregate stake reported for this 
category is also the largest stake of the complete sample; the National Pensions Reserve 
Commission owned around 99.8% of Allied Irish Banks in the period 2012-2014. This commission 
consists of seven members appointed by the Minister of Finance.343 A 92.8% stake in Allied Irish 
Banks was reported for 2011. The Minister for Finance also had a 99.2% stake in Permanent TSB 
Group Plc between 2012 and 2014.    
We now look at the shareholder structures of the companies in our sample. Table 16 provides 





                                                     
343 In compliance with the Irish NPRF Act, the Minister for Finance may only appoint commissioners who 
have acquired substantial expertise and experience at a senior level in any of a number of listed areas 
including investment or international business management, finance or economics, law, actuarial practice, 
and accountancy and auditing.  
Following information at (<http://www.nprf.ie/Commission/commission.htm>). (accessed in March 
2015). 









Corporate Insider Institutional Investor Non-financial company




Shareholder structure per country (in %, amount of observations between parentheses in ‘Mean stake (%)’-column) 




Austria Corporate Insiders 38.1 (70) 28.5 
Institutional Investors 13.1 (46) 5.8 
Non-financial companies 12.2 (14) 7.6 
Government 47.9 (26) 17.9 
Other 21.7 (6) 8.2 
Belgium Corporate Insiders 40.8 (40) 18.4 
Institutional Investors 11.6 (52) 6.5 
Non-financial companies 42.3 (25) 19.8 
Government 36.3 (8) 28.0 
Other - - 
France Corporate Insiders 20.8 (139) 21.0 
Institutional Investors 12.5 (101) 8.4 
Non-financial companies 14.7 (62) 15.4 
Government 19.0 (69) 23.1 
Other 2.2 (2) 1.0 
Germany Corporate Insiders 36.3 (49) 19.9 
Institutional Investors 11.2 (118) 6.8 
Non-financial companies 32.2 (22) 23.5 
Government 21.7 (41) 11.4 
Other 14.7 (12) 9.6 
Ireland Corporate Insiders 19.5 (31) 17.4 
Institutional Investors 20.8 (79) 10.7 
Non-financial companies 2.8 (3) 1.4 
Government 49.5 (24) 35.4 
Other 17.2 (11) 8.4 
Netherlands Corporate Insiders 38.9 (46) 21.5 
Institutional Investors 14.67 (98) 10.5 
Non-financial companies 19.0 (3) 14.7 
Government 7.6 (7) 2.4 
Other 10.4 (5) 1.9 
UK Corporate Insiders 37.8 (67) 22.8 
Institutional Investors 18.2 (477) 9.4 
Non-financial companies 30.1 (35) 23.8 
Government 20.8 (53) 19.6 
Other 15.6 (27) 25.2 
Note: the table shows the average aggregate stake for each type of shareholder for each country. The 
numbers here only consider the reported stakes; if a particular company did not report any stake for a 
particular type of shareholder, it was not included in the average.   
 
The largest average aggregates stakes can be found in Ireland and Austria in the ‘governments; 
category with 49.5 and 47.9%, respectively. For both countries the number of observations in this 
category is relatively small at only 24 and 27 respectively. In Belgium, stakes in the ‘non-financial 
companies’ category are relatively large with an average of 42.3%. However, here too the amount 
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of observations is limited to only 25. The corporate insider stakes in most countries are relatively 
large. Institutional investors are present in 477 of the 505 UK observations. In France, corporate 
insiders had stakes in 139 company observations, but the average stake was lower than in other 
countries.   
As expected, the shareholder type analysis this section has shown that company ownership 
structures differ substantially among Member States. We also have seen that corporate insiders, 
governments and non-financial companies usually have larger stakes than institutional investors. 
In countries with high ownership concentrations such as Austria and Belgium the presence of these 
shareholders was relatively high. In contrast, in the UK ownership concentration was generally low 
and a large majority of the companies had institutional investors as their largest shareholders.  
 
8.3. Concluding Remarks 
In this paragraph, we focused on the types of blockholders in each country. For this we defined 5 
shareholder categories; i) Corporate insiders, including (close) family, board members, founders 
and former board members, trust offices and parent companies or other holding structures and 
pyramid structures; ii) Institutional investors and other funds, including banks, pension funds, 
investment funds and insurance companies, asset managers and other financial institutions or 
portfolio investors; iii) Non-financial companies, including non-financial companies that are not 
considered corporate insiders; iv) Governments, including state-owned enterprises and sovereign 
wealth funds (ultimate owner), and;  v) Other, including for example individual investors who are 
not corporate insiders (category “i)”).  
Due to an information problem, i.e., only voting stakes of shareholders are disclosed that 
passed a certain threshold (cf. supra, for example, section 4 and 5 of this chapter), we largely focused 
on blockholder types in this part of the research. We found that institutional investors are often 
the largest shareholder in the UK, but with relatively low stakes. In contrast, in Austria, France and 
Belgium, corporate insiders usually had the highest ownership stakes. It seems the presence of 
corporate insiders as the largest shareholder and ownership concentration are positively related  
 
9. OUTSIDER SHAREHOLDER OPPOSITION 
9.1. Methodology 
Our analysis in the previous paragraph provides insights into shareholder voting behaviour. We 
cannot yet draw any conclusions on small shareholder voting behaviour.344 In contrast, it is possible 
to make a distinction between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ shareholder voting behaviour. Shareholders 
are considered insider shareholders in this study when they are (very) likely to support management 
proposals. These insider shareholders, or corporate insiders as we designated them in the previous 
                                                     
344 Although it is plausible to assume that blockholders always attend AGMs (cf. supra, section 4 of this 
chapter) we cannot assume that large shareholders always vote in favour, neither always against. One may 
argue that (some) blockholders have means to discuss their opinion with the corporate boards prior to any 
shareholders’ meeting. These shareholders are in regular and close contact with corporate boards.  It is likely 
that the boards present and discuss with these shareholders the agenda items before these are brought to a 
vote. Where appropriate, boards will amend the proposals to avoid disapproval of these shareholders and 
consequently of the general meeting. However, this would definitely not lead to the conclusion that all 
blockholders always vote in favour of management proposals.     
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section, include trust offices,345 board members and founders, companies in a group structure and 
other blockholders that are likely to support the company board. When large insider shareholders 
(or corporate insiders) are present, agenda items that may be unacceptable to outsider shareholders 
can still be approved by large majorities. In particular, this can be the case for say-on-pay 
resolutions and (other) related party transactions.  
Outsider shareholder dissent is calculated as follows (following Van der Elst and Lafarre, 2017):  
 
Outsider shareholder dissent  
= (relative shareholder opposition) / (total percentage represented by outsider 
shareholders) *100%  
= (relative shareholder opposition) / (100% – relative amount of votes represented by 
the summed voting block of all corporate insiders) *100%, 
 
where the ‘relative amount of votes represented by the summed voting block of all corporate 
insiders’ is calculated as346:  
 
Relative amount of votes represented by the summed voting block of all corporate insiders 
= (summed voting block of all corporate insiders) / (total relative voter turnout) *100%. 
 
9.2. Descriptive Analysis 
The highest overall shareholder opposition – excluding (employee) shareholder resolutions and 
countermotions – is on average 14.6%. However, the highest outsider shareholder opposition is 
20.9%, which is significantly higher. Figure 10 shows that in Belgium and France, average outsider 
shareholder opposition is substantially larger than overall shareholder opposition. In the UK, where 
there are in general less insider shareholders, this difference is relatively small.  
 
FIGURE 10 










                                                     
345 A particular kind of large insider shareholder in the Netherlands is the trust office (in Dutch: stichting 
administratiekantoor). For a calculation of their stakes, cf. supra, section 8 of this chapter. 
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Table 17 shows that the average shareholder opposition is significantly larger when we account for 
insider shareholders.347 We included the controversial voting items from table 14 (cf. supra, section 
7.2.3):  
TABLE 17 
Outsider Shareholder Opposition 











i. Director (re-)elections  1,105 10.4 6.6 57.6 
ii. Say on pay: overall 1,014 12.4 8.4 47.6 
iii. Say on pay: remuneration 
report 
640 10.2 7.5 36.0 
iv. Say on pay: other 510 12.9 8.1 59.3 
v. Capital increase 936 11.7 8.3 41.0 
vi. Waiver of pre-emption rights 850 9.6 6.2 54.8 
vii. Related-Party transactions348 126 11.2 6.6 69.7 
viii. GM 14 days 518 8.2 7.5 9.3 
ix. Amendments to the articles 355 6.6 4.2 57.1 
 
Table 17 shows that many resolutions experience a substantial increase in shareholder opposition 
when insider shareholders are considered. ‘GM 14 days’, only present on UK and Irish company 
agendas, shows the smallest average percentage increase of only 9.3%. And the percentage increase 
of opposition to resolutions regarding the remuneration report is relatively small: UK companies, 
which generally have lower ownership concentration and less insider shareholders present, largely 
influence these average percentages. Table 17 shows that shareholder opposition regarding director 
(re-)elections and ‘other’ say on pay increases by more than half on average when accounted for 
insider shareholders. One may see table A.2. in the appendix to this chapter for the descriptives of 
outsider shareholder opposition per country.  
Many resolutions were dismissed by outsider shareholders. For example, three Heineken 
proposals would not have been passed without the participation of the large controlling insider 
shareholders. The largest opposition by outsider shareholders was found at the 2011 Heineken NV 
AGM. At this meeting, 98% of the outsider shareholders voted against the amendments to the 
remuneration policy. Outsider voters also rejected voting items concerning remuneration were also 
rejected at the 2010 and 2013 Heineken general meeting. The 2014 Colruyt NV AGM provides 
another example of this situation: at this AGM, around 17% of the present shareholders voted 
against the remuneration report. However, if we take into account the stake of the controlling block 
of insider shareholders (the Colruyt Family and Groep Sofina) over 85% of the present outsider 
shareholders dismissed this resolution. And almost 82% of the outsider shareholders present at the 
                                                     
347 We excluded five observations from this analysis since the total voting stakes of corporate insiders for 
these observations were larger than the total shareholder turnout. These observations are Strabag (2014); 
Uniqa Insurance Group (2012); D’Ieteren (2012); KBC Groep (2011) and; Metro ST (2011). We also 
excluded the 2010 AGM of the Belgian company GBL from this analysis.   
348 Not related to directors.  
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2014 Raiffeisen Bank AGM voted against the creation of new authorised capital, whereas total 
shareholder opposition was only around 13%. Total shareholder opposition to the authority to 
issue convertible bonds and cancel subscription rights during the 2013 Vienna Insurance Group 
AGM was only 13.5%, whereas the outsider shareholder opposition was over 91% when 
considering the 70% ownership stake of Wiener Stadtische Versicherungsverein. These are just a 
few examples of resolutions that would not have passed without the participation of insider 
shareholders. Our data clearly indicates that outsider shareholder opposition is substantially higher, 
obviously especially in countries that have ownership structures with large insider shareholders 
such as Austria and Belgium.   
 
9.3. Concluding Remarks 
In section 7 of this chapter, we discussed shareholder opposition for different agenda item 
categories and found that even the most important voting items did, on average, receive no 
opposition higher than 9%. However, when excluding corporate insiders, we found that opposition 
rates significantly increased; for example, the say on pay categories received over 12% opposition 
from outsider shareholder on average. In addition, more resolutions would have been dismissed if 
outsider shareholders could solely determine the voting outcome. This raises important questions, 
such as whether large insider shareholder should be excluded from voting in certain corporate 
decisions and/or companies should pay more attention to outsider shareholder opinions (cf. infra, 
section 10.2). At the very least, these results indicate that shareholders do not always blindly follow 




10. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
10.1. Conclusions 
The aim of this chapter was to evaluate voter turnout and (small) shareholder behaviour during 
AGMs in Europe in a descriptive setting. To do so, we constructed a sample of AGMs of listed 
companies from seven different European countries during a period of five consecutive years. As 
we have seen in the introduction, legal and economic theory suggest that one of the problems with 
shareholder voting in AGMs is low turnout; low attendance undermines the theoretical monitoring 
function of AGMs, and, moreover, may provide large shareholders with a de facto majority stake. 
The latter is especially relevant for countries with more concentrated ownership structures. But are 
these attendance rates indeed that low nowadays? How did they evolve over time? What are the 
relevant characteristics of AGMs in the European Member States? These were the questions 
addressed, amongst others, in this chapter.  
We conclude that there is an overall increasing trend in voter turnout rates in AGMs in Europe, 
which includes both total shareholder voter turnout rates and small shareholder voter turnout rates. 
Our findings correspond to existing research that studies voter turnout rates in earlier periods. The 
total shareholder voter turnout rates in Belgium, Austria and Germany are relatively low compared 
to current rates in the UK and Ireland. For Belgian companies, there was a sharp increase from an 
average total turnout rate of 46.4% in 2010 to almost 60% in 2014. France and the Netherlands 
show the highest turnout rates of all continental European countries in our sample for the year 
2014. If one excludes the Dutch companies that have not listed all their shares, but issued 
depository receipts, the average voter turnout in the Netherlands over the 2010-2014 is only 60.7%.  
In terms of small shareholder voter turnout rates we can conclude that there are some 
substantial differences among countries as well. In the UK small shareholder turnout rates are 
relatively high, around 60% for the entire sample period. In contrast, in Belgium small shareholder 
turnout rates are only 9.3 and 9.4% in 2010 and 2011, but increased to over 30% in 2014. AGMs 
of Austrian companies have a relatively low small shareholder turnout rate. Again, France and the 
Netherlands display relatively high small shareholder turnout rates compared to other continental 
European companies in 2014.  
As expected, the ownership structures of Belgian and Austrian companies are relatively 
concentrated, whereas UK companies have more dispersed ownership structures. The ownership 
structures of Irish companies listed to the main index are also relatively concentrated. The results 
for the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) show that the Netherlands has the lowest ownership 
concentration of all continental European countries in our sample. In contrast, small shareholders 
in France have a relatively high voting power (BANZHAFsmall), compared to other continental 
European countries. Small shareholders in the Anglo-American countries in our sample, UK and 
Ireland, have the most voting power with respectively 0.74 and 0.83%. In Belgium, a small 
shareholder holding 1% of the votes, only has a voting power of less than one-third of his voting 
stake. Overall, these results are in line with the presumed stylized fact that ownership concentration 
is higher in continental Europe than in the UK. However, we would like to emphasise that there 
are also UK companies with more concentrated ownership structures, and companies that have 
registered offices in continental European countries with more dispersed ownership structures. 
The international character of the large, listed, often ‘multinational’ companies in our sample 
somewhat diminishes the differences between the UK and continental European countries.   
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Based on the findings in chapter 1, we determined several voting item categories and 
investigated the content of AGMs in practice. The 1,255 AGMs in our sample had, on average, 
almost 17 voting items on their agendas, with the highest averages in the UK and France (both 
over 19 items on average). In Austria, agendas were relatively short with (a little) less than 10 agenda 
items on average. Shareholders of UK companies may (re-)elect on average more than nine 
directors per meeting. In contrast, in Austria and Germany this is only 2.3 or 2.5 directors on 
average, respectively. Few voting items did not pass, and if a voting item was rejected, the rejection 
was often thoroughly discussed in the media. The remuneration report was rejected at 8 of the 641 
meetings that included this agenda item. Resolutions regarding changes to share capital were 
slightly more often dismissed (33 times, including capital increases, limitations to pre-emption 
rights and share buy-backs). However, if we only consider the outsider shareholders, many more 
resolutions would have been dismissed. The highest shareholder opposition at an AGM was on 
average 17.8%. Director (re-)elections, say-on-pay resolutions, capital increases and proposals 
regarding the notice period for GMs frequently receive the greatest shareholder opposition. 
We also evaluated the types of blockholders in each country. The largest shareholder in the UK 
was often an institutional investor, whereas in Austria, France and Belgium it was a corporate 
insider. In the Netherlands and Ireland there are relatively many companies with institutional 
investors as their largest shareholders. However, the average stakes of this type of largest 
shareholder are often small, with only 8.5% in UK companies and 13.6% in the Netherlands.    
 
10.2. Discussion and Policy Implications 
The results in this chapter show that some small shareholders (although certainly not all) do vote, 
and that there is an increasing trend in small shareholder voter turnout.  Note that this outcome is 
not in line with the economic theory discussed in the introduction chapter that suggests that hardly 
any small shareholder will vote in practice. We further elaborate on this finding below, and 
afterwards we discuss the implications for outsider shareholders.   
 
The Turnout Decision 
Note that economic theory often departs from the common assumption that individuals, in our 
case shareholders, act as rational individuals. Rational shareholders weigh the costs and benefits of 
their behaviour and consider the expected behaviour of others. This assumption of rationality is 
generally necessary for a prediction of behaviour, because irrational behaviour does not fall into 
any pattern; only the relationship between actions that form some pattern can be analysed (rational 
choice theory, also see, for instance, Downs, 1957).349 However, the rationality assumption may 
not always hold.  
Rational choice theory attempts to explain why in many political elections people decide to 
vote regardless of whether an individual can affect the outcome of the vote.  It considers turnout 
rates at political elections a ‘major theoretical puzzle’ (Aldrich, 1993, p. 246), also referred to as the 
Downs paradox. Also in case of shareholder voting, it may be possible that shareholders choose 
to vote regardless of whether they can affect the voting outcome or whether other shareholders 
                                                     
349 However, preferences are exogenously determined. In economic analysis, the rationality assumption is 
imposed on the individual’s means, not his or her ends. It refers ‘solely to a man who moves toward his 
goals in a way which, to the best of his knowledge, uses the least possible input of scarce resources per unit 
of valued output’ (Downs, 1957, p. 5). 
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can benefit from their monitoring efforts. At first sight, this may be considered irrational behaviour, 
but there can be several plausible explanations. First, small shareholders may act rationally in 
accordance with their perception of reality; these shareholders may have a higher subjective 
perception of being decisive,350 and even a small increase in the probability of being pivotal may 
have an impact on the turnout decision (Larcinese, 2013). Moreover, economic scholars do perhaps 
not include all benefits of voting, but only focus on whether shareholders can be pivotal or not. 
For instance, as we have seen before, the AGM has more functions and shareholders may also 
value their forum rights (cf. infra, chapter 6 of this research). In addition, shareholders may derive 
other benefits from voting. For example, these shareholders may derive utility from being an active 
and responsible shareholder; these factors add a private dimension to the public good of 
shareholder voting. Or, as we have seen in the example in the introduction chapter of this research, 
they join the meeting perhaps for the snacks and gadgets.  
To see why (small) shareholders decide to attend, and how (small) shareholder turnout can be 
enhanced, we examine the factors that may contribute to attendance rates in chapters 3 and 4. For 
this we consider Aldrich’s theory on political elections. He addresses the problems of voting in 
political elections – which may correspond to the shareholder absenteeism problems in the 
corporate governance context – and argues that turnout is a ‘low-cost low-benefit action’ to many. 
This implies that small changes in costs and benefits affect the decision to vote of many: he argues 
that the decision to vote is made ‘at the margin’. In chapter 3 we focus on the benefits of the 
turnout decision, and in chapter 4 on the costs. In chapter 6 we investigate the value of the forum 
function.  
 
Outsider Shareholders  
This chapter already provides important insights into the shareholder’s turnout decision. Our 
findings suggest that shareholder voting, at the very least, is not completely irrelevant. Although 
only a small part of the voting items did not pass, we found that some resolution categories received 
higher dissent rates than others. These categories include director (re-)elections and say-on-pay 
resolutions. Moreover, when we consider outsider shareholders, we note even higher dissent rates, 
and resolutions are more often dismissed by this group. These results indicate that shareholders do 
not blindly follow the proposals of the corporate board. In addition, these results raise important 
questions, such as whether large insider shareholder should be excluded from voting in certain 
corporate decisions, or that, perhaps, companies should pay more attention to outsider shareholder 
opinions.  
Since 2014, small shareholders (i.e., independent shareholders) may vote separately on the 
election of independent directors in companies that have a controlling shareholder in the UK (in 
accordance with the Listing Rules, LR 9.2.2AR jo 9.2.2ER). The threshold for control is set at 30% 
and includes acting in concert. If the resolution is not approved, the company may propose a 
further resolution to elect or re-elect the proposed independent director which cannot be voted on 
until 90 days since the meeting have elapsed. It must be voted on within 30 days from the end of 
this 90-day wait period (LR 9.2.2FR). This second resolution must be approved by the shareholders 
                                                     
350 Research has shown that we are not very good at estimating risks and are generally optimistic when 
estimating our chances. Behavioural economists have been challenging the rationality assumptions in eco-
nomics, including the Rational Expectations School (Buchholz, 2007). In addition to optimism, Tversky 
Kahneman developed three heuristic principles that people rely on when assessing probabilities and risks; 
i) representativeness; ii) availability, and; iii) adjustment and anchoring (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).   
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of the company (LR 9.2.2FR). Since ownership is more concentrated in continental European 
countries, legislators may consider adopting such rules that focus on outsider shareholders in these 
countries as well to enhance the role of AGMs. We strongly recommend investigating the effects 
of these new listing rules on independent shareholder voting in future studies. One step further 
would be the appointment of independent directors solely by independent shareholders (Van der 
Elst, 2013), but this may probably result in disproportionate control on the art of minority 
shareholders in corporate boards in some situations. For example, Van der Elst and Lafarre (2017) 
found that Dutch outsider shareholders sometimes used discharge resolutions as a mean to express 
their dissatisfaction with the corporate decision-making regarding say-on-pay resolutions. In this 
line of reasoning, minority shareholders perhaps may use the independent director elections in the 
same manner. Hence, we do not argue against the appointment of independent directors solely by 
minority shareholders per se, since the general purpose of these directors is to enhance minority 
shareholder protection against insider opportunistic behaviour of insiders, though possible side 
effects should be carefully assessed. 
 
Lastly, we emphasise that this research uses the best proxy available to evaluate small shareholder 
turnout, but it remains a proxy. It may be the case that we have a downward bias in our reported 






APPENDIX CHAPTER 2  
A.1. Sample 
TABLE A.1:  
Sample characteristics  
Company Country  
(incorporation) 




Company Country  
(incorporation) 




3i UK Financial Services 8775 FTSE n.a. K+S Germany Chemicals 1353 DAX n.a. 
AB InBev Belgium Food & Beverage 3533 BEL n.a. KBC Groep Belgium Banks 8355 BEL n.a. 
Aberdeen Asset Management UK Equity/Non-Equity Investment 
Instruments 
8985 FTSE n.a. Kenmare Resources Ireland Basic Resources 1775 ISEQ n.a. 
Accor France Travel & Leisure 5753 CAC n.a. Kering (PPR) France Retail 5373 CAC n.a. 
Ackermans & van Haaren Belgium Financial Services 8775 BEL n.a. Kerry Group Ireland Food & Beverage 3577 ISEQ n.a. 
Adidas Germany Personal & Household Goods 3765 DAX n.a. Kingfisher UK Retail 5375 FTSE n.a. 
Admiral Group UK Insurance 8534 FTSE n.a. Kingspan Group Ireland Construction & Materials 2353 ISEQ n.a. 
Aegon Netherlands Insurance 8575 AEX n.a. KPN Netherlands Telecommunications 6535 AEX n.a. 
Aer Lingus Group Ireland Travel & Leisure 5751 ISEQ n.a. Lafarge France Construction & Materials 2353 CAC n.a. 
Ageas – Fortis Belgium Insurance 8575 BEL n.a. Lagardere   France Media 5557 CAC n.a. 
Aggreko UK Industrial Goods & Services 2791 FTSE n.a. Land Securities Group UK Real Estate 8671 FTSE n.a. 
Ahold (merger with Delhaize) Netherlands Retail 5337 AEX n.a. Lanxess Germany Chemicals 1353 DAX n.a. 
Air Liquide France Chemicals 1353 CAC n.a. Legal & General Group UK Insurance 8575 FTSE n.a. 
Airbus Group France Industrial Goods & Services 2713 CAC n.a. Legrand France Industrial Goods & Services 2733 CAC n.a. 
Akzo Nobel Netherlands Chemicals 1357 AEX n.a. Linde Germany Chemicals 1353 DAX n.a. 
Alcatel-lucent France Technology 9582 CAC n.a. Lloyds Banking Group UK Banks 8355 FTSE n.a. 
Allianz Germany Insurance 8532 DAX n.a. London Stock Exchange 
Group 
UK Financial Services 8777 FTSE n.a. 
Allied Irish Banks Ireland Banks 8355 ISEQ n.a. Lonmin Plc UK Basic Resources 1779 FTSE n.a. 
Alstom France Industrial Goods & Services 2757 CAC n.a. L'Oreal  France Personal & Household 
Goods 
3767 CAC n.a. 
Amec UK Oil & Gas 573 FTSE n.a. LVMH France Personal & Household 
Goods 
3763 CAC n.a. 
Andritz  Austria Industrial Goods & Services 2757 ATX n.a. MAN Germany Financial Services 8771 DAX n.a. 
Anglo American UK Basic Resources 1775 FTSE n.a. Marks & Spencer Group UK Retail 5373 FTSE n.a. 
Antofagasta UK Basic Resources 1775 FTSE n.a. Meggitt UK Industrial Goods & Services 2713 FTSE n.a. 
ARM Holdings UK Technology 9576 FTSE n.a. Metro ST Germany Retail 5337 DAX n.a. 
Aryzta Ireland Food & Beverage 3577 ISEQ n.a. Morrison (Wm) Supermarkets UK Retail 5337 FTSE n.a. 
Ashtead Group UK Industrial Goods & Services 2791 FTSE n.a. Muenchener 
Rueckversicherungs 
Germany Insurance 8538 DAX n.a. 
ASML Netherlands Technology 9576 AEX n.a. National Grid UK Utilities 7575 FTSE n.a. 
Associated British Foods UK Food & Beverage 3577 FTSE n.a. Next UK Retail 5371 FTSE n.a. 
AstraZeneca UK Health Care 4577 FTSE n.a. Oesterr. Post Austria Industrial Goods & Services 2771 ATX n.a. 
Aviva UK Insurance 8575 FTSE n.a. Old mutual UK Insurance 8575 FTSE n.a. 
AXA France Insurance 8532 CAC n.a. OMV Austria Oil & Gas 537 ATX n.a. 
Babcock international UK Industrial Goods & Services 2791 FTSE n.a. Paddy Power Ireland Travel & Leisure 5752 ISEQ n.a. 
BAE Systems UK Industrial Goods & Services 2717 FTSE n.a. Pearson UK Media 5557 FTSE n.a. 
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BAM Groep, Koninklijke Netherlands Construction & Materials 2357 AEX n.a. Permanent TSB Group (Irish 
life and permanent) 
Ireland Insurance 8575 ISEQ n.a. 
Bank of Ireland Ireland Banks 8355 ISEQ n.a. Pernod Ricard France Food & Beverage 3535 CAC n.a. 
Barclays UK Banks 8355 FTSE n.a. Persimmon UK Personal & Household 
Goods 
3728 FTSE n.a. 
Barrat Developments UK Personal & Household Goods 3728 FTSE n.a. Petrofac UK Oil & Gas 573 FTSE n.a. 
BASF Germany Chemicals 1353 DAX n.a. Peugeot  France Automobiles & Parts 3353 CAC n.a. 
Bayer Germany Chemicals 1357 DAX n.a. Philips Netherlands Industrial Goods & Services 2727 AEX n.a. 
Befimmo Belgium Real Estate 8671 BEL n.a. Prudential UK Insurance 8575 FTSE n.a. 
Beiersdorf Germany Personal & Household Goods 3767 DAX n.a. Publicis Groupe SA France Media 5555 CAC n.a. 
Bekaert Belgium Industrial Goods & Services 2727 BEL n.a. Raiffeisen Bank Int. Austria Banks 8355 ATX n.a. 
Belgacom (Proximus) Belgium Telecommunications 6535 BEL n.a. Randstad Holding Netherlands Industrial Goods & Services 2793 AEX n.a. 
BG Group UK Oil & Gas 537 FTSE n.a. Reed Elsevier NV (RELX) Netherlands Media 5557 AEX FTSE 
BHP Billiton  UK Basic Resources 1775 FTSE n.a. Reed Elsevier Plc (RELX) UK Media 5557 FTSE AEX 
BMW Germany Automobiles & Parts 3353 DAX n.a. Renault France Automobiles & Parts 3353 CAC n.a. 
BNP Paribas Act A France Banks 8355 CAC n.a. Rexam UK Industrial Goods & Services 2723 FTSE n.a. 
Boskalis Netherlands Construction & Materials 2357 AEX n.a. RHI Austria Industrial Goods & Services 2757 ATX n.a. 
Bouygues France Construction & Materials 2357 CAC n.a. Rio Tinto  UK Basic Resources 1775 FTSE n.a. 
BP UK Oil & Gas 537 FTSE n.a. Rolls-Royce Holdings UK Industrial Goods & Services 2713 FTSE n.a. 
British American Tobacco UK Personal & Household Goods 3785 FTSE n.a. Royal Bank of Scotland Group UK Banks 8355 FTSE n.a. 
British Land Co UK Real Estate 8672 FTSE n.a. Royal Dutch Shell A & B UK Oil & Gas 537 FTSE AEX 
British Sky Broadcasting Group UK Media 5553 FTSE n.a. Royal Imtech Netherlands Industrial Goods & Services 2791 AEX n.a. 
BT Group UK Telecommunications 6535 FTSE n.a. RSA Insurance Group UK Insurance 8532 FTSE n.a. 
Bunzl UK Industrial Goods & Services 2791 FTSE n.a. RWE Germany Utilities 7575 DAX n.a. 
Burberry Group UK Personal & Household Goods 3763 FTSE n.a. Ryanair Ireland Travel & Leisure 5751 ISEQ n.a. 
Bwin.party Digital Entertainment Austria Travel & Leisure 5752 ATX n.a. SABMiller UK Food & Beverage 3533 FTSE n.a. 
C&C Group Ireland Food & Beverage 3535 ISEQ n.a. Safran France Industrial Goods & Services 2713 CAC n.a. 
CA Immobilien Anlagen Austria Real Estate 8633 ATX n.a. Sage group UK Technology 9537 FTSE n.a. 
CAIRN Energy UK Oil & Gas 533 FTSE n.a. Sainsbury (J) UK Retail 5337 FTSE n.a. 
Capita  UK Industrial Goods & Services 2791 FTSE n.a. Salzgitter AG Germany Basic Resources 1757 DAX n.a. 
Carrefour France Retail 5337 CAC n.a. Sanofi Aventis France Health Care 4577 CAC n.a. 
Centrica UK Utilities 7573 FTSE n.a. SAP Germany Technology 9537 DAX n.a. 
Cobham UK Industrial Goods & Services 2713 FTSE n.a. SBM Offshore Netherlands Oil & Gas 573 AEX n.a. 
Cofinimmo Belgium Real Estate 8671 BEL n.a. Schneider Electric France Industrial Goods & Services 2733 CAC n.a. 
Colruyt Belgium Retail 5337 BEL n.a. Schoeller-Bleckmann Austria Oil & Gas 537 ATX n.a. 
Commerzbank Germany Banks 8355 DAX n.a. Schroders UK Financial Services 8771 FTSE n.a. 
Compass  UK Travel & Leisure 5757 FTSE n.a. Semperit AG Holding Austria Industrial Goods & Services 2757 ATX n.a. 
Continental Germany Automobiles & Parts 3357 DAX n.a. Serco Group UK Industrial Goods & Services 2791 FTSE n.a. 
Conwert Immobilien Invest Austria Real Estate 8633 ATX n.a. Severn Trent UK Utilities 7577 FTSE n.a. 
Corio Netherlands Real Estate 8672 AEX n.a. Shire UK Health Care 4577 FTSE n.a. 
Credit Agricole France Banks 8355 CAC n.a. Siemens Germany Industrial Goods & Services 2733 DAX n.a. 
CRH Ireland Construction & Materials 2353 ISEQ FTSE Smith & Nephew UK Health Care 4535 FTSE n.a. 
Croda International UK Chemicals 1357 FTSE n.a. Smiths Group UK Industrial Goods & Services 2727 FTSE n.a. 
Daimler Germany Automobiles & Parts 3353 DAX n.a. Smurfit Kappa Group Ireland Industrial Goods & Services 2723 ISEQ n.a. 
Danone France Food & Beverage 3577 CAC n.a. Societe Generale France Banks 8355 CAC n.a. 
DCC Ireland Industrial Goods & Services 2797 ISEQ n.a. Solvay  Belgium Chemicals 1357 BEL CAC 
Delhaize Groep (merger with Ahold) Belgium Retail 5337 BEL n.a. Sport Direct International UK Retail 5371 FTSE n.a. 
Delta Lloyd Groep Netherlands Insurance 8575 AEX BEL SSE (Scottish and Southern 
Energy) 
UK Utilities 7535 FTSE n.a. 
Deutsche Bank Germany Banks 8355 DAX n.a. St Microelectronics France Technology 9576 CAC n.a. 
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Deutsche Boerse Germany Financial Services 8777 DAX n.a. St. James's Place UK Insurance 8575 FTSE n.a. 
Deutsche Lufthansa Germany Travel & Leisure 5751 DAX n.a. Standard Chartered UK Banks 8355 FTSE n.a. 
Deutsche Post Germany Industrial Goods & Services 2771 DAX n.a. Standard Life UK Insurance 8575 FTSE n.a. 
Deutsche Telekom Germany Telecommunications 6535 DAX n.a. Strabag Austria Construction & Materials 2357 ATX n.a. 
Diageo UK Food & Beverage 3535 FTSE n.a. Tate & Lyle UK Food & Beverage 3577 FTSE n.a. 
D'Ieteren Belgium Retail 5379 BEL n.a. Taylor Wimpey UK Personal & Household 
Goods 
3728 FTSE n.a. 
Dragon Oil Ireland Oil & Gas 533 ISEQ n.a. Technip France Oil & Gas 573 CAC n.a. 
DSM Netherlands Chemicals 1357 AEX n.a. Telekom Austria Austria Telecommunications 6535 ATX n.a. 
E.ON Germany Utilities 7575 DAX n.a. Telenet Group Hold Belgium Media 5553 BEL n.a. 
Easyjet UK Travel & Leisure 5751 FTSE n.a. Tesco UK Retail 5337 FTSE n.a. 
EDF France Utilities 7535 CAC n.a. ThyssenKrupp Germany Industrial Goods & Services 2727 DAX n.a. 
Elia Belgium Utilities 7535 BEL n.a. TNT Netherlands Industrial Goods & Services 2771 AEX n.a. 
Erste Group Bank Austria Banks 8355 ATX n.a. TomTom Netherlands Technology 9578 AEX n.a. 
Essilor Intl  France Health Care 4537 CAC n.a. Total France Oil & Gas 537 CAC n.a. 
Experian UK Industrial Goods & Services 2791 FTSE n.a. Travis Perkins UK Industrial Goods & Services 2797 FTSE n.a. 
FBD Holdings Ireland Insurance 8532 ISEQ n.a. Tui Plc UK Travel & Leisure 5759 FTSE n.a. 
Flughafen Wien AG Austria Travel & Leisure 5751 ATX n.a. Tullow Oil UK Oil & Gas 533 FTSE n.a. 
Fresenius Medical Care AG & CO 
KGaA 
Germany Health Care 4533 DAX n.a. UCB Belgium Health Care 4577 BEL n.a. 
Fresenius SE & CO KGaA Germany Health Care 4533 DAX n.a. Umicore Belgium Chemicals 1357 BEL n.a. 
Fresnillo UK Basic Resources 1779 FTSE n.a. Unibail-Rodamco  France Real Estate 8672 CAC AEX 
Fugro Netherlands Oil & Gas 573 AEX n.a. Unilever NV Netherlands Food & Beverage 3577 AEX FTSE 
G4S UK Industrial Goods & Services 2791 FTSE n.a. Unilever Plc UK Food & Beverage 3577 FTSE AEX 
GBL Belgium Financial Services 8775 BEL n.a. Uniqa Insurance Group AG Austria Insurance 8575 ATX n.a. 
GDF Suez France Utilities 7575 CAC n.a. United Utilities Group UK Utilities 7577 FTSE n.a. 
Gemalto Netherlands Technology 9537 AEX FTSE Valeo France Automobiles & Parts 3355 CAC n.a. 
GKN UK Automobiles & Parts 3355 FTSE n.a. Vallourec  France Industrial Goods & Services 2757 CAC n.a. 
Glanbia Ireland Food & Beverage 3577 ISEQ n.a. Vedanta Resources UK Basic Resources 1775 FTSE n.a. 
GlaxoSmithKline UK Health Care 4577 FTSE n.a. Veolia Environ  France Utilities 7577 CAC n.a. 
Hammerson UK Real Estate 8672 FTSE n.a. Verbund AG Kat. A Austria Utilities 7537 ATX n.a. 
Hargreaves Lansdown UK Financial Services 8771 FTSE n.a. Vienna Insurance Group Austria Insurance 8532 ATX n.a. 
HeidelbergCement Germany Construction & Materials 2353 DAX n.a. Vinci France Construction & Materials 2357 CAC n.a. 
Heineken Netherlands Food & Beverage 3533 AEX n.a. Vivendi France Media 5553 CAC n.a. 
Henkel Germany Personal & Household Goods 3767 DAX n.a. Vodafone Group UK Telecommunications 6575 FTSE n.a. 
HSBC Hldgs  UK Banks 8355 FTSE n.a. Voestalpine Austria Basic Resources 1757 ATX n.a. 
IMI UK Industrial Goods & Services 2757 FTSE n.a. Volkswagen Germany Automobiles & Parts 3353 DAX n.a. 
Immofinanz Austria Real Estate 8633 ATX n.a. Weir Group UK Industrial Goods & Services 2757 FTSE n.a. 
Imperial Tobacco Group UK Personal & Household Goods 3785 FTSE n.a. Wereldhave Netherlands Real Estate 8672 AEX n.a. 
Independent News & Media  Ireland Media 5557 ISEQ n.a. Whitbread UK Travel & Leisure 5757 FTSE n.a. 
Infineon Technologies Germany Technology 9576 DAX n.a. Wienerberger Austria Construction & Materials 2353 ATX n.a. 
ING Group Netherlands Insurance 8575 AEX n.a. William Hill UK Travel & Leisure 5752 FTSE n.a. 
Intercell AG (currently Valvena) Austria Health Care 4573 ATX n.a. Wolseley UK Industrial Goods & Services 2797 FTSE n.a. 
Intercontinental Hotels Group UK Travel & Leisure 5753 FTSE n.a. Wolters Kluwer Netherlands Media 5557 AEX n.a. 
Intertek Group UK Industrial Goods & Services 2791 FTSE n.a. WPP UK Media 5555 FTSE n.a. 
Intu UK Real Estate 8672 FTSE n.a. Xstrata (Glencore xstrata) UK Basic Resources 1775 FTSE n.a. 
ITV UK Media 5553 FTSE n.a. Zumtobel Austria Construction & Materials 2353 ATX n.a. 
Johnson Matthey UK Chemicals 1357 FTSE n.a. 
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A.2. Voting Power Indices 
1. Shareholder Voting Power under Different Ownership Structures.  
To gain more insight into the differences in shareholder voting power, this appendix analyses the 
Banzhaf index for different ownership structures. For example, in an ownership structure where 
there is only one large shareholder holding 20% of the voting rights and 80 other small symmetric 
shareholders that all hold a stake of 1%, the voting power of the large shareholder exceeds 60%; 
in case there are 160 small symmetric shareholders that all hold a stake of 0.5%, the voting power 
of the large shareholder even exceeds 90%. In contrast, if there is another large shareholder that 
holds 18% of the votes and all other small symmetric shareholders each hold 1%, the voting power 
of the large shareholder holding 20% of the votes only amounts to 15%. Similarly, in an ownership 
structure with 200 small shareholder each holding 0.5% of the votes, each small shareholder is 
equally powerful and has a voting power of 0.5%; in contrast, when there is a large shareholder 
holding 20% of the votes and 160 small symmetric shareholders, a small shareholder has only 
0.04% of the voting power.  
The following graph shows the voting power of one large and remaining small shareholders 
when symmetric small shareholders retain 1%, 0.5% and 0.25% of the votes respectively:351 
 
FIGURE A.1:  
Relationship between voting power of a large and small shareholder 
 
 
It follows from graph A.1 that a large shareholder’s voting power already exceeds 50% when he or 
she holds 15% of the voting rights and every other shareholder holds a stake of 0.5%. And when 
holding 25% of the total votes, the large shareholder holds approximately 100% of the voting 
                                                     
351 On the y-axis, the voting power of the large and small shareholder is shown and on the x-axis the 
shareholding of the large shareholder is shown. The quota for the three games is respectively 50.5, 51, and 













































power.352 A large shareholder holding less than 20% of the voting rights may already exercise full 
control when small shareholders only retain stakes of 0.25%.  
However, in a company with two large shareholders, the voting power of a small shareholder 
may be completely different. Figure A.2 below illustrates the relationship between the voting power 
of the largest shareholder, the second largest shareholder and a small symmetric shareholder 
holding 0.5% of the votes. The shareholdings of the first and second largest shareholder amount 
to 50% of the voting rights together (i.e., when the largest shareholder has a voting stake of 35%, 
the second largest shareholder has a voting stake of 15%). It is interesting to see that the Banzhaf 
index assigns a small shareholder a larger voting power when the two largest shareholders are more 
equal. Moreover, when these two shareholders both have a voting stake of 25% of the votes, the 
small symmetric shareholder holding 0.5% of the votes has 0.8% of the voting power.353 
 
FIGURE A.2:   
Voting power of two blockholders and a small shareholder (0.5%) 
 
 
The previous analyses indicate that small shareholder voting power can be lower or higher than 
their actually voting stakes, depending on the ownership structure. Note that whereas we show the 
voting power of a symmetric small shareholder with at least 0.25% of the voting rights, small 
shareholder stakes, and thereby their voting power, can be significantly lower in practice.  
 
 
                                                     
352 Rounded to integers. In this case, the small shareholder holds 0.0018% of the voting power, which is 
approximately zero.  
































2. ‘Amenability’ method of Poulsen, Strand and Thomsen: Two examples 
Consider again an ownership structure where one large shareholder holds 20% of the voting rights 
and 80 small symmetric shareholders that all hold a stake of 1%: 
 
Ownership structure 1:  {q: 1, 2, 3, …, 81}  
= {51: 20, 1, 1, …, 1}. 
 
In this situation, with a quota of 51% and including all shareholders, the voting power of the large 
shareholder is 60.5% according to the Banzhaf index. However, when we do not consider these 
small shareholders holding 1% of the votes, as Poulsen, Strand and Thomsen (2010) propose to 
be the first step in their analysis of amenability, the quota will be 11% and the large shareholder 
will have 100% of the voting power. The first 19 small shareholders that are added cannot affect 
the voting outcome; however, the twentieth small shareholder decreases the voting power of the 
large shareholder by 0.05%. In contrast, the eightieth shareholder, for example, decreases the 
voting power of the large shareholder by 2.7%.354  
Now consider another ownership structure where there are three shareholders, holding 14, 10 
and 6% of the voting rights respectively, and 70 shareholders holding each 1% of the votes: 
 
Ownership structure 2:  {q: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, …, 73}  
= {51: 14, 10, 6, 1, 1, …., 1}. 
 
With a quota of 51% and including all shareholders, the voting power of the largest shareholder is 
16.6%. The other shareholders have a voting power of 9.1 and 6.4% respectively. Without the small 
shareholders, with a quota of 16%, the voting power of each shareholder is one third. When adding 
another small shareholder, the division of voting power among the three largest shareholders 
remains the same. However, when a second small shareholder is added, the game changes: the 
voting power of the largest shareholder increases to 36%, which means that its voting power 
increases with 2.7% (a percentage increase of more than 8%). The voting power of the two small 
shareholders is now 4%, which is higher than their absolute voting stake and is also significantly 
higher than the voting power of the small shareholder in the game where there is only one small 
shareholder added.355  
This example shows that both the voting power of the largest shareholder and of other 
shareholders in the game may influence small shareholder voting power. This is not shown by the 
measure of amenability that Poulsen, Strand and Thomsen (2010) use. Figure A.3 describes the 
effect on the voting power of the largest shareholder and small shareholders when adding one 
additional small shareholder successively in the two situations described above. 
 
 
                                                     
354 The voting power decreases from 63.14 to 60.47%: this is a percentage decrease of more than 4.2%. 
355 In this particular game, the small shareholders and the largest shareholder are together able to form a 
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FIGURE A.3: 
Change in the Voting Power of the Largest Shareholder and small shareholders (y-axis: voting power (%), x-axis: 
amount of small shareholders in the game) 
 
Largest shareholder voting power: 
 
Ownership structure 1    Ownership structure 2 
 
Small shareholder voting power: 
  
Ownership structure 1   Ownership structure 2 
  
Moreover, the average percentage decrease when adding an additional shareholder holding 1% of 
the voting rights is 0.49% in the first ownership structure and 0.72% in the second ownership 
structure. In contrast, the Banzhaf voting power index assigns a voting power of only 0.49% to 
small shareholders holding a 1% stake in the first ownership structure, whereas in the second 
situation the voting power is 0.97%. It may be clear that in the situation with a large shareholder 
that has a stake of 20%, small shareholders would have significantly lower voting power than in 
the second ownership structure situation. It seems that the Banzhaf voting power index for small 
shareholders is more favourable as it better captures these differences than Poulsen, Strand and 
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A.3. Outsider Shareholder Opposition 
 
TABLE A.2. 
Outsider Shareholder Opposition per Country 
Resolution Category Austria Belgium France Germany Ireland Netherlands UK 


























































































n.a. n.a. 1.7 
(5) 






















                                                     
356 Not related to directors.  
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CHAPTER 3 - ‘THE MORE THE MERRIER’: WHAT DRIVES (SMALL) SHAREHOLDER 
ATTENDANCE AT ANNUAL GENERAL MEETINGS? 
 
ABSTRACT 
This chapter investigates which factors contribute to (small) shareholder attendance using a hand-collected panel 
dataset with information about turnout rates, voting behaviour, and ownership structures of companies that are listed 
in seven Member States. We document how ownership concentration positively affects total shareholder turnout, but 
has a negative effect on small shareholder turnout. Voting power also affects small shareholder turnout rates; the 
greater small shareholder voting power, the greater their eagerness to vote. In addition, total and small shareholder 
turnout is higher the more important the meeting agenda. And, small shareholders tend to free-ride on large 
institutional shareholders and corporate insiders, but the magnitude of the free-rider effect is larger for the latter 
category of blockholders. Our results provide some important insights for the debate on shareholder rights and the role 
of the AGM in corporate governance. The results show that, despite the criticism, the AGM still plays an important 
role in small shareholder monitoring. Some topics seem to clearly motivate small shareholders to attend, while others 
are less relevant. Policy makers can stimulate shareholder monitoring by focusing on the factors that are determined 
in this study, but it is important to take into account possible endogeneity issues as well.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There are different ways to investigate the role of AGMs in an empirical analysis. For instance, one 
may evaluate the (voting) behaviour of shareholders in AGMs and ask the question, what drives 
shareholder dissent? This question has been studied by many scholars (e.g., Renneboog and 
Szilagyi, 2013; Belcredi, Bozzi and Di Noia, 2013; Conyon and Sadler, 2010; De Jong, Mertens and 
Roosenboom, 2006). One may also choose to evaluate shareholder turnout rates357 – i.e., which 
factors contribute to shareholder voter turnout? Surprisingly, not many scholars have paid attention 
to the latter question, though turnout rates, rather than voting behaviour, contributes to all three 
theoretical functions of the AGM (cf. supra, introduction and chapter 1). Van der Elst (2011) is one 
of the few that focused his research on shareholder attendance rates. In this chapter, our research 
builds on his framework and evaluates the reasons why shareholders decide to attend AGMs. We 
focus on small shareholders in particular as this group presumably has few incentives to vote (cf. 
supra, introduction and chapter 1).  
 
1.1. Outline of this Chapter 
This chapter begins by considering related research on shareholder voting behaviour. Since turnout 
is not widely discussed in the field of corporate governance, but is in the political economy literature 
base, we discuss some basic theory from this field in section 3 and relate it to (small) shareholder 
turnout. Then, in section 4 we formulate five hypotheses on factors that might contribute to (small) 
shareholder participation in AGMs in Europe. In the fifth section we explain our sample selection 
method and in section 6 we provide information on the variables that we use for our regression 
                                                     
357 In this study, we use the terms ‘to participate’ and ‘to attend’ (or ‘shareholder attendance’ and ‘shareholder 
participation’) as synonyms; both terms include the situations that shareholders either physically attend the 
again, or vote by proxy or by mail.  
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analyses in section 7. Section 7 also includes a discussion of possible robustness concerns. Section 
8 provides conclusions, policy implications and recommendations.  
 
2. RELATED LITERATURE ON SHAREHOLDER VOTING  
Surprisingly few scholars so far have made use of (open) data to study the factors that determine 
voter turnout rates in AGMs. In this section we look into studies that consider shareholder 
behaviour at (European) AGMs. We distinguish three categories of these studies: i) studies that 
(only) study shareholder proposals, ii) studies that study a specific voting item category (in a specific 
country), and iii) (comparative) studies that consider shareholder voting behaviour on management 
and shareholder proposals in general.  
 
2.1. Shareholder Proposals 
As we have seen in our legal analysis, article 6 of the Shareholder Rights Directive provides 
shareholders that (together) cross a particular threshold of share capital (no higher than 5%) with 
the right to put items on the agenda of the general meeting (accompanied by a justification or a 
draft resolution) or to table draft resolutions (article 6). In the US, shareholder proposals usually 
require a lower share capital threshold, but are subject to many rules and are often precatory or 
very costly to initiate. However, although these rules in the US are quite strict, shareholder 
proposals are more common in the US. As a result, shareholder proposals are often studied in the 
US.358 Our descriptive analysis in chapter 2 shows that in Europe, of the over 23,000 agenda items, 
only 106 were shareholder proposals; in the Netherlands and Belgium no shareholder proposals 
were submitted to the AGMs.359 Cziraki, Renneboog and Szilagyi (2010) also study shareholder 
proposals in Europe. The authors use a sample of 290 shareholder proposals submitted in nine 
Member States between 1998 and 2008. They retrieved their data from Manifest and their sample 
includes 40 UK companies and 23 companies in Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Russia and Switzerland.360 They find that shareholder proposals are especially 
infrequent in continental European countries. In line with the findings of Buchanan et al. (2012), 
who compare shareholder proposals in the US and UK, the authors also find that in the UK 
shareholder proposals often relate to board composition, whereas in continental European 
countries it is specific corporate governance issues that are addressed more often. Although 
proposals usually face large shareholder opposition,361 the authors conclude that it can be a valuable 
monitoring device as underperforming companies with low leverage are usually targeted by proxy 
proposals. The authors also find that the probability of a shareholder proposal being put on the 
                                                     
358 A small selection of these studies: Ertimur, Ferri and Stubben (2010); Gillan and Starks (2000, 2007); 
Cotter and Thomas (2007); Karpoff (2001); Thomas and Martin (1998). On may also refer to Harris and 
Raviv (2010): these authors evaluate whether shareholders should have more control of corporate decisions.  
359 However, one needs to take into account that we only studied AGMs.  
360 The authors explain that Manifest contains a total of (only) 720 shareholder proposals in Europe, but 
that the voting outcomes were only reported for 290 proposals. Of the 720 shareholder proposals, 362 were 
submitted in the UK (period 1998-2008) and 358 in continental Europe (period 2005-2008). In contrast, in 
the US 2,792 proposals were submitted in the period 1996-2005. The average number of shareholder 
proposals that are submitted per year is 32.9, 89.5 and 279.2 the UK, continental Europe and the US, 
respectively. Cziraki, Renneboog and Szilagyi (2010), pp. 749-750 (table 2).  
361 The authors find that proposals in the UK were most successful with 30.3% of the votes in favour on 
average; in continental Europe, the average percentages of votes in favour was 21.1%.  
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agenda increases with ownership concentration and the stake of institutional investors. The authors 
also investigate the effect of shareholder proposals on stock prices and find a ‘significant negative 
abnormal return of -1.23%’, which indicates that – according to the authors – ‘the market interprets 
proposals and their failure to pass the shareholder vote as a negative signal of governance concerns’ 
but that ‘the market responds better to proposals submitted against large firms with low leverage’ 
(p. 741). 
 
2.2. Voting Items  
Next we discuss the studies that focus on a particular voting item category. Belcredi, Bozzi and Di 
Noia (2013) studied minority shareholder behaviour regarding board elections in Italy between 
2008 and 2010, using a manually collected dataset from AGM minutes and other data sources. The 
corporate election system in Italy allows minority shareholders to submit alternative slates of 
candidates. The authors find, inter alia, that minority activism in corporate elections is positively 
associated with the number of ‘relevant’362 shareholders (excluding controlling blockholders) but 
negatively with the stake of the ultimate shareholder, the presence of a shareholder agreement and 
the free float.363 Minority shareholders decided to submit a slate of candidates in board elections 
more often in state-owned firms, and less often in family firms, but the authors concluded that 
ownership concentration is more relevant than the type of ultimate shareholder. Cai, Garner and 
Walkling (2009) also studied (uncontested364) director elections. The authors used a sample of 
13,384 director elections at 2,488 US general meetings and investigated the relationship between 
performance (both at the company and director level) and the votes that directors received.365 Cai, 
Garner and Walkling (2009) found that directors generally received many votes in favour. 
Moreover, the authors pointed out that if a director was slated, he or she was elected. The authors 
found mixed results for their hypotheses and concluded that, although lower numbers of votes led 
to reductions in ‘abnormal’ CEO compensation, the number of votes had little impact on the 
outcome of elections, director reputation or firm performance.  
Executive remuneration and say-on-pay resolutions have also been widely studied. For 
instance, Conyon and Sadler (2010) examined the relationship between shareholder dissent and 
executive remuneration and showed that higher executive remuneration leads to more dissent. 
Correa and Lel (2013) investigated the effects of shareholders’ say on pay on CEO compensation, 
the fraction of the top management’s pay that is captured by CEOs, and firm valuation, using a 
sample of 103,000 firm-year observations from 39 countries (from the S&P’s Capital IQ database, 
                                                     
362 The authors defined a relevant shareholder as any shareholder holding more than 2% of the share capital 
in a listed firm.  
363 Free float is defined as the share capital (in percentage) that is held neither by the ultimate owner, nor by 
other relevant shareholders.  
364 Where the number of director candidates is the same as the number of positions. 
365 One may note that director elections in the US are generally organised differently than in Europe. First 
of all, there is a possibility of cumulative voting. Next, Cai, Garner and Walkling explain that under ‘plurality 
elections’ (section 216(1) DGCL) all directors shall be elected with a plurality of the votes. This means that, 
if for example three directors are to be elected and only three are running, directors could be elected with a 
single vote. Under plurality vote rules, shareholder can vote in favour of a director, withhold their vote(s), 
or decide not to vote; shareholders cannot vote against (see also Cai, Garner and Walkling, 2007). In 2006 
the sentence ‘A bylaw amendment adopted by stockholders which specifies the votes that shall be necessary 
for the election of directors shall not be further amended or repealed by the board of directors’ was added 
to section 216 DGCL.  
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CIQ). The authors found, inter alia, that the say-on-pay right corresponded with a lower level of 
CEO compensation and a lower portion of pay received by CEOs. In addition, companies most 
affected by say-on-pay legislation were the ones with poor performance. Ferri and Maber (2013) 
studied say on pay in the UK (FTSE-350 data from Manifest, BoardEx and other databases) and 
found positive stock price reaction at firms, in particular for firms that have high pay without 
performance. The authors also found that significant dissent rates on say-on-pay proposals affected 
executive compensation. Van der Elst and Lafarre (2017) studied say-on-pay proposals in the 
Netherlands. the Netherlands was the first country to introduce a mandatory shareholders’ vote on 
the remuneration policy in 2004. The authors show that in the Netherlands say-on-pay proposals 
are seldom dismissed, but that ‘outsider shareholder opposition’ is substantially higher than total 
shareholder opposition (cf. supra, section 9 of chapter 2). Thomas and Van der Elst (2015) 
conducted a comparative legal study on say on pay (including the US, UK, Australia, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands) and provided some empirical evidence as well. 
The authors found that say-on-pay regulations and their effects varied across nations, but noted 
that there were some general trends. The authors concluded that say on pay was likely to stay in 
corporate governance. Finally, Barontini et al. (2013) studied the impact of reforms on directors’ 
remuneration in the aftermath of the financial crisis. The authors also provided an overview of 
European say-on-pay regulation (table 1 in their study).  
 
2.3. General Studies 
We also consider more general (comparative) studies that study shareholder voting behaviour. First, 
De Jong, Mertens and Roosenboom (2006) studied both voter turnout and shareholder behaviour 
for 54 different Dutch companies at 245 Dutch AGMs in the period 1998-2002. They found that 
the shareholder turnout of Dutch AGMs, for the companies without depository receipts, was 
relatively low at around 30%.  The authors concluded that, although the percentages of votes 
against were typically very small, and moreover, proposals were rarely rejected, the proposals 
regarding increases in capital and exclusions of pre-emption rights usually received the greatest 
opposition. The authors also noted that they found no relationship between ownership 
concentration and shareholder opposition; the same held for financial performance. The overall 
conclusion of De Jong, Mertens and Roosenboom (2006) was that ‘shareholders in the Netherlands 
have hardly any influence on management’.366  
Renneboog and Szilagyi (2013) conducted a large study that examines 42,170 management 
proposals and 329 shareholder proposals submitted to general meetings in 17 European countries 
between 2005 and June 2010, to assess, inter alia, what drives the level of shareholders dissent over 
management proposals.367 They found little dissent over management proposals, with an average 
of 96.3% and median 99.3% for all proposals in all 17 countries. The multivariate analyses368 
                                                     
366 According to the authors, their research provides strong indications that non-Anglo-Saxon countries 
such as the Netherlands differ from Anglo-Saxon countries in that shareholder are much more active in the 
Netherlands, and regulatory initiatives that enhance corporate governance mechanisms should take this into 
account. 
367 Besides this question, the authors also examined why firms were targeted by shareholder proposals and 
what drove the level of voting support attracted by shareholder proposals.  
368 The dependent variable in their models is the percentage of the votes in favour, a variable between zero 
and one. The authors use the logistical transformation ln[votes for/(100-votes for)]. The authors also 
included ‘extensive controls’ in their models, ‘for meeting, proposal, firm and country characteristics’ (p. 
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showed that corporate management recommendations were the biggest drivers in the success of a 
proposal, but, when there was also a shareholder proposal on the agenda or ‘management is 
defeated before’,369 dissent increases. The authors found no relationship between firm performance 
and voting dissent. Interestingly, Renneboog and Szilagyi showed that management proposals were 
generally supported by corporate insiders, affiliate firms, governments and ‘pressure-sensitive’ 
institutional investors, but less successful in large firms with widely held and diverse ownership 
structures, as well as in firms held by ‘pressure-insensitive’ institutional investors.370 Accordingly, 
they concluded that these pressure-insensitive institutional investors, such as investment funds ‘are 
prepared to use their vote to publicly challenge management’. The authors also concluded that 
minority shareholders would become more critical at meetings. In addition to these findings, the 
authors also estimated the effect of country-level regulations that may restrict shareholder turnout, 
such as share blocking and record date restrictions and found that these restrictions lowered 
shareholder dissent over management proposals. In contrast, proxy voting reduced shareholder 
dissent, but the authors presumed this was due to the ultimate owners of the shares not giving 
specific voting instructions.371 These country-level differences have been substantially reduced with 
the introduction of Directive 2007/36/EC, however (for an extensive analysis, one may refer to 
chapter 4 of this research).  
Poulsen, Strand and Thomsen (2010) studied the impact of voting power on shareholder 
activism at Swedish AGMs. The authors investigated whether there was a positive relationship 
between shareholder activism and a measure of the largest shareholder’s sensitivity to increased 
participation by small shareholders. The authors found, inter alia, that the ‘amenability’ to small 
shareholder voting power led to more proposals by the nomination committee, but fewer proposals 
by other shareholders and lower dissent rates (cf. supra, we discussed this amenability method in the 
appendix to chapter 2).  
 
3. TURNOUT IN POLITICAL ELECTIONS 
Whereas the turnout decision is not commonly studied in corporate governance, it is widely 
discussed in a political context. Downs (1957) was one of the first to address the political election 
puzzle in rational choice theory, asking the question why do citizens vote in political elections when the 
marginal effect of their vote is insignificant? In his work, Downs uses the parameter D to describe the 
value of seeing democracy continue (also see Aldrich, 1993); if no one would vote, democracy 
                                                     
339). These controls included country-level differences in shareholder rights that may be relevant for 
participation at shareholder meetings, such as whether shareholders need to have their shares deposited in 
order to attend the meeting (share blocking). Besides, the authors also included the anti-self-dealing index 
(Djankov et al., 2008) and an index composed of several World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, 
in order to capture governance quality at the country level.  
369 The variable ‘management defeated before’ is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a management 
proposal has previously failed or a management-contested shareholder proposal has previously passed, and 
zero otherwise. (Appendix, p. 358 and further).  
370 Renneboog and Szilagyi (2013), p. 348. Pressure-sensitive institutional investors include banks and 
insurance companies and pressure-insensitive institutional investors are pension and labour union funds, 
investment funds and their managements and independent investment advisors (Appendix, the data are 
retrieved from CapitalIQ). 
371 The authors include a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if shareholders may be fully permitted to vote 
by proxy.  
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would fail. In his work, Aldrich (1993) shows the formula that is also used by Riker and Ordeshook 
(1968), building on the theory of Downs (1957); 
 
R = PB + D – C,  
 
where R denotes the revenue, P the probability that one vote will make a difference, B the benefits 
that the preferred candidate wins, D the value that an individual receives from voting regardless of 
the outcome (i.e., similar to Downs’ value of seeing democracy continue) and C the voting costs. 
Aldrich adds that P is larger the closer the election is, but also varies from person to person. This 
P term is the problematic term in rational choice theory, as it should be very small, approximately 
zero, in a large electorate. This indicates that either B must be very large, or D needs to be close or 
equal to C.372  
Aldrich addresses this problem and argues that turnout is a ‘low-cost low-benefit action’ (p. 
261) for many. This explanation implies that small changes in costs and benefits affect the decision 
to vote for many: for him, the decision to vote is made ‘at the margin’ (p. 261). He writes that 
voting costs are generally low: in the US, for example, ballots typically contain more contests, which 
may result in ‘economies of scale’ for voting. The same argument can be made in the case of 
shareholder voting. Other arguments that Aldrich presents are that the costs of voting are generally 
low since voting ‘does not take that long’ and ‘polling places are not that far away’ (p. 261), and 
voting decisions are (partly) based on accidental information reducing voting costs (following 
Downs, 1957). Van der Elst (2011) offers a similar line of reasoning in the corporate law setting: 
shareholders only must approve or reject – or withhold their votes regarding – voting items that 
are prepared company directors, and hence, voting costs may be low.   
Like costs, per Aldrich, benefits are also low. Accordingly, modestly changing either the costs 
or the benefits of voting may have a significant impact on turnout rates. Aldrich’s approach explains 
four characteristics of political turnout rates, which may be relevant for our assessment of 
shareholder voting: i) many variables are related to turnout, but often moderately or weakly; ii) the 
question of who votes is difficult to answer (also see our earlier discussion of the incomplete 
information problem, cf. supra, chapter 2, section 5 and 6); iii) individual decisions to vote are not 
always optimal since it is not worth the effort to examine whether R would indeed be positive, and; 
iv) models suffer from measurement errors, ‘attenuating estimates’ (pp. 264-265).  
The analogue of this theory to (small) shareholder turnout is very relevant to our research. The 
small shareholder base of public companies is certainly not homogenous and consists of, for 
example, institutional shareholders, but also a large variety of private shareholders. When we 
incorporate Aldrich’s equation, R = PB + D – C, it may be the case that small private shareholders 
define the term D differently than institutional investors. Factors influencing D may also differ 
                                                     
372 Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974, 1975), as also described by Aldrich, use a slightly different approach: the 
‘minimax regret model’. This model can be explained as follows: assume that you did not vote and it turns 
out that your preferred candidate could not win by exactly one vote. Then, would you have any regret, and 
if so, how much? In case you abstained from voting, the expected outcome is a tie, which yields a payoff of 
1/2. However, had you exercised your voting right, you would have gained (1 – C). Hence, the amount of 
regret in this situation would be (1 – C) – 1/2 = 1/2 – C. For each action, i.e., vote for the preferred 
candidate or abstain from voting, the maximum amount of regret is calculated for the five aforementioned 
situations. The minimax regret strategy then suggests that one chooses the action that yields the lowest of 




among private shareholders. For example, the D term for the private investor that is quoted by 
Bremmer (2016, cf. supra, introduction chapter) would perhaps include the ambiance of the AGM, 
the food and drinks and the opportunity to have a nice day out. And, his opportunity costs may be 
relatively low compared to other (private) shareholders: in this case, the C term will be relatively 
low and the benefits incorporated in D are relatively large.  
The introduction of the Shareholder Rights Directive (Directive 2007/36/EC) has arguably 
substantially decreased voting costs. In the next chapter we examine whether we can put a causal 
claim on the relationship between the implementation of the Shareholder Rights Directive, and 
thus the fall of voting costs, and the increase in turnout rates. However, before we do this in chapter 
4, in the next sections of this chapter we first focus on the benefits side of the turnout decision (i.e., 




Economic theory explains that if large shareholders are present, small shareholders may have more 
incentives to free-ride on the monitoring efforts of these large shareholders. We therefore expect 
to find the following relationship between ownership structure and voter turnout (following Van 
der Elst, 2011, hypothesis 2b): 
 
Hypothesis 1:  (small) shareholders are less likely to attend the AGM if the ownership 
structure is more concentrated.  
 
The willingness of small shareholders to attend the AGM is likely to decrease when these small 
shareholders have less opportunity to influence decision-making. Their voting power, measured by 
indices such as the Banzhaf index or Shapley-Shubik value (cf. infra, chapter 2, section 6), is not 
only determined by their own voting stake, but also by the complete ownership structure of a 
company. We test whether small shareholders indeed consider their voting power (or, in Aldrich’s 
terms, whether small turnout rates are higher when P is larger):  
 
Hypothesis 2:  the decision of small shareholders to vote is positively related to their voting 
power. 
 
The ‘importance of the meeting’ may also influence voter turnout (Van der Elst, 2011, p. 10). Both 
blockholders and small shareholders may have stronger incentives to attend the AGM if they care 
more about the items on the agenda. High dissent rates may indicate the importance of agenda 
items. Van der Elst concludes that director elections have a significant effect on voter turnout rates. 
Per Van der Schee (2011), the appointment and dismissal of board members are the most important 
shareholder powers. Since ‘the board “controls” the strategy and policies of the firm, “control” 
over the board is crucial’ (Van der Schee, 2011, p. 139). Cools (2011) also explains that ‘[t]he most 
important voting right of shareholders is probably the right to elect and dismiss directors’ (Cools, 
2011, p. 200). The number of director elections may thus have a positive effect on shareholder 
attendance. Conyon and Sadler (2010) demonstrate that shareholders are more likely to vote against 
resolutions related to directors’ pay compared to other types of non-pay related resolutions. 
Moreover, they find that high executive pay packages obtain more votes against.  
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In addition, resolutions linked to the company’s share capital may also affect the interests of 
incumbent shareholders. For example, the authorisation to issue shares in combination with a 
restriction on shareholders’ pre-emptive rights can cause a dilution of the stake of existing 
shareholders. The agenda items with the highest opposition on average are reported in table 2 (cf. 
infra, section 5.2 of this chapter).   
Article 6 the Shareholder Rights Directive allows shareholders that hold (a combined) stake of 
at least 5% to add a proposal to the agenda of the AGM. In cases where an item proposed by a 
shareholder is placed on the agenda, shareholders may have more incentive to attend the AGM as 
the passing (or the dismissal) of such a resolution might be of great importance to them. At the 
very least, these shareholder proposals indicate a form of shareholder activism. 
To summarize, we expect that:  
 
Hypothesis 3:  the importance of the meeting will positively affect (small) shareholder 
voter turnout of at the AGM. 
 
The type of blockholder can influence small shareholder turnout, too. Corporate insiders such as 
families have large incentives to invest in monitoring and small shareholders may choose to free-
ride on these efforts. But, the presence of corporate insiders can also be harmful to small 
shareholders, especially when these shareholders are likely to maximize private benefits. For 
example, Maury and Pajuste (2005) find that families extract more private benefits, and that firm 
value increases when these are monitored by other types of large shareholders. Thus, the presence 
of families or other large corporate insiders that are likely to behave opportunistically may increase 
the incentives for small shareholders to engage in relatively costly monitoring. However, since these 
corporate insiders usually have large stakes in order to be able to exercise (de facto) control, small 
shareholders may not be willing to incur the cost of monitoring (especially when their voting power 
is low), and may instead choose to exit the company. These considerations are summarized in the 
following hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 4a:  Corporate insiders have a positive impact on small shareholder turnout. 
 
Hypothesis 4b:  Corporate insiders have a negative impact on small shareholder turnout, 
especially when their ownership stake is larger. 
 
Expectations about the effect of institutional investors on small shareholder voting are 
inconclusive. In most countries, institutional investors have certain responsibilities to monitor 
management and act as active shareholders. Institutional investors will generally ‘join’ shareholder 
meetings (usually by proxy and with the help of proxy advisors, see Schouten, 2012), in particular 
in the UK, where institutional investors have to exercise their voting rights. Their participation may 
thus increase total and small shareholder turnout. Their presence, however, may actually reduce the 
incentive of other shareholders to monitor, i.e. to vote at the AGM, as i) they are able to free-ride 
on the monitoring effort of these institutional investors, and ii) AGMs become less important as a 





Hypothesis 5a:  Institutional investors have a positive impact on (small) shareholder 
turnout. 
 
Hypothesis 5b:  Institutional investors have a negative impact on (small) shareholder 
turnout. 
 










Ownership concentration + - 
Voting power (small shareholder) ? + 
Voting power (large shareholder) n.a. - 
Importance of the meeting + + 
Corporate insiders n.a. ? 
Institutional investors n.a. ? 
  
For our analyses in the remaining sections of this chapter, we use the same sample of 1,255 
observations (251 companies) as in chapter 2 (cf. supra, table 1 and appendix A.1 of chapter 2).  
 
5. VARIABLES 
The dependent variables in this study are total shareholder turnout and small shareholder turnout 
measures (cf. supra, chapter 2, sections 3-4). Explanatory variables include measures of ownership 
structure, voting power, and meeting importance (cf. supra, chapter 2, sections 5-8). These variables 
are described in the next section.  
 
5.1. DEPENDENT VARIABLES  
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the calculation of total shareholder turnout is rather 
straightforward: 
 
TURNOUT   
= (Total number of votes cast)/(Total amount of votes outstanding) * 100%, 
 
where the total amount of votes outstanding is corrected for treasury shares. Retrieving small 
shareholder turnout rates is more difficult. Due to the incomplete information problem regarding 
AGM attendance, we have developed a proxy to estimate small shareholder turnout rates (cf. supra, 







TURNOUTsmall   
= (Amount of small shareholders present)/(Total amount small shareholders) *100%  
= (TURNOUT – Summed voting block of all blockholders)/(100% – Summed voting block 
of all blockholders) *100% 
 
This formula defines small shareholders as all shareholders with less than 5% of the voting rights 
(i.e., all shareholders not being blockholders).  
 
5.2. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The independent variables considered in this framework have been defined in the previous chapter. 
These variables include ownership and voting power measures, ‘importance of the meeting’ 
measures, types of shareholder measures and control variables. As we have seen in chapter 1, AGM 
agendas substantially differ among Member States. To use them correctly in the regression analysis, 
we developed a framework of different voting item categories in chapter 1 of this research. The 
voting items that may contribute to the importance of the meeting, as found in chapter 2 of this 
research, are described in table 2:   
 
TABLE 2 
Overview of Voting Item Categories 
Resolution Category Mean 
opposition (%)373 
Director (re-)elections  6.6 
Remuneration report 7.5 
Say on Pay (other) 8.0 
Capital increase 8.3 
Waiver of pre-emption rights 6.2 
Amendment to articles  4.2 
Discharge 1.6 
RPT  6.6 
GM 14 days 7.5 
 
These items are only included in the analysis when shareholder opposition is the highest among all 
resolutions during an AGM (in the ‘opposition’ variables, cf. infra, table 3). We also use measures 
that describe the number of directors that are up for (re-)election, the number of voting items on 
the agenda, the number of proposals dismissed per meeting and the number of shareholder 
proposals (see table 3, below for a detailed description per variable).  
We also include control variables in our analyses that provide financial information and firm 
characteristics. We use two financial indicators from DataStream, the Total Return Index and the 
Price Index. The log of the market value for the fourth quarter of the year before the AGM took 
                                                     
373 Discharging directors and amending the articles of association are also considered important (the 
standard deviation of dissent for these resolutions is relatively large, cf. supra, table 13 in chapter 2).   
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place is used as a size measure (data is also retrieved from Datastream). The index a company 
belongs to and the ICB supersector are both considered.374  
An overview of variables is provided in table 3 below. In the appendix of this chapter 
descriptive characteristics of these variables are displayed (table A.1).    
 
TABLE 3 







TURNOUT Calculated as the total voter turnout divided by the total number of votes 
(treasury shares not considered). 
TURNOUTsmall Calculated as the total relative voter turnout minus the summed voting block of 
all blockholders divided by 100% minus the summed voting block of all 
blockholders.  
We consider all reported stakes over 5%.  
 
Concentration and voting power measures 
C1 This is the concentration ratio for the largest shareholder.  
BLOCK This is the concentration ratio for all shareholders with a stake of 5% 
(blockholders), calculated as: 𝐶𝑟𝑥 =  ∑ 𝑠𝑖
𝑥
𝑖=1 , where si ≥ 5%. 
HHI 
 
Calculated as: 𝐻 =  ∑ 𝑠𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1 , considering the stakes of all blockholders and 
where the unknown stake of the small shareholders is ε, which is approximately 
zero. 
R12 This is the ratio of stake of the second largest shareholder divided by the stake 
of the largest shareholder (cf. supra, section 5.1.1 of chapter 2).  
BANZHAFsmall 
 
The Banzhaf index for a small shareholder holding 1% of the votes, calculated 
with the program Ipmmle of Leech. The quorum is set at 51%and all stakes 
rounded to the nearest integer. 
BANZHAFlarge The Banzhaf index for the largest shareholder. 
SHAPLEYsmall The Shapley-Shubik index for a small shareholder holding 1% of the votes, 
calculated using Leech’s Ssmmle program.  
 
‘Importance of the Meeting’ 
Items The number of voting items that shareholders can vote on.  
Elections The number of (supervisory) board members elected or re-elected by the AGM. 
Opposition Highest percentage of no-votes at the AGM. Shareholder proposals and 
countermotions are excluded. Abstentions are excluded.  
Rejections The number of voting items rejected at the AGM. Two variations: shareholder 
proposals and countermotions are excluded.  
                                                     
374 Previous research also considered the impact of social media (Powell and Rapp, 2015; Van der Elst, 2011; 
Nordén and Strand, 2011), but there is a general consensus that external attention is likely to be related to 
the size and prominence of companies (Powell & Rapp, 2015; Van der Elst, 2011). The sector in which 
companies operate can also probably have an effect on media attention. Our sector index and market value 
measures already control for this. 
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dX These dummy variables have a value of 1if shareholders could vote on the voting 
items that are reported in table 2 of this chapter (hence, ‘X’ denotes the agenda 
items as described as described in table 2) 









Dummy variables for the type of largest ultimate shareholder. These dummy 
variables take a value of 1 if the largest shareholder is that specific type of 





The aggregate disclosed voting stake (larger or equal to 1%) of each type of 
ultimate shareholder that is present in the company (larger than or equal to 1% 




SIZE Market value data for the fourth quarter of the year before the AGM took place 
is retrieved from Datastream. The variable is calculated by multiplying the share 
price by the number of ordinary shares in issue. Note that Datastream only 
includes ordinary shares in its market value data.  
Index The index (or indices) of which the company is part of. Companies can be dual 
listed. 
Sector The ICB-supersector category to which the company belongs.  
TI, PI Total Return Index (TI): this shows a theoretical growth in value in millions of 
euro of a shareholding over a specified period, under the assumption that 
dividends are re-invested to purchase additional units of an equity or unit trust 
at the closing price applicable on the ex-dividend date. 
Price Index (PI): The price index expresses the share price as a percentage of its 
value on the base date, adjusted for capital changes. 
 
Table A.2. (Appendix) reports the Pearson correlations between the independent variables. In this 
table, we highlighted all Pearson correlations that are statistically significant at the 5% level and 
have a correlation coefficient of 0.5 or more. One may note, inter alia, a high correlation between 
the ownership concentration and voting power variables, and between some of the type of investor 
variables and the ownership concentration and voting power variables. We take into account these 
findings in constructing our models and the analyses in this chapter.     
 
6. STATISTICAL MODEL 
6.1. Fixed and Random Effects 
We conduct a panel data analysis since our data contains cross-sectional and time series 
dimensions.375  In the words of Cameron and Trivedi (2005), ‘panel data are repeated observations 
                                                     
375 In this study, when we state that the significance level is ‘lower’, we mean that the estimator is less 
significant, i.e., the 0.1% level is the ‘highest’ significance level that is reported in this section.   
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on the same cross section, typically of individuals or firms in microeconomics applications, 
observed for several time periods’ (p. 697). Our repeated observations on the same cross section 
are the 251 listed companies in our sample and the time series dimension consists of five years (T 
= 5). The error term in panel data models is usually described as:376  
  
εit = αi + uit, 
 
where uit is assumed to be homoscedastic and not correlated over time. The term αi is time invariant 
and homoscedastic across individuals. It is often described as unobserved individual characteristics 
(also called unobserved heterogeneity) that do not vary over time.  
Two commonly used panel data models are the fixed effects model and the random effects 
model. The random effects model assumes that xis is independent of εit  ∀ s,t. In other words, the 
observable regressors xit are uncorrelated with the unobservable characteristics in both αi and uit. 
However, in many applications this assumption is considered too strict, and that actually E{xit αi} 
≠ 0.377 The fixed effects model does not require that αi and xit be uncorrelated. Individual-specific 
intercept terms are included in the fixed model (i.e., the ‘fixed effects’) that can be described in the 
following manner:  
  
yit = αi + xit’β + uit, 
 
where αi are fixed unknown constants
378 and uit, the error term, is iid
379 over i and t. To obtain the 
estimator for the fixed effects model, often referred to as the ‘within estimator’ (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2005; Verbeek, 2012), we can transform the data. As Cameron and Trivedi (2005) put it, 
the fixed effects estimator ‘measures the association between individual-specific deviations of 
regressors from their time-averaged values and individual-specific deviations of the dependent 
variable from its time-averaged value’ (p. 703), thereby using the variation in the data over time. 
The within transformation provides us with:   
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖        
= (𝛼𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖) + (𝑥𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖)
′𝛽 + (𝑢𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖)   
=  (𝑥𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖)
′𝛽 + (𝑢𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖),  
 
since the 𝛼𝑖 terms cancel.
380  
                                                     
376 The explanation of the panel data models in this paragraph uses Verbeek’s notations and terms (2012), 
chapter 10.  
377 A common example often used to describe the effect of unobserved individual characteristics is the 
application of wages: a person’s unobserved ability is likely to affect his or her wages (in this case, the 
dependent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡), but will also have an effect on the level of education that is included as one of the 
regressors (𝑥𝑖𝑡).  
378 This implies that the model includes N dummies. Note that the term 𝛽0 is omitted, due to the individual 
intercepts αi.  
379 ‘iid’ means independently and identically distributed over individuals over time. The random effects 
model can be described as yit = β0 + xit’β + αi + uit, where uit is iid over i and t with mean zero and variance 
σu2 and αi is iid across individuals with mean zero and variance σα2. αi and uit need to be ‘mutually’ independent 
and independent of xis (for all i, t).  
380 The average αi does not vary for each individual.  
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This is a regression model in deviations from individual means and does not include the 
unobserved individual characteristics (Verbeek, 2012, p. 377). One should note that in both the 
fixed effects and random effects models the strict exogeneity assumption E{xit uis} = 0 ∀ s,t must 
hold. The random effects model also assumes that αi and xit are uncorrelated, however. The fixed 
effects estimator controls for all time invariant omitted variables (thus, for all that does not vary over 
time) that drive the independent variable. Thus, the fixed effects estimator also controls for 
unobserved or unknown omitted variables, and clearly reduces any possible omitted variable bias. 
As Cameron and Trivedi (2005, p. 715) argue: ‘the fixed effects model has the attraction of allowing 
one to use panel data to establish causation under weaker assumptions’, i.e., E{xit αi} ≠ 0.   
Unfortunately, this model usually obtains higher standard errors because only within-individual 
information is used. In contrast, the random effects estimator also makes use of information 
between observations and thus is a more efficient estimator generally. There is thus a trade-off 
between consistency and efficiency (Allison, 2009). 
To decide whether to use the fixed effects model or random effects model, we conduct a 
Hausman test that compares the fixed effects and random effects estimator. It tests the null 
hypothesis that the unobserved individual characteristics and the explanatory variables are 
uncorrelated (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 717). The null is rejected in all tests and accordingly, 
the fixed effects model is the appropriate model to use in our analysis.381 However, since firms are 
heterogeneous, we do not use a substantial part of the variation in our data when using the fixed 
effects model. Thus, we decided to include the random effects estimators for total turnout rates 
and small turnout rates in the appendix of this chapter (tables A.4 and A.5). Table A.3 in the 
appendix shows that the between variation in the dependent variables is around twice as large as 
the within variation.382 
We test for heteroscedasticity as well. Simply stated, heteroscedasticity arises if different error 
terms do not have identical variances, which causes statistical problems. The tests reveal that there 
is indeed heteroscedasticity in this sample, and hence we use heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
errors in the next analyses.383 Our data also shows that serial correlation is present.384 To control 
for this statistical problem, we use cluster-robust standard errors in our analyses.385  
 
                                                     
381 Analysing the models that are reported in Table 4 and 5 (cf. infra, section 8 of this chapter) shows that the 
correlation between the fixed effects and the explanatory variables, i.e. E{xit αi}, are between -0.23 and -
0.57 for the models with TURNOUTlog as the dependent variable, and between -0.30 and -0.84 for the 
models with TURNOUTsmall as the dependent variable. These results indicate that the fixed effects model 
is the appropriate model.  
382 One may also note that the rho, which denotes the proportion of variance in the dependent variable that 
is attributable to the fixed effects (i.e., intraclass correlation) is rather large in the models that are reported 
in table 4 and 5 (cf. infra, section 7).  
383 This test is the user-written program ‘xttest3’ described as the Modified Wald test for groupwise 
heteroscedasticity in a fixed effect regression model.  
384 Using the user-written xtserial program in STATA. However, note that we have a panel data set with 
short time periods.  
385 We also tested for normality of the residuals. We plotted the distribution of the residuals (command 
‘kdensity’), the standardized normal probability plot (‘pnorm’), and the quantiles of the residuals (‘qnorm’) 
for each model in table 4 and 5 to see whether the residuals are normally distributed (the latter two plots 
show non-normality in the middle and tails of the distribution, respectively).  
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6.2. Transformation of the Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables in our model are total shareholder turnout and small shareholder turnout 
expressed as percentages. For our regression analyses we consider whether a transformation of our 
data would be required. The transformation is important since the predicted values of the 
dependent variables cannot be smaller than 0 or larger than 100%, and the OLS model may 
estimate predictions outside this [0,100] interval. To overcome this problem, we can use the 
following transformation, also employed by Renneboog and Szilagyi (2013): 
 
ln[y/(100 – y)],   
 







For interpretation of the output it is more straightforward to present results without this logit 
transformation. To see whether the problem would be severe in our dataset,386 we look at our 
dependent variables. The variable TURNOUT (in percentage) ranges between [15.22; 99.98], 
whereas the variable TURNOUTsmall (in percentage) ranges between [0; 83.73]. If we take a closer 
look, we can see that only for 46 of the 1,255 observations is TURNOUT larger than or equal to 
90%, whereas only for 49 of the 1,255 observations TURNOUTsmall is smaller than or equal to 
10%. We also predict the turnout rates. The predictions are shown in figure 2 and 3:   
 
                                                     
386 One may note that the problem is severe if the turnout rates are close to the boundaries of the intervals. 







































Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
pr1 1,247 65.59 8.96 29.20 120.10 
 
Figure 2 displays predicted values that are larger than 100% (and skewed to the right): this is the 
case for 14 observations (~ 1% of all observations). Although this problem is only present for a 
small number of observations, these findings indicate that we should use the Renneboog and 





Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
pr2 1,247 49.71 12.15 3.70 76.00 
 
                                                     
387 Using STATA-commands ‘predict pr1’, ‘hist pr1’, ‘sum pr1’ and ‘count if pr1>100’. Figure 2 shows the 
predicted outcomes for the complete fixed effects model.  
388 Using STATA-commands ‘predict pr2’, ‘hist pr2’, ‘sum pr2’ and ‘count if pr2<0’. Figure 3 shows the 
predicted outcomes complete fixed effects model.  
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Figure 3 shows that the variable TURNOUTsmall does not cause any problems. We do not 
perform a linear transformation for this variable. As we have seen in the previous chapter, for 17 
companies, small shareholder turnout was set to zero (cf. infra, chapter two, section 4). In order to 
obtain sound results we conduct the analyses in the next sections with and without these 17 
observations.389  
 
6.3. State Dependency 
Could voter turnout in year t depend on the voter turnout the previous year, thus in year t-1 (i.e., 
that there are dynamic effects)? Consider a linear dynamic panel data model with a lagged 
dependent variable that is described as: 
  
yit = αi + xit’β + γyi,t-1 + uit, 
 
for i = 1, ..., N and t = 2, ...,T, and where it is assumed that uit is iid (0, σ
2
u). Note that the lagged 
variable yi,t-1 will depend on αi, the fixed effects. Hence, the random effects model is inconsistent. 
Moreover, the fixed effects estimator is inconsistent for a fixed amount of time periods as the strict 
exogeneity assumption is violated as well (Verbeek, 2012). As such, when current voter turnout 
rates depend on past ones we cannot use these estimators. Instead, we perform a general method 
of moments (GMM) estimation method that is based on the moment condition that the turnout 
rates of (small) shareholders of two periods in the past are uncorrelated with the difference between 
the error term today and one period in the past (GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond, 1991).390 
For estimating the dynamic model we do not use the log-transformed dependent variables. 
 
                                                     
389 The estimators for the sample without the 17 observations are not displayed in this chapter, but the 
results are similar.  
390 First, we transform the data to obtain the first difference is obtained in order to eliminate the fixed 
effects; 
yit – yi,t-1  
= γ(yi,t-1 – yi,t-2) + (uit – ui,t-1). 
Next, we use the dependent variable of two periods ago (yi,t-2) as our instrument: this instrument is correlated 
with yit – yi,t-1 (relevance condition), but not with uit – ui,t-1 (exclusion restriction) (Verbeek, 2012; Cameron & Trivedi, 
2005). In order for the exclusion restriction to hold, the first-differenced errors should not be auto-
correlated at higher orders (in our case, order two). In order to test for this, we use the post-estimation 
command ‘estat abond’ for the dynamic models that are reported in table 4 and 5 (cf. infra, section 8 of this 
chapter). We cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation in the second order for these 
models. Hence, yi,t-2 satisfies the conditions for an instrumental variable estimator. Based on this moment 
condition that the turnout rates of two periods ago are uncorrelated with the difference between the error 
term today and one period ago, we perform general method of moments estimation using the GMM 
estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991). The authors derive a consistent GMM estimator for the parameters 
of a dynamic panel data model. The stata-command ‘xtabond’ implements this estimator. Also see the Stata 
manual on xtabond, <http://www.stata.com/manuals13/xtxtabond.pdf>. (accessed in March 2015). 
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7. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
7.1. Total Shareholder Voter Turnout 
Table 4 shows the panel data models with total shareholder voter turnout as the dependent 
variable.391 The sector and index variables are fixed effects and hence omitted from the fixed effects 
models. The random effects models are displayed in the appendix to this chapter (table A.3). 
Models 1-4, 6 and 7 consider the full sample and models 5 and 6 take only into account the UK 
companies in our sample. Models 1 and 2 and 5 and 6 are fixed effects models, models 3 and 4 
dynamic models to account for dynamic effects, and models 7 and 8 random effects models that 
include country dummies to account for country-specific effects. In models 1 and 2 and 4-8 the 
dependent variable is the transformed TURNOUT, i.e. TURNOUTlog. In the dynamic models we 
do not use this transformation. All these aforementioned models are displayed to increase the 
transparency of our research: the nature of our data is complex and for some countries we have 
few observations. The results that are shown are robust and valid, but it is important to take the 
sometimes lack of data into account.  
Models 3 and 4 show that the lagged dependent variable is statistically significant at the 5% 
level. From these two models we can conclude that dynamic effects are present in turnout rates. In 
other words, there is state dependency, which implies some level of persistence in total shareholder 
turnout rates: a 1% increase in last year’s total shareholder turnout rate implies an increase in the 
total shareholder turnout rate of the current year between 0.21 and 0.23%.  
Next we discuss the other independent variables. To do so, we consider the static and dynamic 
models. First of all, we consider the ownership concentration variables. We see that ownership 
concentration contributes to shareholder turnout rates in general, in agreement with Van der Elst’s 
findings (2011). The Banzhaf index for the largest shareholder displays a negative effect on total 
shareholder turnout, which is statistically significant in the UK models and in the dynamic models. 
This may indicate that shareholders are less eager to attend the shareholder meeting when the 
largest shareholder has more voting power. Furthermore, the Shapley-Shubik index for small 
shareholders shows a positive effect on turnout rates that is statistically significant in all full sample 
models. From the dynamic models we can learn that the coefficient of the Shapley-Shubik index is 
quite large (around 7%), but one should keep in mind that a 1% increase in the Shapley-Shubik 
index is relatively substantial due to the nature of this variable. To conclude, these findings tell us 
that when ownership concentration is higher, shareholder turnout is higher, but a more unequal 
division of voting power leads to lower shareholder turnout rates.    
The ‘importance of the meeting’ variables also exhibits some noteworthy effects. We can 
confirm that the number of directors that are to be (re-)elected positively contributes to total 
shareholder turnout. However, when we look at the dynamic models, we observe a strong negative 
effect for the dummy that indicates whether directors are to be (re-)elected. This effect is not 
present in the other models. Also, the number of directors that are to be (re-)elected does not 
contribute to shareholder turnout in the dynamic models. These (dynamic) results should therefore 
be addressed with some caution and we do not draw any strong conclusions from them.  The 
                                                     
391 In the second chapter we noted a substantial decrease in German turnout rates in the 2012-2013 period. 
We did not find any reasons for this substantial decrease. We decided to keep the German companies in 
our analyses in this chapter, but in order to provide a robustness check we display the regression results 
without the German companies in table A.7 of the appendix to this chapter (also for small shareholder 
turnout).   
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number of shareholder proposals that are on the agenda negatively influences turnout rates in the 
UK. With respect to the agenda items dummies, we only see a strong positive effect from the 
approval of the remuneration report. Note that this variable is omitted from the UK sub-sample 
models since this agenda item is mandatory in the UK. We tend to conclude that shareholders 
indeed are more likely to join the AGM the greater the importance of the meeting; board (re-
)elections and approval of the remuneration report are considered two of the most important 
agenda items (Conyon and Sadler, 2010; Van der Schee, 2012). Agenda items concerning 
amendments to the articles of association, generally considered important as well, show a negative 
effect for UK companies. We do not observe these effects in the other models. The dummy 
GM14days shows in the full-sample fixed effects models a statistically significant, negative effect, 
which is also present in the random effects models with country dummies. One may note that this 
effect is not present in the models for the UK-sample; we therefore suspect that the negative effect 
is (partly) caused by the Irish companies in the complete sample.  
Regarding the types of shareholders, we can conclude that governmental presence, but also the 
presence of non-financial companies as shareholders, generally contributes to shareholder turnout. 
In the dynamic model (model 3) these effects are not present. Government presence does have a 
positive effect in the UK models either. The effects of other type of shareholder variables are less 
clear, which means that we cannot confirm or reject our hypotheses, but due to incomplete 
information problems, our types of shareholder variables are merely ownership concentration 
measures. We further discuss this problem in the next section and in the appendix to this chapter 
(section 7.2., small shareholder voter turnout, table A.6 of the appendix).   
Lastly, regarding the random effects models (models 7 and 8): Austria is the base country for 
the country dummies in models 7 and 8. We can see that only in Belgium are shareholder turnout 
rates are statistically significantly lower than in Austria. And when a company is situated in the 
Netherlands, Ireland or the UK, its voter turnout significantly increases, ceteris paribus. The 
coefficient for the Netherlands is somewhat larger than the coefficient for the UK, which is 
remarkable.392   
                                                     
392 We also estimated the random effects models using a dummy for the common law family (UK and 
Ireland) instead of the country dummies. These models report similar results, including a statistically 
significant (0.1% level) positive coefficient of 0.549 for the dummy variable that denotes the common law 
family in the complete model (model 7 of table 4, dependent variable: TURNOUTlog).  
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TABLE 4  
Panel Data Analysis Fixed Effects Cluster-Robust Estimator (Total Shareholder Turnout) 
 Full sample fixed effects Full sample dynamic model UK sample fixed effects Full sample random effects 
 Full fixed  
effects model 
Reduced fixed  
effects model 
dynamic Model a  Reduced  
Dynamic model a 
Full fixed  
effects model 





Reduced   
random  
effects model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable TURNOUTlog TURNOUTlog TURNOUT TURNOUT TURNOUTlog TURNOUTlog TURNOUTlog TURNOUTlog 
         
Lagged 
L.TURNOUT   0.207* 0.230*     
   (0.102) (0.0895)     
Ownership concentration 
Concentration1 No effect  No effect  No effect  No effect  
HHI 0.000241* 0.000305*** 0.00506* 0.00782*** 0.000103 0.000177** 0.000381*** 0.000360*** 
 (0.000112) (0.0000764) (0.00229) (0.00142) (0.000108) (0.0000662) (0.000112) (0.0000650) 
BLOCK No effect  No effect  0.00690* 0.00583*   
     (0.00297) (0.00285)   
R12 No effect  No effect  No effect  No effect  
BANZHAFsmall No effect  No effect  -0.361† No effect No effect  
     (0.200)    
BANZHAFlarge No effect  -0.115* -0.0844** -0.00700*** -0.00596** No effect  
   (0.0484) (0.0259) (0.00143) (0.00195)   
SHAPLEYsmall 0.388* 0.540*** 7.063* 6.705† No effect  0.452** 0.578*** 
 (0.150) (0.151) (3.404) (3.442)   (0.159) (0.154) 
Importance of the Meeting 
Elections 0.00711† 0.00713* No effect No effect 0.0110* 0.0159*** 0.00698† 0.00816* 
 (0.00368) (0.00350)   (0.00436) (0.00393) (0.00356) (0.00330) 
Items 0.00362† No effect No effect  No effect  No effect  
 (0.00214)        
Rejections  No effect  No effect  No effect  No effect  
Shareholders No effect  No effect  -0.169*** -0.136** No effect  
     (0.0496) (0.0472)   
Opposition No effect  No effect  No effect  No effect  
dDirector(re-)elect No effect  -1.907* -1.766* No effect  No effect  
   (0.850) (0.801)     
dRemunerationreport 0.286*** 0.304*** 3.799* 3.995** omitted  0.310*** 0.315*** 
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 (0.0703) (0.0714) (1.663) (1.462)   (0.0690) (0.0699) 
dSoPother No effect  No effect  No effect  No effect  
dCapital No effect  No effect  omitted  No effect  
dPreemption No effect  No effect  No effect  No effect  
dDischarge No effect  No effect  omitted  No effect  
dGM14days -0.153† -0.177* No effect  No effect   -0.185* -0.208* 
 (0.0895) (0.0867)     (0.0837) (0.0810) 
dAmendments No effect  No effect  -0.0751** -0.0764** No effect  
      (0.0278)   
dRPT No effect  No effect  omitted  No effect  
Types of Shareholders  
dInsider No effect  No effect  -0.230†  No effect  
     (0.133)    
dInstitutional No effect  No effect  No effect  No effect  
dNonfinancial No effect  No effect  No effect  No effect  
dGovernment  No effect  No effect  No effect  No effect  
%Insider No effect No effect No effect  No effect No effect No effect 0.00843* 
        (0.00375) 
%Institutional 0.00552† No effect No effect  No effect No effect No effect No effect 
 (0.00298)        
%Nonfinancial 0.0173** 0.0152* No effect  0.0566*** 0.0433*** 0.0115* 0.0137*** 
 (0.00636) (0.00597)   (0.0123) (0.00889) (0.00555) (0.00400) 
%Government  0.0224*** 0.0271*** No effect  No effect No effect 0.0202*** 0.0183*** 
 (0.00671) (0.00801)     (0.00562) (0.00494) 
Control Variables  
logSIZE 0.351*** 0.166*** No effect  No effect  0.151**  
 (0.0404) (0.0425)     (0.0546)  
logPI No effect  No effect  No effect  No effect  
logRI No effect  No effect  0.138†  No effect  
     (0.0763)    
Index  omitted  omitted  omitted    
Sector omitted  omitted  omitted  No effect  
dAustria       omitted omitted 
dBelgium       -0.592*** -0.596*** 
       (0.146) (0.132) 
dGermany       No effect No effect 
dFrance       No effect No effect 
dIreland       0.669** 0.565*** 
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       (0.249) (0.166) 
dNetherlands       0.806* 0.865* 
       (0.362) (0.348) 
dUK       0.750** 0.616*** 
       (0.252) (0.167) 
Other information 
_cons -1.613*** -1.867*** No const No const 0.0673 0.892*** -1.906*** -2.024*** 
 (0.367) (0.429)   (0.824) (0.220) (0.444) (0.361) 
N 1246 1248 748 752 503 505 1246 1249 
adj. R2 0.545 0.521   0.292 0.220   
Rho  0.938 0.896   0.886 0.866 0.843 0.833 
Note: the table displays panel data regressions (fixed effects for models 1-2 and 5-6, Arelano-Bond estimator for models 3-4, and random effects for models 6 and 7). 
The dependent variable is either TURNOUT or the logit transformation of total shareholder voter turnout TURNOUTlog, calculated as: ln[%TURNOUT/(100% - 
%TURNOUT)]. logRI is the natural logarithm of the total return index, logPI the natural logarithm of the price index and logSIZE the natural logarithm of market 
value. Cluster-Robust standard errors are in parentheses (robust standard errors for the Arelano-Bond estimators). Rho denotes the proportion of variance in the 
dependent variable attributable to fixed effects (intraclass correlation). ‘No effect’ indicates that the result was not statistically significant at the 10% level, and hence, 
the effect may not be different from 0.  
†p < 0.1,  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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7.2. SMALL SHAREHOLDER VOTER TURNOUT 
Table 5 shows the panel data models for small shareholder voter turnout. Again, we ran fixed 
effects (model 1-2 and 4-5, the latter models with the UK sub-sample), a dynamic model with 
GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (model 3), and random effects with country dummies 
(models 6-7). Table A.5 in the appendix to this chapter has the random effects models and Table 
A.7 the fixed effects models for a sub-sample without German companies. In all seven models 
presented in table 5 the dependent variable is TURNOUTsmall. We also conducted these analyses 
without the 17 observations for which a small shareholder turnout rate of zero was reported (cf. 
supra, chapter 2, nt. 246). The findings (not reported in this research) were similar and thus these 
17 observations did not cause any bias.   
First, we can see from model 3 that the lagged dependent variable does not have any significant 
effect (denoted as ‘no effect’ in table 5). We therefore conclude that there is no state dependency 
involved. For this reason, we do not display the reduced dynamic model in table 5.  
The results in table 5 show that ownership concentration indeed negatively contributes to small 
shareholder turnout. Hence, like the findings of Van der Elst (2011), we can confirm our hypothesis 
that the more concentrated the ownership structure, the less likely small shareholders are to attend 
the AGM.  
Next we discuss the effect of voting power on small shareholder turnout. The voting power of 
the largest shareholder shows a statistically significant negative effect on small shareholder voter 
turnout several models reported in table 5, but not in the reduced fixed effects models for the full 
sample. The other voting power measures, the Shapley-Shubik index for a hypothetical small 
shareholder that holds a voting stake of 1% (SHAPLEYsmall) and the Banzhaf index for a 
hypothetical small shareholder with a 1% voting stake (BANZHAFsmall), seem not to contribute 
to small shareholder turnout rates in the static models. However, SHAPLEYsmall shows a positive 
effect that is statistically significant at the 10% level in the dynamic model. The magnitude of the 
effect is again substantial at almost 12%, but one may note that an increase of 1% in the Shapley-
Shubik index for a small shareholder that holds 1% of the voting rights is relatively substantial. 
From these results we cannot fully confirm our second hypothesis, although there are some 
suggestions that small shareholders take into account voting power. In table 6 we include 
interaction terms to account for the effects of ownership concentration in the type of shareholder 
variables: in these models too we see that SHAPLEYsmall contributes to small shareholder 
turnout. These models suggest that the Shapley-Shubik index for small shareholders has more 
explanatory power than the Banzhaf index for small shareholders (cf. supra, section 6 of chapter 2).  
As for the variables related to the importance of the meeting, the number of directors (re-
)elected during the AGM has a positive effect in the reduced fixed effects model (model 2) at the 
1% significance level, and in the UK sub-sample models, the dynamic model, and the reduced 
random effects model at the 5% level. The number of shareholder proposals has a statistically 
significant negative effect on small shareholder voting in the UK. When we consider at the voting 
item dummies, we see that the remuneration report dummy shows a strong positive effect on small 
shareholder turnout that is statistically significant at the 0.1% level in all models. The dummy 
variable for the agenda item ‘discharge’ shows a positive effect that is statistically significant at the 
10% level in the first fixed effects model for the complete sample. In general, we can conclude that 
small shareholders care most about important agenda items such as the remuneration report and 
director elections. However, it is important to note that we have found that voting items regarding 
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amendments of articles of association negatively influence UK (small) shareholder voter turnout 
(variable ‘Amendments’), but have no explanatory power in the full sample models. One should 
note that we did not distinguish between the different types of amendments. Moreover, some 
companies use several agenda items for different amendments, for instance per article, whereas 
others use only one voting item for amending different articles.   
Regarding the random effects models (models 6 and 7), we note again that only in Belgium are 
small shareholder turnout rates are statistically significantly lower than in Austria. The coefficient 
for the Netherlands is smaller than the coefficient for the UK, in contrast to total shareholder 
turnout (cf. supra, table 4).393 
Lastly, we consider the effect of the different types of shareholders. The variable that denotes 
the magnitude of the aggregate disclosed stake of non-financial companies is statistically significant 
in all models (except for the dynamic one).  The magnitude of the disclosed stake of governments 
also contributes to small shareholder turnout in the fixed effects models for the complete sample.   
 
  
                                                     
393 We estimated the random effects models using a dummy for the common law family (UK and Ireland) 
instead of the country dummies for small shareholder turnout as well. Also these models report similar 
results, including a statistically significant (1% level) positive coefficient of 9.1 for the dummy variable that 
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L.TURNOUTsmall   No effect     
Ownership concentration 
Concentration1 0.750† No effect 0.0472 0.0181  1.109** No effect 
 (0.418)  (0.0312) (0.0123)  (0.339)  
HHI No effect   No effect  -0.00717*  
      (0.00302)  
BLOCK -0.603*** -0.670*** -0.614*** -0.262** -0.301*** -0.543*** -0.454*** 
 (0.0887) (0.0900) (0.106) (0.0871) (0.0702) (0.0849) (0.0739) 
R12 No effect  No effect No effect  No effect  
BANZHAFsmall No effect  No effect No effect  No effect  
BANZHAFlarge -0.179* No effect -0.162* -0.217*** -0.0865* -0.159* No effect 
 (0.0818)  (0.0786) (0.0497) (0.0412) (0.0766)  
SHAPLEYsmall No effect  11.68† No effect  No effect  
   (6.844)     
Importance of the Meeting 
Elections No effect 0.290** 0.298† 0.290* 0.325* No effect 0.2361* 
  (0.103) (0.169) (0.129) (0.1281)  (0.1029) 
Items No effect  No effect No effect  No effect  
Rejections No effect  No effect No effect  No effect  
Shareholder No effect  No effect -3.747** -3.114* No effect  
    (1.304) (1.2040)   
Opposition No effect  No effect No effect  No effect  
dDirector(re-)elect No effect  -2.780* No effect  No effect  
   (1.293)     
dRemunerationreport 10.32*** 10.898*** 7.160** omitted  10.91*** 11.186*** 
 (2.255) (2.2691) (2.760)   (2.405) (2.554) 
dSoPother No effect  No effect No effect  No effect  
dCapital No effect  No effect omitted  No effect  
dPreemption No effect  No effect No effect  No effect  
dDischarge 7.037† No effect No effect omitted  No effect  
 (4.163)       
dGM14days No effect  No effect No effect  -3.311† -3.0105† 
      (2.007) (1.816) 
dAmendments No effect  No effect -2.037* -2.160** No effect  
    (0.803) (0.805)   
dRPT No effect  No effect omitted  No effect  
Types of Shareholders 
dInsider No effect  No effect No effect  No effect  
dInstitutional No effect  No effect No effect  No effect  
dNonfinancial No effect  No effect No effect  No effect  
dGovernment  No effect  No effect No effect  No effect  
%Insider No effect 0.264† No effect No effect No effect No effect  
  (0.155)      
%Institutional No effect No effect No effect No effect No effect No effect  
%Nonfinancial 0.440* 0.477** No effect 1.568*** 0.984*** 0.323* 0.2156** 
 (0.194) (0.181)  (0.264) (0.160) (0.159) (0.06816) 
%Government  0.418† 0.305† No effect No effect No effect No effect   




logSIZE No effect  No effect -3.657† No effect No effect 4.504*** 
    (1.890)   (0.986) 
logPI No effect  No effect No effect  3.788*** -2.302*** 
      (0.859) (0.808) 
logRI No effect  No effect No effect  -1.892**  
      (0.686)  
Index  omitted  Omitted omitted  omitted   
Sector omitted  Omitted omitted  No effect  
Country dummies 
dAustria      omitted omitted 
dBelgium      -23.72*** -23.36*** 
      (3.811) (3.856) 
dGermany      13.97** 13.62*** 
      (5.401) (3.337) 
dFrance      6.155 5.741 
      (3.951) (3.826) 
dIreland      10.53 6.340 
      (6.595) (5.045) 
dNetherlands      10.42* 10.04* 
      (4.098) (4.015) 
dUK      16.81** 12.64** 
      (6.319) (4.479) 
Other information 
_cons 23.05† 44.13*** no const 50.26* 38.22† 12.97 30.01*** 
 (13.89) (7.848)  (25.30) (21.97) (11.01) (4.296) 
N 1231 1254 725 503 502 1246 1247 
adj. R2 0.205 0.204  0.415 0.359   
Rho  0.799 0.785  0.908 0.885 0.556 0.551 
Note: the table reports panel data regressions (fixed effects for models 1-5 and random effects for model 6 
and 7). The dependent variable is TURNOUTsmall. logRI is the natural logarithm of the total return index, 
logPI the natural logarithm of the price index and logSIZE the natural logarithm of market value. Cluster-
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Rho indicates the proportion of variance in the dependent 
variable that is attributable to the fixed effects (intraclass correlation). ‘No effect’ indicates that the result 
was not statistically significant at the 10% level. 
† p < 0.1,  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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The aggregate ownership stake of any shareholder type displays a positive effect on small 
shareholder turnout (insignificant effects are reported in the table, but denoted as ‘no effect’). One 
of our incomplete information problems is that we are only able to identify the aggregate stake of 
a particular type of shareholder whose ownership stake is disclosed (cf. supra, section 5 of chapter 
2) – which is the larger shareholder. Thus, for example, when ownership of corporate insiders is 
rather concentrated, the variable ‘%Insider’ increases. This can imply that this measure rather 
(partly) measures the effect of ownership concentration than the effect of the presence of these 
corporate insiders (also see the Pearson correlations displayed in table A.2, appendix394). This may 
also hold for the other shareholder type variables.  
We add interaction terms that consider both the ownership concentration and the type of 
shareholder to the first and second model that is reported in table 5 (fixed effects models for the 
full sample). These are displayed in the first and second model in table 6. As a robustness test we 
also estimate the interaction terms with the HHI. We find very comparable results (not reported). 
The third model in table 6 displays model 2 of table 5 without the ownership concentration variable 
‘BLOCK’.  
Before we evaluate the effects of the interaction terms and type of shareholder variables, we 
first discuss changes in effects of the other independent variables: in particular, the voting power 
measures. Models 1 and 2 in table 6 show that the negative effect of the Banzhaf index for large 
shareholders has become more significant. The Shapley-Shubik index for small shareholders has 
also become statistically significant at the 5% level in these two models. These results strongly 
suggest that, when ownership is better specified, our second hypothesis can be confirmed. The 
effect of the variable ‘Elections’ has also become statistically significant at the 10% level in the first 
model and even at the 1% level in the second model. These results are in line with our third 
hypothesis.   
 
  
                                                     
394 This table shows that the presence of corporate insiders is positively correlated with ownership 
concentration, whereas the presence of institutional investors is negatively correlated with the ownership 




Panel Data Analysis Small Shareholder Turnout: Models 1 and 2 with Interaction Terms 
 Full model Reduced model Reduced model  
without BLOCK 
 (1) (2) (3) 








BLOCK -0.379*** -0.385***  
 (0.111) (0.111)  
BANZHAFlarge -0.244** -0.157*** No effect 
 (0.0761) (0.0414)  
SHAPLEYsmall 9.980* 9.947* No effect 
 (5.014) (4.781)  
Importance of the Meeting   
Elections 0.201† 0.271** 0.291** 
 (0.110) (0.101) (0.107) 
Types of Shareholders 
%Insider 0.850*** 0.860*** -0.117 
 (0.238) (0.224) (0.165) 
%Institutional 0.312** 0.358** -0.434*** 
 (0.112) (0.109) (0.104) 
%Nonfinancial 1.463*** 1.369*** 0.0379 
 (0.294) (0.294) (0.178) 
%Government  0.522 0.513 -0.0502 
 (0.376) (0.440) (0.168) 
Interaction Terms 
%Insider*BLOCK -0.0126*** -0.0128***  
 (0.00366) (0.00342)  
%Institutional*BLOCK -0.00742* -0.00973**  
 (0.00338) (0.00333)  
%Nonfinancial*BLOCK -0.0192*** -0.0178***  
 (0.00462) (0.00455)  
%Government*BLOCK -0.00768 -0.00875  
 (0.00519) (0.00567)  
Other information 
_cons 31.21* 40.29*** 49.61*** 
 (12.91) (6.017) (8.115) 
N 1247 1254 1254 
adj. R2 0.238 0.243 0.155 
Rho  0.809 0.795 0.779 
Note: the table reports parts of the panel data regressions (fixed effects estimators in all models) that are 
also shown in Table 5, but with interaction terms added. The dependent variable is small shareholder turnout 
(TURNOUTsmall). Cluster-Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Rho indicates the proportion of 
variance in the dependent variable that is attributable to the fixed effects (intraclass correlation). ‘No effect’ 
indicates that the result was not statistically significant at the 10% level. 
† p < 0.1,  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.   
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The aggregate stake of the shareholder types shows positive effects that are statistically significant 
for institutional investors, corporate insiders, and non-financial companies in the fixed effects 
models 1 and 2. The magnitude of the coefficients is also larger. The presence of institutional 
investors clearly contributes to small shareholder turnout, but to a lesser extent than corporate 
insiders and non-financial companies. The variable that represents the aggregate stake of 
governments, %Government, is not statistically significant anymore.  
One may note that the interaction terms all have a negative impact on small shareholder turnout 
rates. This indicates that the presence of these particular types of shareholders positively 
contributes to small shareholder voting, but when ownership concentration is higher, small 
shareholders tend to free-ride and refrain from voting. This is especially so where large corporate 
insiders or non-financial companies are present. Hence, hypothesis 4b is (at least partly) confirmed. 
The results show that ownership concentration partially drives the effect of the type of shareholder 
variables on small shareholder turnout in table 5. For example, the aggregate stake of institutional 
investors an sich has a positive effect on small shareholder turnout – just like the stake of corporate 
insiders, non-financial companies and governments. When we add the interaction terms the 
positive effect of the type of shareholder variables on small shareholder turnout increases 
(confirming hypotheses 4a and 5a).  
The results from model 3 also confirm this result: for this model we ran model 2 of table 5 
without the ownership concentration variable ‘BLOCK’. We see that the shareholder type variables 
now show a negative impact on small shareholder turnout – in this model they rather represent an 
ownership concentration measure. The models that are reported in table A.6 in the appendix show 
less conclusive results for total shareholder turnout (with the ownership concentration variable 
HHI).  
 
7.3. Robustness Concerns 
In our empirical analyses, we used several methodological robustness tests as mentioned above 
(i.e., fixed effects models, random effects models with country dummies, dynamic models and a 
UK sub-sample).395  We further address possible endogeneity concerns. The fixed effects model 
fully controls for fixed omitted variables, but also has the strict exogeneity assumption (cf. supra, section 
6.1).396 Unfortunately, since we do not have an instrument, we cannot test for endogeneity in the 
usual way. We therefore emphasise that endogeneity might be an issue in our models.397 However, 
                                                     
395 Including the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (or ‘Hausman test’) to test for model misspecification. 
Specifically, in a panel data setting, this test helps to choose between a fixed effects or random effects model. 
The null hypothesis contains that the preferred model is random effects and it tests whether the unobserved 
individual characteristics and the explanatory variables are uncorrelated (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). As 
we have seen in section 6.1. of this chapter, the null is rejected in all tests and accordingly, the fixed effects 
model is the appropriate model to use in our analysis (cf. supra, section 6.1.). 
396 One may note that the fixed effects models essentially make use of inside instruments that fulfil the 
relevance condition, i.e., the instrument ?̃?𝑖 = (𝑥𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖) should be correlated with the explanatory variables, 
which is indeed the case, and the exclusion restriction, which means that  ?̃?𝑖 and uit, αi should not be correlated. 
The assumption in the fixed effects model is that all explanatory variables are independent of all uit, i.e., the 
strict exogeneity assumption, which means that the second instrument condition (‘exclusion restriction’) holds by 
assumption in the fixed effects model.  
397 In addition, note that our ownership measures may suffer from measurement errors because of the 
potential incomplete information problems (cf. infra, section 4). Companies may also disclose incorrect 
information. Unfortunately, this concern cannot be easily addressed with standard robustness tests such as 
187 
 
note that Wooldridge’s ‘leads’ approach (2002) shows that the strict exogeneity assumption is likely 
to hold for our key regressors.398   
We also consider the problem of reverse causality. The purpose of our research is to see 
whether there are causal relationships between our dependent and independent variables. In 
general, there are no severe direct reverse causality problems by the nature of our data, except for 
two situations: i) the agenda of the AGM is changed during the meeting,399 and; ii) shareholders 
change their opinion on a particular voting item during the meeting, when the voter turnout rate is 
already known. The first situation is exceptional, and the latter is only relevant for the ‘Opposition’ 
variable which was only marginally significant. Moreover, this only holds for shareholders that are 
physically present at the AGM. We do not implement additional robustness tests for these 
problems.  
  
                                                     
an instrumental variable approach, as the reliability of the data depends on the quality of the information 
disclosed by the companies. 
398 Wooldridge (2002) offers a solution to our problem: we can add a ‘lead’ (p. 285) of the explanatory 
variables to test this strict exogeneity assumption. The coefficients of these lead variabes,  in Wooldridge’s 
example, should be zero. One may note that by adding the lead variables 𝑥𝑖,𝑡+1, we lose the information for 
the year 2014 in our model. The model becomes: 
yit = αi + xit’β + wi,t+1’ + uit , where t = 1,2,3,4 and 𝑤𝑖,𝑡+1 is a subset of 𝑥𝑖,𝑡+1. 
We tested the whether the leads of the following variables are significant for model 2 (reduced fixed effects 
model) of table 4 (cf. supra, section 7.1): HHI, SHAPLEYsmall, Elections, dGM14days %Nonfinancial, 
%Government and SIZE (no lead variables statistical significant, except for the lead variables of dGM14days 
and %Nonfinancial). For model 2 of table 5 (cf. supra, section 7.2): BLOCK, SHAPLEYsmall, Elections, %Insider, 
%Nonfinancial and %Government (no lead variables statistical significant, except for the lead variable of 
%Nonfinancial). Following these ‘leads tests’ of Wooldridge (2002), we can, at least to some extent, conclude 
that the important variables in our analyses generally do not suffer from endogeneity problems. However, 
since we were not able to use an instrumental variable approach, we emphasise that endogeneity might be 
an issue.  




8. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
8.1. Conclusions 
The aim of this part of the research was to evaluate which factors contribute to (small) shareholder 
participation at AGMs in Europe. We explored different factors that may influence these (small) 
shareholder turnout rates, which we divided into different categories; i) ownership concentration 
measures, ii) voting power measures, iii) ‘importance of the meeting’ measures, and iv) type of 
shareholder measures. We found that ownership concentration measures have a positive effect on 
total shareholder turnout rates, but negatively affect small shareholder turnout rates (confirming 
hypothesis 1). When small shareholders have more voting power they are more eager to vote. 
Similarly, when the largest shareholder has more voting power, small shareholders are less likely to 
attend the AGM (confirming hypothesis 2). Surprisingly, the Shapley-Shubik index for small 
shareholders has more explanatory power in our framework than the Banzhaf index (the latter not 
reported). Hence, as discussed in chapter 2, the Shapley-Shubik index probably better reflects small 
shareholder voting power in practice compared to the Banzhaf index. However, one should note 
that the effect of the Shapley-Shubik index was only statistically significant in the fixed effects 
models when the interaction terms with the type of shareholder variables and concentration 
measures were added to the models. Perhaps these voting power indices are not entirely suitable 
for explaining small shareholder voting. For instance, as we have seen, these indices do not consider 
the preferences of shareholders, do not measure voting power a priori and they consider all voting 
outcomes equally likely (cf. supra, chapter 2, section 6.2.1). In chapter 5 of this research we take a 
closer look at this matter. 
We have also seen that shareholders generally consider the meeting agenda, which means that 
our findings at least partly confirm our third hypothesis as well. When the approval of the 
remuneration report is on the agenda, (small) shareholder turnout will be higher. Discharging 
directors also positively affects small shareholder turnout. An explanation may be that small 
shareholders can use these discharge resolutions as a means of expressing their dissatisfaction with 
corporate decision-making (Van der Elst and Lafarre, 2017), and thus these resolutions may 
contribute to the importance of the meeting. The number of director (re-)elections also contributes 
to (small) shareholder turnout. 
In addition, our findings show that small shareholders tend to free-ride on large institutional 
shareholders and corporate insiders. However, the magnitude of the free-rider problem with larger 
institutional investors seems smaller than with larger corporate insiders. Small shareholders 
probably consider their votes to be worth less when the latter are involved.  
To conclude, although the practical role of the AGM is widely criticized nowadays, the results 
of our analysis indicate that at least certain features of the AGM are not meaningless to small 
shareholders at all – even if these shareholders are confronted with the typical continental 
European feature of concentrated ownership – which (partly) counters this criticism. Ownership 
structure and voting power explain small shareholder turnout, but the types of voting items also 
seem to matter. Some voting items, such as adoption of the financial statements, are clearly just 
formalities, while others are clearly relevant to small shareholders, such as remuneration report 
approval. It seems that regardless of whether shareholders can influence decision-making, turnout 
rates are higher when these voting items are on the agenda. This behaviour may indicate that 
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shareholders view the AGM not only as a venue for decision-making, but also as a place to exercise 
information and forum rights.  




Factor Effect on  
TURNOUT 
Effect on  
TURNOUTsmall 
Ownership concentration + - 
Voting power  
(small shareholder) 
+ + (when interaction 
terms are added to the 
models). 
Voting power  
(large shareholder) 
- - 
Importance of the meeting + + 
Corporate insiders n.a. +, but - for larger 
corporate insiders. 




8.2. Discussion and Policy Implications 
Our research provides evidence for Bebchuk’s statement (2005) that AGMs should have more 
powers and that increasing the benefits side of the turnout decision would lead to higher attendance 
rates. To stimulate small shareholder monitoring and increase the relevance of AGMs, (European) 
policy makers may focus on the findings from this study. The research has shown that (small) 
shareholder turnout rises when the benefits of attendance, for instance, because of lower ownership 
concentration or greater voting power or a more important meeting agenda, are higher.  
 
Increasing Small Shareholder Benefits  
There are many tools in corporate governance to raise the benefits of voting to small (outsider) 
shareholders. For instance, as we have seen in the discussion of chapter 2’s results (cf. supra, chapter 
2, section 10.2), the new UK Listing Rules (LR 9.2.2AR jo 9.2.2ER) that provide a separate vote 
for outsider shareholders on the election of independent directors in companies that have a 
controlling shareholder, may increase the benefits of the turnout decision to these (small) 
shareholders. In addition, one may note that director elections drive small shareholder turnout to 
some extent, which means that small shareholders generally care about these voting items. National 
legislators in the other (continental) European Member States may consider adopting a similar rule.   
But there are more options to increase small shareholder benefits. For example, the new Share-
holder Rights Directive introduces a European say on pay that includes approval of the remuner-
ation report. We have seen that this agenda item drives (small) shareholder turnout. In the 2015 
version of the proposed amendments to the Shareholder Rights Directive, the EP proposed that, 
in case of a rejection of the remuneration report when the vote is advisory, the company should, 
‘where necessary, enter into dialogue with the shareholders to identify the reasons for rejection’. In 
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addition, the company should explain in the next remuneration report how the vote of the share-
holders was taken into account. In the adopted version of article 9b by the EP and the Council, 
the requirement to enter into dialogue with the shareholders was deleted. This deleted rule showed 
some similarities with provision E.2.2 in the UKCGC (cf. infra, chapter 5, section 6.2.). With this 
new rule, companies must explain how they intend to engage with concerned shareholders when a 
significant proportions of the votes are against a particular resolution. These rules may increase the 
opportunities for (outsider) shareholders to voice their concerns and may contribute to their per-
ceived benefits. This is in line with our findings that small shareholders may view the AGM not 
only as a venue for decision-making, but also as a place to exercise information and forum rights 
(cf. supra, see discussion above). However, especially in case of UK’s provision E.2.2, it remains 
unclear how companies should engage with their shareholders, especially since the identity of small 
shareholders is often unknown.  
 
Further Research 
This study is one of the first to analyse shareholder turnout and it opens the door for future 
research. We recommend further analysis of the factors that contribute to (small) shareholder 
turnout. For example, as we have seen in the introduction, decision-making is only one of the three 
AGM functions. To see whether and to what extent the forum and information function are 
fulfilled in practice, AGM meeting documents may be analysed; accordingly, in chapter 6 of this 
research we analyse Dutch meeting documents. In addition, one should note that we only took 
into account the companies that are included in the main indices of the seven European countries 
and that our results may not hold for medium-sized and smaller firms in these countries. Further 
country-level analyses may lead to more generalizable results.   
We have found that voting items on amendments to articles of association negatively influences 
UK (small) shareholder voter turnout, but have no explanatory power in the full sample models. 
One should note that we did not consider the content of these amendments. Further analysis in 
this respect may contribute to the understanding of shareholder behaviour. Regarding the effect of 
the types of shareholders on (small) shareholder turnout, an analysis of a larger sample of, for 
example, only German companies could be fruitful, since these companies usually disclose the 
complete (grouped) stake of the different types of shareholders in their annual reports. In addition, 
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median sd min max 
TURNOUT 65.6 67.6 14.8 15.22 99.99 
TURNOUTsmall 49.7 54.3 18.1 9 83.73 
C1 22.6 12.8 20.5 0 99.8 
BLOCK 28.7 22.2 21.9 0 99.8 
HHI 987.3 227.3 1537.5 0 9960 
R12 47.5 49.0 33.1 1 100 
BANZHAFsmall 0.67 0.96 0.44 0 1.70 
BANZHAFlarge 41.0 16.0 40.1 1 100 
SHAPLEYsmall 0.78 0.97 0.36 0 1.2 
Items 12.9 12 5.7 2 59 
Elections 6.1 6 4.5 0 21 
Opposition 14.6 10.8 13.3 0 89.9 
Rejections 0.1 0 0.3 0 4 
Shareholders 0.1 0 0.5 0 8 
dDirector(re-)elect 0.9 1 0.3 0 1 
dRemunerationreport 0.5 1 0.5 0 1 
dSoPother 0.4 0 0.5 0 1 
dCapital 0.7 1 0.4 0 1 
dPreemption 0.7 1 0.5 0 1 
dDischarge 0.4 1 0.5 0 1 
dRPT 0.0 0 0.2 0 1 
dGM14days 0.4 0 0.5 0 1 
dAmendments 0.3 0 0.5 0 1 
%Insider 11.1 0 20.5 0 91.1 
%Institutional 12.4 10.9 10.7 0 53.1 
%Nonfinancial 3.2 0 11.3 0 77.1 
%Government 4.8 0 14.7 0 99.8 
dInsider 0.3 0 0.4 0 1 
dInstitutional 0.5 1 0.5 0 1 
dNonfinancial 0.1 0 0.3 0 1 
dGovernment 0.1 0 0.3 0 1 
logSIZE (1250 observations) 8.8 8.8 1.3 3.4 12.0 
logTI (1251 observations) 7.6 7.6 2.4 -1.8 13.8 
logPI (1248 obervations) 6.7 6.7 1.9 -0.1 12.3 
Note: the table reports descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables that are used in 














































































































              
                  
  
HHI 0.9566* 1.0000 
             
   
0.0000 
              
  
BLOCK 0.9346* 0.8853* 1.0000 
            
   
0.0000 0.0000 
             
  
R12 -0.7445* -0.6089* -0.6092* 1.0000 
           
   
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
            
  
BANZHAFsmall -0.8670* -0.7564* -0.7420* 0.8089* 1.0000 
          
   
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
           
  
BANZHAFlarge 0.8995* 0.8214* 0.7575* 0.8214* -0.9745* 1.0000 
         
   
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
          
  
SHAPLEYsmall -0.9244* -0.8245* -0.8870* 0.6665* 0.8279* -0.8159* 1.0000 
        
   
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
         
  
Elections -0.1770* -0.1448* -0.1422* 0.2250* 0.2359* -0.2323* 0.1445* 1.0000 
       
   
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
        
  
Opposition -0.1464* -0.1246* -0.1750* 0.0598* 0.1254* -0.1009* 0.1599* 0.0593* 1.0000 
      
   
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0343 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0357 
       
  
Rejections  0.0405 0.0211 0.0692* -0.0261 -0.0084 0.0453 0.0051 -0.0100 0.5058* 1.0000 
     
   
0.1515 0.4562 0.0141 0.3553 0.7653 0.1090 0.8571 0.7236 0.0000 
      
  
Shareholders -0.0048 0.0068 -0.0030 -0.0134 0.0253 -0.0113 0.0318 0.0089 0.0555* -0.0218 1.0000 
    
   
0.8659 0.8099 0.9162 0.6353 0.3704 0.6880 0.2601 0.7526 0.0495 0.4395 
     
  
Items -0.2011* -0.1833* -0.1971* 0.1781* 0.2258* -0.2236* 0.1801* 0.3832* 0.1950* 0.0326 0.0466 1.0000 
   
   
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2486 0.0989 
    
  
dDirector(re-)elect -0.0917* -0.0790* -0.0787* 0.1319* 0.1183* -0.1183* 0.0490 0.4659* 0.0854* -0.0058 -0.0166 0.2428* 1.0000 
  
   
0.0011 0.0051 0.0053 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0827 0.0000 0.0025 0.8375 0.5561 0.0000 
   
  
dRemunerationreport -0.1970* -0.1549* -0.1622* 0.2683* 0.2512* -0.2614* 0.1567* 0.6091* -0.0331 -0.0068 -0.1257* 0.2926* 0.3266* 1.0000 
 
   
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2409 0.8097 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  
  
dSoPother 0.0355 -0.0006 0.0050 -0.1267* -0.0816* 0.0927* -0.0139 -0.2142* 0.1277* 0.0017 0.0939* 0.0195 -0.0983* -0.4084* 1.0000    
0.2093 0.9817 0.8587 0.0000 0.0038 0.0010 0.6237 0.0000 0.0000 0.9526 0.0009 0.4906 0.0005 0.0000 
 
  
dCapital -0.2825* -0.2462* -0.2362* 0.2915* 0.2944* -0.3059* 0.2384* 0.3652* 0.1883* 0.0665* -0.0433 0.4750* 0.1897* 0.3578* -0.0566* 1.0000   
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0185 0.1248 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0450   
dPreemption -0.2140* -0.1894* -0.1739* 0.2302* 0.2257* -0.2242* 0.1955* 0.3119* 0.1559* 0.0612* -0.0367 0.4015* 0.1429* 0.2393* -0.0339 0.7530* 1.0000  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0301 0.1942 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2302 0.0000  
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dDischarge 0.2374* 0.1711* 0.1909* -0.3154* -0.3505* 0.3409* -0.2346* -0.5841* -0.1406* -0.0185 -0.0024 -0.5293* -0.3617* -0.6129* 0.2031* -0.4947* -0.3578*  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5130 0.9330 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
dGM14days -0.2354* -0.1944* -0.1834* 0.3062* 0.2812* -0.2900* 0.2039* 0.5887* -0.0520 -0.0113 -0.1115* 0.3409* 0.2941* 0.7933* -0.3502* 0.4566* 0.3260*  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0655 0.6900 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
dAmendments 0.0381 0.0349 0.0378 -0.0410 -0.0198 0.0393 -0.0070 -0.1773* 0.0668* 0.0934* 0.0356 0.0248 -0.1253* -0.1826* 0.0546 0.0054 0.0173  
0.1777 0.2166 0.1811 0.1468 0.4829 0.1642 0.8043 0.0000 0.0180 0.0009 0.2081 0.3809 0.0000 0.0000 0.0531 0.8481 0.5412 
dRPT -0.0377 -0.0342 -0.0183 0.0634* 0.0905* -0.0559* 0.0556* -0.0428 0.2301* 0.0322 0.1194* 0.1918* 0.0144 -0.1990* 0.1965* 0.0084 0.0178  
0.1817 0.2258 0.5165 0.0248 0.0013 0.0478 0.0488 0.1295 0.0000 0.2540 0.0000 0.0000 0.6102 0.0000 0.0000 0.7655 0.5281 
dInsider 0.4585* 0.3713* 0.4295* -0.4417* -0.4660* 0.4946* -0.4246* -0.1496* 0.0676* 0.0979* 0.0771* -0.0656* 0.0065 -0.2459* 0.1557* -0.1061* -0.0704*  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0167 0.0005 0.0063 0.0201 0.8167 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0126 
dInstitutional -0.6718* -0.5600* -0.6645* 0.5999* 0.6440* -0.7076* 0.5696* 0.2405* -0.0337 -0.0872* -0.0904* 0.1635* 0.0938* 0.3301* -0.1785* 0.2733* 0.1822*  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2331 0.0020 0.0013 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
dNonfinancial 0.1841* 0.1372* 0.2003* -0.1557* -0.1826* 0.2045* -0.1432* -0.0497 0.0568* 0.0129 -0.0386 -0.0494 -0.0465 -0.0398 -0.0108 -0.1165* -0.1053*  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0785 0.0443 0.6482 0.1717 0.0804 0.0997 0.1592 0.7031 0.0000 0.0002 
dGovernment  0.2512* 0.2378* 0.2561* -0.1949* -0.2034* 0.2405* -0.1714* -0.0818* -0.0915* -0.0178 0.0839* -0.0693* -0.1319* -0.1095* 0.0612* -0.1448* -0.0748*  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0038 0.0012 0.5277 0.0029 0.0141 0.0000 0.0001 0.0301 0.0000 0.0080 
%Insider 0.6594* 0.5972* 0.6180* -0.4888* -0.5875* 0.6136* -0.6578* -0.1300* -0.0534 0.0564* -0.0019 -0.0953* 0.0003 -0.2230* 0.0967* -0.1161* -0.0858*  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0585 0.0457 0.9471 0.0007 0.9917 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 0.0023 
%Institutional -0.4486* -0.4200* -0.2968* 0.4483* 0.4623* -0.4633* 0.4529* 0.2439* -0.0214 -0.0710* -0.0974* 0.1260* 0.1332* 0.3839* -0.2519* 0.2563* 0.1924*  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4493 0.0119 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
%Nonfinancial 0.2709* 0.2339* 0.2828* -0.1893* -0.2446* 0.2593* -0.2363* -0.0508 0.0287 0.0260 -0.0264 -0.0584* -0.0615* -0.0394 -0.0261 -0.1458* -0.1163*  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0722 0.3094 0.3565 0.3505 0.0388 0.0294 0.1632 0.3550 0.0000 0.0000 
%Government  0.4134* 0.4644* 0.4158* -0.2325* -0.2926* 0.3188* -0.3262* -0.0997* -0.1162* 0.0397 0.0773* -0.1020* -0.1188* -0.0925* 0.0261 -0.1752* -0.1241*  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.1596 0.0062 0.0003 0.0000 0.0010 0.3547 0.0000 0.0000 
logSIZE -0.0596* -0.0334 -0.1274* 0.0261 0.0427 -0.0686* 0.0145 0.1568* 0.0232 -0.0724* 0.1317* 0.2469* 0.0271 -0.0904* 0.0978* 0.1122* 0.1649*  
0.0351 0.2375 0.0000 0.3568 0.1317 0.0153 0.6087 0.0000 0.4117 0.0104 0.0000 0.0000 0.3390 0.0014 0.0005 0.0001 0.0000 
logPI -0.2225* -0.2150* -0.2030* 0.2141* 0.2150* -0.2288* 0.1614* 0.2622* 0.0197 -0.0828* -0.0097 0.2026* 0.1400* 0.2700* -0.0982* 0.2208* 0.1293*  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4861 0.0034 0.7317 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 
logRI -0.2529* -0.2284* -0.2412* 0.2595* 0.2487* -0.2657* 0.1958* 0.2751* 0.0123 -0.0951* 0.0144 0.2213* 0.1603* 0.2653* -0.1033* 0.2166* 0.1360*  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6642 0.0008 0.6119 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 
Index  -0.2172* -0.1596* -0.1875* 0.2557* 0.2862* -0.2878* 0.2083* 0.5394* -0.0039 0.0246 0.0036 0.2925* 0.2047* 0.6764* -0.3314* 0.3266* 0.2485*  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8897 0.3835 0.8973 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Sector -0.0909* -0.0883* -0.1027* 0.0611* 0.0640* -0.0762* 0.0534 -0.0166 0.0644* 0.0903* -0.0169 0.0149 -0.0030 0.0658* -0.0344 0.0095 0.0356  




































































































                
 
                 
dGM14days -0.6631* 1.0000 
               
 0.0000 
                
dAmendments 0.0923* -0.1348* 1.0000 
              
 0.0011 0.0000 
               
dRPT -0.1579* -0.1680* 0.0616* 1.0000 
             
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0290 
              
dInsider 0.1780* -0.2666* 0.0492 0.1005* 1.0000 
            
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0815 0.0004 
             
dInstitutional -0.2554* 0.3527* -0.0794* -0.0756* -0.6185* 1.0000 
           
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0049 0.0074 0.0000 
            
dNonfinancial 0.0275 -0.0931* -0.0125 0.0148 -0.1702* -0.2976* 1.0000 
          
 0.3307 0.0010 0.6576 0.6004 0.0000 0.0000 
           
dGovernment  0.0682* -0.0863* 0.0584* -0.0115 -0.2108* -0.3685* -0.1014* 1.0000 
         
 0.0156 0.0022 0.0385 0.6845 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 
          
%Insider 0.2101* -0.2333* 0.0386 0.0538 0.8190* -0.5321* -0.1473* -0.1586* 1.0000 
        
 0.0000 0.0000 0.1713 0.0570 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
         
%Institutional -0.3126* 0.4214* -0.0706* -0.1038* -0.4310* 0.6230* -0.0955* -0.2592* -0.4324* 1.0000 
       
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0124 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 
        
%Nonfinancial 0.0639* -0.0957* -0.0180 0.0210 -0.1505* -0.2720* 0.8779* -0.0674* -0.1393* -0.1282* 1.0000 
      
 0.0236 0.0007 0.5236 0.4569 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0169 0.0000 0.0000 
       
%Government  0.0381 -0.1026* 0.0603* -0.0227 -0.1486* -0.3138* -0.0913* 0.8149* -0.1166* -0.2834* -0.0620* 1.0000 
     
 0.1777 0.0003 0.0327 0.4210 0.0000 0.0000 0.0012 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0281 
      
logSIZE -0.0831* -0.0960* -0.0030 0.1160* 0.0077 -0.0212 0.0019 0.1219* -0.0232 -0.1794* 0.0163 0.0596* 1.0000 
    
 0.0033 0.0007 0.9164 0.0000 0.7864 0.4550 0.9464 0.0000 0.4127 0.0000 0.5645 0.0350 
     
logPI -0.2759* 0.2964* -0.1084* 0.0296 -0.0193 0.1957* -0.0423 -0.1942* -0.0365 0.1476* -0.0553 -0.2445* 0.2946* 1.0000 
   
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.2961 0.4953 0.0000 0.1354 0.0000 0.1975 0.0000 0.0508 0.0000 0.0000 
    
logRI -0.2901* 0.2923* -0.1177* 0.0441 -0.0788* 0.2164* -0.0428 -0.1550* -0.0936* 0.1503* -0.0680* -0.2052* 0.3131* 0.9448* 1.0000 
  
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1186 0.0053 0.0000 0.1299 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0161 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
   
Index  -0.6956* 0.6989* -0.0676* -0.0650* -0.2539* 0.2583* -0.0394 0.0050 -0.2633* 0.3228* -0.0460 -0.0011 0.0969* 0.2421* 0.2309* 1.0000 
 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0166 0.0212 0.0000 0.0000 0.1634 0.8608 0.0000 0.0000 0.1033 0.9685 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 
  
Sector -0.0371 0.0578* 0.0004 -0.0687* -0.0770* 0.1102* -0.0582* -0.0212 -0.1029* 0.0164 -0.0520 0.0227 -0.1096* -0.0609* -0.0840* -0.0339 1.0000 
 0.1891 0.0405 0.9895 0.0150 0.0063 0.0001 0.0393 0.4535 0.0003 0.5611 0.0658 0.4207 0.0001 0.0313 0.0029 0.2307 
 
Note: the tables report the Pearson correlations of the independent variables that are used in the regression framework of this chapter. Significant levels are indicated 
as well (second row per variable). * p < 0.05. We highlighted all Pearson correlations that are statistically significant at the 5% level and have a correlation coefficient 
of 0.5 or more. One may note, inter alia, a high correlation between the ownership concentration and voting power variables, and between some of the type of investor 




A.2. Random Effects 
In this section we report the random effects estimators for TURNOUT and TURNOUTsmall. 




Panel Data Analysis Random Effects Cluster-Robust Estimator (Total Shareholder Turnout) 
Dependent variable Standard deviation 
TURNOUT Overall 14.78 
 Between 13.6 
 Within 5.8 
TURNOUTsmall Overall 18.14 
 Between 16.11 
 Within 8.39 
 






Panel Data Analysis Random Effects Cluster-Robust Estimator (Total Shareholder Turnout) 
 Full sample random effects UK sample random effects 




Full random  
effects model 
Reduced random  
effects model 













Concentration1 No effect  No effect  
HHI 0.000432*** 0.000390*** No effect 0.000191*** 
 (0.000111) (0.0000653)  (0.0000514) 
BLOCK No effect  0.00906*** 0.00839** 
   (0.00261) (0.00258) 
R12 No effect  No effect  
BANZHAFsmall No effect  No effect No effect 
BANZHAFlarge No effect  -0.00693*** -0.00473** 
   (0.00140) (0.00181) 
SHAPLEYsmall 0.465** 0.631*** No effect  
 (0.164) (0.163)   
 
Importance of the Meeting 
Elections 0.00878* 0.00969** 0.0114** 0.0193*** 
 (0.00358) (0.00338) (0.00393) (0.00409) 
Items No effect No effect No effect  
Rejections  No effect  No effect  
Shareholders No effect  -0.118* -0.160* 
   (0.0571) (0.0661) 
Opposition No effect  No effect  
dDirector(re-)elect No effect  No effect  
dRemunerationreport 0.338*** 0.350*** omitted  
 (0.0642) (0.0630)   
dSoPother No effect  No effect  
dCapital No effect  omitted  
dPreemption No effect  No effect  
dDischarge No effect  omitted  
dGM14days No effect No effect No effect   
dAmendments No effect  -0.0861**  
   (0.0269)  
dRPT No effect  No effect  
 
Types of Shareholders 
dInsider No effect  -0.3041†  
   (0.15675)  
dInstitutional No effect  No effect  
dNonfinancial No effect  No effect  
dGovernment  No effect  No effect  
%Insider No effect No effect No effect No effect 
%Institutional No effect 0.00452† No effect No effect 
  (0.00252)   
%Nonfinancial No effect 0.00949* 0.0183** 0.0144*** 
  (0.00403) (0.00562) (0.00430) 
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%Government  0.0200*** 0.0172*** No effect No effect 
 (0.00563) (0.00492)   
 
Control variables 
logSIZE 0.149** 0.138*** -0.0517*  
 (0.0508) (0.0337) (0.0252)  
logPI No effect  No effect  
logRI No effect  0.138†  
   (0.0763)  
Index  No effect  No effect 0.101* 
    (0.0458) 
Sector No effect  No effect No effect 
 
Other information 
_cons -1.408** -1.818*** 0 0 
 (0.455) (0.359) (.) (.) 
N 1246 1248 503 503 
R2 overall 0.383 0.365 0.625 0.572 
Rho  0.855 0.858 0.701 0.704 
Note: the table reports random effects panel data regressions. The dependent variable is the logit 
transformation of total shareholder voter turnout TURNOUTlog, calculated as: ln[%TURNOUT/(100% - 
%TURNOUT)]. logRI is the natural logarithm of the total return index, logPI the natural logarithm of the 
price index and logSIZE the natural logarithm of market value. Cluster-Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. ‘No effect’ indicates that the result was not statistically significant at the 10% level. 






Panel Data Analysis Random Effects Cluster-Robust Estimator (Small Shareholder Turnout) 
 Full sample random effects UK sample random effects 










 (1) (2) (4) (5) 










Concentration1 0.887** 0.775** No effect  
 (0.343) (0.272)   
HHI -0.00525† -0.00471† No effect  
 (0.00304) (0.00258)   
BLOCK -0.517*** -0.569*** -0.207** -0.208* 
 (0.0833) (0.0911) (0.0744) (0.0828) 
R12 No effect  No effect  
BANZHAFsmall No effect  No effect  
BANZHAFlarge -0.133† -0.119* -0.211*** No effect 
 (0.0716) (0.0500) (0.0578)  
SHAPLEYsmall 8.157† 8.080† No effect  
 (4.855) (4.731)   
 
Importance of the Meeting 
Elections 0.204† 0.305** 0.304** 0.336** 
 (0.109) (0.0973) (0.114) (0.114) 
Items No effect  No effect  
Rejections No effect  No effect  
Shareholder No effect  -2.714† -3.162* 
   (1.499) (1.338) 
Opposition No effect  No effect  
dDirector(re-)elect No effect  No effect  
dRemunerationreport 8.171*** 8.975*** omitted  
 (1.985) (1.813)   
dSoPother No effect  No effect  
dCapital No effect  omitted  
dPreemption No effect  No effect  
dDischarge -7.551** -9.045*** omitted  
 (2.880) (2.479)   
dGM14days No effect  No effect  
dAmendments No effect  -2.358** -2.426** 
   (0.773) (0.784) 
dRPT No effect  No effect  
dInsider No effect  No effect -8.553*** 
    (2.471) 
 
Types of Shareholders 
dInstitutional No effect  No effect  
dNonfinancial No effect  No effect  
dGovernment  -0.220†  No effect  
 (0.120)    
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%Insider No effect 0.204 No effect 0.272* 
  (0.129)  (0.127) 
%Institutional No effect  -0.179† No effect 
   (0.0998)  
%Nonfinancial No effect 0.292* 0.458* 0.450*** 
  (0.139) (0.182) (0.111) 
%Government  No effect  No effect No effect 
 
Control variables 
logSIZE No effect  -1.583* No effect 
   (0.703)  
logPI 3.429***  1.927†  
 (0.910)  (1.125)  
logRI -1.761**  No effect  
 (0.670)    
Index  No effect    
Sector No effect  No effect  
 
Other information 
_cons 19.73† 44.56*** 53.33* 42.49† 
 (11.02) (5.789) (23.94) (21.88) 
N 1246 1254 503 503 
Overall R2 0.398 0.336 0.242 0.177 
Rho  0.617 0.646 0.678 0.709 
Note: the table reports random effects panel data regressions. The dependent variable is TURNOUTsmall. 
logRI is the natural logarithm of the total return index, logPI the natural logarithm of the price index and 
logSIZE the natural logarithm of market value. Cluster-Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ‘No 
effect’ indicates that the result was not statistically significant at the 10% level. 





A.3. Interaction Terms 
Table A.4 (next page) shows us that ownership concentration has a positive effect on total 
shareholder turnout rates. In model 4, where we do not include the ownership concentration 
variables, the types of shareholder variables all show positive results that are statistically significant 
at the 0.1% level: in this model, these variables are merely ownership concentration indicators. The 






Panel Data Analysis Total Shareholder Turnout: Models 1 and 2 with Interaction Terms 
 Full sample 
 Full model Full dynamic 
model 
Reduced model Reduced model 
without HHI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 











HHI 0.000281** 0.00794*** 0.000264**  
 (0.0000897) (0.00216) (0.0000957)  
BLOCK 0.000596 0.0666 -0.000615  
 (0.00320) (0.0996) (0.00325)  
 
Types of Shareholders 
%Insider 0.0129 0.134 0.0101 0.0164*** 
 (0.00807) (0.199) (0.00665) (0.00345) 
%Institutional 0.00572 0.0995 0.00505 0.00888*** 
 (0.00376) (0.111) (0.00371) (0.00256) 
%Nonfinancial 0.0354** 0.416 0.0280** 0.0300*** 
 (0.0107) (0.300) (0.00845) (0.00389) 
%Government  -0.00426 -0.406 -0.0229 0.0518*** 
 (0.0110) (0.268) (0.0123) (0.00576) 
 
Interaction Terms  
%Insider*BLOCK No effect No effect No effect  
%Institutional*BLOCK No effect No effect No effect  
%Nonfinancial*BLOCK No effect -0.00897* No effect  
  (0.00422)   
%Government*BLOCK No effect No effect 0.000577***  
   (0.000156)  
 
Other information 
_cons -1.382***  -1.578*** -1.659*** 
 (0.354)  (0.362) (0.474) 
N 1247 749 1248 1248 
adj. R2 0.558  0.554 0.498 
Rho  0.910  0.895 0.912 
Note: the table reports parts of the panel data regressions (fixed effects estimator in models 1, 3 and 4 and 
the Arrelano-Bond estimator in model 2) that are also shown in table 4, but with interaction terms added. 
The dependent variable is either the logit transformation of the variable TURNOUT, 
ln[%TURNOUT/(100% - %TURNOUT), or TURNOUT] or the variable TURNOUT. Rho indicates the 
proportion of variance in the dependent variable that is attributable to the fixed effects (intraclass 
correlation). ‘No effect’ indicates that the result was not statistically significant at the 10% level.  
† p < 0.1,  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.   
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A.4. Analyses without German Companies 
Table A.5 illustrates the fixed effects estimators for a sub-sample without the German companies. 
We can conclude that the results are generally similar to the tables reported in this chapter. One 
may note that the estimator for the variable ‘SHAPLEYsmall’ is statistically significant at the 1 and 
5% level in the fixed effects models 3 and 4 for small shareholder turnout that are reported in this 
table. Also, the dummy variable for amendments to the articles of association now shows a 
statistically significant negative effect in models 1 (total shareholder turnout) and 3 (small 
shareholder turnout). To conclude, the findings that are reported in this model definitely do not 
contradict our conclusions in this chapter, but actually confirm them.  
 
TABLE A.7 
Panel Data Analysis Fixed Effects Cluster-Robust Estimator (Total and Small Shareholder Turnout, no 
German Companies) 
 TURNOUTlog 
Fixed effects models 
TURNOUTsmall 
Fixed effects models 









 (1) (2) (4) (5) 
Ownership concentration 
Concentration1 No effect  No effect  
HHI 0.000374*** 0.000384*** No effect  
 (0.0000949) (0.0000648)   
BLOCK No effect  -0.533*** -0.618*** 
   (0.0930) (0.0971) 
R12 No effect  No effect  
BANZHAFsmall No effect  No effect  
BANZHAFlarge No effect  -0.115† -0.0988* 
   (0.0673) (0.0453) 
SHAPLEYsmall 0.491** 0.662*** 13.34* 14.60** 
 (0.157) (0.160) (5.499) (5.418) 
 
Importance of the Meeting 
   
Elections 0.00723† 0.00852* No effect  
 (0.00395) (0.00398)   
Items 0.00390† No effect No effect  
 (0.00221)    
Rejections  No effect  No effect No effect 
Shareholders No effect  No effect No effect 
Opposition No effect  No effect No effect 
dDirector(re-)elect No effect  No effect  
dRemunerationreport 0.284*** 0.310*** 10.34*** 11.03*** 
 (0.0708) (0.0728) (2.209) (2.237) 
dSoPother No effect  No effect  
dCapital No effect  No effect  
dPreemption No effect  No effect  
dDischarge No effect  7.336* 7.488† 
   (3.551) (4.392) 
dGM14days -0.152† -0.162† -4. 83† No effect 
 (0.0828) (0.0830) (2.356)  
dAmendments -0.0615**  -1.621*  
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 (0.0223)  (0.699)  
dRPT No effect  No effect  
 
Types of Shareholders 
dInsider No effect  No effect  
dInstitutional No effect  No effect  
     
dNonfinancial No effect  No effect  
     
dGovernment  No effect  No effect  
%Insider 0.00826† No effect No effect 0.270† 
 (0.00492)   (0.159) 
%Institutional 0.00825** 0.00677* 0.161† No effect 
 (0.00304) (0.00283) (0.0956)  
%Nonfinancial 0.0228*** 0.0221*** 0.555** 0.564** 
 (0.00543) (0.00438) (0.198) (0.183) 
%Government  0.0157* 0.0212** No effect No effect 
 (0.00615) (0.00732)   
 
Control Variables 
    
logSIZE 0.352*** 0.191*** No effect  
 (0.0393) (0.0430)   
logPI No effect  No effect  
logRI No effect  No effect  
Index  Omitted  Omitted  
Sector Omitted  Omitted  
 
Other information 
    
_cons -1.895*** -2.231*** 9.968 37.78*** 
 (0.385) (0.416) (13.61) (6.707) 
N 1086 1088 1086 1094 
R2 overall 0.592 0.566 0.221 0.199 
Rho  0.934 0.901 0.839 0.802 
Note: the table reports fixed effects panel data regressions for Austria, Belgium, France, Netherlands, 
Ireland, and UK (Germany omitted). The dependent variable in model 1-2 is the logit transformation of 
total shareholder voter turnout TURNOUTlog, calculated as: ln[%TURNOUT/(100% - %TURNOUT)]. 
The dependent variable in models 3 and 4 is TURNOUTsmall. logRI is the natural logarithm the total return 
index, logPI the natural logarithm of the price index and logSIZE the natural logarithm of market value. 
Cluster-Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  




CHAPTER 4 - THE IMPACT OF THE SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS DIRECTIVE 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this part of the research we consider the costs of the turnout decision and evaluate whether the introduction of the 
Shareholder Rights Directive, which aimed at lowering voting costs, has had a positive impact on (small) shareholder 
attendance. For this, we investigate turnout rates in Belgium, France and the Netherlands. We find strong indications 
that the Shareholder Rights Directive indeed had a positive impact on (small) shareholder attendance in these 
countries. The findings of this study may encourage policy makers to further reduce the costs of (cross-border) voting. 
It shows that the introduction of the new Shareholder Rights Directive may contribute to (small) shareholder 
engagement.   
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, we considered factors that contribute to (small) shareholder turnout, i.e., 
the benefits of the voting decision. Shareholder turnout may be considered a low-cost-low-benefit 
decision that is made at the margin, however (analogy in political elections, see Aldrich, 1993, cf. 
supra, chapter 3). Hence, not only (small) changes in the benefits of voting, but also any changes in 
the costs voting may have a large impact on the turnout decision of shareholders.   
In chapter 1, we discussed the European framework of shareholder rights. We have seen that 
with the introduction of the Shareholder Rights Directive (2007/36/EC) the EC hoped to enhance 
shareholder voting rates at (A)GMs400 by, inter alia, lowering the voting costs for (cross-border) 
shareholders. The provisions introduced by the Directive include i) the introduction of a minimum 
notice period of 21 days (which can be reduced to 14 days), ii) the requirement to publish the 
convocation and documents to be submitted to the (A)GM at the company’s website at least 21 
days before the meeting takes place, iii) a ban on impediments to electronic participation, iv) easing 
the use of proxy holders, v) a ban on share blocking and the introduction of a record date of no 
more than 30 days before the meeting, and vi) the requirement to disclose the voting results on the 
company’s website. If the Aldrich hypothesis is indeed applicable to shareholder voting, the 
introduction of the Shareholder Rights Directive may have increased turnout rates by reducing the 
costs of voting. 
 
1.1. Outline of this Chapter 
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate whether the introduction of the Shareholder Rights Directive 
(2007/36/EC) has had a positive impact on shareholder turnout rates in listed companies in 
Europe. In the next section we outline our hypothesis and explain our research method. Then, in 
section 3 we take a closer look at the impact of the introduction of the Shareholder Rights Directive 
on the national laws of the countries we are examining in order to see whether the introduction of 
                                                     
400 For example, preambule 3 of the Directive states that ‘holders of shares carrying voting rights should be 
able to exercise those rights given that they are reflected in the price that has to be paid at the acquisition of 
the shares. Furthermore, effective shareholder control is a prerequisite to sound corporate governance and 
should, therefore, be facilitated and encouraged. It is therefore necessary to adopt measures to approximate 
the laws of the Member States to this end. Obstacles which deter shareholders from voting, such as making 
the exercise of voting rights subject to the blocking of shares during a certain period before the general 
meeting, should be removed’. 
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the Shareholder Rights Directive may have indeed (substantially) lowered the costs of voting in 
these countries. Section 4 shows the regression results and section 5 covers robustness checks, 
including the justification of the parallel trend assumption. Finally, section 6 provides some 
concluding remarks and a discussion.  
 
2. OUR HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH METHOD 
2.1. Hypothesis 
When we look at our empirical findings in chapter two (table 2), we see an increase in total 
shareholder turnout rates in the Netherlands from 2010 to 2011 of 6.1% that is substantially higher 
than in other years. Interestingly, in the Netherlands, the Shareholder Rights Directive was 
implemented through the Wet ter implementatie van de richtlijn aandeelhoudersrechten, which came into 
effect on July 1, 2010. The 2010 AGMs all took place in either March, April or May, and thus were 
not yet subject to the provisions in the Shareholder Rights Directive.401 But the Netherlands is not 
the only country that experienced a clear jump in turnout rates; in Belgium, where the 
implementation act of the Shareholder Rights Directive came into force on January 1, 2012, total 
shareholder turnout from 2011 to 2012 increased by 8.6%. And, in France, where the provisions 
of the Directive went into effect on December 9, 2010,402 we see an increase in turnout rates of 
4.5% from 2010 to 2011. With respect to the small turnout rates of these three Member States, we 
observe the following: an increase of more than 11% from 2010 to 2011 in the Netherlands, an 
increase of more than 7% from 2010 to 2011 in France, and more than 14% in Belgium from 2011 
to 2012 (cf. supra, table 4 of chapter 2). 
There was thus a rise in (small) shareholder turnout rates in the Netherlands, Belgium and 
France after the implementation of the Shareholder Rights Directive. In order to see whether we 
can put a causal claim on this increase, we test the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis: the introduction of the Shareholder Rights Directive, aimed at lowering the 
cost of voting, has positively affected (small) shareholder turnout rates in 
the Netherlands, Belgium, and France.  
 
In this chapter we evaluate whether the Shareholder Rights Directive increased (small) shareholder 
voter turnout in the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. Unfortunately, for the other countries in 
our sample (Austria, Germany, Ireland and the UK) we cannot see the effect of the Shareholder 
Rights Directive in our data, as these countries implemented the Shareholder Rights Directive prior 
to our 2010-2014 sample period.403   
                                                     
401 Eumedion also reports a significant increase in the voter turnout rates. In their reports they show an 
average total shareholder turnout rate of 49.8% in 2010, 47.8% in 2009, and 49.2% in 2008 for AEX-25 
companies. In contrast, in 2011, Eumedion reports an average turnout rate of around 59%. One must note 
that Eumedion does not take into account the voting rights of the trust offices in its reported turnout rates, 
which explains the difference between our reported numbers and theirs. Eumedion (2011).   
402 ‘Ordonnance n° 2010-1511 du 9 décembre 2010 portant transposition de la directive 2007/36/ CE du 11 juillet 2007 
concernant l'exercice de certains droits des actionnaires de sociétés cotées’. 
403 In Austria, the Shareholder Rights Directive was implemented with the 2009 Stock Corporation 
Amendment Act (Aktienrechts Änderungsgesetz; AktRÄG) that went into force on 1 August, 2009. In Germany, 
the ARUG (Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Umsetzung der Aktionärsrechterichtlinie) was adopted in German law on 3 




2.2. Research Method 
Due to the nature of our data and the available sample period, we decided to use a difference-in-
differences estimation framework (hereinafter: d-i-d).404  The d-i-d method compares observations 
from a treatment group with those from a control group before and after a particular ‘treatment’. 
Hence, for a d-i-d estimation, we need to have i) a treatment at a particular moment; ii) treatment 
observations that are available before and after the treatment, and; iii) control observations that are 
available before and after the treatment. The d-i-d framework was used in the seminal work of 
Ashenfelter and Card (1985) and Card and Krueger (1994). Ashenfelter and Card (1985) estimated 
the effectiveness of training for participants in the 1976 CETA (Comprehensive Employment and 
Training Act) programs, by looking at trainee earnings. To do so, they used the group of trainees 
and a control group with the same age distribution as the trainees. The authors generally found a 
positive effect, but noted that the magnitude of the effect was sensitive to the participation model. 
Card and Krueger (1994) examined the effect of a minimum wage increase in New Jersey: on April 
1, 1992, the minimum wage rose from 4.25 USD tot 5.05 USD per hour. To examine the effect, 
the authors evaluated 410 fast-food restaurants in New Jersey and Pennsylvania (control group) 
before and after the increase in minimum wage. Meyer, Viscusi and Durbin (1995) also studied the 
effects of workers’ compensation on time out of work. The authors have a before and after period, 
where the treatment effect consists of a policy change that raised the weekly benefit amount. The 
treatment group consists of ‘high earners’, and the control group of ‘low earners’: these low earners 
were not affected by the increase in the weekly benefit. The authors conducted their analysis in 
both the state of Kentucky and the state of Michigan, and found a positive treatment effect in both 
states (although statistically insignificant for the state of Michigan).  
The treatment, in our research, is the implementation of the Shareholder Rights Directive 
(2007/36/EC) in the Netherlands (2011), Belgium (2012) and France (2011). As we have seen, the 
Shareholder Rights Directive was implemented in the Netherlands in July 2010, shortly after the 
2010 AGM season of the AEX-25 companies: all 2010 AGMs took place either in March, April or 
May, and thus where not yet subject to the provisions in the Shareholder Rights Directive. In 
Belgium, it was implemented with the act of 20 December, 2010, which came into force on January 
1, 2012, prior to the 2012 AGM season. And in France, the Shareholder Rights Directive was fully 
implemented with the law of 9 December, 2010. France already adopted part of the Directive under 
Decree no. 2010-684 (23 June, 2010),405 however. This decree focused particularly on shareholder 
information rights prior to the meeting, including the disclosure of relevant documents via the 
company’s website, proxy voting forms, and rules regarding the notice of the meeting. Since these 
provisions applied to AGMs that were held on or after October 1, 2010, we removed Pernod 
Ricard SA, which held its 2010 AGM on 10 November, 2010, from our sample of CAC-40 
companies. Thus, in our analyses the treatment observations are the AEX-25, the BEL-20, and the 
                                                     
on 3 August, 2009. In the UK the Shareholder Rights Directive was implemented in August 2009 (The 
Companies (Shareholders’ Rights) Regulations 2009 of 3 August, 2009). Since we only have data from the 
2010 AGMs onwards, we cannot compare the turnout rates before and after the implementation of the 
Shareholder Rights Directive in these countries.  
404 For example, see Cameron and Trivedi (2005, p. 787). One may note that a weakness in our analyses is 
the short time period for which we have data available (cf. infra, section 5 of this chapter).  
405 ‘Décret n° 2010-684 du 23 juin 2010 relatif aux droits des actionnaires de sociétés cotées’. 
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CAC-40 (excluding Pernod Ricard SA) companies from our sample that we have used in the 
previous chapters (cf. supra, appendix with chapter 2).  
We compare the turnout rates for these aforementioned companies to the turnout rates for 
UK FTSE-100 companies in the same periods. The UK had already implemented the provisions 
of the shareholder Directive in the UK CA 2006 in August 2009, and, as we will see in the next 
section, the Shareholder Rights Directive did not have a significant impact on the costs of voting 
in the UK. This creates an opportunity to use the FTSE-100 as the control group in our d-i-d 
framework. However, one should note that in the standard d-i-d estimation framework, the 
outcomes at individual level are regressed on a certain policy that applies to all individuals in the 
treatment group, but not in the control group. In our case, the UK experienced the same treatment 
in 2009, i.e., the implementation of the Shareholder Rights Directive, but, as we will see in the next 
section, the regulatory changes were much less significant than in the other three countries. 
The d-i-d estimator can be graphically shown in the following way with the AEX-25 companies 
as the treatment group (the displayed treatment group contains the AEX-25 companies, with the 
treatment year 2011): 
 
FIGURE 1 
d-i-d estimator (example NL & UK TURNOUT) 
 
 
The d-i-d estimator controls for differences in levels between treatment and control group. The 
advantage of the d-i-d estimator (compared to a cross-sectional estimator) is that it allows for fixed 
effects (similar to the fixed effects panel data model). According to Bertrand, Duflo and 
Millainathan (2004), ‘the great appeal of [d-i-d estimation] comes from its simplicity as well as its 
potential to circumvent many of the endogeneity problems that typically arise when making 
comparisons between heterogeneous individuals’ (p. 250). However, as we can see in figure 1 
already, the d-i-d estimator relies on the parallel trend or common trend assumption. This means that 
time trends need to be the same for both the treatment and the control group, which is a rather 
strong assumption. In section 5 we evaluate the validity of this assumption for our analysis.  
We can summarize the d-i-d estimator in the following way, where δ is the treatment effect and 
γ indicates the treatment year: 406  
                                                     
406 The STATA-command that is used for these analyses is ‘diff’. Besides the general d-i-d framework, this 
command also allows for matching. We can match the observations in the control and treatment group, so 





 t t+1  
(treatment year) 
Difference 
Treated (Netherlands, Belgium, France) α + β α + β + γ + δ γ + δ 
Control (UK) α α + γ γ 
d-i-d (treatment effect)   δ 
 
Before we turn to our estimation results (section 4), we first take a closer look at the impact of the 
Shareholder Rights Directive on the costs of voting at the national level of the countries of interest. 
As we will see, the Shareholder Rights Directive had a substantial impact on the procedural rules 
in the Netherlands, France and Belgium, but less in the UK.  
 
3. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DIRECTIVE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
In this section we evaluate the amendments to the national laws of the Netherlands, Belgium, 
France, and the UK as a result of the introduction of the Shareholder Rights Directive. In order to 
conduct a clear comparative analysis, we evaluate the amendments below.407  
 
3.1. Information Prior to the AGM 
Article 5 of the Shareholder Rights Directive comprises two main rules: i) the minimum notice 
period is at least 21 days,408 and; ii) requirements for the information that needs to be published by 
the company prior to the meeting, including the notification of the meeting. The notice of the 
meeting must:  
(a) indicate precisely when and where the general meeting is to take place, and the proposed agenda 
for the general meeting; (b) contain a clear and precise description of the procedures that 
shareholders must comply with in order to be able to participate and to cast their vote in the general 
meeting. This includes information concerning: (i) the rights available to shareholders under Article 
6 [right to put items on the agenda of the general meeting and to table draft resolutions], to the 
extent that those rights can be exercised after the issuing of the convocation, and under Article 9 
                                                     
as the companies in the treatment group (either the Netherlands or Belgium) are not (entirely) the same as 
the companies in the control group (UK). In other words, when we want to match company i with 
characteristics Xi with a company in the control group, this company also needs to have exactly the same 
characteristics Xi = Xj. Although exact matching is not possible, we can match on the closeness of our 
observations: the d-i-d estimator can easily be combined with Kernel matching. Briefly, kernel matching 
uses control group observations and determines their weights in accordance with their closeness using a 
kernel weighting function (for instance, ?̃?𝑖𝑗 =
𝐾(||𝑋𝑖− 𝑋𝑗||)
∑ 𝐾𝑙|𝐷=0 (||𝑋𝑖− 𝑋𝑙||)
, where ?̃?𝑖𝑗 is the weighting function, Xi  
the characteristics of company i (in our case, either an AEX-25 or BEL-20 company) and Xj the 
characteristics of company j in the control group). We report the results for the kernel matching d-i-d 
estimation in the appendix of this chapter. However, it is important to note that due to our (very) limited 
sample sizes, the matching of observations may be quite far from close.  
407 For further analyses of the impact of the provisions in the Shareholder Rights Directive in the different 
Member States, one may for example refer to Zetzsche (2008). See also Hopt (2015).  
408 Except for a general meeting that is not an AGM, if shareholder approval for shortening this period is 
obtained and the possibility to vote by electronic means is offered pursuant to article 5(1) second paragraph 
of the Directive. 
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[right to ask questions], and the deadlines by which those rights may be exercised; the convocation 
may confine itself to stating only the deadlines by which those rights may be exercised, provided 
it contains a reference to more detailed information concerning those rights being made 
available on the Internet site of the company; (ii) the procedure for voting by proxy, notably the 
forms to be used to vote by proxy and the means by which the company is prepared to accept 
electronic notifications of the appointment of proxy holders; and (iii) where applicable, the 
procedures for casting votes by correspondence or by electronic means; (c) where applicable, state the record 
date as defined in Article 7(2) and explain that only those who are shareholders on that date 
shall have the right to participate and vote in the general meeting; (d) indicate where and how 
the full, unabridged text of the documents and draft resolutions referred to in points (c) and (d) of 
paragraph 4 may be obtained; (e) indicate the address of the Internet site on which the information 
referred to in paragraph 4 will be made available. (emphasis added by the author).  
In addition to these requirements, article 5(4) stipulates that the following information to be made 
available on the company website: i) the notice of the meeting, ii) the total number of shares and 
voting rights at the day of the convocation, iii) the documents to be submitted to the general 
meeting, iv) a draft resolution (or, where no resolution is proposed a comment from the competent 
body) for each item on the proposed agenda, including draft resolutions tabled by shareholders (as 
soon as practicable after the company has received them), and iv) the forms to be used to vote by 
proxy and by correspondence.  
The notice period was increased in all four Member States: in Belgium, article 533 WvV was 
introduced to increase the minimum notice period to 30 days. In France, article R225-73 of the 
Decree increased the minimum notice period to 35 days (or 15 days if the meeting is convened in 
accordance with article L.233-32 FCC). In the Netherlands, the minimum notice period became 42 
days for listed companies ex article 2:115(2) DCC (and article 5:25ka Wft). In the UK the minimum 
notice period was increased to 21 days for EGMs, ex section 307A CA 2006. However, this section 
still makes it possible to call an EGM with a notice period of at least 14 days.409 Before the 
implementation of the Shareholder Rights Directive, the notice period for AGMs was already 21 
days in the UK.410 
Table A.8 in the appendix to this chapter provides an overview of the national laws regarding 
the information that needs to published prior to the AGM that were amended. All Member States 
closely followed the Directive when implementing the new provisions. In the UK, the option of 
publishing the notice of the meeting and the documents related to the meeting on the company’s 
website was already adopted under UK law (without requirement).  
 
                                                     
409 Such a proceeding requires a special resolution passed at the preceding (annual) general meeting (see also 
chapter 1 and 2 of this research). Another requirement mandates that the company offers all shareholders 
the option of voting by electronic means. 
410 Cf. supra, see table 2 of chapter 1 for an overview of the minimum notice period and record date in the 
seven Member States. Strikingly, though the minimum notice period and the record date are regulated in 
the Shareholder Rights Directive under a minimum harmonization requirement, it does not have a harmo-
nizing effect in practice. In our opinion, there is no real economic explanation for these different ap-
proaches, unless the disclosure requirements are more demanding in France and the Netherlands than in 
the UK, which would be why these countries require companies to provide longer notification periods – 
which is, to our knowledge, certainly not the case. 
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3.2. The Right to Put Items on the Agenda and to Table Draft Resolutions 
Article 6 of the Shareholder Rights Directive stipulates that shareholders have the right to place 
items on the agenda of the general meeting and to table draft resolutions. The minimum threshold 
for these rights may not exceed 5% of the share capital (cf. supra, chapter 1, section 2.1.2).  
With the introduction of the Shareholder Rights Directive, some changes were made to 
national laws. In Belgium, the right to put items on the agenda was implemented in article 533ter 
WvV with the requirement that shareholder(s) need to have a minimum capital stake of 3%. In the 
Netherlands, nowadays, a shareholder proposal cannot be refused on the grounds of substantial 
company interests. This exclusion was removed from article 2:114a DCC, in accordance with the 
Shareholder Rights Directive. In France, article L.225-105 FCC now allows shareholders to request 
the inclusion of an item on the agenda of the general meeting; before the implementation, 
shareholders only had the opportunity to require the inclusion of draft resolutions. Regulation 4 of 
the UK Companies Regulations 2009 requires a minimum 5% capital stake to call a meeting 
(implemented in section 303 CA 2006). Sections 338A, 340A and 240B of the UK CA 2006 were 
inserted to empower shareholders to require the inclusion of other matters (i.e., other than a 
proposed resolution).  
 
3.3. Requirements for Participation and Voting 
Article 7(1)(a) of the Shareholder Rights Directive bans the obligation to deposit shares for a few 
days before the GM to be able to vote. The second paragraph of this article requires a record date 
of maximum 30 days. In Belgium, the law of 20 December 2010 also adds a second paragraph to 
article 536 WvV obliging listed companies to use a record date: share blocking is now prohibited 
in accordance with the Directive. The registration date is limited to 14 days before the meeting. 
The Dutch legislature (eventually) decided to implement a record date of no more than 28 days 
before the AGM ex article 2:119 DCC. Share blocking was also allowed under Dutch law before 
the implementation of the Shareholder Rights Directive (former article 2:117(3) DCC).411 In 
France, the record date system had already been implemented in 2007, which have been set to three 
business days before the general meeting. In the UK, the share blocking prohibition was 
implemented in section 360B(1), but this was just a formal requirement as share blocking was not 
used in the UK prior to the implementation of the Shareholder Rights Directive. The use of a 
record date not later than 48 hours before the meeting, as delineated in new section 360B(2) was 
already in keeping with UK practice before the implementation of the Shareholder Rights Directive 
(EC, 2006, Impact Assessment, p. 215).  
 
3.4. Participation by Electronic Means 
As we have seen in chapter 1, article 8(1) of the Shareholder Rights Directive stipulates that 
Member States shall permit companies to offer their shareholders any form of participation in the 
general meeting by electronic means, notably any or all of the following forms of participation: (a) 
real-time transmission of the general meeting; (b) real-time two-way communication enabling 
shareholders to address the general meeting from a remote location; (c) a mechanism for casting 
votes, whether before or during the general meeting, without the need to appoint a proxy holder 
                                                     
411 However, a record date system was already included in the DCGC 2008 in best practice IV.1.7: ‘De 
vennootschap bepaalt een registratiedatum voor de uitoefening van stem- en vergaderrechten’. 
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who is physically present at the meeting. Paragraph 2 of article 8 adds that electronic participation 
may only be made subject to requirements when those are necessary to ensure the identification of 
shareholders and the security of electronic participation. This paragraph also adds that these 
requirements be proportionate to their purposes. 
In many Member States participation by electronic means was already possible (at least to some 
extent) before the introduction of the Shareholder Rights Directive. In the Netherlands 
participation by electronic means was introduced with the law of January 2007, Wet elektronische 
communicatiemiddelen, in articles 2:117a DCC and 2:117b DCC (cf. supra, chapter 1). Article 2:117a(3) 
DCC was amended with the implementation of the Directive, in order to avoid unreasonable 
restrictions to the use of electronic means for participation (shareholder identification). In France, 
it was also already allowed to allow video conferencing at the AGM in the articles prior to the 
introduction of the Shareholder Rights Directive ex article L.225-107(II) FCC. In the UK, the 
electronic participation option was already introduced with the CA 2006 (and amendments that 
came into effect on October 1, 2007). These provisions include the use of electronic 
communication and electronic proxy voting. 
In contrast, in Belgium, article 538bis WvV was introduced to allow for electronic participation. 
It stipulates that the possibility to electronically participate must be adopted in the articles of 
association, which requires a qualified majority. Article 538bis WvV states that shareholders that 
remotely participate are considered to be attending the meeting and are thus included in turnout 
rates.  
 
3.5. The Right to Ask Questions 
Article 9 of the Shareholder Rights Directive grants shareholders the right to ask questions. 
Paragraph 1 states that ‘every shareholder shall have the right to ask questions related to items on the 
agenda of the general meeting. The company shall answer the questions put to it by shareholders’ 
(emphasis added by the author). In accordance with the preamble, this paragraph thus limits the 
right to ask questions to the items on the agenda of the (A)GM. Paragraph 2 of this article includes 
some other potential restrictions as well: Member States are allowed to take measures, or can allow 
companies to take measures to ensure shareholder identification, the good order of general 
meetings and their preparation and protection of confidentiality and companies business interests. 
Member States may also allow companies to provide one overall answer to questions with the same 
content. Lastly, Member States may also determine a question answered if the relevant information 
is available on the company’s website in a ‘question and answer’ format. 
In France, article L.225-108 FCC includes the right to ask written questions. That one response 
can be given to questions that have the same content, and that an answer to a written question is 
deemed to be given where it appears on the website in a Q&A section was added later. In Belgium, 
the right to ask questions was already provided before the implementation of the Shareholder 
Rights Directive, but was amended: the right to submit questions in writing before the meeting was 
added to article 540 WvV as was the right to provide one overall answer to questions with the same 
content (article 540 WvV).   
In the UK, answering questions from shareholders was already common practice before the 
introduction of the Shareholder Rights Directive. The new section 319A CA 2006 was 
implemented in order to formally fulfil the requirements of the Shareholder Rights Directive.  As 




3.6. Proxy Voting 
Article 10 and 11 of the Shareholder Rights Directive enable shareholders to appoint a proxy holder 
to attend the AGM (or other general meeting) in person or by electronic means.  This proxy holder, 
who votes in the shareholder’s name, can be a natural person or a legal person. This person not 
only votes, but also enjoys the same rights as the shareholder such as the right to ask questions 
(discussed below) and engage in discussions.  
Prior to the implementation of the Shareholder Rights Directive in France, shareholders were 
only allowed to be represented by another shareholder or by spouse in accordance with article 
L.225-106 FCC: following the adoption of the Directive, shareholders of listed companies can also 
be represented by any other natural or legal person of their choice. Article R225-79 FCC stipulates 
the use of electronic proxy voting. Articles L.225-106-1, L.225-106-2, and L.225-106-3, which 
contain additional (disclosure) requirements regarding proxy voting, were also added to the FCC. 
In Belgium, article 547bis WvV regarding proxy voting was inserted. 
In the Netherlands, article 2:117(6) DCC was amended to require companies to recognize 
proxies submitted electronically. And in the UK, electronic proxy voting had already allowed been 
allowed ex section 333(2) CA 2006 since January 2007. This section stipulates that where a 
company has given an electronic address (either in an instrument of proxy sent out by the company 
in relation to the meeting, or in an invitation to appoint a proxy issued by the company in relation 
to the meeting) it is considered to have agreed that any document or information relating to proxies 
for that meeting may be sent by electronic means to that address (subject to any conditions or 
limitations specified in the notice). With the implementation of the Shareholder Rights Directive, 
section 360A CA 2006 was added states that companies may conduct ‘a meeting in such a way that 
persons who are not present together at the same place may by electronic means attend and speak 
and vote at it’ (paragraph 1). New section 322A CA 2006 was introduced to allow companies to 
enable advance voting on a poll in their articles of association.  
 
3.7. Publication of Voting Results 
The last provision of the Shareholder Rights Directive that we consider is the requirement to 
publish the voting results on the company’s website. This provision was implemented in article 546 
WvV in Belgium and in article 2:120 DCC and 5:25ka(3) Wft in the Netherlands. In France, where 
it was implemented in article R225-106-1 of the Decree, the publication of the voting results was 
already common practice before the implementation of the Directive. In the UK, section 341 CA 
2006 was amended. Before the implementation of the Shareholder Rights Directive, quoted 
companies already had to disclose the results of all polls carried out in the general meetings (not 
required for resolutions passed by a show of hands).  
 
3.8. Impact on the National Level 
The analysis above provides us with the following observations. The Shareholder Rights Directive 
had (some) impact on the disclosure of information prior to the meeting in all four Member States. 
The main amendments to Belgian law include: i) the prohibition of share blocking and the use of 
a mandatory record date system; ii) the possibility to make use of electronic means; iii) new rules 
on proxy voting, and iv) the publication of the voting results. In the Netherlands, the use of share 
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blocking was also prohibited. In addition, the legislature amended article 117(6) DCC regarding the 
use of electronic proxy voting. The voting result publication requirement was introduced as well. 
In France, the scope of proxy voting was broadened in particular. Belgium, France and the 
Netherlands increased the minimum notice period: in the UK, the notice period for general 
meetings (not AGMs) was increased. It seems that the introduction of the Shareholder Rights 
Directive in the UK only led to minor changes or the adoption of formal provisions under the CA 
2006 concerning matters that were already common practice (for instance, the right to ask 
questions). Although the changes to the laws of the Member States are not entirely comparable, 
we tend to conclude that the implementation of the Shareholder Rights Directive has led to the 
largest changes under Belgian national law and has had the lowest impact on UK national laws. 
Our findings indicate that the Directive had (far) more impact on the national laws in France and 
the Netherlands than in the UK, but somewhat less than in Belgium. 
 
4. ANALYSES 
In this section we show the results of the d-i-d estimation. In order to obtain more precise estimates 
and to control for different trends in the characteristics of our observations, we also include the 
relevant covariates (cf. supra, chapter 3, explained in table 3 and reported in the analyses in table 4 
and 5).412 The analyses are shown in table 2. However, before we discuss our findings, it is 
important to note that our sample is somewhat restricted: we only have 17 Belgian companies and 
24 Dutch companies, which means that each observation has significant impact on the results, and 
accordingly, one needs to evaluate the results with some caution. The kernel matching d-i-d 
estimates are reported in the appendix to this chapter. These estimators show results that are similar 
to table 2.  
The results in table 2 show that the treatment effect is statistically significant at the 1% level in 
the Netherlands for total shareholder turnout and at the 0.1% level for small shareholder turnout. 
The treatment effect for total shareholder turnout rates is around 6%, for small shareholder turnout 
this is 9%. For Belgium the treatment effect is statistically significant at the 0.1% level in both 
models. The magnitude is larger than for the Dutch companies: 7% for total shareholder turnout 
and even around 12% for small shareholder turnout rates. Yet we must take into account that a 
shareholder’s say on the remuneration report was added in the form of the Law of 6 April 2010, 
namely the Wet tot versterking van het deugdelijk bestuur bij de genoteerde vennootschappen en de autonome 
overheidsbedrijven en tot wijziging van de regeling inzake het beroepsverbod in de bank- en financiële sector 
(implemented in article 554 WvV). This law came into force on 3 May 2010. Of 17 Belgian 
companies in our sample, only one company allowed a shareholders’ say on the remuneration 
report in 2010 (AB Inbev NV). In 2011, this number increased to five companies, and in 2012, 
sixteen of the seventeen companies put the remuneration report to a vote. One may recall from 
the previous chapter that the remuneration report as a voting item strongly contributes to (small) 
shareholder turnout. Hence, it is possible that (part of) the treatment effects that are reported in 
table 2 for Belgian companies are caused by the adoption of shareholders’ say on pay. When 
controlling for the remuneration report by adding the dummy to the analyses, we find a statistically 
significant treatment effect of 5.5% for total shareholder turnout and of 8.2% for small shareholder 
                                                     
412 We did not include the dummy for the remuneration report for the analyses with the Dutch and French 
companies, as these companies generally do not put this voting item on the agenda (cf. supra, chapter 1 of 
this research).   
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turnout (both statistically significant at the 10% level).413 One may note that these analyses show 
that a voting item concerning the remuneration report, which contributes to the importance of the 
meeting, i.e., the benefits side of the turnout decision, has a strong effect on total and small 
shareholder turnout. As such, our analyses confirm the conclusions of chapter 3.  
Table 2 further shows a treatment effect for total shareholder turnout of around 3% 
(statistically significant at the 5% level) and an effect of around 4% for small shareholder turnout 
rates (also statistically significant at the 5% level) for the French companies in our sample. 414 
 
                                                     
413 Kernel matching d-i-d analyses (not reported) also provide statistically significant positive treatment 
effects (in both analyses at the 0.1% significance level).  
414 Since our sample sizes are small, we also reported the d-i-d estimators without including all covariates. 




d-i-d estimation AEX-25 and FTSE-100 (2010-2011) & BEL-20 and FTSE-100 (2011-2012) & CAC-40 and FTSE-100 (2010-2011) 





























































d-i-d with covariates 
Baseline         
Control 71.317 68.073 85.796 83.870 68.571 63.488 71.364 71.402 
Treated  57.301 48.204 50.418 50.111 15.190 13.647 63.919 59.172 
Difference -14.016*** -19.869*** -35.378*** -33.758*** -53.381*** -49.841*** -7.444*** -12.230*** 
(2.844) (4.017) (3.119) (4.585) (3.054) (4.817) (1.593) (1.803) 
Follow-up         
Control 72.641 70.699 87.618 85.662 71.122 65.991 73.512 74.925 
Treated  64.380 59.735 59.282 57.365 29.495 24.362 68.940 66.420 
Difference -8.261** -10.964** -28.336*** -28.297*** -41.628*** -41.629*** -4.572*** -8.505*** 
(2.887) (3.980) (3.556) (3.597) (3.886) (3.962) (1.692) (1.969) 
         
d-i-d (δ) 
 
5.755** 8.906** 7.042*** 5.461† 11.753*** 8.212† 2.873* 3.725* 
(1.835) (2.840) (1.492) (3.066) (3.182) (4.928) (1.152) (1.784) 
R2 0.49 0.29 0.66 0.66 0.77 0.78 0.48 0.30 
N control:  200 202 201 200 202 202 200 202 
N treated:  45 48 34 34 34 34 72 72 
Note: d-i-d estimator using the STATA-command ‘diff’. Treatment group are either the AEX-25 companies, the BEL-20 companies or the CAC-40 companies; control 
group are the FTSE-100 companies. Year of treatment is either 2011 (AEX-25 and CAC-40) or 2012 (BEL-20). Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Note that 
when using normal standard errors, the standard errors are different: in this case, the treatment effects for the treatment group CAC-40 are not statistically significant 
anymore. For the AEX-25 companies, the treatment effect remains statistically significant at the 5% level for total and small shareholder turnout. For the BEL-20 companies, 
all treatment effects remain statistically significant at the 5% level, except for the treatment effect for TURNOUT with the covariate dRemunerationreport included. †p < 
0.1,  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Although the results above would seem to indicate that the Shareholder Rights Directive indeed 
had a positive impact on turnout rates in Belgium and the Netherlands, we have to be careful in 
drawing conclusions. Our sample sizes, as a result of the nature of our data, are very small and 
companies may not be entirely comparable, which may bias our results. In addition, the results of 
our d-i-d analyses for France are not statistically significant once we use normal standard errors. 
For the Netherlands and Belgium, the results remain statistically significant at the 5% level (when 
we do not control for the remuneration report415). Due to the large differences between these 
standard errors, the estimation results that are reported in table 2 should be read with some caution 
(see also Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004; Donald and Lang, 2007). Nonetheless, our 
analyses provide at least some indications that the Shareholder Rights Directive indeed stimulated 
(small) shareholder participation. 
In addition to the considerations above, one also needs to take into account that the d-i-d 
estimator uses a very strong assumption: the parallel or common trend assumption. In the next 
section we evaluate this assumption and conduct placebo analyses to demonstrate (at least to some 
extent) the robustness of our results. 
 
5. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
5.1. Common Trend Assumption 
In section 3 we have seen that the d-i-d estimator assumes a common trend, or a parallel path prior 
to the treatment. This means that average changes in output among those treated if untreated are 
equal to the observed changes among comparable controls (Mora and Regggio, 2014, p. 5) Testing 
the common trend assumption is difficult in our research. In order to see whether a common trend 
assumption may be a valid assumption we make use of external data sources beyond the time 
period our research covers (2010-2014). We use average total voter turnout data from the yearly 
reports from Eumedion for the Netherlands, and turnout data from Van der Elst for the years 
2007 to 2012 for total turnout rates in Belgium, France and the UK (an overview of the companies 
that are included in the sample is provided in the appendix to this chapter) and the average turnout 
rates reported in the 2012 AGM report of Eumedion for the same period for the Netherlands. 
Figure 2 shows the comparison in turnout trend for the Netherlands and the UK:  
 
  
                                                     



























a 2007-2009 UK TURNOUT data from Van der Elst. Table A.3 in the Appendix of this chapter provides 
an overview of the companies included in this sample. Average Dutch TURNOUT data is retrieved from 
Eumedion (2013), AvA evaluatie (<http://www.eumedion.nl/nl/public/kennisbank/ava-
evaluaties/2013_ava-evaluatie.pdf>). (accessed in January 2016). 
 
As we can see from figure 2, Eumedion also reports a significant increase in the voter turnout rates 
for AEX-25 companies in 2011. In their reports they show an average total shareholder turnout 
rate of 49.8% in 2010, 47.8% in 2009, and 49.2% in 2008 for AEX-25 companies. In contrast, in 
2011, Eumedion reports an average turnout rate of around 59%. One must note that Eumedion 
does not take into account the voting rights of the trust offices in their reported turnout rates, 
which explains the difference between our reported numbers (cf. supra, chapter 2) and theirs. With 
respect to the common trend assumption we can see that between 2007 and 2010 the trend is not 
entirely parallel, though quite similar. However, from 2010 to 2011 the average voter turnout rate 
for AEX-companies increased substantially, whereas the trend for the UK remained more or less 
the same. Although we admit that this figure provides by no means foolproof evidence that the 
parallel trend assumption holds in this context, it nevertheless suggests that it might hold. Figure 2 
also shows the trend of small voter turnout for the AEX-25 and the FTSE-100 companies. 
Unfortunately, our sample (which is also used in chapter 2 and 3) only contains data for the period 
2010-2014. As a result, we cannot conclude from this figure that the parallel trend assumption 
holds. Nonetheless, one should note that in the 2010-2011 period small shareholder turnout rate 
increased more in the Netherlands than in the UK, and also more than in subsequent periods.       






TURNOUTa & TURNOUTsmall (%) BEL-20 and FTSE-100 compared 
 
a 2007-2009 UK and 2007-2009 Belgian TURNOUT data from Van der Elst (2011). Tables A.3 and A.4 in 
the Appendix of this chapter shows an overview of the companies included in this sample. 
 
From these figures we cannot entirely confirm that the BEL-20 and FTSE-100 companies follow 
the same trend, but we do observe a strong jump from 2011 to 2012 for BEL-20 companies in 
both total shareholder and small shareholder turnout rates, which is not present for the FTSE-100 
companies. Moreover, turnout rates in Belgium before the 2011-2012 period were even falling.  
Figure 4 compares total and small shareholder turnout trends for France and the UK. The 
TURNOUT trends in the periods before the 2010-2011 period are more or less the same for both 
countries. During the 2010-2011 period we can see a jump in the average total shareholder turnout 
rate for the CAC-40 companies, which does not manifest for the FTSE-100 companies. Figure 4 
displays a sharper increase in small turnout rates for France than for the UK, which we did not 
observe for other periods. Like before, however, we cannot confirm the parallel trend assumption 





TURNOUTa & TURNOUTsmall (%) CAC-40 and FTSE-100 compared 
 
a 2007-2009 UK and 2007-2009 French TURNOUT data from Van der Elst. Tables A.3 and A.5 in the 
Appendix of this chapter shows an overview of the companies included in this sample. 
 
Although the analyses of figures 2-4 certainly did not reject the parallel trend assumption, they did 
not (entirely) confirm this assumption either. In the next section we will use additional robustness 
tests often used in d-i-d estimations: placebo analyses.416 
  
5.2. PLACEBO ANALYSES 
For placebo analyses, a pre-treatment period must be tested, but unfortunately our initial sample 
for the Netherlands and France does not allow for this. With the data used for figures 2-4 (previous 
section) we conduct placebo analyses for total shareholder turnout for the period 2009-2010 
(placebo-treatment year 2010): the results are displayed in the appendix to this chapter (table A.7). 
For the analyses that are reported below (table 3), we use the 2011-2012 period with placebo-
treatment year 2012 for these two countries. For Belgium we use the 2010-2011 period (placebo-
treatment year 2011). The results are shown in table 3. From the table we can conclude that (most 
of) these placebo d-i-d estimators are highly insignificant and hence, these placebo treatment effects 
do not exist. One may also note that also the placebo analyses that are reported in the appendix 
show statistically insignificant treatment effects.  
                                                     
416 For example, Card and Krueger (1994), who examined the effect of a minimum wage increase in New 
Jersey, also used a placebo test. However, since these authors did not have any data available for earlier 
years, they performed a placebo analysis using unemployment data of more expensive (higher-class) 
restaurants to calculate the d-i-d estimator.   
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The rather small and/or insignificant treatment effects reported in both tables (which indicate 
that we cannot confirm that the treatment effect is different from zero) provide additional evidence 




D-i-D placebo estimation AEX-25 and FTSE-100 (2011-2012) & BEL-20 and FTSE-100 (2010-2011)417 & CAC-40 and FTSE-100 (2011-2012) 


































d-i-d with covariates     
Baseline       
Control 68.201 50.679 85.716 76.025 66.892 62.670 
Treated  58.927 38.787 54.341 27.902 62.552 53.424 
Difference -9.275*** -11.892** -31.376*** -48.123 -4.340* -9.246*** 
(2.856) (3.439) (3.530) (2.759) (1.768) (2.194) 
Follow-up       
Control 69.981 53.386 88.159 79.927 68.606 65.302 
Treated  61.374 39.628 53.243 27.033 63.106 54.986 
Difference -8.607** -13.758** -34.916*** -52.893*** -5.500** -10.317*** 
(2.920) (3.072) (2.953) (2.582) (1.884) (2.443) 
       
d-i-d (δ) 0.667 -1.866 -3.540 -4.771† -1.160 -1.071 
(1.044) (2.060) (2.400) (2.695) (0.896) (1.508) 
       
R2 0.45 0.26 0.66 0.77 0.45 0.25 
N control:  201 202 200 202 201 202 
N treated:  47 48 33 33 72 72 
Note: Placebo d-i-d estimator using the STATA-command ‘diff’. Treatment group are either the AEX-25 companies, BEL-20 companies or the CAC-40 companies; 
control group are the FTSE-100 companies. Year of placebo-treatment is either 2011 (BEL-20) or 2012 (AEX-25, CAC-40). Cluster-robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. †p < 0.1,  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
                                                     




6. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
6.1. Conclusions 
In the previous chapter we established that the benefits of turnout positively contribute to the 
(small) shareholder’s turnout decision. The aim of this chapter was to test the costs of the turnout 
decision, namely, whether lowering shareholder voting costs would contribute to higher voter 
turnout rates. We investigated whether the hypothesis that the introduction of the Shareholder 
Rights Directive (2007/36/EC) has positively affected (small) shareholder turnout rates in the 
Netherlands, Belgium, and France, holds. For this we used a d-i-d framework, and compared the 
(small) shareholder turnout rates of these aforementioned countries with those of UK companies. 
Our results tend to confirm our hypothesis: we found a positive treatment effect on total 
shareholder turnout rates of around 6% in the Netherlands, 5% in Belgium, and around 3% for 
France. For small shareholder turnout rates, the positive treatment effect is around 9% in the 
Netherlands, around 8% in Belgium, and 4% in France. Additional d-i-d analyses with less 
covariates and kernel matching d-i-d analyses show very similar treatment effects (reported in the 
appendix to this chapter). Nevertheless, it is important to recognize the limitations of these 
analyses, and we strongly suggest this research to be considered as a first step. For instance, our 
sample sizes are, especially for the Netherlands and Belgium, very small. Repeating the d-i-d 
analyses with a larger dataset – and more pre-treatment periods – is certainly recommended for 
future endeavours. In addition, we were only able to test the impact of the Shareholder Rights 
Directive in three Member States. Still our analyses seem to show consistent results. We conclude 
that this research at the very least provides some strong indications that lowering the costs of voting 
indeed has a positive impact on shareholder turnout rates.   
 
6.2. Discussion and Policy Implications 
This research suggests that lowering shareholder voting costs positively contributes to turnout 
rates. The EC has proposed amendments to the Shareholder Rights Directive that were formally 
adopted (in an amended version) in March 2017. Some of these amendments aim to lower the 
costs of cross-border voting. In the explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposal, the EC 
argues that cross-border shareholders in particular (still) experience difficulties exercising their 
shareholder rights as a result of intermediaries (also see Zetzsche, 2008; Davies et al., 2011). The 
findings of our research suggest that these amendments are indeed desirable. An interesting avenue 
for future research is the possible effect of the national implementation of this new Shareholder 
Rights Directive on turnout rates in a couple of years.  
We measured a lower treatment effect in France than in the Netherland and Belgium. Before 
the implementation of the Shareholder Rights Directive, (small) shareholder voter turnout was 
larger in France than in the Netherlands and Belgium: 63.2% compared to 56.8% and 45.8% 
respectively for total shareholder turnout, and 45.2% compared to 32.5% and 9.5% respectively 
for small shareholder turnout. It may be the case that, since the turnout decision is made at the 
margin, the higher turnout rates are, the more difficult it is to increase those rates even further. It 
is likely that part of the shareholder base will (generally) never attend (for instance, because voting 
costs can be very small, but never zero, and hence, shareholders need to see at least some benefits 
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to participate), and thus turnout rates will probably never reach 100%. However, as long as voting 





APPENDIX CHAPTER 4 
A.1. Kernel Matching d-i-d Estimates 
TABLE A.1 
Kernel Matching d-i-d estimation AEX-25 and FTSE-100 (2010-2011), CAC-40 and FTSE-100 (2010-2011), & BEL-20 and FTSE-100 (2011-2012) 
 AEX-25 (2010-2011) BEL-20 (2011-2012) CAC-40 (2010-2011) 
Outcome variable TURNOUT TURNOUTsmall TURNOUT TURNOUTsmall TURNOUT TURNOUTsmall 























Kernel propensity score matching d-i-d 
Baseline       
Control 73.848 57.866 75.781 62.660 70.435 57.041 
Treated  56.831 37.675 45.781 9.474 62.905 44.854 
Difference -17.017*** -20.191*** -29.945*** -53.186*** -7.530 -12.187*** 
 (4.663) (4.665) (4.314) (1.928) (2.858) (2.302) 
Follow-up       
Control 75.063 62.017 77.115 64.139 71.955 60.139 
Treated  62.933 49.305 54.396 23.710 67.499 51.961 
Difference -12.130** -12.712*** -22.719*** -40.429*** -4.456† -8.178*** 
 (4.072) (3.453) (4.818) (3.127) (2.553) (2.215) 
       
d-i-d (δ) 4.887** 7.479* 7.226*** 12.757*** 3.074** 4.009* 
 (1.603) (3.600) (4.818) (3.233) (1.001) (1.779) 
       
R2 0.20 0.29 0.55 0.90 0.09 0.22 
N control:  184 192 199 201 200 202 
N treated:  48 48 34 34 72 72 
Note: d-i-d estimator using the STATA-command ‘diff’. Treatment group are either the AEX-25 companies, the BEL-20 companies or the CAC-40 companies; control 
group are the FTSE-100 companies. Year of treatment is either 2011 (AEX-25 and CAC-40) or 2012 (BEL-20). Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Kernel: 
Gaussian. Note that when using normal standard errors, the standard errors may become very different from the reported ones: the treatment effects for the treatment 
groups CAC-40 and AEX-25 are not statistically significant anymore. For the BEL-20 companies, all treatment effects remain statistically significant (for total shareholder 
turnout at the 5% level, and for small shareholder turnout at the 0.1% level). †p < 0.1,  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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A.2. d-i-d Estimators not all Covariates Included 
 
TABLE A.2 
d-i-d estimators AEX-25 and FTSE-100 (2010-2011), CAC-40 and FTSE-100 (2010-2011), & BEL-
20 and FTSE-100 (2011-2012) 
Control groups AEX-25 BEL-20 CAC-40 
 d-i-d (δ) d-i-d (δ) d-i-d (δ) 
Dependent variable: TURNOUT 
Covariates: 
HHI 5.334** 6.847*** 2.765** 
 (1.512) (1.459) (0.972) 
HHI, Elections 5.876** 6.648*** 2.287† 
 (5.876) (1.529) (1.273) 
HHI, Elections, dRemunerationreport  5.293†  
  (3.011)  
No covariates 4.006* 7.023*** 2.493* 
 (1.568) (1.372) (1.011) 
R2 (range) 0.10-0.49 0.33-0.63 0.04-0.46 
Dependent variable: TURNOUTsmall 
Covariates: 
BLOCK 8.441** 11.738*** 4.170** 
 (2.794) (3.195) (1.526) 
BLOCK, Elections 8.617** 11.536*** 3.247† 
 (2.871) (3.194) (1.817) 
HHI, Elections, dRemunerationreport n.a. 9.217* n.a. 
  (4.470)  
No covariates 8.476** 11.669*** 4.195** 
 (2.868) (3.228) (1.567) 
R2 (range) 0.18-0.26 0.76 0.22-0.25 
Note: d-i-d estimator using the STATA-command ‘diff’. Treatment group are either the AEX-25 companies, 
the BEL-20 companies or the CAC-40 companies; control group are the FTSE-100 companies. Year of 
treatment is either 2011 (AEX-25 and CAC-40) or 2012 (BEL-20). Cluster-robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. Without cluster-robust standard errors, the treatment effects for the CAC-40 are not 
statistically significant anymore; for the AEX-25 companies, only the d-i-d regression without covariates for 
TURNOUT is not statistically significant anymore, and for the BEL-20 companies only the regression that 
includes the remuneration report is not statistically significant anymore for TURNOUT. The remainder of 
the regressions are all statistically significant at least at the 5% level. One may note that the R-square without 
covariates is substantially lower in some cases.  








Company Years Company Years Company Years 
Aberdeen Asset 
Management 
2009 Diageo 2007-2009 Prudential 2007-2009 
Admiral Group 2007-2009 Experian 2007-2009 Rexam 2007-2009 
Aggreko 2007-2009 Fresnillo 2009 Rio Tinto 2008-2009 
Amec 2007-2009 G4S 2009 Rolls-Royce 
Holdings 
2008-2009 
Anglo American 2007-2009 GKN 2007-2009 Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group 
2008-2009 
Antofagasta 2007-2009 GlaxoSmithKline 2007-2009 RSA Insurance 
Group 
2007-2009 
ARM Holdings 2007-2009 Hammerson 2007-2009 SABMiller 2007-2009 
Associated British Foods 2007-2009 Hargreaves Lansdown 2007-2009 Sage Group 2007-2009 
AstraZeneca 2007-2009 HSBC Hldgs 2007-2009 Sainsbury (J) 2008-2009 
Aviva 2007-2009 IMI 2009 Schroders 2007-2009 
Babcock International 
Group 
2008-2009 Imperial Tobacco 
Group 
2009 Serco Group 2009 
BAE Systems 2007-2009 InterContinental Hotels 
Group 
2008-2009 Severn Trent 2007-2009 
Barclays 2007-2009 International 
Consolidated Airlines 
Group 
2007-2009 Shire 2009 
BG Group 2007-2009 Intertek Group 2009 Smith & Nephew 2008-2009 
BHP Billiton 2008-2009 Johnson Matthey 2007-2009 Smiths Group 2008-2009 
BP 2008-2009 Kazakhmys 2008-2009 SSE 2009 
British American 
Tobacco 
2009 Kingfisher 2007-2009 Standard Chartered 2007-2009 
British Land Co 2007-2009 Land Securities Group 2007-2009 Standard Life 2007-2009 
British Sky Broadcasting 
Group 
2007-2009 Legal & General Group 2007-2009 Tate & Lyle 2007-2009 
BT Group 2007-2009 Lloyds Banking Group 2007-2009 Tesco 2007-2009 
Bunzl 2007-2009 Marks & Spencer 
Group 
2007-2009 Tullow Oil 2007-2009 
Burberry Group 2007-2009 Meggitt 2007-2009 United Utilities 
Group 
2007-2009 
Capita 2009 Morrison (Wm) 
Supermarkets 
2009 Vedanta Resources 2009 
Capital Shopping Centres 
Group 
2007-2009 National Grid 2007-2009 Vodafone Group 2009 
Carnival 2007-2009 Next 2007-2009 Weir Group 2007-2009 
Centrica 2007-2009 Old Mutual 2007-2009 Whitbread 2007-2009 
Compass Group 2008-2009 Pearson 2009 Wolseley 2007-2009 








Ab Inbev 2007-2009 
















Company Years Company Years 
Accor 2007-2009 LVMH 2009 
Air liquide 2007-2009 Michelin 2007-2008 
Alcatel-lucent 2007-2009 Pernod ricard 2007-2009 
Alstom 2008-2009 Peugeot 2007-2009 
AXA 2007-2009 PPR 2008-2009 
Bnp paribas act a 2007-2009 Renault 2008-2009 
Bouygues 2007-2009 Safran 2008-2009 
Cap gemini 2007-2009 Saint gobain 2008-2009 
Carrefour 2007-2009 Schneider electric 2007 
Credit agricole 2007-2009 Societe generale 2009 
Danone 2007-2009 Sanofi-aventis 2007-2009 
Eads 2007-2009 Stmicroelectronics 2007-2009 
EDF 2009 Technip 2008-2009 
Essilor intl  2007-2009 Total 2007-2009 
France telecom 2009 Unibail-rodamco 2007-2009 
Lafarge 2007-2009 Vallourec 2007-2009 
Legrand 2007-2009 Veolia environ  2007-2009 
Lagardere s c a  2007-2009 Vinci 2007-2009 





A.4. d-i-d Estimates (Placebo) 
 
TABLE A.7 
d-i-d placebo estimation for TURNOUT  
AEX-25 and FTSE-100 (2009-2010) & CAC-40 and FTSE-100 (2009-2010) 
 AEX-25 placebo  
(2009-2010) 
CAC-40 placebo  
(2009-2010) 
Outcome variable TURNOUT TURNOUT 
d-i-d (δ) 2.974 -2.410 
 (4.461) (1.551) 
   
R2 0.13 0.02 
N control:  156 158 
N treated:  33 52 
Note: Placebo d-i-d estimator using the STATA-command ‘diff’. Treatment group are either the AEX-25 
companies or CAC-40 companies; control group are the FTSE-100 companies. Year of placebo treatment 
is 2009. The 2009 covariates are the same as the 2010 covariates for the FTSE-100 companies and the CAC-
40 companies. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. The companies that are included in the 
AEX-25 sample are: Aegon NV, Akzo Nobel NV, Kon. BAM Groep NV, DSM NV, Fugro NV, Gemalto 





A.5. Information Published Prior to AGM 
 
TABLE A.8. 
Publication of information on the company’s website 
Provisions regarding: Belgium France Netherlands UK 






































Blockholders can behave opportunistically because small shareholder voting suffers from coordination problems. In 
this chapter we investigate the features of small shareholder voting using a theoretical framework. Specifically, we 
investigate when defeating a blockholder’s resolution is optional for shareholders. When the willingness-to-vote in the 
shareholder base is sufficiently high the Pareto efficient equilibrium is reached. However, if small shareholders are not 
able to coordinate, transferring voting rights can be a solution. Regulatory initiatives that facilitate communication 
between small shareholders or focus on institutional investors and corporate governance tools that alter or add the 
threshold in the voting game also contribute to solving the coordination problem. These corporate governance initiatives 
can increase the relevance of AGMs in Europe.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this part of the research we study a model to present the behaviour of small shareholders in 
concentrated ownership structures, in order to obtain more insights into the functioning of AGMs. 
In particular, we consider situations where an opportunistic blockholder tries to increase his 
personal benefits, and evaluate the behavioural interactions between this blockholder and small 
shareholders. 
 
1.1.  Ownership Concentration 
The Berle and Means (1932) model of dispersed ownership was the dominant corporate model for 
large public companies for a long time. Scholars today agree that it is not a common model for 
every country. We have seen in the introduction to this dissertation that ownership patterns in 
continental Europe and Asian countries are more concentrated than in Anglo-Saxon countries, 
which is considered a stylized fact (for instance, Van der Elst, 2008; Barca and Becht, 2001; Becht 
and Roëll, 1999; La Porta et al., 1998, 1999; Franks and Mayer, 1995). Ownership concentration 
has important consequences for corporate governance and has been analysed by scholars in 
different settings, for example in take-overs (Grossman and Hart, 1980, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986). In their seminal work, Grossman and Hart (1980) show that a raider without a stake would 
never benefit from taking over a company to improve it, since atomic shareholders are able to free-
ride on this improvement. Moreover, since Grossman and Hart also assume that there are some 
takeover and monitoring costs involved, the raider would incur a loss. The externality in this public 
good problem – i.e., all atomic shareholders can benefit from the raider’s efforts – can be 
internalized when a shareholder becomes large enough (Grossman and Hart, 1988). In other words, 
ownership concentration would be a solution to the free-rider problem in take-overs.  
Legal and economics scholars also investigated the (presumed positive) link between ownership 
concentration, increased shareholder monitoring and firm value (Kamerschen, 1968). The results 
of many of these studies were inconclusive, however. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) who also did not 
find a significant relationship between ownership concentration and profit for a sample of 511 US 
corporations, argue that ‘[a] decision by shareholders to alter the ownership structure of their firm 
from concentrated to diffuse should be a decision made in awareness of its consequences for 
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loosening control over professional management. The higher cost and reduced profit that would 
be associated with this loosening in owner control should be offset by lower capital acquisition 
cost or other profit-enhancing aspects of diffuse ownership if shareholders choose to broaden 
ownership.’ (p. 1174). This trade-off shows that they presume positive blockholder monitoring 
effects. Many scholars have discussed blockholder incentives to monitor corporate affairs 
(Hirschman, 1970; Aghion, Bolton and Tirole, 2004).  
But blockholder monitoring is certainly not always desirable. For example, Burkart, Gromb 
and Panunzi (1997) discuss the costs of excessive control or blockholder ‘over-monitoring’: the 
authors argue that there is a trade-off between the gains of large shareholder monitoring and those 
of managerial discretion. Managers will take on more initiative in widely dispersed ownership 
structures. Others argue that blockholders not only over-monitor corporate management, but will 
engage in opportunistic behaviour at the expense of minority shareholders. 418 Blockholders may 
have incentives to use their majority stake to maximize their private benefits instead of the total 
value for all shareholders. For example, they can choose to forego profitable investment 
opportunities when these investments require additional external funds to avoid a dilution of their 
controlling stake (i.e., Leech, 1987, p. 236). A large shareholder can negotiate a cheap loan with the 
company, for example with an interest rate below the market rate (also called ‘tunneling behaviour’). 
Importantly, the smaller the de facto controlling stake of the blockholder, the larger the benefits of 
opportunistic behaviour at the company’s expense. Some authors argue that this opportunistic 
behaviour can be limited by the design of the articles of association (Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi, 
1997), while others say that this is not (entirely) possible because of the imperfect Coasian world 
that we live in (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999). In addition, note that limitation of this opportunistic 
behaviour is also not always efficient per se. For example, Pacces (2011) analyses the disciplining 
mechanisms against expropriation in the US and the UK and, inter alia, finds that these may 
negatively affect the efficient decision-making of blockholders, which brings us back to the benefits 
of ownership concentration.419 
 
 
1.2.  Small Shareholder Oversight  
The EC recognizes the problem of opportunistic behaviour and has proposed to enhance 
regulation on the matter, in particular on related-party transactions. The EC states that these 
transactions ‘create the opportunity to obtain value belonging to the company to the detriment of 
shareholders, and in particular minority shareholders’ (2014, p. 5).  To enhance shareholder 
oversight on these transactions the EC has, inter alia, proposed to implement a shareholder’s vote 
on important related-party transactions, for example those with a value of over 5% of the 
company’s assets. Enhanced shareholder oversight on say on pay issues is proposed.  
Formal decision-making on matters that are outside the board’s purview and/or listed in the 
law or the articles of association are made by the AGM (for example, article 2:117(1) DCC, section 
119 AktG). As we have seen in the introduction, the AGM has an important theoretical role in 
                                                     
418 In this respect on may also refer to the theory of corporate control offered by Goshen and Hamdani 
(2016). The authors challenge the view that blockholder act opportunistically, arguing that entrepreneurs 
retain corporate control to pursue their vision. The authors call this the ‘diosyncratic vision’ of entrepre-
neurs.  
419 In this respect one refer also to a recent study of Goshen and Hamdani (2016).  
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corporate governance, but its functioning in practice is often criticized. Common criticism includes 
low attendance rates of (small) shareholders, often referred to as ‘shareholder absenteeism’. 
Shareholder voter turnout is especially low in continental European countries, where ownership 
concentration is generally higher (cf. supra, chapter 2 of this research, also see: Van der Elst, 2011; 
Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2013; ISS Voting Results 2010, 2011). Thus, de jure non-controlling 
opportunistic blockholders may have de facto controlling voting power in AGMs. There are several 
examples of de facto controlling shareholders, even in AGMs of companies that are part of main 
indices. When we look at our panel data sample of 1,255 AGMs of 252 companies that we have 
used in the previous chapters, we see that during 131 of these AGMs of 48 different companies 
there was a de facto controlling shareholder with a de jure a non-controlling stake (during 196 AGMs 
there was a de facto and de jure controlling blockholder). Most of these companies are Belgian or 
Austrian companies.  
During some of these meetings we see a large discrepancy between the interests of the 
blockholder and small shareholders that is reflected in the voting outcomes. For example, at the 
2014 AGM of Independent News & Media Plc (Ireland) one of the items on the agenda was a 
proposal to authorise the establishment of a long-term incentive plan. Around 20% of the votes 
were cast against this proposal. Since the largest shareholder at this meeting had a controlling stake 
of almost 60% of the votes present (his de jure stake was only around 30%), around half of the other 
shareholders voted against this long-term incentive plan. Another example is the TomTom NV 
remuneration policy (the Netherlands) in 2014; during its 2014 AGM, the founders of TomTom 
together had a stake of around 47%. Since the shareholder turnout was around 72%, these founders 
held a controlling stake of over 65%. The remuneration policy and option plan both received over 
17% of the votes against, indicating that around half of the other shareholders that were present 
voted against these proposals. And, during the 2014 AGM of Bekaert NV (Belgium), the 
remuneration report received over 18% of the votes against. Since the total voter turnout at this 
meeting was less than 50%, the large shareholder ̀ Stichting administratiekantoor Bekaert' held over 
76% of the voting rights during this AGM. This indicates that almost 80% of the other shareholders 
that were present during this meeting voted against the remuneration proposal.  
But why do small shareholders allow these larger shareholders to exercise de facto control and 
to behave opportunistically if they are clearly against particular resolutions? To answer this question 
and to explore solutions to this problem, we develop a theoretical framework to explore the 
features of (small) shareholder voting in concentrated ownership structures. In our framework, the 
aggregate of small shareholders has a majority of the voting rights. These shareholders are thus, in 
theory, able to beat large shareholder proposals, but have problems uniting their powers in practice.  
 
1.3.  Outline of this Chapter 
In the next two sections we provide an introduction to the literature on public goods and solutions 
to coordination problems. We then introduce a theoretical framework for small shareholder voting 
in section 4. This analytical model provides insights into how small shareholders decide to vote 
and how their aggregate voting effort can be enhanced. One of the solutions that will be presented 
is the decoupling of voting rights from capital rights (section 5). However, as we will see, this 
solution may not be sufficient as coordination problems will remain. In section 6 we therefore 
evaluate other solutions to the public good problem of small shareholder monitoring, including 
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communication forums at company websites and other corporate governance tools. Section 7 
outlines conclusions, policy implications and recommendations. 
 
2. COORDINATION PROBLEMS 
2.1.  Voting Power Theory 
Previous research has mainly focused on classical voting power indices to explain shareholder 
voting (Leech, 2002; Rydqvist, 1986; Overland, Mavruk and Sjögren, 2012; Poulsen, Strand and 
Thomsen, 2010, and cf. supra, chapters 2-4 of this research and chapter 2, section 6 in particular). 
Two classical power indices dominate: the Banzhaf index and Shapley-Shubik index. These models 
do involve some simplification of reality when applied to shareholder voting games, however. 
These voting power indices measure a priori voting power. Past behaviour, turnout rates and 
preferences are not considered. The indices assume that all shareholders always exercise their 
voting rights, which is certainly not the case in practice; voter turnout rates for listed companies 
are virtually always lower than 100%. Voting power indices also do not consider shareholder 
preferences (Kaniovski and Leech, 2009). These preferences are very important when analysing 
shareholder voting. For instance, in the examples that were mentioned in the previous section we 
see a clear divergence between the interests of the de facto controlling blockholder and those of 
small shareholders. In this case the voting outcomes are not equally likely anymore, but the voting 
result depends on the ability of small shareholders to coordinate toward a certain outcome.  
We also included these two classical voting power indices in our analyses of (small) shareholder 
voter turnout in chapter 3: although our findings suggest that small shareholders indeed consider 
voting power when they decide whether to attend the meeting, the effect was not present in every 
model. We suspect that the aforementioned flaws of the voting power indices in the shareholder 
voting framework have something to do with this. To investigate (small) shareholder voting more 
closely we determine 4 different scenarios that small shareholders can face, using expectations for 
a small minority shareholder i that considers voting at an AGM:  
 
1) Scenario: Expected to be Beneficial and Adopted: 
The resolution that is on the agenda of the AGM is beneficial to (most of the) shareholders, 
including the small shareholder i and this shareholder expects that the resolution will be 
adopted.  
 
2) Scenario: Expected to be Detrimental and Dismissed: 
The resolution that is on the agenda of the AGM is detrimental to (most of the) 
shareholders, including the small shareholder i and this shareholder expects that the 
resolution will be dismissed.  
 
3) Scenario: Expected to be Detrimental and Adopted: 
The resolution is detrimental to a majority of shareholders, including the small shareholder 
i, but this shareholder expects that the resolution will still be adopted (due to concentrated 





4) Scenario: Expected to be Beneficial and Dismissed: 
The resolution is beneficial to some shareholders, including the small shareholder i, but 
this shareholder expects that the resolution will nonetheless be dismissed.  
 
In the first two situations, the outcome is expected to be beneficial for shareholder i regardless of 
whether this shareholder will exercise his voting right during the AGM. However, in scenario 3 
and 4 the small shareholder will be worse off if the expected voting outcome comes to pass. 
Situation 4 refers, for example, to shareholder proposals that are put on the agenda by a small 
(group of) shareholder(s). Earlier research shows that shareholder proposals are relatively rare in 
Europe and seldom adopted (Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2011). The fourth situation may also entail 
management proposals that are beneficial to small shareholders but blocked by a large shareholder 
such as the proposal to distribute dividends or to allot new shares. The third scenario directly relates 
to conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders as well. In this analysis, 
we focus on this third situation, but the parallel with the blocked management proposal in the 
fourth one is notable. 
We assume that virtually all small shareholders are against the resolution promoted by a large 
shareholder. The resolution that benefits the large shareholder is expected to be detrimental to 
small shareholders (in other words, the expected added value of passing this resolution is negative 
to these shareholders) and thus we know something about the preferences of these small 
shareholders. One may, for example, think of related party transactions, the election of the relative 
of a major shareholder as a director or some executive pay decisions. In this case the decision of 
the small minority shareholder to exercise his voting right does not entirely depend on his voting 
power, but merely on his expectations on the voting activity of other small shareholders. As such, 
we need a different approach than the classical voting power indices.  
If a specific resolution is only beneficial to this large blockholder, the small shareholder expects 
that, should small shareholders exercise their voting right at the AGM, they will vote against this 
resolution. Hence, the payoff function for this small shareholder depends on how many other 
shareholders are expected to take a certain action as well. These games are called ‘coordination games’. In 
addition, as we have seen in the introduction chapter of this research, benefits that follow from 
small shareholder monitoring can be considered as a public good due to its non-excludability, since 
a shareholder cannot exclude another shareholder from the benefits of its monitoring and these 
benefits are non-rival. This offers the opportunity to free-ride on the monitoring efforts of others. 
Hence, we must consider a shareholder coordination game with a free-rider problem.      
 
2.2. Shareholder Voting Games 
We use a game-theoretic approach to introduce shareholder coordination problems in this section. 
A well-known coordination game with multiple equilibria is the stag-hunt game (or assurance 
game). In this game, there are two identical players who choose simultaneously from between two 
actions, a safe strategy L that yields a low payoff of 1 and a social cooperation strategy H that yields 
a high payoff of h if the other player also chooses this action; otherwise this strategy yields zero 
otherwise. The stag-hunt game has two Nash equilibria, i.e., a pair of strategies so that no 
shareholder can increase his payoff by unilaterally changing its strategy, in pure strategies: (H,H) = 
(h,h) and (L,L) = (l,l). Equilibrium (H,H)=(h,h) clearly is the Pareto efficient equilibrium (i.e., it is 
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not possible to make one of the players better off without hurting the other player at the same 
time). Table 1 shows this simple stag-hunt game: 
 
TABLE 1 
Stag-hunt Game (where h > l) 
 Player j 
Player i Strategy H Strategy L 
Strategy H (h,h) (0,l) 
Strategy L (l,0) (l,l) 
 
We can apply this simple coordination game to a situation of shareholder voting with two identical 
shareholders (see table 2 below). Only when both shareholders decide to vote can they both earn 
net benefits π = r – c, where r represents the benefits (revenue) from voting and c the voting costs. 
However, if only one of the two shareholders decides to vote whereas the other does not, this 
shareholder incurs voting costs c, whereas the other shareholder earns zero. If both shareholders 
decide not to attend the AGM, they do not incur any voting costs, but also receive no benefits (the 
status quo). The problem is that this game has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies: (Vote, Vote) = 
(π,π) and (Not Vote, Not Vote) = (0,0). If shareholders fail to coordinate the Pareto efficient Nash 




Shareholder Voting Game (where π > 0 and C < 0) 
 Shareholder j 
Shareholder i Vote Not Vote 
Vote (π,π) (c,0) 
Not Vote (0,c) (0,0) 
 
Many economists have addressed this issue of two equilibria. For example, Schelling (1960) 
introduced the focal point – also called the ‘Schelling point’. A focal point is a natural reason that 
causes players to focus on one of the Nash equilibria. Whereas we would expect that the focal 
point would be the Pareto dominant equilibrium (Vote, Vote) = (π,π), or in the stag-hunt game 
(H,H) = (h,h), scholars have shown that players often fail to coordinate on this beneficial 
equilibrium (Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil, 1990, 1991; Kim, 1996).  
The stag-hunt game can also be played with N players. The strategy H yields payoff h if at least 
M players choose the same action H, but it yields zero otherwise. In this respect, M is the critical 
mass: the amount of players that is needed to yield the public good, or to end up in the ‘good’ 
equilibrium. In order to define M we can use a simple majority rule (M is exactly equal to N/2+1), 
a qualified majority rule (for example, M exactly equal to 3N/4 or 2N/3) or a unanimity rule (M = 
N). A feature of coordination games with N players is that player i’s payoff depends on his own 
action and on the sum of the actions taken by the other players.  
We can also apply coordination games with N players to the small shareholder voting game in 
table 2. Assume that every shareholder holds one voting right. For voting items with a simple 
majority rule, the strategy Vote yields payoff r for each player if at least M ≥ N/2 + 1 small 
shareholders choose the same action Vote (including this player), but it yields c < 0 otherwise. The 
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total payoff if the critical mass is reached is thus N*r. The net benefit from voting for shareholder 
i when the critical mass is reached is denoted by π = r - c if this shareholder has exercised his voting 
right and r if not. We can summarize the analysis of N small shareholders that want to block a 
resolution of a large blockholder who holds a de jure minority stake, with a simple majority rule in 
the following three tables: 
 
TABLE 3 
Shareholder Voting Game with N Small Shareholders (where π > 0 and c < 0) 
 Small shareholders = M-1 
Small shareholder i Vote Not Vote 
Vote [π; (M-1)π] (c,0) 
Not Vote [0; (M-1)c] (0,0) 
 
In this table, the critical mass is denoted by M, the cost of voting by c, and the payoff for each 
player if the critical mass is reached is denoted by π = r - c. Table 3 shows the situation when 
shareholder i expects that he or she is the pivotal voter: in this case, the critical mass is almost 
reached, and the vote of shareholder i turns the losing coalition of small shareholders into a winning 
one. Again there are two Nash equilibria in pure strategies; (Vote, Vote) = (π, (M-1)π) and (Not Vote, 
Not Vote) = (0,0). If shareholder i expects these M-1 shareholders to exercise their voting rights, he 
will also do so.   
However, when the free-rider problem is present and shareholder i expects that there are 
already enough small shareholders attending the AGM, the situation can be shown as follows:  
 
TABLE 4 
Shareholder Voting Game with N Small Shareholders (where π>0 and c<0) 
 Small shareholders = M 420 
Small shareholder i Vote Not Vote 
Vote (π; Mπ) (c,0) 
Not Vote (r; Mπ) (0,0) 
 
In this table, the critical mass is denoted by M, the cost of voting by c, and the payoff for each 
player if the critical mass is reached is denoted by π = r - c. Shareholder i expects that the critical 
mass is reached regardless of whether he exercises his voting right. We can eliminate strategy Vote 
for shareholder i since this strategy is strictly dominated by strategy Not Vote and the same holds 
for the other shareholders. As a result, in this game, there is only one Nash equilibrium; (Not Vote, 
Vote)=(r; Mπ). Now we consider the situation when shareholder i does not think enough 





                                                     
420 The outcome of this game holds also for all other situations where shareholder i expects that the amount 




Shareholder Voting Game with N Small Shareholders (where π>0 and c<0) 
 Small Shareholders = M-2421 
Shareholder i Vote Not Vote 
Vote [c; (M-2)c] (c,0) 
Not Vote [0; (M-2)c] (0,0) 
 
In this table the critical mass is denoted by M, the cost of voting by c, and the payoff for each player 
if the critical mass is reached is denoted by π = r - c. Again, the strategy Vote for shareholder i (and 
for the other small shareholders) is strictly dominated by the strategy Not Vote. The only Nash 
Equilibrium in this game is (Not Vote, Not Vote) = (0,0). 
The latter two games show that – in cases where the small shareholders are rational and 
consider their vote to be insignificant – small shareholders will not exercise their voting rights at 
AGMs. Only in Table 3 are small shareholders willing to vote during AGMs. 
We summarize the payoffs from the actions Vote or Not Vote for shareholder i seen in tables 
3-5 in table 6: 
 
TABLE 6 
Shareholder Voting Game with N Small Shareholders (where π>0 and c<0) 
 Expectations shareholder i 
    
Actions shareholder i  
Expected turnout of other 
small  
shareholders ≥ M 
Expected turnout of other 
small  
shareholders ≤ M - 2  
Expected turnout of other 
small  
shareholders = M - 1  
Vote C c r – c = π * 
Not Vote 0 * 0 * 0 
* Optimal choices for shareholder i.  
 
3. PUBLIC GOOD GAMES AND THEIR SOLUTIONS 
Small shareholder monitoring is considered a public good that suffers from free-riding problems. 
Adding a threshold to a public good problem turns it into a coordination game. There is a large 
and diversified literature on public good games and approaches to solving the accompanying free-
rider problems, especially in the field of environmental economics (quasi-public com-mons access 
goods such as oceans and atmosphere are widely discussed, for instance see Demsetz, 1967; Barrett, 
1990). Classical economic rational choice theory suggests that free-rider problems are severe and 
hard to solve. The general solution to free-rider problems in the production of a public good is to 
exclude the players that do not contribute to it from enjoying its benefits or punish them – i.e., 
turning the public good into a private one (in a take-over bid situation see Grossman and Hart, 
1980, p. 59; the authors proposed introducing the dilution of shares after the take-over, to punish 
small shareholders for their free-riding behaviour in such a way that free-riding is not beneficial 
anymore). In practice, this is not always possible in the provision of a public good, as ‘non-
excludability’ lies at the core of public good games. Punishments may not be desirable in every 
situation, either, and are a rather unimaginable solution in our case of shareholder voting.   
                                                     
421 The outcome of this game holds also for all other situations where shareholder i expects that the amount 
of other small shareholders voting ≤ M-2. 
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Although the aforementioned solution is rather effective, it is also unfeasible and thus many 
economists, social and political scientists and psychologists have looked for other options as well 
(Ledyard, 1995). Marwell and Ames (1981) distinguish two versions of the free-rider hypothesis; 
the ‘weak’ version, which states that the voluntary provision of public goods by groups will be sub-
optimal, and the ‘strong’ version that holds that (virtually) no public goods at all will be provided 
through voluntary means, and test whether these versions hold in an abstract experimental 
situation. They conclude that many of the experimental results do not support the strong free-rider 
hypothesis as some people voluntarily contribute to public goods. However, free-riding does exist, 
as people do not contribute to the optimal amount of the public good, which confirms the ‘weak’ 
version. Oliver and Marwell (1988) argue that the theory of collective action does not predict that 
coordination never occurs, but that it will not consist of small isolated contributions. Rather, it will 
involve a small number of participants that make contributions because they know, or expect that, 
they can ‘make a difference’. Hence, purely theoretical economic considerations of the free-rider 
problem in public good games are not sufficient. 
Many scholars have studied (and continue to study) public good games in experimental settings. 
There is a large diversity of studies in this category. Ledyard (1995) provides a survey and tries to 
answer the fundamental question – what improves cooperation? He lists 19 variables that have 
been identified by researchers as having an effect on the level of contributions, and identifies the 
direction and level of the effect (Table 2.10 ‘Stylized Facts’, p. 143). Some of the variables that he 
identified are relevant for our situation. These are: i) homogeneity and common knowledge, ii) 
communication, and iii) thresholds. We discuss them below: 
Homogeneity and common knowledge: Ledyard found that participant homogeneity and the 
availability of information usually have positive effects on contributions.422  As we have seen in the 
previous sections of this study, there are large differences among shareholders. Shareholders are 
definitely not homogeneous, although they all have in common that they are the ‘residual claimants’ 
of the company. The level of ‘common knowledge’ – that players know their own payoff and others 
– is hard to define in shareholder voting games. Information is widely available due to disclosure 
obligations in regulations and soft law, provided through annual reports and accompanied 
remuneration reports, for example. But it may not always be feasible for many individual 
shareholders to completely ‘access’ this information due to inability, a lack of available time and 
other resources or interest (Velasco, 2006). Shareholder structures are not completely known and 
other shareholders’ motives are definitely not always clear. Large shareholders may also engage in 
one-on-ones, from which they can glean private knowledge.  
Communication: Ledyard found that communication positively contributes to the provision of 
public goods. This effect is widely recognized in the existing literature base. Communication shapes 
expectations and enables players to coordinate their actions. Players may reveal private information 
through (costless) communication. Many authors have shown that communication of private 
information contributes to the efficient provision of a public good, including cheap talk (i.e., 
communication between players that does not directly affect the payoffs of the game, see Crawford 
and Sobel, 1982; Forges, 1986; Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1991; Oprea, Charness and Friedman, 2014; 
Palfrey, Rosenthal and Roy, 2015). However, although it has been shown that communication 
                                                     
422 However, he also makes the following ‘tentative conjectures’ on homogeneity and complete information: 
i) heterogeneity generally lowers the rate of contribution, unless there is incomplete information and no 
repetition; ii) complete information generally leads to lower contribution than with incomplete information, 
unless there is homogeneity (p.160).    
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improves coordination, the effectiveness of communication may depend on the communication 
structure and the private information players have (e.g., Palfrey, Rosenthal and Roy, 2015). 
Communication among small shareholders may thus increase their ability to coordinate their voting 
effort and defeat a large shareholder. However, since small shareholders of large listed companies 
are usually unknown and the ownership stakes are widely dispersed, communication without 
facilitating devices such as a shareholder forum may not be possible. Moreover, many of those 
small shareholders exercising their voting rights in practice are doing so remotely, and hence do 
not take part in the debate in the AGM.  
Thresholds: The introduction of a threshold transforms games with public goods into a 
coordination game with a set of additional Pareto-optimal equilibria (Bagnoli and Lipman, 1989; 
Rauchdobler, Sausgruber and Tyran, 2009). In a game without a threshold there is only one 
equilibrium which is inefficient: all players fully free-ride and thus contribute zero. In contrast, a 
game with a threshold has more pure-strategy equilibria. In these games, there is a set of efficient 
symmetric and asymmetric equilibria with contributions that allow the threshold to be reached. 
Once such a threshold is attained, the public good will be provided. In this way, the action of an 
individual player can be essential for whether the public good (i.e. blocking the resolution) is 
provided or not.   
There can be a trade-off between the threshold level and the likelihood that a threshold is 
reached. More specifically, when a threshold increases, both the benefits and costs of cooperation 
may increase. Higher thresholds may be more desirable, but players may be less confident that a 
high threshold can be reached and might worry that their contribution will be wasted. In turn, 
lower thresholds have lower coordination costs, but may also provide a less desirable amount of 
the public good. The findings of Rauchdobler, Sausgruber and Tyran (2009) show that higher 
thresholds generally have a positive effect on contributions, but that these contributions are 
generally not sufficient to reach it.   
 
 
4. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF SMALL SHAREHOLDER VOTING 
In this section we use an analytical model of small shareholder participation which includes 
different small shareholder preferences to evaluate how small shareholders may respond to a 
detrimental blockholder resolution. This model provides some insights in shareholder coordination 
failures and explains why regulatory solutions that foster cooperation are needed. Like Grossman 
and Hart (1980) we assume that parameter a describes the activities engaged in by the company 
(including investment decisions, hiring decisions and managerial effort) and that there is no 
uncertainty about the company’s profit once activity a has been selected. Grossman and Hart 
(1980) explain that this function of a can also be seen as the net present value of the future stream 
of profit generated by activity a or the market value of the company’s shares. A denotes the set of 
all feasible activities for the company. Currently the company is engaged in activity a0 ∈ A. The 
company's profit function can be described as Π = f(a0).  
 
4.1.  Shareholder Structure 
Our company has one blockholder b that holds a stake of wb of the total voting rights. We assume 
that the blockholder does not hold a majority stake. The remaining fraction of the shares (1 – wb) 
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are distributed among N small shareholders, where N is a very large number by assumption. Each 
small shareholder i holds a fixed voting stake of si, and shareholder j a fixed voting stake of sj, where 
si = sj = s. In other words, the small shareholder voting stakes are symmetric. The aggregate of the 
stakes of all small shareholders and blockholder add up to one. We assume that there are no special 
share classes or special voting rights. Hence, every small shareholder holds stake s that contains a 
fixed amount of voting rights s. 
As we have seen in the previous chapters, shareholders are certainly not homogeneous, 
although corporate law theory generally assumes that (small) shareholders have the same interests: 
‘all cut from the same cloth, all intent on maximizing profits or share values’ (Dunlavy, 2006, p. 
1350). Greenwood (1996) calls these theoretical shareholders ‘fictional shareholders’ in his paper, 
as this image is a fiction, and does not include any personal characteristics of the ‘real’ shareholders 
standing behind this fiction. Although we assume in this model that the small shareholders have 
the same interests – defeating the blockholder’s proposal – we include heterogeneity in their 
preferences. More specifically, we assume that there is a continuum of N small shareholders that 
are located at x ∈ [0,1] with different activism preferences.  At x = 1 on the interval [0,1] one can 
find the extremely active shareholder type who really enjoys voting during the general meeting. In 
contrast, at x = 0 there is the extremely inactive shareholder type who does not derive any utility from 
voting an sich. The closer to 1 on the interval, the more active the small shareholders are, and vice 
versa. The location of a particular small shareholder determines its ‘willingness-to-vote’, which is 
the utility a particular shareholder gets from voting per se; if shareholder i is located at 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, 
and shareholder j is located at 0 ≤ xj ≤ 1, and xi, xj ∈ [0,1] and xi > xj, the utility that shareholder i 
derives from voting an sich is higher than that of shareholder j. Thus, in our model, small 
shareholders have symmetric voting stakes (each small shareholder holds a fixed stake si), but differ 




Graphical Presentation Continuum of Small Shareholders 
 
 
If the N small shareholders are homogeneously distributed along the [0,1] interval, then the average 
willingness-to-vote of the shareholders is 1/2. However, if the small shareholder base is generally 
active, more shareholders will be located on the right half of the line and the average willingness-
to-vote will be higher than 1/2. Similarly, if there are many inactive shareholders, more 
shareholders will be located on the left half of the [0,1] interval. In the latter case, the average 
willingness-to-vote will be lower than 1/2. We introduce variable t to determine the median 
willingness-to-vote of a particular shareholder base. Hence, if t = 1/2, then all shareholders are 
homogeneously distributed along the entire [0,1] interval. However, if t > 1/2, we assume that the 
majority of the small shareholders are located on the right half of the [0,1] interval. In contrast, if t 
< 1/2, then most small shareholders are located on the left half of the interval. For every value of 
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t we assume that shareholders are homogeneously located at the right side of the line and also at 
the left side. For instance, if t = 2/3, which means that the shareholder base is rather active, half 
of the shareholder base is homogenously distributed on the [2/3;1] interval, and the other half of 
the shareholders is homogeneously distributed on the [0;2/3] interval. Of course, there is an 
(almost) infinite number of type distributions within shareholder base N possible for each average 
willingness-to-vote t.  We impose this assumption about the distribution of shareholders in order 
to keep the model as simple as possible. 
We can present the aforementioned assumptions of our model graphically for t = 2/3 in the 
following way (figure 2):  
 
FIGURE 2 









4.2. Payoff Functions  
Next we assume that blockholder b can put a voting item on the agenda that can be adopted by a 
simple majority. This item is beneficial to him or her, but detrimental to the company (like a related 
party transaction that provides in private benefits and has a negative effect on a).423 More 
specifically, activity a1 the company engages in after the adoption of the blockholder’s resolution, 
generates a value of v(a1) to the company: 
  
(1)  v(a1) = v(a0) – B, 
 
where v(a1) ≥ 0 (hence, the possibility of bankruptcy is excluded in our model), B is the maximum 
amount of private benefits that can be extracted by the blockholder and thus also denotes the loss 
to the company. We assume that the blockholder is an opportunistic profit maximizer who 
optimizes his own benefits at the expense of the other shareholders.  
In order to put a voting item on the agenda, blockholder b incurs costs C. By assumption, the 
costs to put a resolution on the agenda are strictly smaller than the benefits blockholder b gains (B) 
when the resolution is adopted. The utility functions of the blockholder (Ub), the continuum of 
small shareholders (UN) and individual small shareholder i (Ui) can be described as follows (we 
assume that the utility of the shareholders directly depends on the value that is generated by the 




                                                     





𝑤𝑏𝑣(𝑎0)  + (1 − 𝑤𝑏)𝐵 − 𝐶                                                 if adopted;
𝑤𝑏𝑣(𝑎0) − 𝐶                                                                     if not adopted;





(1 − 𝑤𝑏)𝑣(𝑎1) = (1 − 𝑤𝑏)𝑣(𝑎0) − (1 − 𝑤𝑏)𝐵                  if adopted;






𝑠𝑣(𝑎1) = 𝑠𝑣(𝑎0) − 𝑠𝐵                                                           if adopted;




Status quo means that the blockholder does not put the resolution on the agenda. The blockholder 
has a payoff of (1 – wb)B – C, compared to the status quo when the resolution is adopted, whereas 
the small shareholders together lose (1 – wb)B, and small shareholder i loses sB. When the resolution 
is dismissed, the blockholder incurs costs C relative to the status quo.  
The game has three stages. In stage 1, blockholder b decides whether he or she puts the 
resolution on the agenda. In stage 2 all shareholders decide whether they exercise their voting rights 
during the AGM. And in stage 3 the resolution is either adopted or dismissed and the company 
generates a value of v(a1) (when adopted) or v(a0) (when not adopted). 
 
4.3. Stage 2: Small Shareholder Action 
Suppose that blockholder b has put the detrimental voting item on the agenda. How will the small 
shareholders of this firm react to this proposal? Rational small shareholder i is willing to vote when 
the benefits of the action Voting exceed the benefits of Not Voting. Voting costs for each small 
shareholder are denoted by the constant c.424 425 Equation 5 shows the voting decision for 
shareholder i: 
 
(5)  𝜌𝑖𝑠𝐵 + 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 𝑐,    where  0 ≤ ρi ≤ 1, 
 
where 𝜌𝑖𝑠𝐵 + 𝑥𝑖 denotes the benefits of voting and c the voting costs. This equation communicates 
that the cost of voting is the same for each small shareholder, but that the benefits of voting per 
se, denoted by the willingness-to-vote, location xi, differs per shareholder i. Variable ρi takes a value 
                                                     
424 In our framework we take the adoption of the detrimental resolution as a starting point for analysing 
decision-making: small shareholders do not lose when the detrimental resolution is adopted, but gain when 
the resolution is dismissed, so that there is a clear benefit to voting in our analysis.  
425 Although shareholders will always incur some cost of voting (i.e., in practice, voting costs will never be 
zero, cf. supra, chapter 4 of this study), one may note that these costs are generally low nowadays throughout 
Europe as a result of European regulations. The shareholder rights directive already lowered shareholder 
voting costs substantially and the new proposal of the EC to amend this directive focuses, inter alia, on the 
ease of cross-border voting (also see Van der Elst, 2011). In the last section of the previous chapter we 
focused on the costs of the shareholder voting decision. In this part of the research we again focus on the 
benefits (cf. supra, chapter 3) and keep the voting costs constant.  
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between 0 and 1, and denotes the probability that a shareholder assigns to being pivotal. Voting is 
beneficial when rational small shareholder i expects to be able to ‘make a difference’. When small 
shareholder i expects that the resolution will be adopted regardless whether he joins the AGM and 
votes against it, the coordination risk is fully present and the expected benefits of voting will be 
zero. Hence, in this case, c ≤ xi needs to hold. And, in case shareholder i expects that the resolution 
will be dismissed anyway, and thus shareholder i obtains 𝑠𝐵 regardless whether he or she votes, 
free-riding on the voting effort of other small shareholders will be optimal. In this case c ≤ xi must 
also hold in order for shareholder i to exercise his voting right. Only when shareholder i expects 
his vote to affect the voting outcome, free-riding may no longer be optimal (when c > xi). In this 
situation, small shareholder i also takes into account the benefits that can be gained through 
blocking the resolution, and the condition that needs to hold in order to shareholder i to exercise 
its voting rights becomes c ≤ xi + 𝑠𝐵.  
Shareholder i expects to make a difference when he or she expects the small shareholder 
turnout rate, denoted by α, to be somewhat smaller than the critical mass (denoted by m), which is 
the fraction of small shareholder needed to defeat the blockholder’s resolution. More specifically, 
shareholder i expects to be pivotal when α = α* = m – 1/N, where 1/N is the fraction of the total 
votes of the small shareholders that shareholder i can contribute (which is a very small amount). 
We can summarize these three cases in Table 7.  
 
TABLE 7 
Expected Pay-offs for Shareholder i 
Situation Expected  




Action Not Vote 
1 α < 𝛼∗  xi – c 0 
2 α ≥ 𝛼∗  sB + xi – c sB 
3 𝛼 = 𝛼∗ sB + xi – c 0 
 
In situation 1, small shareholder i expects the small shareholder turnout rate to be smaller than 
turnout rate 𝛼∗ = m – 1/N, which is the approximate turnout rate at which he or she expects to 
be able to make the difference. Hence, in this situation, the action Not Vote is optimal and there 
may be a coordination problem among the small shareholders. Situation 2 describes the situation 
where shareholder i expects the small shareholder turnout rate to be higher than the critical mass. 
He or she will free ride on the voting effort of the other shareholders if xi < c. In the third situation 
shareholder i expects to be able to make the difference, and thus votes against the proposal at the 
AGM if sB + xi ≥ c. Hence, probability ρi denotes the expected probability a shareholder assigns to 
the occurrence of situation 3 as shown in table 7. 
Similar to what we have seen in the analyses of coordination problems and the voting power 
indices in the previous paragraphs and chapters, a rational small shareholder will generally not 
assign a very large probability to making the difference in the voting poll. The probability of 
shareholder i’s vote mattering is very low, which may indicate that ρi generally will have a low value. 
However, shareholders definitely do not always act rationally. Some shareholders may be more 
optimistic than others about their own actions, and can overestimate the effect of their 
contribution, whereas others may be more pessimistic and even underestimate the effect of their 
contribution; hence, ρi  and ρj can have very different values in the same shareholder voting game. 
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However, in order to keep the analysis as simple as possible, we assume that the more active 
shareholders that have a higher willingness-to-vote and also assign a higher value to making the 
difference (0 ≤ ρi ≤ 1 and ρi ≥ ρj if xi ≥ xj).  
The next step in our analysis is to find the location of indifferent shareholder ?̅?, who is indifferent 
in the choice between the strategies Voting and Not Voting. This shareholder is located at: 
 
(6)  ?̅?(𝑡) = 𝑐 − 𝜌?̅?𝑠𝐵, 
 
where the location of the indifferent shareholder depends on t and 𝜌?̅? denotes the probability the 
indifferent shareholder assigns to making the difference. We assume that every shareholder located 
on the right-hand side of the indifferent shareholder on the [0,1] interval assigns at least the same 
probability ρi as the indifferent shareholder. Thus, for every shareholder j that is located at 𝑥𝑗 >  ?̅?, 
𝜌𝑗  ≥  𝜌?̅? must hold. Similarly, every shareholder located on the left-hand side of this indifferent 
shareholder assigns at most the same probability as the indifferent shareholder to being pivotal: thus, 
for every shareholder i that is located at 𝑥𝑗 <  ?̅?, holds that  𝜌𝑗  ≤  𝜌?̅?. Determining the location of 
the indifferent shareholder is key, since all shareholders to the left of this shareholder on the [0,1]-
interval will not exercise their voting rights. In other words, when we know the location of this 
indifferent shareholder for a given c, we know how many small shareholders will exercise their 
voting rights.  
The critical mass, which is the fraction of small shareholders that is needed to defeat the 
blockholder’s resolution, can be denoted as m =
𝑤𝑏
(1−𝑤𝑏)
 under simple majority voting rules.426 It 
follows that, in order to establish a blocking coalition, the indifferent shareholder should be at 
maximum located at (i.e., the ‘optimal indifferent shareholder’):427     
 













where ?̅?∗ is the location of the indifferent shareholder so that the critical mass can be reached for 
a given value of t. One should note that the most active shareholders are located on the right-hand 
                                                     
426 m is the stake of the blockholder divided by the aggregate stake of the entire small shareholder base. If a 
blockholder holds a 30% stake, m has a value of 3/7. This means that at least 3/7 of the small shareholder 
base needs to exercise their voting right in order to defeat the blockholder. Note that we are discussing a 
blocking coalition of small shareholders under simple majority rules; 50% of the votes against during the 
AGM is enough to block the resolution of the blockholder.  
427 Formula (7) explains the location of the indifferent shareholder. Since our most active shareholders are 
located on the right half of the [0,1]-interval, one needs to start there. The formula takes into account the 
distance and the mass of shareholders (hence, the density of the shareholders on each side of the interval, 
which is [0.5/(1-t)]). We also need to take into account two situations: i) less than half of the small 
shareholder base is needed to defeat the blockholder: hence, the indifferent shareholder is located to the 
right of t: this situation is explained by formula (7), or ii) more than half of the small shareholder base is 
needed to defeat the blockholder (hence, the indifferent shareholder is located to the left of t): the latter 
situation is shown by formula (8). One may note that less than half of the small shareholder base is needed 













side of the horizontal line. For instance, for t = 1/2, we have ?̅?∗ (
1
2
) = (1 −
𝑤𝑏
(1−𝑤𝑏)
) = (1 − 𝑚). 
When the blockholder holds a stake that is larger than 1/3 of the total voting rights, the critical 
mass must be larger than 1/2. In this case, the indifferent shareholder needs to be located to the 
left of t. Hence, we then have:428 
 


































). If the blockholder’s 
voting stake is 40%, then m = 4/6 and, accordingly, ?̅?∗ = 2/6 (also see section 4.3.1). Formulas (7) 
and (8) are shown graphically in figure 3:  
 
FIGURE 3 
Graphical Representation of Formulas (7) and (8) 
 
 
In order for the ‘optimal’ indifferent shareholder to fulfil condition (7), the costs need to be equal 
or smaller than his willingness-to-vote and the expected benefits of blocking the resolution: 
 













                                                     
428 With this formula, we first calculate the part of the shareholder base needed to block the coalition located 






). Then we multiply this amount 
by 1/2 and divide it by t in order to account for the distance of interval [0, t]. This amount is then subtracted 
from t in order to determine the location on the [0,1]-interval of the optimal indifferent shareholder. 
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Similarly, when the critical mass is larger than 1/2, the following condition must be true: 
 











) + 𝜌?̅?𝑠𝐵,     for 𝑤𝑏 ≥
1
3
.   
 
Whether or not these conditions hold, depends on parameters wb, t, 𝜌?̅?𝑠𝐵 and c. More precisely, if 
voting stake wb of blockholder b is relatively small, it is small shareholders are likelier to be able to 
block the resolution. This is also the case if the expected benefits that can be gained by voting, 
 𝜌?̅?𝑠𝐵, are relatively large, or the costs of voting c are relatively low.  
 
4.3.1. Numerical Example  
We first consider the situation when blockholder b has a stake of 30% (thus, condition 9 needs to 
hold). When replacing wb with 0.3, we have m = 3/7. In the previous section we denoted variable t 
as the median willingness-to-vote in the model. If we assume that the median willingness-to-vote t 
= 1/2, which means that shareholders are allocated homogeneously on the entire [0,1] interval, the 
shareholders on the interval [4/7;1] need to exercise their voting rights (see equation (7)). Hence c 
– 𝜌?̅?𝑠𝐵 ≤ ?̅?
∗= 4/7 must hold. If t = 2/3, which means that half of the small shareholder base is 
located at the [2/3;1] interval, 3/7ths of the shareholder base is located at the interval [5/7; 1].429 
Hence, the location of the indifferent shareholder in this situation must be ?̅?∗≤ 5/7. This means 
that c – 𝜌?̅?𝑠𝐵 ≤ ?̅?
∗ = 5/7 must hold. In contrast, if t = 1/3, which means that half of the small 
shareholder base is located on the [1/3;1] interval, the needed 3/7ths of the shareholder base is 
located more to the left of the horizontal line. In this case c – 𝜌?̅?𝑠𝐵 ≤ ?̅?
∗ = 3/7 must hold.430 






. Hence, a majority of the small shareholder base needs to exercise its voting rights at the 
AGM. 1/6th-part of these shareholders must be located to the left of t. For t = 1/2, c – 𝜌?̅?𝑠𝐵 ≤ ?̅?
∗ 
= 1/3 needs to hold. And when t = 2/3, the indifferent shareholder must be located at; c – 𝜌?̅?𝑠𝐵 ≤ 
?̅?∗ = 4/9.431 In contrast, when t = 1/3, this is c – 𝜌?̅?𝑠𝐵 ≤ ?̅?
∗ = 2/9.432 433 
 
4.4. Stage 1:  The Blockholder’s Decision 
The utility of the blockholder (Ub) is 𝑤𝑏𝑎0 + (1 − 𝑤𝑏)𝐵 − 𝐶 if the resolution is adopted, 𝑤𝑏𝑎0 − 𝐶 
if the resolution is dismissed, and  𝑤𝑏𝑎0 if he does not exercise his right to add the resolution to 
                                                     
429 i.e.,  (1 −  
(3/7)∗(1/3)
(1/2)
) = 5/7. 
430 i.e.,  (1 − 
(3/7)∗(2/3)
(1/2)
) = 3/7. 












) = 4/9. 












) = 2/9. 
433 The maximum amounts of c for each value of t when wb = 0.3 and 0.4 are graphically shown in the 
appendix to this chapter.  
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the agenda (the status quo is maintained). When will it be optimal for the blockholder to put the 
resolution on the agenda? This would be the case if:434  
 
 (11)  𝜇𝑏((1 − 𝑤𝑏)𝐵 − 𝐶) ≥ (1 − 𝜇𝑏)𝐶   
↔  𝜇𝑏(1 − 𝑤𝑏)𝐵 ≥ 𝐶, 
 
where μb denotes the probability the blockholder assigns to the situation that the resolution is 
adopted (where 0 ≤ μb ≤ 1). Whether or not the blockholder adds his resolution to the agenda 
depends on the value of parameters C and 𝜇𝑏. Only when the blockholder expects with a 
probability of one that voting costs for small shareholders, c, are sufficiently low, so that ?̅?∗(𝑡) +
 𝜌?̅?𝑠𝐵 ≥  𝑐, then μb = 0 and the blockholder will not put his resolution on the agenda as long as C 
> 0. If the blockholder thinks that there is some probability that his resolution will pass, i.e., μb > 
0, his decision will depend on the value of μb and the private benefits 𝐵 that he derives from the 
resolution. 
We now consider the situation that either condition 9 or 10 does not hold, depending on 𝑤𝑏 – 
i.e., the indifferent shareholder ?̅? is located too far to the right for the critical mass to be established 
– and that the blockholder expects that there is a probability that the resolution will be adopted so 
that 𝜇𝑏(1 − 𝑤𝑏)𝐵 ≥ 𝐶 holds. In this situation, the rational blockholder decides to put his voting 
item on the meeting's agenda and small shareholder coordination will fail. Can we solve this 
problem so that small shareholders will be able to coordinate on blocking the resolution, without 
having to substantially increase their ownership?435  
 
5. MARKET SOLUTION: DECOUPLING OF VOTING RIGHTS 
The indifferent small shareholder and the small shareholders that are located to the right of the 
indifferent small shareholder are always exercising their voting rights at the AGM, since their 
willingness-to-vote is larger than the voting costs. However, suppose that these small active 
shareholders are not able to defeat the resolution because the following inequalities hold: 436  
 














) > 0        for  𝑥 ̅≤ t,  
   
                                                     
434 Formula (11) shows that the expected net benefits from putting an item on the agenda of the AGM must 
be positive. μb denotes the expected probability that the voting item is adopted according the blockholder: 
hence, (1- μb) describes the expected probability that the resolution will be defeated.  
435 One may note that, when a quorum of more than 30% is required for the approval of this resolution, 
small shareholders may choose to not exercise their vote. In the wordings of Charléty, Fagart & Souam 
(2016), the majority in favour of this proposal is then 100% (since the blockholder is the only voter), but 
the proposal is not adopted. For more insights on this matter and the effects of quorums in shareholder 
voting decisions, one may consider this aforementioned paper of Charléty, Fagart & Souam (2016). 
436 The first equation describes the situation where less than half of the small shareholder base is needed to 
defeat the blockholder’s resolution.  The latter equation holds for situations when the indifferent 
shareholder’s willingness-to-vote is smaller than the average willingness-to-vote of the shareholder base, but 
this is still not enough to defeat the blockholder’s resolution.  
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where m is the critical mass. The active shareholders may look for solutions to defeat the resolution. 
An option is to buy a particular amount of inactive shareholders’ shares so that the active 
shareholders together have enough voting rights to defeat the resolution during the AGM.  
 
5.1. Empty Voting 
Why would these shareholders buy the entire share if they only need the voting rights at a particular 
AGM though?437 In case voting and economic ownership decoupling is allowed in the market, these 
active shareholders will only seek voting rights. Voting with these decoupled voting rights is often 
referred to as ‘empty voting’ in the literature (e.g., Schouten, 2012; Black and Hu, 2008, 2006). Hu 
and Black were the first to use this term in their 2006 article. Empty voting is the exercise of voting 
power without corresponding economic interest (and risk). Whereas Easterbrook and Fischel 
(1983) argued that the decoupling of the voting rights from the economic right was not possible, 
Hu and Black observed that “new vote buying” actually has become possible and warn the public 
about empty voting, stating that ‘[w]e have found more than twenty publicly known or rumoured 
examples, almost all since 2002. Several involve empty voting by investors with negative economic 
interests, who would profit if the companies’ share prices go down. How many more have remained 
hidden is unknown’ (p. 907). 
Although Hu and Black (2006) already recognized that not all empty voting is bad, empty voting 
is generally considered a problem in the current literature base (for Europe, also see Clottens, 2012). 
Hu and Black (2006) originally proposed increased ownership disclosure regulation, but in their 
2008 paper, the authors propose further regulatory measures, including providing companies with 
the possibility to limit empty voters’ voting power. In the European Union, there have been some 
proposals to address empty voting, but real action has not (yet) been undertaken (EC, 2010, pp. 
86-87)438. 
Although the dangers of empty voting cannot be ignored, it may actually contribute to a 
solution in our case. As Hu and Black (2006) already note, empty voting could also move votes 
from less active to more active investors and therefore enhance shareholder monitoring.   
 
5.2. Homogenous Distribution of Small Shareholders  
Let us first consider how this works in our model for the simple situation when t = 1/2, which 
means that small shareholders are homogeneously distributed along the entire [0,1] interval. When 
                                                     
437 If active shareholders are not able to only buy the decoupled voting rights from the inactive shareholders, 
they will have to fully compensate the inactive shareholders. More specifically, the inactive shareholders will 
anticipate the voting of the active shareholders and thus will try to free-ride on their monitoring effort. As 
a result, the active shareholders have to transfer the gains of defeating the resolution to the inactive 
shareholders. If the active shareholders are not able to coordinate their actions, small active shareholder i 
does not know how many shares the other active shareholders are going to buy and has to take into account 
this uncertainty. If the average small active shareholders are too risk averse, too few active small shareholders 
buy the inactive shareholders’ shares and, as a result, the resolution cannot be rejected. Decoupling voting 
rights from capital rights overcomes this problem. Moreover, institutional investors, for instance often build 
their portfolios in such way that the expected return is optimized. These shareholders may not be willing to 
purchase additional shares, only to improve the corporate governance in a particular company. Liquidity is 
another possible issue.  




t = 1/2, the active shareholders need to obtain the voting rights from at least [m– (1 – ?̅?)]-part of 
the total small shareholder base. The most logical counterparties for these transactions are the 
inactive shareholders that are located at the interval [0 ; m– (1 – ?̅?)] of the horizontal line; these 
shareholders derive the lowest utility from exercising their voting rights an sich (i.e., lowest 
willingness-to-vote). According to classical rational choice theory, we can conclude that every small 
shareholder that is located to the left of the indifferent shareholder located at ?̅? would accept a bid 
of approximately zero for their voting rights; according to our analysis, these shareholders do not 
exercise their voting rights, as the utility of voting is lower than the costs of voting for these 
shareholders (i.e., xj + 𝜌𝑗𝑠𝐵 < c). In other words, since the costs of actively participating in the 
AGM for these small shareholders exceed the benefits, their voting right is worthless to them and 
they will probably accept any offer.  
The offer of active shareholders may create expectations about whether the resolution of the 
blockholder can be defeated. More specifically, it is possible that small inactive shareholders assign 
some positive probability to the situation that, when contributing their votes, the coalition will 
become a winning one (hence, 𝜌𝑗𝑠𝐵 may increase). Since xj < c holds by assumption, these inactive 
shareholders will not vote themselves, but will (temporarily) sell their voting rights (for free) to the 
active shareholders.     
But, as we have seen in the discussion of public goods games in the previous sections, the 
rational choice theory does not always hold in practice. The endowment effect can also play a role 
(Thaler, 1980). Moreover, it may be possible that the expectations of the inactive small shareholders 
do not change (substantially) after receiving a request for their voting rights. In this case, when the 
inactive small shareholders are not willing to lend their voting rights for free, active small 
shareholders may offer some positive amount of money, suppose 𝜎. We assume that the inactive 
shareholders accept any bid that is at least equal to the value of their voting right, xj. Hence, the 
average bid of an active shareholder that wants to borrow the voting rights of an inactive 
shareholder that is located on the interval [0; ?̅?∗ – (1 – ?̅?)] needs to be at least ?̅? = 
1
2
(?̅?∗ − (1 − ?̅?)) 
if t = 1/2.  
 
5.3. General Situation 
Next we consider the average bid for any value of t. We can distinguish three situations that are 
displayed in figure 4. In the first situation the indifferent shareholder (?̅?) and the optimal indifferent 
shareholder (?̅?∗) are both located to the right of t. In the second situation these two are both located 
left of t and in the third situation the optimal indifferent shareholder is located left of t whereas the 





Three possible situations 
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)) if  ?̅? > ?̅?∗  and ?̅? >
𝑡,  ?̅?∗ < 𝑡  (situation 3). Next we calculate the average bid that needs to be made to the inactive 
shareholders. For this we assume that the active shareholders will buy the (voting) stakes of the 
most inactive shareholders, thus, the shareholders that are located on the left of the [0,1]-interval. 
In the case that the small inactive shareholders are willing to accept the bid for at least the value of 
their utility from voting an sich, i.e. small inactive shareholder j wants to get at least bid 𝜎 =  𝑥𝑗 for 
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Additional stakes needed and average bids  














































In addition to the cost of the bid, active shareholders incur some transaction costs T for each 
voting rights unit s they obtain as well (we do not live in a perfect Coasian world). Hence, the 
average cost of obtaining (voting) stake s is ?̅?1 + 𝑇 in situation 1, ?̅?2 + 𝑇 in situation 2 and ?̅?3 + 𝑇 
in situation 3. When: 
 
(13)  𝑘( ?̅?𝜆 + 𝑇) ≤  𝑠𝐵,  
 
where 𝜆 = 1, 2, 3, and k denotes the average amount of voting stakes s that each active small 
shareholder needs to obtain in order to reach the critical mass, it will be beneficial for all active 
small shareholders to buy their part of the needed voting rights from the small inactive 
shareholders.  
This solution engenders a coordination problem – even when condition (13) holds – that we 
must take into account.439 We can summarize the payoff functions for active shareholder i in the 
following matrix (table 9 below), where X is the number of active small shareholders that are 
located at the [?̅?,1]-interval, and ?̃? the average amount of stakes active shareholder i expects the 
other active shareholders to buy. Table 9 shows the different possible scenarios for active small 
shareholder i. In the first situation, when active small shareholder i expects the other active small 
shareholders to buy sufficient extra voting rights, shareholder i will free-ride. And in the third 
situation as displayed in table 9, shareholder i expects the other small shareholders to buy 
insufficient voting rights from the inactive small shareholders so that it will be too expensive for 
the small active shareholder to buy all remaining needed voting stakes. Only in the second situation, 
when active small shareholder i expects that the other active small shareholders each buy ?̃? voting 
rights on average such that the costs of buying the remainder voting stake does not exceed the 
benefits of defeating the blockholder (i.e., sB ≥ (𝑋𝑘 − (𝑋 − 1)?̃?)( ?̅?𝜆 + 𝑇)), will he buy the 
remaining voting stakes.440 
  
                                                     
439 One may note that even when ?̅?1 ≈ ?̅?2 ≈ ?̅?3 ≈ 0, there will still be some transaction costs involved, 
which will result in the same coordination problem. 
440 It may also be the case that the blockholder is able to buy voting rights, for instance when there is an 
information asymmetry between the blockholder and (part) of the small shareholder base, so that those 
small shareholders do not recognize the detrimental effect of that blockholder’s proposal. We do not include 




Payoff Matrix for Small Active Shareholder i 441 
Other Active Small  
Shareholders 
(𝑋 − 1)  
 
 
Small Shareholder i 
Scenario 1: 
Other shareholders buy 
sufficient extra voting 
rights. 
Scenario 2: 
Other shareholders buy 
(𝑋 − 1)?̃?  extra voting 
stakes. 
Scenario 3: 
Other shareholders do 
not buy (sufficient) 
extra voting rights. 
Buys (𝑋𝑘 − (𝑋 − 1)?̃?) 
extra voting rights 
∆𝑈𝑖= – (𝑋𝑘 − (𝑋 −
1)?̃?)( ?̅?𝜆 + 𝑇)  
< 0 
∆𝑈𝑖= sB – (𝑋𝑘 − (𝑋 −
1)?̃?)( ?̅?𝜆 + 𝑇)  
> 0 * 
∆𝑈𝑖= sB – (𝑋𝑘 − (𝑋 −
1)?̃?)( ?̅?𝜆 + 𝑇)  
< 0 
Status quo: does not buy 
extra voting rights. 
 




∆𝑈𝑖= 0 * 
Note: In scenario 1, small shareholder i receives the benefits sB from blocking the resolution regardless of 
whether he decides to buy any additional (voting) stakes. In contrast, in scenario 3, the benefits sB do not 
outweigh the extra costs of buying the needed voting stakes. Only in scenario 2 does the small shareholder 
buy the needed voting stakes from the inactive shareholders.  
* The optimal choices for each scenario.  
 
If active shareholder i expects that situation two occurs with probability 𝜃𝑖 , the following condition 
needs to hold for shareholder i to buy the needed voting rights: 
 
(14)  (𝑋𝑘 − (𝑋 − 1)?̃?)( ?̅?𝜆 + 𝑇) <  𝜃𝑖𝑠𝐵,          
 
where i = 1, 2, .., X, and 𝑋𝑘 denotes the needed number of stakes the active small shareholders 
need to buy in order to be able to defeat the resolution of the blockholder, ?̃? denotes the expected 
average amount of stakes the other shareholders will buy, and ( ?̅?𝜆 + 𝑇) denote the costs of buying 
voting stake s. When this probability 𝜃𝑖 is low, coordination among active small shareholders is 
difficult, even when ?̅?1 ≈ ?̅?2 ≈ ?̅?3 ≈ 0. In this case, we again have a coordination failure and the 
optimal outcome will not be reached without measures that stimulate coordination.  
How can we overcome this coordination problem? Of course we can assume that the active 
small shareholders derive some extra utility from voting with each extra stake s ansich, let’s say δxi. 
If 𝛿(𝑋𝑘 − (𝑋 − 1)?̃?)𝑥𝑖  ≥ (𝑋𝑘 − (𝑋 − 1)?̃?)( 𝜎𝜆 + 𝑇)  ↔  𝛿𝑥𝑖 ≥  ( 𝜎𝜆 + 𝑇)  holds, active shareholder i 
buys the additional voting rights.442 Whether this is a realistic assumption is subject to doubt. Most 
of the time, institutional investors must exercise their voting rights anyway. Other shareholders 
that derive utility from being responsible shareholders will also probably not have a much higher 
utility, for the simple fact that they are already ‘responsible’. Moreover, the question and 
information rights remain the same. In contrast, a shareholder crosses the threshold for the right 
to put an item on the agenda and table draft agenda by having an extra voting stake, his utility will 
probably increase. However, these thresholds are relatively high (most of the times around 3 or 5% 
                                                     
441 Instead of buying, institutional investors may also borrow the additional voting rights, or seek proxies 
from inactive shareholders. Since each of these actions include some transaction costs T by assumption, the 
outcomes outlined in this Table also hold for these other scenarios.  
442 Instead, one may consider decreasing marginal utility for voting with each extra stake s. for example 
𝜏xi√𝑠.Voting with an extra stake s will now increase the utility of voting with 𝜏xi√2 – 𝜏xi, whereas voting 
with the second extra stake s will only increase the utility with 𝜏xi√3 – 𝜏xi√2. This assumption, that entails 
decreasing marginal utility, may be more realistic for small voting stakes.  
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of the voting rights). Moreover, the right to agenda entails another form of shareholder activism 
and whether or not long-term focused shareholders such as institutional investors use this right is 
subject to question. Although there are some strong arguments that utility will not (substantially) 
increase when an extra voting unit is added to the voting stake for some shareholders, others may 
actually derive extra utility in particular circumstances; shareholders, and certainly small 
shareholders, are a heterogeneous group that may have many different preferences and incentives.  
We can conclude that small shareholder coordination may be enhanced by empty voting, but 
there may remain a small active shareholder coordination problem, and this solution may thus not 
be very effective in every situation. In other words, the market cannot reach the optimal situation 
and requires regulation. One should note that empty voting should only be allowed with some 
caution, considering the negative effects that can result therefore. In the next section we discuss 
regulatory solutions to this small (active) shareholder coordination problem.  
 
6. REGULATORY SOLUTIONS 
In section 3 we have seen that research on public goods remains largely inconclusive about factors 
that enhance contributions. Ledyard (1995) has summarized part of this literature and come up 
with a list of factors that may or may not contribute to the provision of public goods. We discussed 
three of these factors; homogeneity/complete information, communication and thresholds. The 
first category is a rather difficult one for regulators to address nowadays. The shareholder base 
differs substantially between public companies and is rather heterogeneous. Information 
requirements are already widely in place as a result of various (European) regulations, but 
information will always be incomplete to some extent. In our analysis in this section we focus on 
the latter two solutions that can be affected by regulation or other corporate governance tools.   
 
6.1.  Shareholder Communication Facilities 
Communication is one of the solutions for coordination problems. If active shareholders can 
coordinate the amount of extra voting rights they buy or borrow from inactive shareholders, or the 
amount of proxies they need to seek, the resolution can be defeated and the optimal governance 
outcome will be reached.  
We thus propose a mechanism that fosters communication among shareholders that are willing 
to participate. Such a mechanism will also lower transaction costs T, thereby increasing the scope 
for cooperation. For example, a shareholder cooperation forum or an EU proxy solicitation system 
that enables shareholders to seek proxies from other shareholders, as mentioned in the EC 
(2011a)443 Green Paper, can contribute to active shareholder communication and cooperation. In 
France, many public companies use shareholders’ clubs on their websites to communicate with 
their shareholders and provide information (Club des actionnaires). These clubs are not obligatory 
under French law, but merely initiatives on the part of French listed companies. For example, Total 
SA indicates on its website that it organises around 30 events per year. If such an online 
shareholders’ club offers communication tools for shareholders, for example via a forum-tool or 
discussion board, so that active shareholders are able to identify one another and communicate 
with one another, the coordination problem that is described in the previous sections is likely to 
                                                     




be reduced or even solved. Some companies impose requirements that shareholders meet in order 
to be able to join the club (for instance, Société Générale SA), while others do not. Some companies 
even seem to use it as a marketing device, for instance by offering discounts. Besides these 
shareholder clubs, French companies usually also make use of shareholder committees. GDF Suez 
NV (part of the BEL-20) has also introduced a shareholder club.  
In Germany, section 127a AktG has created a shareholders’ forum at the national level, which 
is available for shareholders at <www.bundesanzeiger.de> (Aktionärsforum, ex Aktionärsforum 
verordnung). Paragraph 1 of section 127a AktG states that shareholders (or shareholder associations) 
may invite other shareholders to the shareholder forum of the Federal Gazette to act jointly or by 
proxy for the purpose of filing a motion or request or to vote in the general meeting. Article 127a(2) 
AktG provides that the invitation shall contain the contact details of the shareholder, the company 
name, the date of the general meeting and either the motion, request, or the proposal for the 
exercise of voting rights concerning a particular resolution.  
 
6.1.1. Acting in Concert 
The current rules on ‘acting in concert’ may restrict such solutions to the shareholder coordination 
problem (EC, 2011a)444. The lack of uniformity and clearness in these rules results in uncertainty 
about which forms of shareholder cooperation fall under the definition(s) of acting in concert (i.e., 
Clerc et al., 2012).445 The relevant question is, when does shareholder cooperation, for example 
using a forum, becomes acting in concert? Eumedion (2006) argues that, first of all, this would be 
the case when shareholders are interconnected in such a way that they are in fact one shareholder, 
such as family ties or corporate groups. Although under particular circumstances institutional 
investors may also be acting in concert, Eumedion argues that this is not necessarily the case since 
these shareholders are often ‘like minded’ (2006, p. 6). When applying the definition of ‘acting in 
concert’ it is important to assess whether the goal of gaining control and consequently changing 
the ownership structure justifies offering minority shareholder and exit.  
The EC recognizes that the existence of different definitions and interpretation at the national 
level creates uncertainty for international investors wishing to cooperate with other shareholders 
and may restrict their willingness to cooperate (EC, 2012)446. In the 2011 Green Paper the EC 
(2011a)447 concludes that the concept of acting in concert should be clarified at the EU level, which 
could be provided through the development of guidelines. In November 2013, the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) provided some guidance in answering this question by 
publishing a ‘White List’ that contains activities ‘that will not, in and of itself, lead to a conclusion 
                                                     
444 EC (2011a) Green Paper The EU Corporate Governance Framework, COM (2011) 164 final. 5 April 
2011.  
445 The Takeover Directive (2004/25/EC) and the Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC) use different 
definitions of acting in concert.  Some Member States adopt a definition that is quite similar to that in the 
Takeover Directive, whereas others add the definition of article 10(a) of the Transparency Directive to the 
definition in the Takeover Directive. 
446 EC (2012a) Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions application of Directive 2004/25/EC 
on takeover bids. COM (2012) 347 final. 28 June 2012.  




that the shareholders are acting in concert’ (ESMA, 2013)448. The activities that are described under 
items (d)(A)(i) and (ii) and (d)(B), to approve or reject a proposal relating to directors’ 
remuneration, to approve or reject an acquisition or disposal of assets and to reject a related party 
transaction, respectively, are examples of possible detrimental resolutions that blockholder b may 
put on the agenda. Hence, communication between (active) shareholders on shareholders’ forums 
or discussion boards and a subsequent agreement to vote against a particular item is allowed 
according to the White List. If shareholders engage in an activity that is on this list, it cannot be in 
and of itself acting in concert under any circumstances, but national authorities evaluate each specific 
case, taking into account specific facts and circumstances. Hence, the list does not provide 
shareholders with guaranteed safe havens for particular forms of cooperation, but merely with 
some guidelines. National authorities can give more detailed guidance.449  
This list only includes situations when shareholders who act together already retain a particular 
amount of voting rights.450 If communication costs are (approximately) zero, or enough small 
shareholders are willing to engage in such a forum, reaching the critical mass to defeat a particular 
resolution will not be a problem. In these situations, a forum or other discussion tool will be 
sufficient to solve the coordination problem. In other situations, active shareholders may be willing 
to acquire – temporarily – a certain quantity of shares or voting rights, or together seek proxies. 
Whether this would be allowed is not yet addressed in the White List or other policy documents, 
and thus remains unclear. One could argue that the underlying goal for doing so for the small 
shareholders in our model is the same as the activities that ESMA outlines on this White List, i.e., 
to pursue a stand-alone voting agreement in order to improve corporate governance, and that this 
activity would plainly fall within the scope of this list. The Heidelberger Kommentar (2014, p. 1088) 
discusses the scope of acting in concert regarding section 127a AktG, and state that ‘[f]ür die 
Annahme eines ‘acting in concert’ bedarf es gem § 30 Abs 2 S 2 WpÜG bzw § 22 ABs 2 S 2 WpHG entweder 
einer Verständigüng über die Ausübung von Stimmrechten oder eines sonstigen Zusammenwirkens, das mit dem 
Ziel der dauerhaften und erheblichen Änderung der unternehmerischen Ausrichtung der AG erfolgt’. In other 
words, to ‘acting in concert’ is either an agreement on the exercise of voting rights or another form 
of cooperation with the goal of permanently and substantially changing the company strategy 
required. The authors argue that the shareholder forum ‘nur eine punktuelle Koordination für Einzelfällen 
zulasst’, i.e., it enables selective coordination for individual cases, it would not create any problems 
in and of itself, but could fall under the ‘acting in concert’ category in particular cases.    
It seems that the current legal framework offers room for these kinds of initiatives. That said, 
European scholars and politicians have been very sceptical of the decoupling of voting rights in 
the past. Implementing a European shareholder forum, probably involving a proxy solicitation 
system, including some necessary clarifications regarding thereof, would probably be the best 
option.  
                                                     
448 ESMA (2013) Information on shareholder cooperation and acting in concert under the Takeover Bids 
Directive, 12 November 2013, ESMA/2013/142, Public Statement. 
449 In this respect it is interesting to consider the case of the Netherlands, where not the Financial Markets 
Authority (In Dutch: AFM) but the Enterprise Chamber of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal is responsible 
for handling concert-party arrangements. As a judiciary authority, the Enterprise Chamber is not bound by 
the White List. One may refer to De Brauw et al. (2013). Moreover, it cannot provide guidance to 
shareholders in an ad hoc manner, like other national authorities. See ESMA (2013), Appendix A.  
450 Paragraph 4.2 of the ESMA information document adds that if shareholders cooperate to engage in an 
activity not included on the White List, this does not necessarily mean that those shareholders will be 




6.1.2. Institutional Investors 
Whether shareholders such as institutional investors would be willing to put effort into defeating 
a detrimental resolution remains an important question. These shareholders face (soft) regulatory 
pressure to actively monitor the companies they invest in. However, due to large portfolios of 
sometimes thousands of companies, institutional investors usually delegate monitoring to proxy 
advisors. When an institutional investor relies on proxy advisor voting recommendations, the 
recommendation to vote against a particular resolution may signal that it would be beneficial for 
this institutional investor to cooperate with other shareholders. Since institutional investors are 
generally required to form a thoughtful judgment (Schouten, 2012) and may be required to disclose 
how they use proxy advisor recommendations (e.g., UK Stewardship Code Principle 6), 
institutional investors will probably not blindly follow their advice, although studies found low 
deviation rates from this advice (Schouten, 2012; Cotter, Palmiter and Thomas, 2010). Moreover, 
as we have seen before, additional action may come at a cost. We therefore expect institutional 
investors to (at least to some extent) carefully weigh costs and benefits before engaging in 
coordination efforts.  
In practice we find some form of cooperation among institutional investors as well. In the UK, 
institutional investors recognize the collective action problem. For these institutional investors, the 
exit strategy is not an option as it would imbalance their portfolios and/or cause a fall in the value 
of their investments (Prentice, 2011). As a result, institutional investors have set up the Institutional 
Shareholders’ Committee (ISC). This committee advises shareholders on their rights, and deals 
with, inter alia, company monitoring. It acts according to its voting rules. Principle 3 of ‘The 
Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders and Agents – Statement of Principles’ holds that: 
‘[i]nstitutional shareholders and/or agents, either directly or through contracted research providers, 
will review Annual Reports and Accounts, other circulars, and general meeting resolutions. They 
may attend company meetings where they may raise questions about investee companies’ affairs. 
Also investee companies will be monitored to determine when it is necessary to enter into an active 
dialogue with the investee company’s board and senior management. This monitoring needs to be 
regular, and the process needs to be clearly communicable and checked periodically for its 
effectiveness. Monitoring may require sharing information with other shareholders or agents and 
agreeing a common course of action’. 
In accordance with the Steward Ship Code, institutional investors in the UK are required to 
vote with ‘all shares held’ (principle 6). The aforementioned initiative and this rule substantially 
reduce the coordination problem for (small) shareholders in the UK. As we have seen in the 
previous chapters of our research, small shareholder voter turnout is relatively high. One may note 
that also the new Shareholder Rights Directive (adopted in March 2017) may reduce small 
shareholder coordination problems; it puts more emphasis on the long-term engagement of 
institutional investors and asset managers, for instance with the introduction of transparency 
requirements. These new provisions may substantially reduce small shareholder coordination 




6.2. Thresholds  
6.2.1. Lowering Thresholds  
One of the solutions to the public good problem that has been advocated in the literature is the 
introduction of a threshold. As we have seen, a threshold transforms a public good problem into 
a coordination problem. Shareholder voting games already include thresholds at which a particular 
resolution will be passed. We have also seen that lower thresholds are more attainable, which is 
quite intuitive since it is easier for small active shareholders to coordinate on a lower threshold. 
This relationship may imply that qualified majorities for particular resolutions such as RPT or 
director remuneration and elections are desirable for companies with more concentrated ownership 
structures. A similar solution that completely solves the coordination problem can be found in the 
UK Listing Rules; ‘independent’ shareholders have the right to vote separately on the election of 
independent directors in companies that have a controlling shareholder (UK Listing Rule 9.2.2AR 
jo 9.2.2ER, cf. supra, chapter 2 of this research).  
 
6.2.2. Adding Thresholds 
It is also possible to add an additional threshold to the shareholder voting game. Quite recently two 
new corporate governance tools have been introduced which impose a similar effect: UK Rule 
E.2.2 and the Australian Two-Strikes rule.  
In September 2014, the UK Financial Reporting Council (FRC) introduced a new version of 
the UK Corporate Governance Code, including a new paragraph of provision E.2.2. With this new 
rule, companies must explain how they intend to engage with concerned shareholders when a 
significant proportion of the votes, in the opinion of the board, are against a particular resolution. 
With this rule the FRC is asking companies to give “a clear signal” upon publication of the voting 
results that they will initiate engagement with opposing shareholders (2014, p. 7). As a general 
guideline, according to the GC100 & Investor Group (2013), more than 20% of the votes against 
can be considered significant. That said, higher or lower levels may be more fitting depending on 
the situation (2013, p. 29). A similar guideline has not yet been indicated by the FRC.  
The other rule, the Australian ‘two-strikes rule’, was introduced in 2011 in section 250U-250Y 
of the Australian Corporation Act (hereinafter: ACA). It holds that when the remuneration report 
is opposed by 25% or more shareholders for two years in a row at the AGM, shareholders vote 
during the second AGM on whether all directors, except for the chief executive officer or managing 
director, should stand for re-election (the ‘spill resolution’, section 250V ACA). If this spill 
resolution passes with a simple voting majority, a new general meeting (the ‘spill meeting’) will be 
organised within 90 days to re-elect these directors. A minimum of three directors should remain 
after the spill meeting (section 201A(2) ACA). The two directors that received the highest 
proportions of votes in favour will stay on the corporate board (250X ACA) along with the CEO. 
And, in case the company fails to hold this spill meeting within 90 days of the spill resolution being 
passed, all incumbent board members of the company after these 90 days commit an offense.451 
                                                     
451 Monem and Ng (2013) and MacMillan (2012) noticed an ‘incongruity’ of the two-strikes rule; whereas 
‘key management personnel’ and closely related parties are not allowed to vote on the remuneration report 
following section 250R(4) of the Australian Corporations Act, they are permitted to vote at the spill meeting 
(in accordance with section 250V(2), subsection 250R(4) applies also in relation to the spill resolution). 
Monem and Ng (2013) use the Crown Limited case to illustrate the situation. At the time a majority of 
shareholder voted against the remuneration report, but its core shareholder, the executive chairman of 
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This law was passed in in 2011. Nomen and Ng (2013) investigated it in practice and found that 
111 companies received a strike in 2011; 122 in 2012. The authors state that for 22 of the 105 
companies in their sample that received a strike in 2012 were receiving their second one.452  
These two new corporate governance rules, Rule E.2.2 and the two-strikes rule, add a second 
lower threshold to the shareholder coordination game. The rules are in fact somewhat weaker 
versions of rules that either implement a qualified majority or provide a separate vote to small 
shareholders: in both situations lowered thresholds makes coordination easier, though the payoffs 
for small shareholders are different. To illustrate the possible effects of the E.2.2 rule and two-
strike rule, we can add an additional threshold (in terms of the critical mass) denoted by  ?̂? to our 
model. Note that this threshold is strictly lower than the critical mass to dismiss the resolution, and 
hence: ?̂? < 𝑚. If shareholders assign some positive value to reaching this threshold, there will be 
a large probability that this lower threshold is reached. However, if the lower threshold is reached, 
the detrimental resolution may still be accepted and the profits of the company will still be sub-
optimal.  
How can reaching this lower threshold with a lower pay-off become a solution to the 
shareholder coordination game? There can be several ways how this additional threshold increases 
small shareholder turnout in general. First of all, if the positive value of reaching the lower 
threshold is sufficiently high, this additional threshold adds another situation to the game in which 
a small shareholder expects to make the difference and exercises his voting rights. Hence, it 
increases the probability that a small shareholder decides to attend the meeting. Next, reaching this 
lower threshold can establish a credible signal to small shareholders that their vote during next year's 
AGM can make the difference. If enough shareholders are triggered by this signal, then these rules 
may be the solution to the shareholder coordination problem. Yet another possibility is that 
reaching this threshold imposes sufficiently high reputation or other costs on the blockholder. In 
the case of the UK rule, it is unclear whether it would pose additional (reputation) costs on the 
blockholder. On the other hand, the Australian two-strikes rule clearly imposes large costs on 
blockholders that control the company's board. Nevertheless, these additional thresholds can also 
increase minority shareholder opportunities to engage in opportunistic behaviour.   
                                                     
Crown Limited with a 46% stake, declared the re-election of the entire board at the spill meeting after a 
second strike. 
452 Egan Associates (2015) provides more recent data on the Australian two-strikes rule. The authors 
describe that 11 Australian companies received their first strike during the 2015 AGM season. Mortgage 
Choice received a second strike as a result of protests against the 100% short-term incentive pay to the 
former CEO Michael Russell. UGL also received a second strike: 45% of the shareholders voted against the 
remuneration report. The spill resolution was defeated in both cases.  Egan Associates also describes that 




7. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
7.1. Conclusions 
Small shareholder voting suffers from coordination problems. Since shareholders are able to free-
ride on other shareholders' monitoring decisions, few shareholders will exercise their voting rights 
during AGMs. Thus, large shareholders without a de jure controlling stake can become controlling 
blockholders in practice. We have explored the features of small shareholder voting, using a model 
that allows for different shareholder preferences. When the willingness to vote is sufficiently high, 
shareholders can end up in the Pareto efficient equilibrium. And, if small shareholders are not able 
to block the a blockholder’s resolution due to coordination failures, transferring voting rights up 
to the critical mass from inactive to active shareholders can be optimal. We found that for some 
parameter values active shareholders will indeed buy (or borrow) the voting rights of the inactive 
shareholders, but that this solution gives rise to new coordination problems in most cases.  
Regulation that facilitates communication between small (active) shareholders is likely to 
enhance the ability of small shareholders to defeat an opportunistic blockholder and thus reach the 
optimal outcome. Companies can promote online shareholder communication platforms, either at 
the company level like the club des actionnaires in France, or at the national level, like the 
Aktionärsforum in Germany. Focussing on institutional investors in this respect may also be helpful. 
Another option is to focus on voting thresholds. We have seen that it is easier for small 
shareholders to coordinate at a lower threshold, since the critical mass is lower. As a result, qualified 
majorities also enhance small shareholder voting in situations where they hope to block particular 
resolution. With respect to director elections, we can point to the new UK Listing Rules (LR 
9.2.2AR jo 9.2.2ER) that provides small shareholders with an independent voting poll on 
independent directors (cf. supra, also discussed in chapter 3 of this study).  In addition to lowering 
the threshold in the shareholder voting game, one may also consider adding an additional, lower 
threshold. The result of reaching this lower threshold may be a lower pay-off for small shareholders 
(Rule E.2.2 and the Australian two-strikes rule), but such a rule may still stimulate small shareholder 
voting.  
 
7.2. Discussion and Policy Implications  
Corporate governance tools that focus on thresholds, for instance qualified majority rules, but also 
the new UK Listing Rules (LR 9.2.2AR jo 9.2.2ER) are examples of strong solutions to these 
coordination problems. However, it is important to note that they may also cause some problems 
as they may impede decision-making. Moreover, companies are heterogeneous, including in their 
shareholder structure. A one-size-fits-all corporate governance approach is therefore not suitable. 
Instead, governments may consider adopting rules for companies with concentrated ownership 
structures (like the UK Listing Rule) in national corporate governance codes that usually follow the 
comply-or-explain principle (soft law approach). One may also consider adopting a corporate 
governance approach like the E.2.2 Rule (UK) or the two-strikes rule (Australia): these rules in fact 
impose an additional threshold in the shareholder voting game that, when attained, generates a 
lower payoff to small shareholders.  Nonetheless, we recommend that future studies evaluate 
empirically whether an additional threshold would positively affect voter turnout rates. 
Shareholder communication platforms are neither difficult nor costly to implement and may 
generate large results, but it can be questioned that the existing examples of shareholder 
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communication platforms are sufficient to foster shareholder coordination. Further research is 
needed on the particular needs of (small) shareholders regarding these communication platforms 
to establish their optimal form. Regarding the role of institutional investors, it should be noted that 
the new Shareholder Rights Directive (adopted in March 2017) will put more emphasis on the long-
term engagement of these shareholders with the introduction of, for instance, transparency 
requirements. The introduction of a rule like principle 6 of the UK Steward Ship Code, which 
requires institutional investors to vote with ‘all shares held’, in countries with more concentrated 
ownership structures may also reduce shareholder coordination problems.  
Lastly, it is important to note that the proposed solutions are not only applicable to situations 
with opportunistic blockholders but are also desirable in cases where small shareholders want to 





APPENDIX CHAPTER 5 
A.1. Maximum Cost Amounts 
 
In this appendix we show the maximum amounts of c for each value of t (when wb = 0.3 and 0.4). 
When 𝜌?̅? ≠ 0, the curves in this figure will shift upwards with 𝜌?̅?𝑠𝐵, thereby increasing the 
maximum level of cost c for which the small shareholders are able to defeat the opposition. In this 
figure we have set the value of  𝜌?̅?𝑠𝐵 equal to 0.15, but this is a completely arbitrary amount (shown 
as the upper-curve for each wb).  
 
FIGURE A.1. 
Maximum Amounts of c for Given t (wb= 0.3 or 0.4, 𝜌?̅? = 0 or > 0) 
Note: this figure shows the maximum values of c for different values of t so that small shareholders are able 
to defeat the blockholder (holding either a stake of 40% or 30%).  The expected benefits from voting, 




CHAPTER 6 - SHAREHOLDER DIALOGUE: ASSESSING THE RELEVANCE OF DUTCH AGMS 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this chapter we are among the first to investigate the actual course of affairs in AGMs with respect to shareholder 
forum rights. In the first part of the chapter we provide descriptive statistics on the use of the right to ask questions 
and speak in AGMs in the Netherlands. We find that in an average meeting there are around 42 questions and 
remarks made by around 8 shareholders. Most of these questions and remarks seem to be relevant: with a 
categorization framework of 14 topics we could already identify over 50% of these questions and remarks. We also 
find that private investor interests in these 14 topic categories generally reflect those of the entire shareholder base. 
Next, we consider the determinants of the use of these forum rights. In several panel data analyses with a Poisson 
distribution and a negative binomial distribution we, inter alia, found that the ‘importance of the meeting’ generally 
contributes to the amount of questions and remarks and the number of shareholders that actively engage in discussions. 
We have also found that the number of speakers – and the number of private investors – that actively attend the 
AGM depends on previous attendance numbers. This may imply that there is a small base of very active (private) 
investors in the Netherlands. We conclude that the forum function of AGMs is definitely relevant.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in the introduction, the role of the AGM can be divided into three functions. In this 
chapter we evaluate one of these functions in particular; the forum function. As we have seen in 
the first chapter, the right to ask questions was implemented at the European level with the 
Shareholder Rights Directive, although many countries provided this right already before the 
implementation of this Directive.453 Whereas larger shareholders and particular types of 
shareholders such as institutional investors often have the opportunity to engage in one-on-one 
meetings with the corporate board (e.g., Van der Elst, 2011; Tiemstra and De Keijzer, 2008), the 
AGM is generally the only place for smaller shareholders, including private investors, to ask their 
questions and voice their concerns.454 The forum function of the AGM thus contributes to the 
ability of all shareholders to make informed decisions on the proposals that are on the agenda.  
Although the forum function seems to be important on paper, scholars have criticized this 
function of AGMs, arguing that these meetings generally lack a meaningful dialogue and that 
relevant issues are usually not discussed (for instance, see Klaassen, 2011455; Short and Keasey, 
1999). Minority shareholders are often considered the cause of these problems.   
                                                     
453 One may note that there is no similar provision in US law, but it is common practice to have discussions 
and questions. See Pinto (2008).  
454 We have seen that in France, shareholders – acting individually or in concert – that hold at least a certain 
stake are able to submit written questions to the chairman of the (management) board regarding the 
operations of the company or its subsidiaries at all times ex article L.225-231 jo L.225-120 FCC. The 
questions must be answered within a month ex L.225-231(2) and the reply must be sent to the registered 
auditor as well. If the questions are not (satisfactorily) answered, shareholders may require the appointment 
of one or more experts. The requirements for these stakes are:  5% of the voting rights for capital less than 
750,000 euros; 4% for over 750,000 euros and up to 4,500,000 euros; 3% over 4,500,000 euros and up to 
7,500,000 euros; 2% over 7,500,000 euros and up to 15,000,000 euros; 1% over 15,000,000 euros (cf. supra, 
chapter 1, section 4.1). This law does not exist in the Netherlands.  
455 Klaassen starts by stating that everyone who has ever been to one or more (Dutch) AGMs probably has 
wondered whether such a meeting cannot become more efficient. She notes that many shareholders make 
use of their right to speak during AGMs, which per Klaassen leads sometimes to questions and other 
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Despite these criticisms, scholars have remained rather silent about what actually happens at 
AGMs. Only very few scholars (to our knowledge) have discussed some empirics in the past. As 
we have seen in the introduction chapter, Shilling (2001) studies the results from around 100 
interviews with supervisory board members of large German corporations and Apostolides (2007) 
discusses the actual course of affairs during 22 AGMs in the UK since 2001. In addition, Van der 
Elst (2012) investigates the questions that were asked during the 2011 AGMs of 81 listed 
companies in the Netherlands. He concludes that the right to ask questions is of importance to 
small private shareholders and their representatives. De Jong, Mertens and Roosenboom (2003) 
investigate 245 AGMs of Dutch companies that are part of the AEX-25 or AMX-25 in the period 
1998-2002 and find that on average around ten shareholders speak in these AGMs. Accordingly, 
they conclude that only few shareholders use their right to speak in practice. The authors also find 
that most questions are regarding the strategy of the company. During the 2002 AGMs more 
questions were asked about the auditing, which, according to the authors, can be explained by the 
large accounting scandals in that period. Klaassen (2011) briefly evaluates the duration of Dutch 
AGMs, and finds that Dutch meetings take on average 2 hours and 43 minutes: the shortest took 
15 minutes and the longest 8.5 hours (she explains that this was the 2008 Fortis EGM to inform 
the shareholders of the state interferences at the time). She concludes that limiting the speaking 
time of shareholders will not be necessary in a large majority of the cases (p. 74). Next, in an early 
empirical study on Belgian AGMs, Van der Elst and Wymeersch (1997) investigate the use of the 
right to ask questions using a questionnaire (65 companies, including 17 listed companies). The 
authors find that shareholders have used this right at 75% of the AGMs in their sample. Most 
questions concern the board’s report or ‘general questions’ (p. 83). Most questions were asked by 
‘andere natuurlijke personen’, including private investors. Institutional investors asked questions in the 
AGMs of around 30% of the companies.  
The objective of this (at least to some extent) pioneering research is, first, to reveal what actually 
happens at AGMs. We investigate how, and to what extent, shareholders make use of their forum 
rights in the Netherlands. To do so, we investigate the meeting documents for a sample of Dutch 
AEX-25 and AMX-25 companies for the years 2004-2015 (unbalanced panel data set, cf. infra, table 
1, section 2.1). The DCGC 2008 (as well as the 2003 version) provides the opportunity to study 
these questions, as it requires companies to provide the shareholders, upon request, with the 
‘report’ of the general meeting (Principle IV.3.10). There is no specific obligation for companies to 
disclose this information to the public. It is nonetheless common practice for companies to upload 
detailed minutes on their websites. We show our descriptive findings and develop a categorization 
framework to investigate the content of the meeting documents. We also consider whether the 
factors that contribute to the turnout decision of (small) shareholders (cf. supra, chapter 3 of this 
research), also drive the use of the shareholder forum rights, to see whether the AGM’s forum 
function is relevant or not.  
 
1.1.  Dutch Law  
Dutch law already granted the right to ask questions in AGMs (article 2:107(2) DCC) prior to the 
implementation of the Shareholder Rights Directive (since 1971), which enables us to begin our 
                                                     
remarks that are not (entirely) related to the agenda, such as questions regarding parking tickets and lunch, 
which, according to Klaassen, may harm the good course of AGMs. 
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sample period a. few years before the introduction of this Directive.456 Article 2:117(1) DCC 
provides individual shareholders with the general right to speak during general meetings. Article 
2:107(2) DCC stipulates that the management board and supervisory board shall provide the AGM 
with all requested information, unless a substantial company interest opposes to this. Although this 
provision does not explicitly state that this right belongs to individual shareholders, we have seen 
in chapter one that it is the consensus among Dutch scholars that this right indeed belongs to 
individual shareholders, at least after the implementation of the Shareholder Rights Directive under 
Dutch law (ASMI-case, Hoge Raad 9 July 2010, JOR 2010, 228, cf. supra, chapter 1, section 4.1). It 
follows from our data that it was already common practice before the implementation as well. With 
the implementation of the Shareholder Rights Directive (2007/36/EC), the Dutch legislature gave 
an example of a ‘substantial interest’ to show that these terms have the same meaning as the 
grounds for refusal in the Shareholder Rights Directive: information that may harm the 
competitiveness of the company.457 Whether or not the term ‘substantial interest’, should be 
interpreted in a broad or narrow way is not entirely clear. Scholars generally argue that the refusal 
of an answer should only be exceptional,458 which is in line with practice in the UK. 
We have also seen that article 2:107(2) DCC does not limit the right to ask questions to the 
meeting agenda items in contrast to the Shareholder Rights Directive. In the ASMI-case, the Dutch 
Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) ruled that shareholders may also ask questions that are not related to 
the meeting’s agenda (Hoge Raad 9 July 2010, JOR 2010, 228).459  
There are no legal provisions under Dutch law that explicitly allow the chairman to limit 
shareholder question rights, in contrast to German law (cf. supra, chapter one, section 4.1.).460 The 
role of the chairman is not defined in the DCC either. Klaassen (2011, p. 67) argues that the 
chairman of the AGM, in accordance with standards of reasonableness and fairness, can limit 
shareholder speaking time during the meeting. In an earlier version of the revised DCGC (2008), 
the Corporate Governance Committee proposed provision that included the explicit authority of 
the chairman of the meeting to limit the speaking time of shareholders (cf. supra, section 4 of chapter 
1). In the consultation round some concerned parties opposed this provision, including the VEB 
(‘Association for Securities Holders’, also see Klaassen, 2011, p. 69). One of the arguments against 
the proposed provision was that, according to the VEB, there has not been any investigation on 
which this proposal is based (VEB, 2008, p. 8). However, as we discussed in chapter 1, the 
provision was not adopted in the final version of the DCGC 2008 as there was no need for it 
(Nowak, 2009).  
 
                                                     
456 For a more extensive overview of the Dutch law one may refer to chapter 1 of this research. 
457 This example is in line with the ‘business interests’ as mentioned in the Shareholder Rights Directive. 
Kamerstukken II (2008-2009) 31746, nr.3 (Memorie van Toelichting), p. 15. 
458 For example, one may refer to Van Solinge and Nieuwe Weme (2009), no. 327.  
459 In practice, however, most questions will concern the meeting’s agenda anyway. As we have seen in 
chapter 2 and 3 of our research – agendas usually contain several voting and discussion items, including the 
discussion of the annual report, which in turn covers a broad range of topics (including for example the 
remuneration report, corporate social responsibility topics, etc.). 
460 In an earlier version of the revised DCGC 2008 the provision specifically included the chairman’s power 
to limit shareholder speaking time. In a later stage this provision was again removed. Nowak (2009) claims 
that this provision was not important, as it prescribed common practice.  
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1.2. Outline of this Chapter 
The chapter continues as follows. First, we outline our research method and explain our sample 
selection in section 2. In section 3 we conduct a descriptive study, and investigate the number of 
questions and remarks, the types of shareholders that actively participate in AGMs, and the content 
of the questions and remarks for our sample of Dutch AGMs. Afterwards, in section 4 we consider 
the factors that may contribute to the use of forum rights of (private) shareholders in several count 
data models. Section 5 provides conclusions and a discussion of policy implications.  
 
2. SAMPLE SELECTION AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
2.1.  Research Sample 
Part of our research involves some text mining techniques. As a result, we included meeting 
documents in only one language (Dutch) in our sample.461 The sample consists of those companies 
that cumulatively complied with the requirements that; i) the company be listed in the Netherlands 
either at the AEX-25 or AMX-25 for at least one year in the period 2004-2015, and; ii) the company 
discloses a Dutch version of the minutes of the general meeting for at least one year between 2004 
and 2015. We gathered the meeting documents from the company websites, contacted investor 
relation departments and used Van der Elst’s database. Eventually, 78 companies fulfilled the 
aforementioned sample requirements, which resulted in a sample of 556 AGMs. These companies 




















                                                     
461 Dutch meeting documents provide us with the largest sample size, and those are the ones we choose to 
analyse. Lately, some large Dutch listed companies have started to publish the minutes of their AGMs in 
English. Other, more international companies such as RELX and Heineken have already been publishing 
their documents in English for quite some years. However, a large majority of Dutch listed companies still 
publish their meeting documents (also) in Dutch.    
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TABLE 1  
Sample of AEX and AMX companies (2004-2015) 
# Company Years # Company Years 
1 Aalberts Industrie  2008-2015 40 Nedap  2011, 2015 
2 Accell Group  2007-2015 41 Neways 2004-2015 
3 Acomo 2015 42 Nieuwe Steen Investments   2008-2010, 2012-2015 
4 Aegon  2004-2015 43 Nationale Nederlanden  2015 
5 Ahold  2008-2009, 2011-
2013, 2015 
44 Nutreco  2004-2009, 2013-2015 
6 Ajax  2005-2008, 2014 45 OCE  2005-2009 
7 Arcadis  2004-2007, 2010-2015 46 Oranjewoud  
 
2008, 2010-2015 
8 ASM International   2006-2015 47 Ordina  2004, 2006-2015 
9 Ballast Nedam  2004-2015 48 Pharming Group  2009-2015 
10 BAM Groep, 
Koninklijke  
2004-2015 49 Philips  2004-2015 
11 Batenburg  2007-2015 50 Post NL  2010-2015 
12 Beter Bed  2007-2015 51 Qurius  2004-2009, 2011-2013 
13 Binck Bank  2009-2015 52 Randstad  2008-2015 
14 Boskalis Westminster  2007, 2009-2015 53 RotoSmeets  2004-2009  
15 Brunel International  2005, 2007-2015 54 Royal Delft  2011-2015 
16 Corbion (CSM) 2010-2015 55 Royal Imtech  2004-2014 
17 Corio  2004-2008 2010, 
2011, 2014 
56 SBM Offshore  2008-2013 
18 CTAC  2005-2007, 2010-2015 57 Sligro Food group  2007-2015 
19 CVG  2004, 2006-2009 58 SNS Reaal   2007-2012 
20 Delta Lloyd  2010-2015 59 Spyker  2005 
21 Docdata 2006-2015 60 Stern  2009, 2013-2015 
22 DPA  2010-2015 61 Super de Boer   2004-2009 
23 DSM  2005-2015 62 Ten Cate  2005-2015 
24 Eurocommercial 
Properties  
2007-2013 63 TKH Group  2008-2015 
25 Exact Holding  2005-2014 64 TNT  2009-2011 
26 Fugro  2007-2015 65 TNT Express   2012-2015 
27 Gamma  2004-2010 66 TMG 2005-2009, 2011, 2012-
2013, 2015 
28 Grontmij  2005, 2008-2015 67 TomTom  2015 
29 Groot 
Handelsgebouw 
2008, 2010-2014 68 Unilever  2009 
30 Heineken  2008-2011, 2013-2015 69 Unit4  2007-2010, 2012-2013 
31 Holland Colours  2006-2011, 2013-2015 70 USG People  2004-2010, 2012-2015 
32 ICT Aut  2004-2015 71 Value8   2007-2012, 2014-2015 
33 ING  2004-2012 72 Vastned Retail    2008-2015 
34 Kasbank  2010-2014 73 Vopak  2008-2015 
35 Kendrion  2008-2015 74 Wavin  2008, 2009 
36 Koninklijke Brill  2008, 2011-2015  75 Wegener  2004, 2006, 2008, 2009 
37 KPN  2008-2015 76 Wereldhave  2007-2015 
38 Lucas Bols 2015 77 Wessanen  2006-2008, 2010-2015 
39 Macintosh  2008-2015 78 Wolters Kluwer  2005-2015 
 
The panel data set used in this chapter is unbalanced as shown in table 1. We have in total 78 
different companies over a 12-year period (T=12). The mean period of the companies in our sam-






In this part of the research, we investigate how and to what extent the shareholder’s right to ask 
questions and to speak in AGMs is used in practice. Although this may sound rather straight 
forward, there are several complications.  
First, questions and remarks are often hard to differentiate and are usually just a matter of 
framing.462 For example, shareholders may make several remarks to introduce their question. Also, 
consider the following example of a remark that was made in the 2007 AGM of ING NV: 
‘[aandeelhouder] suggereert in dit verband dat het opkomst percentage ook kan worden verhoogd door de AVA-
vergaderingen van de verschillende beursfondsen beter te spreiden’ (translation: [shareholder] suggests that, in 
this context, the turnout rate could also be increased if the AGMs of listed companies are planned 
on more different dates). Although formally, a suggestion is not a question, the chairman of the 
meeting gives this shareholder an answer.463 This, but also because remarks are an important 
instrument for shareholder voice and the Dutch forum right also involves the right to speak, has 
led us to decide to consider both questions and remarks. 
The second complication has to do with follow-up questions and remarks. Since some follow-
up questions and remarks may include requests for clarification or address the incompleteness of 
a provided answer, while others may address a different aspect following an answer, we cannot 
record every follow-up remark or question in the same way. Moreover, follow-up questions (and 
remarks) may also be posed by other shareholders. In order to process the data as soundly as 
possible, we followed the following rules: i) follow-up questions and remarks without any new 
elements464 are considered to be the same question or remark: the text of these follow-up questions 
and remarks is added to the case of the initial question or remark; ii) follow-up questions and 
remarks that address a new element, which was not discussed in the initial question or remark, are 
processed as a new entry; and iii) follow-up questions and remarks by a shareholder other than the 
shareholder that posed the initial question or made the initial remark are always considered as a 
separate question or remark. Lastly, shareholders or proxy holders voting statements without any 
explanation or argumentation whatsoever are not considered as a question or remark.  
Our main data sources, i.e., the minutes of the AGMs, also entail some complications: whereas 
some minutes contain the recordings of the meeting, others are merely a summary of what has 
been said and asked. Only in the first case does our data contain the full quotes of the shareholders. 
Although part of the research in this chapter focuses on the content of the questions and remarks 
(cf. infra, section 3.2), this has no large impact on our results as we chose to analyse the data based 
                                                     
462 In this regard, one may refer to the opinion of the BGH (cf. supra, chapter 1): Regarding the distinction 
between the right to ask questions and the right to speak, the BGH concluded that this is not necessary 
according to the wording of the law and the aim of the legislature (paragraph 31 of the verdict), and in 
practice such a distinction would not be easy: ‘Angesichts dieser Abgrenzungsproblematik ist es nicht nur zulässig, 
sondern sachgerecht, die Einschätzung und eine ggf. entsprechend abgestufte Behandlung dem pflichtgemäß auszuübenden 
Ermessen des Versammlungsleiters im konkreten Einzelfall zu überlassen’ (paragraph 32 of the verdict). Case Karl-
Walter Freitag/Biotest AG (2010).  
463 Whereas remarks are often treated as questions, sometimes, for example the 2004 ING NV AGM, 
remarks do not receive any response. 
464 These ‘any new elements’ are subject to the author’s considerations, and, unfortunately, are thus subject 
to the author’s choice by nature.  One may note that these (text) data (or data whatsoever) are always biased 
at least to some extent (in this respect one may also refer to the ‘closure principle’, Van Steen, 2016).  
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on keyword categorization. In our categorization framework we distinguish 14 different topics for 
shareholder questions and remarks (displayed in table A.1 of the appendix). In section 3.2.2 we 
further explain this framework.  
In our analyses in the next sections we also consider different types of shareholders, which we 
divide in different categories. Three common shareholder associations usually ask questions on 
behalf of private shareholders. These are: VEB, VBDO (‘Association for investors of sustainable 
development’) and Stichting rechtsbescherming beleggers (‘Foundation legal protection investors’). 
Besides these three shareholder organisations, we also include the category ‘institutional investors 
and other funds’, which includes banks, pension funds, investment funds and insurance companies, 
asset managers and other financial institutions or portfolio investors (same category as used in 
chapter 2 and 3). Since the forum right is aimed at all shareholders we also evaluate its use by 
private investors.  
In section 4 of this chapter we conduct several panel data models to determine which factors 
contribute to the use of shareholder forum rights. We use the Poisson distribution and censored 
models. In this section, we discuss these models, including the dependent and independent 
variables that we consider. In the next section we first provide descriptive information about the 
use of these forum rights. From now on, when we refer to ‘questions’ in our empirical analysis, we 
mean all questions, remarks, and follow-up questions and remarks as explained in this section (see 
also table 6 of this chapter).  
 
3. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE FORUM RIGHT 
In this section we provide a descriptive analysis of the use of forum rights by different types of 
shareholders. In the next section we consider the number of questions and remarks that are posed 
or made by shareholders. Then, in section 3.2, we evaluate the topics that are discussed, including 
some remarkable dialogues.  
 
3.1. Questions  
In the 566 AGMs that we investigated an average 8.3 different shareholders asked 42.1 questions 
on average (standard deviations are respectively 4.1 and 21.3). This average amount of speakers is 
somewhat lower than the numbers reported in the study of De Jong, Mertens and Roosenboom 
(2003). Following these authors, we can also conclude that not many shareholders make use of 
their right to pose questions during AGMs in the Netherlands. However, shareholders that do use 
this right usually ask several questions. The total number of questions for all our observations is 
23,845. In table 2 we display the average number of questions, and the number of different 
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Table 2 shows that the average number of questions was the lowest in 2007 with 36.5; 2004 was 
the year with the highest average number of questions with an average amount of over 50, but the 
sample size is the smallest for this year and the standard deviation is rather high. In fact, all standard 
deviations are rather high (between 16.7 and 28.1 for all years), which indicates that there is large 
variation in the use of the question right among companies. When we look at the sample range 
reported in column four of table 2, we see that there are some notable outliers (for instance, we 
recorded 205 questions of one the AGMs in 2013). In section four we evaluate which factors 
contribute to this large variation. Next, we consider the number of shareholders that actively 
                                                     
465 Since we consider all companies that are listed for at least one year at either the AEX-25 or the AMX-25 
the number of companies per year in our sample can be higher than 2 times 25 (cf. supra, section 2.1).  
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participate in the AGMs. Table 2 shows that the mean is around 7 to 9 on average. The ranges that 
are reported in the table show us that the highest number of shareholders that actively participated 
in the AGM was 33. At the 2010 Rotosmeets AGM none of the shareholders made use of his 
forum rights. We also discern a large variation among the observations for the number of speakers, 
a phenomenon we will further investigate in the fourth section.  
We also consider the variation among the companies in our sample. We noted that the ING 
NV AGMs were rather active, as on average almost 23 different shareholders engage in discussions, 
whereas shareholders were relatively inactive at the DPA Group NV AGMs (around 3 shareholders 
engage in discussions on average). Shareholders at Ahold NV, KPN and Royal Imtech AGMs were 
also relatively active (over 13 different shareholders pose questions on average in these meetings). 
In contrast, at USG People NV, Value8 NV and Rotosmeets NV meetings relatively few 
shareholders engage in discussions (all less than 5 shareholders on average).  
Next, we look at the type of shareholders that are active at AGMs. Table 3 shows the average 
number of questions per AGM per type of shareholder. The last column shows the average number 
of different private investors who asked one or more questions at the AGMs in our sample. One 
may note that the standard deviations (which are shown between parentheses) are quite high. For 
example, the average number of questions per meeting posed by private investors for the entire 
sample is 16, but the standard deviation is 13, which indicates a large variation between 
observations. The average number of private investors who pose questions or have marks in AGMs 
is around 5 for our entire sample (with a standard deviation of 3.3). As we have seen, the average 
number of shareholders (all types) that pose questions and/or make comments is 8.3 for our entire 
sample. This indicates, that, on average, at least half of the shareholders that speak during these 
meetings are private investors. However, since the average amount of questions is 42.2, we also 
know that, on average, these private investors ask less than half of all the questions during the 
meetings. As table 3 indicates, the VEB, as a representative of many other shareholders, actively 
uses its right to speak at the AGM in the Netherlands. Institutional investors and other funds are 







Average amount of questions and remarks per type of shareholder (s.d between parentheses) 











2004 14.6 1.7 2.2 10.6 23.7 6.5 
 
(10.5) (2.5) (4.6) (13.5) (17.5) (4.6) 
2005 11.8 1.5 2.3 5.9 15.5 5.2 
 
(10.2) (2.5) (5.8) (6.8) (10.6) (3.9) 
2006 13.0 1.5 3.5 5.5 17.0 5.0 
 
(11.7) (2.3) (6.4) (7.3) (13.4) (3.4) 
2007 11.4 1.1 1.6 7.3 13.7 4.2 
 
(6.3) (2.6) (4.1) (12.6) (11.0) (2.7) 
2008 12.1 1.6 2.3 10.4 17.2 4.9 
 
(7.1) (3.4) (4.2) (22.1) (16.5) (3.8) 
2009 11.2 3.5 3.1 8.2 17.2 5.2 
 
(5.3) (5.0) (5.1) (11.3) (12.4) (3.6) 
2010 12.1 3.9 2.8 4.9 14.7 4.7 
 
(8.1) (4.2) (5.2) (8.6) (12.3) (3.4) 
2011 12.6 3.5 3.6 6.5 13.8 4.5 
 
(8.5) (3.1) (5.4) (10.0) (12.0) (3.2) 
2012 12.9 4.1 3.0 4.5 14.4 4.1 
 
(8.2) (3.3) (5.0) (7.9) (11.6) (3.5) 
2013 13.5 4.4 3.0 5.6 16.8 4.7 
 
(8.3) (3.9) (5.0) (8.0) (14.5) (2.9) 
2014 12.1 3.8 3.0 4.5 15.1 4.8 
 
(8.6) (3.9) (4.6) (8.2) (12.1) (3.1) 
2015 11.6 2.6 3.1 5.5 16.6 4.7 
 
(7.4) (2.7) (4.5) (10.0) (11.6) (2.8) 
Total 12.3 3.0 2.8 6.5 15.9 4.8 
 
(8.1) (3.7) (4.9) (11.5) (13.0) (3.3) 
Note: the table shows the average number of questions and remarks and standard deviation per type of 
shareholder per meeting (columns ‘mean’) and the average number of private shareholders that posed 
questions or made comments during the meetings (column ‘#’). 
 
The AGM offers every shareholder the opportunity to ask questions and speak. Table 3 provides us 
with some important insights into this matter. First, the table shows that of all types of 
shareholders, private investors ask most of the questions in the AGMs in our sample: the sample 
average for private investors is 15.9. Since the average number of questions is 42.1 in our sample, 
more than one third of the questions stem from private investors. Moreover, representative 
organisations of smaller shareholders, including the VEB, VBDO and Stichting 
Rechtsbescherming Beleggers, comprise a large part of the remaining questions. Our analysis also 
shows that around 5 private investors effectively make use of their forum rights in the AGM on 
average, which is more than half of the sample average of 8.3. These results show that the AGM 
forum function is most important to the small shareholders and their representatives, which 
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accords with the fact that the AGM is usually the only opportunity for these small shareholders to 
voice their concerns and ask questions.  
 
3.2. Discussion Topics  
3.2.1. Discussions in Dutch AGMs 
Next, we consider the topics discussed at the AGMs. As we have seen, one of the main criticisms 
is the lack of relevant questions by, most of all, small private investors (cf. supra, introduction 
chapter). We recognize that during some meetings, small shareholders indeed ask questions or 
make remarks that are not related to the business and governance of the company or the AGM. 
An example of such a remark can be found during the 2015 Ballast Nedam AGM: one of the 
shareholders complimented the chairman of the meeting and expressed his wish that he personally 
does not have to do as much reading for his grandchildren as the chairman had to do during the 
AGM.  Considering that the results in the previous section showed us that there are on average 40 
questions and/or remarks per AGM, in general, a question about the parking tickets, or a friendly 
remark about one’s grandchildren, will not have a large – if any – detrimental impact on the course 
of affairs during an AGM in our opinion. And, if in a particular case the course of the meeting is 
likely to be interrupted, the chairman of the meeting generally has the ability to interfere. For 
instance – and this was the only case that we encountered for our entire sample – at the 2015 
Binckbank AGM the chairman denied a private investor the right to speak: during this meeting, an 
individual shareholder made some personal, emotional complaints regarding a certain Binckbank 
product. The chairman threatened to suspend the meeting and to have this shareholder removed. 
After some remarks from both sides (for instance: ‘het is een ballentent hier, dit is geen klanttevredenheid’, 
translation: ‘this is a snobby firm, this is not customer satisfaction’, or ‘natuurlijk, maar meneer 
[bestuurder], gooit alles in de prullenmand’, translation: ‘of course, but Mr [director] throws it all away’), 
the meeting was resumed. Other issues, such as questions and remarks of employees that also 
bought (one or more) shares are generally, though sometimes briefly, answered (as is the case at 
Ahold and Heineken AGMs).  
We also noted that at a few AGMs the chairman of the meeting indicated (beforehand) that 
the number of questions per shareholder was limited or asked shareholders to pick just a few 
questions (for instance, the 2009 BAM AGM). This request was usually addressed to the 
representatives of the VEB and VBDO: as table 4 shows, the VEB poses most questions of all 
shareholders on average. Individual shareholders were asked to limit their speaking time on only 
two occasions, at the 2006 and 2011 Aegon AGMs. In only two AGMs an individual shareholder 
requested the limitation of speaking time: this was the case during the meetings of Aegon in 2006 
and 2011. Although chairmen at Dutch AGMs can limit shareholder speaking time, such a 
provision is not implemented under Dutch law, our analysis agrees with Klaassen’s (2011): limiting 
shareholder forum rights is not a major issue in practice.   
Although Van Solinge and Nieuwe Weme (2009) argue that a refusal to answer should only be 
exceptional (cf. supra, chapter 1), answers were refused on several occasions. An example is the 2010 
ASMI AGM: during this meeting, the representative of the VEB wanted to ask the external auditor 
a question. The chairman of the meeting prohibited him from asking a question regarding the 
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management of the IT-system.466 One may note that shareholders in the Netherlands do not have 
the (formal) right to address questions to the external auditor. As we have seen in chapter one, 
Belgium is the only Member State that grants this right (of the seven Member States that we 
investigate in this research).467 
  
3.2.2. Categorization Analysis 
In order to evaluate the relevance of the content of Dutch AGM discussions we introduce a 
categorization framework. The complete categorization framework can be found in table A.1 of 
the appendix to this chapter. We distinguished 14 different topic categories for questions and 
remarks. These categories are: annual report, audit, board elections, capital, corporate governance, 
discharge, diversity, dividend, language, legal, protection mechanisms, remuneration, strategy, and 
sustainability. These categories involve topics related to the agenda items (as we have seen in 
chapter 1), including annual report, audit, board elections, capital, discharge, dividend, and 
remuneration. Next, the categories corporate governance (more general category), diversity, 
sustainability, and protection mechanisms contain common subjects in the field of corporate 
governance. The category ‘legal’ contains keywords related to court proceedings and other 
procedures. Lastly, the category ‘language’ contains keywords that are related to the language used 
in the AGM and/or the annual report. As table A.1 shows, we use several keywords for each 
category. For each category we composed a list of keywords to analyse using text mining 
techniques. We identified the number of questions that contained one or more of these keywords 
(every question or remark was recorded once per category if one or more of the keywords from 
that category was included in the text of this question or remark).  
In addition to these 14 categories, we also analyse the tone of voice of shareholders during the 
meetings, using the categories ‘positive’ and ‘negative’, as shown in table A.2 of the appendix. The 
14 topic categories are necessarily incomplete in terms of relevant topics and in terms of the 
keywords included in each of them. When a question or remark is identified, and belongs to one 
(or more) categories, this does not mean that this remark or question is relevant per se. However, it 
provides at least an indication that the question is likely to concern a relevant matter.  
Below we outline the findings of our analyses. We consider the occurrence of the topic 
categories per type of shareholder in table 4. The 14 categories together (denoted by ‘all’, not 
including ‘negative’ and ‘positive’) already cover 54% of all questions at the AGMs (last column 
table 4). Since the keywords contained in these categories are necessarily incomplete, and we only 
consider 14 categories, we expect there to be far more relevant questions than these numbers cover. 
                                                     
466 Note that this case involves the external auditor. Other examples are, inter alia, the 2013 ASMI AGM and 
the 2008 Brunel AGM. In the 2013 ASMI AGM the chairman of the meeting refused to answer a large 
blockholder representative. The chairman stated that: ‘ik denk dat u met het noemen van namen ver buiten uw 
normale gang van zaken gaat. Het is aan de Raad van Commissarissen statutair om haar voorzitter te benoemen en als u nu 
denkt als achttienprocentaandeelhouder om de Raad van Commissarissen te dwingen in een bepaalde richting, dan denk ik dat 
u buiten de orde bent’ (translation: ‘in my opinion you are far beyond your regular course of affairs by 
mentioning names. The supervisory board appoints its chairman and if you might think that being an 18%-
shareholder allows you to force the supervisory board into a particular direction, then I think you are way 
out of line’). And during the 2008 Brunel AGM the representative of the VEB was not allowed to ask the 
external auditor any questions regarding the remuneration policy. However, as of the 2009 Brunel AGM 
the representative of the VEB was allowed to ask the external auditor about the remuneration report. 
467 Ex article 540 WvV (registered accountants, in Dutch: ‘commissarissen’). 
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Furthermore, we note that the 14 categories in total (denoted by the category ‘all’468) are more 
frequently discussed by the private investors (with an occurrence of 4,201) than by the VEB (4,020). 
When we relate these numbers to the total number of questions, we see that 46.6% of the total 
number of questions by the private investors’ concern one of these categories (cf. infra, table 5); for 
the VEB this is 57.9%. In addition to the strategy and the annual report, director remuneration and 
dividend are the most frequent subjects of discussion among private investors. Interestingly, 
institutional investors discuss remuneration almost as often as the strategy: 227 times versus 269.    
                                                     
468 The category ‘all’ indicates the case occurrence for all fourteen categories. If in a particular question or 


























All 4020 789 1370 4201 1982 512 12,874 54.0 
Annual report 678 155 254 827 396 103 2,413 10.1 
Audit 512 85 51 373 119 17 1,157 4.9 
Capital 122 28 11 124 85 18 388 1.6 
Corporate 
governance 
277 6 111 81 199 29 703 2.9 
Discharge 119 10 81 113 69 20 412 1.7 
Diversity 12 4 99 63 8 5 191 0.8 
Dividend 172 80 8 538 124 59 981 4.1 
Election 241 77 31 241 118 32 740 3.1 
Language 44 19 7 125 13 10 218 0.9 
Legal 128 20 11 138 33 26 356 1.5 
Negative 583 131 92 770 259 87 1,922 8.1 
Positive 1417 256 505 1742 927 230 5,077 21.3 
Protection 225 46 18 221 137 75 722 3.0 
Remuneration 609 23 209 516 328 46 1,731 7.3 
Strategy 2126 398 609 1925 1094 253 6,405 26.9 
Sustainability 219 28 1075 372 181 51 1,926 8.1 
Note: the total number of questions per category of shareholders is 6,943 for the VEB; 1,702 for VBDO; 
1,612 for Stichting Rechtbescherming Beleggers; 3,651 for all institutional investors and other funds; 9,012 
for private investors, and; 879 for the others (all shareholders not included in one of the aforementioned 
categories, including labour unions etc. The percentages in the left-hand column are calculated by dividing 
the amounts in the column ‘total’ by the total amount of questions and remarks in our sample (23,799). 
 
We can conclude that shareholders generally care about – besides the more general categories 
‘strategy’ and ‘annual report’ – executive remuneration: with our categorization we identified that 
at least 7.3% of all questions were related to this category. Sustainability is another rather important 
topic (8.1%), but one of the shareholders’ representatives, VBDO, focuses largely on these matters.  
Next, we compare the percentage of private investor questions that fall into in one of the 14 
categories with those of all shareholders in table 5. The results show that private investors on 
average care more about the dividends (6% compared to 4.1%), and are generally more negative 
(8.5% compared to 8.1%). They also care more about the language (i.e., Dutch or English) that is 
used, for example in the annual report or in the meeting.  Private shareholders are generally less 
interested in sustainability (only around four% of the questions, which is 50% less than the average 
shareholder base) and corporate governance matters compared to the entire shareholder base (only 
around 1%, which is almost 70% less).  We also note that private shareholders ask questions as 







Occurrence of topic categories per type of shareholder (all and private) 
Category All shareholders  
(%) 




All 54.0 46.6 -13.7 
Annual report 10.1 9.2 -8.9 
Audit 4.9 4.1 -16.3 
Capital 1.6 1.4 -12.5 
Corporate governance 2.9 0.9 -69.0 
Discharge 1.7 1.3 -23.5 
Diversity 0.8 0.7 -12.5 
Dividend 4.1 6.0 46.3 
Election 3.1 2.7 -12.9 
Language 0.9 1.4 55.6 
Legal 1.5 1.5 0.0 
Negative 8.1 8.5 4.9 
Positive 21.3 19.3 -9.4 
Protection 3.0 2.5 -16.7 
Remuneration 7.3 5.7 -21.9 
Strategy 26.9 21.4 -20.4 
Sustainability 8.1 4.1 -49.4 
Note: the third column (‘Private investors (%)’) is calculated by dividing the amounts of table 4 by 
9,012 (i.e., the total amounts of questions and remarks by private investors in our sample). 
 
Figure 1 (below) shows the development of topic categories over time for the entire shareholder 
base. The percentages that are shown are calculated based on the number of questions in the 






Topic category occurrence (%) per year 
 
Figure 1 shows that protection mechanisms are nowadays less often discussed in AGMs than in 
the past. This reflects Dutch corporate practice: less Dutch companies nowadays make use of for 
instance depository receipts (see Van den Berg, 2015; cf. supra, chapter 2, section 5.1.2). 
Remuneration is considered an important topic in all years. Figure 1 also shows that sustainability 
has become a more important topic recently. The same holds for matters that concern the external 
auditor: for this topic, category we observe a sharp increase between 2012 and 2014. One may note 
that there was a heavier focus on the external auditor at the European level, which resulted in the 
new Audit Directive (Directive 2014/56/EU) in 2014. In 2011 the EC first developed a proposal 
for this Directive (EC, 2011b)469, and in its Impact Assessment already considered audit firm 
rotation mandatory (EC, 2011c)470, which may (at least partly) explain the large increase in figure 1. 
Also diversity has been discussed (slightly) more often over the years: this topic has received 
significant attention only from not the media, but also from legislators and scholars in different 
fields.471 
                                                     
469 EC (2011b) Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts. COM (2011) 
778 final. 30 November 2011. 
470 EC (2011c) Impact Assessment. Commission staff working paper impact assessment accompanying the 
document proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 
2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts and a proposal for a 
regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on specific requirements regarding statutory audit 
of public-interest entities. SEC (2011) 1384 final. 30 November 2011. 
471 For the regulatory initiative on the European level one may refer to the proposal of the EC for a Directive 
(EC (2012b) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving the 
gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and related 
278 
 
We also look at the development of topic categories over the years for private investors. The 
percentages are calculated as follows: the case occurrence of a certain topic category for private 
investors per year, divided by the case occurrence of the topic category ‘all’ for private investors 
per year, multiplied by 100%. The case occurrence for the topic category ‘all’ is 4,201 (cf. supra, table 
4).  
FIGURE 2 
Topic category occurrence (%) per year for private investors 
 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the following: first we note that, as also shown in table 5, dividends are more 
often discussed by private investors. Remuneration matters are often discussed, with a clear peak 
in 2004 and 2010. In contrast to figure 1, figure 2 shows that private investors did not become 
(much) more interested in sustainability over the years. Note that figure 1 also includes the VBDO, 
a shareholder representative that largely focuses on sustainability (cf. supra, table 4). The external 
auditor has also become significantly more important to private investors in the years 2012-2014.   
The findings in tables 4 and 5 and figures 1 and 2 show that the content of the questions and 
remarks from the private investor subsample do not substantially differ from the entire sample, 
which indicates that this type of shareholder indeed uses its forum rights generally in the same way 
as the other types of shareholders.  
In the next section we conduct econometric analyses in order to evaluate what factors drive 
the use of shareholder forum rights.  
 
                                                     
measures. COM (2012) 614 final. 14 November 2012). And for an example of a financial study, one may 
refer to McKinsey (2007).  
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4. CAUSAL INTERFERENCE 
In this part of our study we evaluate the connection between the use of the shareholder’s forum 
rights (i.e., questions and remarks), and the factors that we investigated in chapter 3 (cf. supra, 
chapter 3, table 4-6 for the analyses). We investigate whether the number of questions and the 
number of shareholders that actively participate is related to the importance of the meeting, 
ownership concentration and voting power and the presence of a large corporate insider. For this 
we conduct regression analyses with the dependent variable ‘question’ (i.e., the total amount of 
questions and remarks during a certain AGM), ‘speaker’ (i.e., the number of shareholders that made 
use of their forum rights during a particular AGM), ‘PrivateQuestion’ (i.e., the total number of 
questions and remarks during a particular AGM by private investors), and ‘PrivateSpeaker’ (i.e., the 
number of private investors that made use of their forum rights during a particular AGM). We are 
not aware of any prior research on the determinants of the use of shareholder forum rights.  
 
4.1.  Hypotheses and Variables 
We investigate which factors may contribute to the use of shareholder forum rights in Dutch 
AGMs. For this we use the factors that we also considered in the third chapter. With respect to the 
importance of the meeting variables, we expect that shareholders have larger incentives to ask 
questions or engage in discussions when they consider the meeting to be more important. Hence, 
we expect that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: the importance of the meeting contributes to the use of forum rights by all 
shareholders and by the separate category of private investors.  
 
In chapter 3 we saw that the remuneration report, director elections, and discharging directors 
affect attendance rates. Since in the Netherlands it is common practice to discharge directors, and 
shareholders do not generally have a vote on the remuneration report, we consider the following 
variables related to the importance of the meeting in this chapter: ‘Elections’, i.e., the number of 
board members (management and supervisory board members) that are up for (re-)election; 
‘Remuneration’, i.e., a dummy variable that has a value of 1 if there is an item on the agenda related 
to the remuneration of board members (management and supervisory board members) and zero 
otherwise, and ‘Dissent’, which is the highest percentage of votes against in a particular AGM (cf. 
infra, table 5 for an overview of the variables).    
For the other variables in our models our expectations are less clear. On the one hand, we 
expect ownership concentration to increase the use of forum rights as these shareholders have 
larger incentives to monitor the corporate board. On the other hand, we expect the use of forum 
rights in the AGM to decrease, as blockholders generally can engage in private meetings, and small 
shareholders have fewer incentives to attend the AGM (cf. supra, results of chapter three). We expect 
that the same holds in those cases where the largest shareholder is a corporate insider. We 
summarize these considerations in the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: ownership concentration and the presence of corporate insiders 




We have seen in chapter three that small shareholders tend to free-ride more on larger corporate 
insiders. We therefore expect the use private investor forum rights to be negatively affected by the 
presence of larger corporate insiders (hypothesis 3):  
 
Hypothesis 3: larger influence by corporate insiders negatively affects the use of forum 
rights by the separate category of private investors.  
 
Lastly, we expect small shareholder voting power to positively contribute to the use of forum rights. 
In chapter 3 we have seen that small shareholder voting power positively contributes to (small) 
shareholder turnout rates. Accordingly, we expect that, when shareholders are more eager to incur 
the turnout costs, they are probably also more eager to exercise their forum rights. We therefore 
expect that: 
 
Hypothesis 4: small shareholder voting power positively contributes to the use of forum 
rights by all shareholders and to the separate category of private investors.  
 
Table 6 provides an overview of the variables that are considered in this part of the research. We 
also include the control variables from the third chapter in our analyses. 472 
  
                                                     
472 We do not focus on turnout rates in this chapter, as these rates have little in common with the number 




Overview of the Variables 
Variable Explanation 
Dependent variables 
Question Number of questions and/or remarks in a particular AGM. 
Speaker Number of shareholders that made use of their right to speak (and ask 
questions).  
PrivateQuestion Number of questions and/or remarks in a particular AGM by a private 
investor.  
PrivateSpeaker Number of private investors that made use of their right to speak (and ask 
questions). 
Ownership concentration and voting power measures 
BLOCK This is the concentration ratio for all shareholders with a stake of 5% or more 
(blockholders), calculated as: 𝐶𝑟𝑥 =  ∑ 𝑠𝑖
𝑥
𝑖=1 , where si ≥ 5%. 
HHI Calculated as: 𝐻 =  ∑ 𝑠𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1 , considering the stakes of all blockholders (holding 
5% or more of the votes) and where the unknown stake of the small 
shareholders is ε, which is approximately zero. Displayed in %. 
BANZHAFlarge The Banzhaf index for the largest shareholder, calculated with the program 
ipmmle of Leech. The quorum is set at 51% and all stakes rounded to the nearest 
integer. 
SHAPLEYsmall The Shapley-Shubik index for a small shareholder holding 1% of the votes, 
calculated with the program ssmmle of Leech. 
‘Importance of the meeting’ variables 
Elections The number of (supervisory) board members that are elected or re-elected by 
the AGM.  
Dissent Highest percentage of no-votes at the AGM (excluding shareholder proposals).  
Remuneration Dummy variable for the voting item regarding remuneration of board members 
(management and supervisory): this variable takes a value of one if a voting item 
regarding the remuneration for management board members and/or 
supervisory board members is on the agenda. Since shareholders in the 
Netherlands generally have no say on the remuneration report, this variable is 
similar to the dSoPother in chapter three of this research.   
Type of shareholder variables 
dInsider Dummy variable for the type of the largest ultimate shareholder: this variable 
takes a value of one if the largest shareholder is an insider, and zero otherwise.  
BANZinsider This is the interaction variable: BANZHAFlarge * dInsider, which denotes the 
voting power of the largest shareholder if this shareholder is a corporate insider.  
Control variables 
logSIZE Market value data for the fourth quarter of the year before the AGM took place 
is retrieved from Datastream. The variable is calculated by multiplying the share 
price by the number of ordinary shares in issue. Note that Datastream only 
includes ordinary shares in its market value data. 
logRI Total Return Index (TI): this shows a theoretical growth in value in millions of 
euro of a shareholding over a specified period, assuming that dividends are re-
invested to purchase additional units of an equity or unit trust at the closing 
price applicable on the ex-dividend date. 
logPI Price Index (PI): The price index expresses the share price as a percentage of its 
value on the base date, adjusted for capital changes 
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Only in the relationship with the variable ‘Dissent’ is there the possibility of a (small) reverse 
causality problem.473 Thus, the reported effects of this variable should be interpreted with caution.  
Table 7 provides descriptive information regarding the dependent and independent variables 
described in table 6.474  
 
TABLE 7 
Descriptive information variables  
Variable # AGMs mean median sd min max 
Question 566 42.1 38 21.3 0 205 
Speaker 566 8.3 8 4.1 0 33 
PrivateQuestion 566 15.9 13 13.0 0 96 
PrivateSpeaker 566 4.8 4 3.3 0 21 
BLOCK 566 46.1 45.9 27.0 0 100 
HHI (%) 566 1252.2 578.8 1647.1 0 9131.7 
BANZHAFlarge 566 0.49 0.31 0.39 0.04 1 
SHAPLEYsmall 566 0.06 0.01 0.22 0 1 
Elections 566 1.6 1 1.6 0 15 
Dissent 552 0.5 0 0.5 0 87.2 
Remuneration 566 0.5 0 0.5 0 1 
dInsider 566 0.4 0 0.5 0 1 
BANZinsider 566 0.3 0 0.4 0 1 
logSIZE 559 2.7 2.7 0.9 -0.1 4.8 
logRI 560 2.3 2.3 0.7 -0.7 3.8 
logPI 517 2.7 2.8 0.9 -0.8 4.5 
 
We first present the Pearson correlations between the dependent and independent variables in table 
8. The importance of the meeting variables (i.e., ‘Dissent’, ‘Elections’ and ‘Remuneration’) show 
positive correlations with the dependent variables. The variable logSIZE also exhibits a positive 
correlation with the dependent variables. The correlation with ‘Speaker’ is especially large with 0.43. 
The Shapley-Shubik value for small shareholders also correlates positively with the dependent 
variables: this effect is somewhat larger for the dependent variables that concern private investors, 
which may confirm our fourth hypothesis. The variable BLOCK, which denotes the aggregate 
stake of all blockholders holding a 5% stake or more, shows a negative correlation with all 
dependent variables, but the Banzhaf index for the largest shareholder in turn shows a positive 
correlation (but, this correlation is only statistically significant for the dependent variable 
‘PrivateQuestion’).475 Lastly, the correlations between the dependent variables and the variable 
‘logSIZE’ are the strongest: table 8 shows positive correlations between 0.17 and 0.43 that are all 
statistically significant at the 0.1% level.  
                                                     
473 Only the variable ‘Dissent’ may create causal problems, since our dependent variables may affect 
shareholder dissent rates as well (reverse causation). However, one should consider that generally, a large 
part of shareholders appoints proxy holders or remotely exercises its voting rights. In these cases, the causal 
problems are likely to be minor. Nevertheless, one should consider the results with some caution.  
474 Table A.3 in the appendix provides a descriptive overview of the companies sorted by the amount of 
years they are available in the sample (unbalanced sample characteristics).  
475 Following the correlations displayed in table 8, we include the concentration variable BLOCK instead of 





Pearson correlations with significance level 
 
Question Speaker PrivateQuestion PrivateSpeaker 
HHI -0.0422 -0.0641 0.0258 -0.0238 
BLOCK -0.1004* -0.1736*** -0.0842* -0.1626*** 
BANZHAFlarge 0.0239 0.0339 0.1022** 0.0631 
SHAPLEYsmall 0.0939* 0.0950* 0.1270** 0.1203** 
Dissent 0.1055* 0.1670*** 0.0277 0.0788† 
Election 0.1821*** 0.3036*** 0.1845*** 0.2554*** 
Remuneration 0.1112** 0.1485*** 0.0915* 0.1373** 
dInsider 0.1069* 0.0218 0.0297 -0.0003 
BANZinsider 0.0663 0.0223 0.0385 0.011 
logSIZE 0.2489*** 0.4281*** 0.1659*** 0.3319*** 
logPI -0.0158 0.1951*** 0.0022 0.1467*** 
logRI -0.0121 0.1905*** 0.0292 0.1587*** 
†p < 0.1,  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
4.2. Poisson Models 
As we have seen in the previous sections, our dependent variables consist of count data (i.e., only 
non-negative integers). A basic model for these kinds of data is the Poisson distribution with a 
probability mass function:  Pr( Y = y) = 
𝑒− 𝜆 𝜆𝑦
𝑦!
  for λ > 0,  y = 0, 1, 2, etc. The mean and the 
variance of this distribution are assumed to be E(Y) = var(Y) = λ, which signals that the mean is 
assumed to be equal to the variance. However, when we look at our data, we see that we have 
overdispersion (table 9):  
 
TABLE 9 
Descriptive statistics dependent variables 
Variable Range Mean Variance 
Question [0,205] 42.1 451.9 
Speaker [0,33] 8.3 17.1 
PrivateQuestion [0,96] 15.9 168.2 
PrivateSpeaker [0,21] 4.8 11.2 
 
As table 9 shows, the variance is around ten times as large as the mean for the dependent variables 
‘Question’ and ‘PrivateQuestion’; in these cases, we have overdispersed count data and the Poisson 
distribution may not be a reasonable model to use. However, when we take a closer look at the 
relationship between the (log of) the variance and the mean of each dependent variable, we find 
that there is a proportional relationship (appendix to this chapter, section A.3.). Accordingly, we 
report the results of the Poisson models in this chapter, and as an additional robustness check, we 
share the results of the negative binomial models in the appendix to this chapter (appendix, section 
A.4, see also Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).  
Table 10 shows the Poisson distribution panel data models for ‘Question’.  Models 1-3 are 
random effects models, models 4-6 are fixed effects models and model 7 is a population averaged 
model. We conduct a likelihood-ratio test to consider whether the complete models are ‘better’ 
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than the reduced models. For models 1 and 2 we cannot reject our null hypothesis, and hence, we 
cannot conclude that the second model outperforms the first model.476 In contrast, for the fixed 
effects models we conclude that the reduced models outperform the complete model (likelihood 
ratio tests rejects the null at a 5% significance level). Table 10 shows that the robust and bootstrap 
standard errors are larger than the normal standard errors in all models. When we conduct the 
Hausman test for the complete and reduced models, the null hypothesis that the unobserved 
individual characteristics and the explanatory variables are uncorrelated is not rejected in all tests 
(cf. supra, for a description of the Hausman test see chapter 3, section 6), we can use the random 
effects models. However, one may note that the random effects and the fixed effects models are 
rather similar. Model 7 displays the average effects for the population (instead of the individual 
specific effects).  
The estimators reported in table 10 generally confirm our hypothesis that the importance of 
the meeting contributes to the number of questions and remarks. The variable dissent is statistically 
significant at the 10% level in the third model (random effects model with bootstrap standard 
errors). The same holds for the dummy variable that denotes whether a say-on-pay resolution is on 
the meeting’s agenda. The coefficients of a Poisson model do not have a simple linear 
interpretation. The exponentiated Dissent coefficient from model 1 can be used to calculate the 
effect of an increase on the dissent rate with one unit: [exp(0.0016) -1]*100% = 0.16% increase. 
Hence, if the dissent increases by one unit, then the percentage change in the number of questions 
and remarks is only 0.16%. This effect is rather small, but we can conclude that our results indeed 
confirm our first hypothesis. Similarly, when the largest ultimate shareholder is an insider, the 
number of questions is [exp(0.220)-1)]*100% = 24.61% higher. Hence, the variable ‘dInsider’, 
which takes a value of 1 if the largest shareholder is a corporate insider, also has a positive effect 
on the number of questions. We cannot find a similar effect for the ownership concentration 
variable ‘BLOCK’: the same holds for the Banzhaf index for the largest shareholder. However, 
when we consider the interaction variable BANZinsider, which multiplies the ‘dInsider’ variable 
by the Banzhaf index for the largest shareholder, we can see a negative effect that is statistically 
significant at least at the 5% level. It seems that shareholders also free-ride on the monitoring 
efforts of larger corporate insiders with respect to their forum rights (cf. supra, chapter 3 confirms 
this also for the turnout decision). In the next section (4.3) of this chapter we evaluate whether this 
also holds for the sub-category of private investors, in accordance with our third hypothesis.   
The Shapley-Shubik index for a hypothetical small shareholder that holds 1% of the voting 
rights probably also has a positive effect on the number of questions and remarks, which generally 
confirms our fourth hypothesis as well, although this variable is not statistically significant in model 
three. 
Lastly, the size of the company, measured as its market capitalization, has a positive statistically 
significant effect in almost all models. This may be straightforward: the larger the company, the 
larger the potential number of shareholders that ask questions, probably.    
                                                     
476 The log likelihood for model 1 is lnll1=-2893.6 and the log likehood for model 2 is lnll2=-2896.65. The 
likelihood-ratio test provides us with: 2(lnll1 – lnll2) = 6. We compare this with the chi-square value with 




Poisson panel data models for dependent variable ‘Question’ 


























Question Question Question Question Question Question Question 
BLOCK 0.00106   0.00131†    
 (0.000681)   (0.000722)    
BANZHAFlarge 0.0742   0.0996    
 (0.0688)   (0.0727)    
SHAPLEYsmall 0.150* 0.190*** 0.190 0.128† 0.184*** 0.184† 0.201* 
 (0.0696) (0.0411) (0.117) (0.0725) (0.0419) (0.0947) (0.0893) 
Elections 0.00482   0.00519    
 (0.00534)   (0.00542)    
Dissent 0.00161** 0.00157** 0.00157† 0.00153** 0.00150** 0.00150 0.00178† 
 (0.000553) (0.000552) (0.000940) (0.000561) (0.000560) (0.00104) (0.00104) 
Remuneration 0.0509*** 0.0521*** 0.0521† 0.0497*** 0.0511*** 0.0511 0.0559† 
 (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0314) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0319) (0.0325) 
dInsider 0.220*** 0.205*** 0.205* 0.212*** 0.195*** 0.195* 0.223** 
 (0.0537) (0.0519) (0.104) (0.0574) (0.0557) (0.0928) (0.0799) 
BANZinsider -0.313*** -0.208*** -0.208* -0.350*** -0.216*** -0.216* -0.178† 
 (0.0834) (0.0522) (0.0977) (0.0869) (0.0542) (0.0872) (0.0981) 
logSIZE 0.113*** 0.104*** 0.104† 0.0979** 0.0866** 0.0866 0.124* 
 (0.0269) (0.0260) (0.0603) (0.0336) (0.0330) (0.0988) (0.0494) 
_cons 3.274*** 3.366*** 3.366***    3.294*** 
 (0.0925) (0.0820) (0.161)    (0.129) 
N 546 546 546 541 541 541 546 
Log likelihood -2893.612 -2896.571 -2896.571 -2449.055 -2453.336 -2453.336  
Note: the table illustrates Poisson panel data models. The dependent variable is the number of questions 
and remarks per observation (‘Question’). Models 1-3 are random effects models, models 4-6 are fixed 
effects models and model 7 is a population averaged model. Bootstrap standard errors are displayed between 
parentheses for the third model: we ran 50 bootstrap replications. For the sixth and the seventh models we 
report robust standard errors. All standard errors are reported between parentheses.  
†p < 0.1,  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
a  The random effects models follow a gamma distribution. One may note that when we use a normal 
distribution for random effects with robust standard errors in the third model, the significance levels of the 
effects are the same.  
 
When estimating the Poisson models we find that the dispersion parameter alpha is significantly 
greater than zero for all random effects models, which may indicate overdispersion. Nevertheless, 
the models that are reported in table A.4 of the appendix exhibit similar results. The importance 
of the meeting variables (‘Remuneration’ and ‘Dissent’) have become statistically significant at the 
5 and 1% level in the third model respectively, which confirms our second hypothesis. In contrast, 
the variable BANZinsider shows less significant results.  
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Next, we consider the Poisson distribution panel data models for the dependent variable 
‘Speaker’ (reported in table 11). Again, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the Hausman tests, 
which indicates that we are able to use the random effects models reported in table 11. The log 
likelihood ratio tests show that the reduced models do not outperform the complete models, 
though the estimators in these models are rather similar. Our results show that the variable ‘Dissent’ 
has a positive effect on the number of speakers that are present, which is statistically significant at 
least at the 5% level (confirming our first hypothesis). The coefficients are larger than those 
displayed in table 10, but still do not show a very large effect. Also ‘logSIZE’ has a statistically 




Poisson panel data models for dependent variable ‘Speaker’ 






























Speaker Speaker Speaker Speaker Speaker Speaker 
BLOCK -0.000674 -0.000674  -0.000581   
 (0.00126) (0.00141)  (0.00144)   
BANZHAFlarge 0.0294 0.0294  0.0255   
 (0.118) (0.133)  (0.142)   
SHAPLEYsmall 0.0115 0.0115  0.0148   
 (0.129) (0.160)  (0.149)   
Elections 0.0104 0.0104  0.00573   
 (0.0111) (0.00932)  (0.00953)   
Dissent 0.00272* 0.00272** 0.00278** 0.00282** 0.00286** 0.00285** 
 (0.00117) (0.00103) (0.000940) (0.00105) (0.00104) (0.000986) 
Remuneration 0.0406 0.0406  0.0351   
 (0.0326) (0.0279)  (0.0276)   
dInsider 0.0150 0.0150  -0.00707   
 (0.0977) (0.0997)  (0.125)   
BANZinsider -0.00863 -0.00863  0.0384   
 (0.154) (0.152)  (0.163)   
logSIZE 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.197*** 0.138† 0.144† 0.198*** 
 (0.0387) (0.0437) (0.0369) (0.0809) (0.0788) (0.0399) 
_cons 1.561*** 1.561*** 1.526***   1.524*** 
 (0.135) (0.152) (0.110)   (0.112) 
N 546 546 546 541 541 546 
Log likelihood -1337.829 -1337.829 -1339.431 -1025.132 -1026.125  
Note: the table displays Poisson panel data models. The dependent variable is the number of speakers that 
pose questions or have remarks per observation (‘Question’). Models 1-3 are random effects models, models 
4 and 5 are fixed effects models and model 6 is a population averaged model. Bootstrap standard errors are 
displayed between parentheses for the third model: the amount of bootstrap replications is 50. For models 
4-6 we report robust standard errors. All standard errors are reported between parentheses. The other 
control variables (logPI and logRI) had no explanatory power in all models.  
†p < 0.1,  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
a The random effects models follow a gamma distribution. One may note that when we use a normal 
distribution for random effects with robust standard errors in the second and third model, the significance 





Next, we examine whether there are dynamic effects involved in the number of speakers that are 
present at the AGM (cf. supra, chapter 3, section 6.3). In table 12 we add the lagged dependent 
variable to the second and third models (table 11).477 Table 12 shows that the number of speakers 
that is present in today’s AGM depends on the number of speakers that was present in the previous 
AGM, but the effect is not very substantial. In other words, the amount of speakers in previous 
years will matter somewhat to the number of speakers that are at the AGM today. The effect of 
the variable ‘Dissent’ is still statistically significant at the 1 or 5% level. However, the variable 
‘logSIZE’ is not statistically significant anymore in the complete model (model 1). Also, the 
magnitude of logSIZE decreases in these two models. The log likelihood increases substantially 
when adding these dynamic effects, but the lagged dependent variable suppresses the explanation 
power of the independent variables (for more information on this matter, one may refer to Achen, 
2001; Keele and Kelly, 2005).   
                                                     




Dynamic Poisson panel data models for dependent variable ‘Speaker’ 
 (1) (2) 






Dependent variable Speaker Speaker 
Initial condition 0.0279*** 0.0278** 
 (0.00766) (0.00947) 
Lagged dependent variable 0.0203** 0.0206* 
 (0.00694) (0.00986) 
BLOCK -0.00131  
 (0.00132)  
BANZHAFlarge 0.0383  
 (0.102)  
SHAPLEYsmall 0.0106  
 (0.153)  
Elections 0.0101  
 (0.0128)  
Dissent 0.00245** 0.00263* 
 (0.000857) (0.00112) 
Remuneration 0.0433  
 (0.0372)  
dInsider 0.0305  
 (0.0913)  
BANZinsider -0.0254  
 (0.137)  
logSIZE 0.0671 0.0982** 
 (0.0379) (0.0375) 
_cons 1.474*** 1.386*** 
 (0.149) (0.0697) 
N 474 474 
Log likelihood -1145.567 -1147.832 
Note: the table displays dynamic Poisson random effects panel data models. The dependent variable is 
‘Speaker’. Bootstrap standard errors are displayed between parentheses: the amount of bootstrap 
replications is 50. The dynamic models are obtained by adding the initial condition and the lagged dependent 
variables to the corresponding static models (i.e., the ‘Wooldridge solution’).   
†p < 0.1,  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
4.3. Private Investors: Censored Distributions 
The descriptive statistics in the previous sections suggest that there may be more observations for 
which the values of the variables PrivateQuestion and PrivateSpeaker are zero relative to the other 
dependent variables.478 We note that this is the case for 21 observations. Hence, we choose to use 
a censored distribution: the random effects Tobit model,479 which can be denoted as (static model):  
                                                     
478 One may note that only in the 2010 RotoSmeets AGM were no questions or remarks reported. 
479 The marginal effects in these models can be calculated as follows: βx * P(yit > 0 | αi xit). Since the 




y*it = αi + xit’β + uit,  
 
where yit = max(0, y
*
it). The estimators for both the static and dynamic models are reported in table 
13.480 First, we can see that the log likelihood ratios481 are larger for the reduced models that for the 
complete models. The high value of the log likelihood ratio test indicates that the second model 
outperforms the first model. The log likelihood ratio-tests for the other models also provides high 
values. Next, the values for Rho are substantially lower in the dynamic models, which means that 
in these models there is less unobserved heterogeneity. In addition, the dynamic effects are 
statistically significant in all models (at the 0.1% level), which indicates that the dynamic models 
are the preferred ones. Table 13 shows that the effects of the lagged dependent variables are 
substantially larger in these models than in the models displayed in table 12.  
In the reduced dynamic model for ‘PrivateQuestion’ we find that market capitalization 
positively contributes to the number of questions and remarks from private investors. This is also 
the case in the reduced dynamic model for ‘PrivateSpeaker’. We note that the dummy variable for 
say-on-pay agenda items positively contributes to the number of private investors that pose 
questions or make remarks in AGMs, but the effect is only statistically significant in the static 
models. Hence, our results do not confirm or reject our hypotheses. There are some indications 
that the importance of the meeting contributes to private investors’ use of forum rights, but these 
effects are not statistically significant anymore in the dynamic models. The dynamic effects at least 
suggest that the number of private speakers in previous years will matter to the number of private 
speakers that are at the AGM today.482  
The dynamic effects displayed in table 13 are relatively strong, which may perhaps indicate that 
a persistent shareholder base of private investors that generally attends the AGM and asks 
questions exists, but the effects present no direct evidence. In addition, note for example that the 
explanatory power of the other independent variables in the models decreases (for example, 
‘logSIZE’). Yet this possible conclusion agrees with our findings during the data gathering: we 
noted that there are in total approximately 800 different shareholders that ask questions in the 
entire sample.483
                                                     
480 Since we still must address count data, in the appendix we use the static and dynamic Poisson models as 
robustness checks (table A.7). We also estimated the negative binomial models (not reported), and noted 
that these models show similar effects as the Poisson distribution models.  
481 The log likelihood for model 1 is lnll1=-2049.9 and the log likehood for model 2 is lnll2=-2101.627. The 
likelihood-ratio test provides us with: 2(lnll1 – lnll2) = 103.5. 
482 However, note that in the Poisson distribution models in table A.7 the dynamic effects for the amount 
of questions by private investors are not statistically significant.  
483 This number includes the shareholder representative organisations such as the VEB, institutional 
investors and other funds and other types of shareholders. We found that there are on average 4.8 private 
investors actively asking questions and making remarks at the Dutch AGMs. Since we have a sample of 566 
AGMs, if these institutional investors are all different people, we have at least 2,717 different shareholders 
that asked questions. It is important to note that the number of 800 is an approximation, as for some names 





Tobit panel data models for dependent variables ‘PrivateQuestion’ and ‘PrivateSpeaker’ (static and dynamic) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
























Dependent variable PrivateQuestion PrivateQuestion PrivateQuestion PrivateQuestion PrivateSpeaker PrivateSpeaker PrivateSpeaker PrivateSpeaker 
BLOCK -0.0559  -0.0317  -0.00425  -0.00846  
 (0.0500)  (0.0380)  (0.0106)  (0.00715)  
BANZHAFlarge 3.495 4.072* -0.0508 2.721 -0.350  0.194  
 (2.649) (1.794) (5.379) (1.715) (0.817)  (0.744)  
SHAPLEYsmall 3.082  6.119  1.251  0.503  
 (3.743)  (6.139)  (1.046)  (1.032)  
Elections 0.542  0.442  0.0828  0.0996  
 (0.386)  (0.508)  (0.0918)  (0.0990)  
Dissent -0.00184  0.00800  0.00427  0.00380  
 (0.0287)  (0.0272)  (0.0101)  (0.00871)  
Remuneration 1.097  0.726  0.382* 0.414† 0.276 0.310 
 (0.901)  (0.828)  (0.189) (0.218) (0.262) (0.212) 
dInsider -0.962  0.709  -0.510  0.413  
 (2.320)  (1.998)  (0.896)  (0.632)  
BANZinsider 1.718  2.116  0.996  -0.303  
 (3.362)  (5.720)  (1.119)  (1.106)  
logSIZE 1.125 2.090 0.663 1.556* 0.693** 0.800** 0.273 0.460* 
 (1.428) (1.326) (0.818) (0.700) (0.262) (0.284) (0.184) (0.201) 
Initial condition   0.272* 0.258*   0.302*** 0.302*** 
   (0.110) (0.103)   (0.0749) (0.0854) 
Lagged dependent variable   0.143*** 0.155***   0.223*** 0.229*** 
   (0.0409) (0.0369)   (0.0678) (0.0604) 
_cons 11.60** 7.848* 6.051† 3.280 2.590** 2.265** 1.219† 0.687 
 (4.413) (3.548) (3.111) (2.761) (0.949) (0.702) (0.715) (0.554) 
N 546 559 457 466 546 559 457 466 
Log likelihood -2049.910 -2101.627 -1759.904 -1799.385 -1286.001 -1317.046 -1092.271 -1116.883 
Rho 0.399 0.404 0.235 0.252 0.471 0.470 0.214 0.221 
Censored observations 20 21 17 18 20 21 17 18 
Note: the table displays Tobit panel data models. The dependent variable in models 1-4 is ‘PrivateQuestion’ and in models 5-8 this is ‘PrivateSpeaker’. Bootstrap 
standard errors are displayed between parentheses: the amount of bootstrap replications is 50. The dynamic models are obtained by adding the initial condition and 
the lagged dependent variables to corresponding static models. The other control variables (logPI and logRI) had no explanatory power in all models.   
†p < 0.1,  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1. Conclusions 
The objective of our research in this chapter was to take the first steps in revealing how 
shareholders exercise their right to ask questions at AGMs in Europe. We asked the question how, 
and to what extent, shareholders make use of their forum rights in the Netherlands and investigated 
566 AGMs of 78 Dutch companies over a period of 12 years. We started with a descriptive analysis 
and found that shareholders had 42.1 questions and remarks on average. These questions and 
remarks were asked by 8.3 different shareholders on average. The average number of private 
investors who pose questions or have remarks in AGMs is around 5, which is more than half of 
the average number of shareholders asking questions. These private investors ask on average 
around 16 questions per meeting. Our results show that shareholder forum rights are generally 
important to private investors, but also to representatives of (smaller) shareholders such as the 
VEB.  
The next step was to evaluate the content of the questions and remarks that shareholders had 
at AGMs. We designed a categorization framework with 14 topic categories. These categories were: 
annual report, audit, board elections, capital, corporate governance, discharge, diversity, dividend, 
language, legal, protection mechanisms, remuneration, strategy, and sustainability. We found that 
these 14 categories already described 54% of all questions and remarks in our sample. These 14 
categories are necessarily incomplete and only include fourteen topics of our choice, which 
indicates that this percentage only displays the lower limit of relevant questions. These findings 
show that the AGM forum function of AGMs is definitely relevant. Moreover, when we only 
consider private investors, we see that almost 47% of their questions and remarks fall into these 
categories.  
We also find that, in line with the findings in the previous chapters, executive remuneration is 
one of the most discussed topics in AGMs. When we only consider private investors, we even find 
that this type of shareholders cares almost as much about executive remuneration as about 
dividends. We note that the content of the questions and remarks (at least, those that fall into the 
topic categories that we specified) does not substantially differ from the entire shareholder base, 
and hence, that these shareholders use their forum rights in the same way other types of 
shareholders use these rights.  
In the second part of the research we investigated the factors that contribute to the use of 
shareholder forum rights. We evaluated whether the ‘importance of the meeting’ variables 
positively contribute to the use of these rights (hypothesis 1). For the dependent variables that 
denote the number of questions and remarks (‘Question’) and the number of speakers (‘Speaker’), 
we use count data models with Poisson distributions and negative binomial distributions (the latter 
are reported in the appendix to this chapter). Our results tend to confirm our first hypothesis, i.e., 
that the importance of the meeting variables contribute to the use of forum rights by shareholders. 
As expected, the effects from the ownership concentration variable are unclear. The dummy 
variable that indicates that the largest shareholder is a corporate insider has a positive effect on the 
number of questions at the AGM. Apparently, shareholders have more incentives to monitor the 
corporate board (and their fellow shareholders) in these situations. However, when we consider 
the interaction variable BANZinsider, which multiplies this dummy variable by the Banzhaf index 
of the largest shareholder, we can observe a negative effect, which supports our findings in chapter 
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3. It seems that the voting power of small shareholders generally contributes to the use of forum 
rights, although this variable is not statistically significant in all models, and hence, we can only 
provide some indications that our fourth hypothesis may hold. For the dependent variable 
‘Speaker’ we found a (rather small) statistically significant effect of the lagged dependent variable 
in the dynamic models.  
We also estimate these models for private investors as a separate shareholder category. For this 
we used a censored distribution, but also reported the Poisson distribution models in the appendix. 
We estimated static and dynamic panel data models and found that the dynamic effects are 
statistically significant in all models for the variable ‘PrivateSpeaker’. This result indicates that, 
combined with descriptive statistics on our sample, there may be a persistent group of private 
investors that generally attends the AGM in the Netherlands. There are also some indications that 
there are dynamic effects involved in the number of questions and remarks of private investors at 
AGMs, but these are not confirmed by the Poisson distribution models. We note that the dummy 
variable for say-on-pay agenda items positively contributes to the number of private investors that 
pose questions or make remarks in AGMs, but the effect is only statistically significant in the static 
models.  
 
5.2. Discussion and Policy Implications  
Turnout rates do not inform us about the forum function of AGMs; many shareholders usually 
make use of voting by proxy, which means that turnout rates are often not related to shareholders’ 
physical attendance rates. To investigate the use of shareholder forum rights we therefore used the 
meeting documents of Dutch AGMs. Clearly, AGMs cannot function as platforms for dialogues 
without shareholders to attend them. But, when thousands of (small) shareholders attend and even 
a fraction are willing to engage in the discussions, shareholder meetings may take days. Not to 
mention the difficulties of managing such a large event. There is clearly a trade-off: on the one 
hand, regulators encourage shareholders – especially institutional investors – to actively join AGMs 
and participate in discussions to enhance the functioning of AGMs. On the other hand, if too many 
shareholders would join, AGMs cannot function properly. Physical shareholder attendance related 
to the AGM’s functioning may thus be viewed as a concave function. To maintain the proper 
functioning, German law explicitly offers companies the possibility to empower the chairman of 
the meeting to limit shareholder speaking rights (section 131(2) AktG, cf. supra, chapter 1, section 
4.1.4). And, for example in Spain, companies may set a requirement in their articles of association 
regarding a minimum number of shares to be held to attend the AGM (this minimum may not 
exceed one thousand shares following recent amendments to the Spanish Companies Act, La Ley 
de Sociedades de Capital484). Based on our findings, we argue that there is no need for a similar 
provision in the Netherlands. It seems that the Dutch AGM functions quite well. Moreover, we 
found that the forum right is not meaningless, as this research provides strong indications that 
questions and remarks, including those of private investors, involve relevant topics. However, in 
line with the findings of De Jong, Mertens and Roosenboom (2003) we find that only few 
shareholders exercise their right to ask questions or engage in discussions themselves. 
                                                     
484 Article 521 bis of the Spanish Companies Act. Ley 31/2014, de 3 de diciembre, por la que se modifica la Ley de 
Sociedades de Capital para la mejora del gobierno corporativo.  




The second part of our research in this chapter investigated the factors that contribute to the 
use of forum rights in AGMs, to gain better insight into shareholder behaviour. Our findings 
provide yet another indication that an introduction of a European shareholder’s say on the 
remuneration report would increase (active) shareholder participation in AGMs. However, it is 
important to note that the discussion on executive pay is fiery and the media have drawn 
considerable attention to it (Van der Elst and Lafarre, 2017). We found that the dynamic effects in 
the number of these actively participating shareholders are substantial and that there is a small 
persistent group of (private) investors that is generally active at Dutch AGMs. Hence, many 
shareholders do not make use of their forum rights, but the dynamic effects suggest that if active 
shareholder participation increases once, it will also positively affect active shareholder 
participation in the following year.  
This study is one of the first to investigate the use of forum rights of shareholders in AGMs. 
It has made the first steps and opens the door for future research. We recommend further analysis 
of the factors that contribute to the use of forum rights, and of the content of shareholder questions 
and remarks. One may consider using a larger sample and including other countries as well in future 
research for comparative research. With respect to the text mining techniques, we recommend 
further applying these and investigating the relationships between the topics, including for example 
the context in which certain keywords are used (i.e., the first several words that are used before and 




APPENDIX CHAPTER 6  
A.1. Categorization Framework 
 
TABLE A.1 
Categorization of topics 
Category Keywords included 
































































































































































































Tone of voice categorization 















































































































































* denotes a root form. 
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A.2. Characteristics of the Unbalanced Panel Data Sample 
 
TABLE A.3 
Characteristics per Years in Sample 
# years in 
sample 
Variables N i mean p50 sd min max # years in 
sample 
Variables N i mean p50 sd min max 
1 year Question 6 6 35.7 40.0 12.4 16.0 47.0 2 years Question 4 2 32.3 25.5 17.6 20.0 58.0 
Speaker 6 6 8.7 7.5 2.4 7.0 13.0 Speaker 4 2 7.8 7.0 3.8 4.0 13.0 
PrivateQuestion 6 6 14.2 13.0 6.7 5.0 24.0 PrivateQuestion 4 2 17.8 14.0 8.2 13.0 30.0 
PrivateSpeaker 6 6 4.7 5.0 2.4 1.0 8.0 PrivateSpeaker 4 2 5.3 5.0 1.5 4.0 7.0 
BLOCK 6 6 61.4 55.8 18.8 43.3 91.0 BLOCK 4 2 48.4 48.0 22.5 26.8 71.0 
HHI 6 6 2066.8 2078.1 1505.9 417.4 4351.3 HHI 4 2 437.9 426.7 327.5 144.9 753.1 
BANZHAFlarge 6 6 0.7 0.8 0.4 0.2 1.0 BANZHAFlarge 4 2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 
SHAPLEYsmall 6 6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 SHAPLEYsmall 4 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Elections 6 6 2.5 0.0 6.1 0.0 15.0 Elections 4 2 0.8 0.5 1.0 0.0 2.0 
Dissent 6 6 6.4 4.9 6.8 0.0 19.3 Dissent 4 2 1.7 1.6 1.9 0.0 3.4 
dInsider 6 6 0.7 1.0 0.5 0.0 1.0 dInsider 4 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
logSIZE 5 5 3.1 3.1 1.2 1.4 4.4 logSIZE 4 2 2.4 2.3 0.3 2.2 2.9 
3 years Question 3 1 76.3 84.0 18.7 55.0 90.0 4 years Question 16 4 49.9 42.0 25.5 18.0 97.0 
Speaker 3 1 12.7 11.0 2.9 11.0 16.0 Speaker 16 4 8.5 7.5 4.3 3.0 20.0 
PrivateQuestion 3 1 2.7 2.0 3.1 0.0 6.0 PrivateQuestion 16 4 15.1 10.5 14.7 0.0 52.0 
PrivateSpeaker 3 1 1.7 1.0 2.1 0.0 4.0 PrivateSpeaker 16 4 3.9 3.5 2.9 0.0 12.0 
BLOCK 3 1 1.7 0.0 2.9 0.0 5.0 BLOCK 16 4 41.9 38.0 36.7 0.0 99.7 
HHI 3 1 8.3 0.0 14.4 0.0 25.0 HHI 16 4 1402.5 894.6 2151.3 0.0 6762.2 
BANZHAFlarge 3 1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 BANZHAFlarge 16 4 0.7 1.0 0.3 0.3 1.0 
SHAPLEYsmall 3 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 SHAPLEYsmall 16 4 0.3 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Elections 3 1 2.7 2.0 1.2 2.0 4.0 Elections 16 4 1.0 0.5 1.2 0.0 4.0 
Dissent 3 1 52.5 60.0 34.3 15.1 82.4 Dissent 16 4 22.2 23.5 17.6 0.0 51.5 
dInsider 3 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 dInsider 16 4 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.0 1.0 
logSIZE 3 1 3.8 3.9 0.1 3.7 3.9 logSIZE 16 4 2.3 2.4 1.0 0.6 3.6 
5 years Question 25 5 34.6 38.0 14.0 13.0 58.0 6 years Question 60 10 49.6 42.5 27.4 15.0 133.0 
Speaker 25 5 8.6 8.0 3.5 4.0 15.0 Speaker 60 10 8.5 8.0 4.4 1.0 28.0 
PrivateQuestion 25 5 16.7 16.0 10.7 0.0 39.0 PrivateQuestion 60 10 20.7 17.0 17.3 0.0 88.0 
PrivateSpeaker 25 5 4.7 5.0 2.9 0.0 12.0 PrivateSpeaker 60 10 5.1 5.0 3.1 0.0 15.0 
BLOCK 25 5 51.4 47.9 25.4 14.5 100.0 BLOCK 60 10 45.5 49.0 28.4 0.0 95.4 
HHI 25 5 2087.6 416.8 2425.8 142.6 5573.5 HHI 60 10 1202.7 686.0 1288.0 0.0 4290.3 
BANZHAFlarge 25 5 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 1.0 BANZHAFlarge 60 10 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.1 1.0 
SHAPLEYsmall 25 5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 SHAPLEYsmall 60 10 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.0 
Elections 25 5 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.0 2.0 Elections 60 10 1.7 2.0 1.6 0.0 7.0 
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Dissent 23 5 2.0 0.1 3.6 0.0 11.4 Dissent 57 9.5 13.2 4.5 17.8 0.0 83.4 
dInsider 25 5 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.0 dInsider 60 10 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.0 
logSIZE 20 4 1.7 2.0 0.6 0.7 2.3 logSIZE 60 10 2.7 2.8 0.8 1.4 4.1 
7 years Question 56 8 37.0 34.0 17.9 0.0 91.0 8 years Question 120 15 37.6 34.0 17.6 8.0 102.0 
Speaker 56 8 6.8 6.0 3.5 0.0 16.0 Speaker 120 15 7.8 7.0 3.2 1.0 20.0 
PrivateQuestion 56 8 14.7 12.5 9.3 0.0 46.0 PrivateQuestion 120 15 14.5 12.0 12.6 0.0 75.0 
PrivateSpeaker 56 8 4.4 4.0 3.1 0.0 14.0 PrivateSpeaker 120 15 4.5 4.0 2.9 0.0 15.0 
BLOCK 56 8 55.7 56.8 32.0 0.0 99.8 BLOCK 120 15 47.7 46.2 24.6 0.0 95.9 
HHI 56 8 2528.2 983.8 3035.9 0.0 9131.7 HHI 120 15 1067.7 811.6 1129.5 0.0 5075.8 
BANZHAFlarge 56 8 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.1 1.0 BANZHAFlarge 120 15 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.1 1.0 
SHAPLEYsmall 56 8 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.0 SHAPLEYsmall 120 15 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.0 
Elections 56 8 1.4 1.0 1.4 0.0 5.0 Elections 120 15 1.4 1.0 1.2 0.0 5.0 
Dissent 55 7.9 9.0 2.3 13.0 0.0 67.9 Dissent 115 14.4 7.4 1.4 12.5 0.0 65.0 
dInsider 56 8 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.0 dInsider 120 15 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.0 1.0 
logSIZE 56 8 2.6 2.6 0.8 1.4 4.5 logSIZE 119 14.9 2.8 2.9 0.9 -0.1 4.4 
9 years Question 99 11 44.5 39.0 23.6 11.0 143.0 10 years Question 50 5 47.6 44.0 29.0 17.0 205.0 
Speaker 99 11 9.3 8.0 5.4 2.0 33.0 Speaker 50 5 7.8 7.0 4.5 2.0 27.0 
PrivateQuestion 99 11 16.8 14.0 13.1 0.0 77.0 PrivateQuestion 50 5 14.5 10.5 16.5 0.0 96.0 
PrivateSpeaker 99 11 5.2 4.0 4.2 0.0 21.0 PrivateSpeaker 50 5 4.0 3.0 3.4 0.0 13.0 
BLOCK 99 11 50.7 53.2 26.5 0.0 98.2 BLOCK 50 5 45.8 47.2 19.0 5.2 73.8 
HHI 99 11 1364.7 841.0 1369.0 0.0 5068.8 HHI 50 5 1217.2 693.0 1402.1 27.0 3995.5 
BANZHAFlarge 99 11 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.1 1.0 BANZHAFlarge 50 5 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.1 1.0 
SHAPLEYsmall 99 11 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 1.0 SHAPLEYsmall 50 5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Elections 99 11 1.8 1.0 1.8 0.0 7.0 Elections 50 5 1.7 1.0 1.4 0.0 5.0 
Dissent 98 10.9 9.9 3.7 14.0 0.0 65.7 Dissent 50 5 12.8 4.4 15.6 0.0 55.4 
dInsider 99 11 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 1.0 dInsider 50 5 0.8 1.0 0.4 0.0 1.0 
logSIZE 99 11 2.6 2.5 0.9 0.9 4.8 logSIZE 50 5 2.9 2.9 0.3 2.3 3.4 
11 years Question 55 5 37.9 33.0 15.5 18.0 76.0 12 years Question 72 6 44.3 42.0 13.7 14.0 79.0 
Speaker 55 5 7.6 6.0 3.8 3.0 19.0 Speaker 72 6 9.6 9.0 3.5 2.0 17.0 
PrivateQuestion 55 5 12.3 9.0 11.4 0.0 43.0 PrivateQuestion 72 6 18.4 18.0 9.6 0.0 41.0 
PrivateSpeaker 55 5 4.2 3.0 3.3 0.0 15.0 PrivateSpeaker 72 6 6.0 6.0 3.1 0.0 13.0 
BLOCK 55 5 24.9 22.5 10.0 6.0 45.0 BLOCK 72 6 45.9 48.6 30.0 0.0 100.5 
HHI 55 5 297.8 243.6 257.9 36.2 1223.1 HHI 72 6 913.1 494.2 1101.6 0.0 5578.6 
BANZHAFlarge 55 5 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 1.0 BANZHAFlarge 72 6 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.0 1.0 
SHAPLEYsmall 55 5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 SHAPLEYsmall 72 6 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 1.0 
Elections 55 5 1.6 1.0 1.4 0.0 7.0 Elections 72 6 2.0 1.0 1.8 0.0 7.0 
Dissent 55 5 10.6 5.2 12.7 0.0 43.2 Dissent 70 5.8 10.0 4.0 15.0 0.0 87.2 
dInsider 55 5 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.0 1.0 dInsider 72 6 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.0 
logSIZE 55 5 3.1 3.3 0.6 1.9 4.0 logSIZE 72 6 2.8 2.5 1.1 1.1 4.5 
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A.4. Other Models  
 
TABLE A.4 
Negative binomial models (dependent variable ‘Question’) 
























Dependent variable Question Question Question Question Question Question Question 
BLOCK 0.000572   0.00179    
 (0.00127)   (0.00160)    
BANZHAFlarge -0.129   -0.107    
 (0.126)   (0.167)    
SHAPLEYsmall 0.284* 0.175* 0.175 0.258 0.149 0.149 0.208* 
 (0.136) (0.0844) (0.103) (0.168) (0.0915) (0.0971) (0.0959) 
Elections 0.00484   0.00752    
 (0.0110)   (0.0121)    
Dissent 0.00248* 0.00249* 0.00249** 0.00252* 0.00245* 0.00245† 0.00189 
 (0.00118) (0.00118) (0.000939) (0.00124) (0.00124) (0.00136) (0.00105) 
Remuneration 0.0571† 0.0571† 0.0571* 0.0528 0.0532 0.0532† 0.0529 
 (0.0326) (0.0327) (0.0272) (0.0332) (0.0332) (0.0300) (0.0328) 
dInsider 0.195* 0.221* 0.221** 0.197 0.208† 0.208† 0.240** 
 (0.0968) (0.0926) (0.0765) (0.120) (0.116) (0.112) (0.0817) 
BANZinsider -0.0679 -0.174† -0.174 -0.110 -0.162 -0.162 -0.194* 
 (0.157) (0.101) (0.0986) (0.195) (0.116) (0.101) (0.0976) 
logSIZE 0.102** 0.102** 0.102** 0.112† 0.107† 0.107 0.119* 
 (0.0384) (0.0353) (0.0377) (0.0586) (0.0568) (0.0865) (0.0478) 
_cons 1.901*** 1.897*** 1.897*** 1.823*** 1.890*** 1.890*** 3.306*** 
 (0.150) (0.127) (0.186) (0.204) (0.180) (0.270) (0.124) 
N 546 546 546 541 541 541 546 
Log likelihood -2271.951 -2272.595 -2272.595 -1829.270 -1830.072 -1830.072  
Note: the table displays negative binomial panel data models. The dependent variable is the amount of 
questions and remarks per observation (‘Question’). Models 1-3 are random effects models, models 4-6 are 
fixed effects models and model 7 is a population averaged model. Bootstrap standard errors are displayed 
between parentheses for the third model: the amount of bootstrap replications is 50. For the sixth and the 
seventh model we report robust standard errors. All standard errors are reported between parentheses.  






Negative binomial random effects models (dependent variable ‘Speaker’) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Random  
effects 

















averaged (robust  
standard  
errors) 
Dependent variable Speaker Speaker Speaker Speaker Speaker Speaker 
BLOCK -0.000674 -0.000674  -0.000581   
 (0.00126) (0.00146)  (0.00182)   
BANZHAFlarge 0.0294 0.0294  0.0255   
 (0.118) (0.123)  (0.159)   
SHAPLEYsmall 0.0115 0.0115  0.0148   
 (0.129) (0.123)  (0.214)   
Elections 0.0104 0.0104  0.00573   
 (0.0111) (0.00921)  (0.0107)   
Dissent 0.00272* 0.00272** 0.00278** 0.00282* 0.00286* 0.00287** 
 (0.00117) (0.000984) (0.000934) (0.00113) (0.00117) (0.000954) 
Remuneration 0.0406 0.0406  0.0351   
 (0.0326) (0.0297)  (0.0354)   
dInsider 0.0150 0.0150  -0.00707   
 (0.0977) (0.117)  (0.106)   
BANZinsider -0.00863 -0.00863  0.0384   
 (0.154) (0.196)  (0.182)   
logSIZE 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.197*** 0.138 0.144† 0.199*** 
 (0.0387) (0.0348) (0.0390) (0.0862) (0.0771) (0.0404) 
_cons 18.70 18.70*** 16.72*** 21.51*** 18.92*** 1.521*** 
 (.) (0.864) (3.582) (3.013) (4.698) (0.114) 
N 546 546 546 541 541 546 
Log likelihood -1337.829 -1337.829 -1339.431 -1025.129 -1026.125  
Note: the table displays negative binomial panel data models. The dependent variable is the amount of 
speakers that pose questions or have remarks per observation (‘Question’). Models 1-3 are random effects 
models, models 4 and 5 are fixed effects models and model 6 is a population averaged model. Bootstrap 
standard errors are displayed between parentheses for the models 2-5: the amount of bootstrap replications 
is 50. For the sixth model we report robust standard errors. All standard errors are reported between 
parentheses.  







Dynamic Negative Binomial Random Effects Models (dependent variable ‘Speaker’) 
 (1) (2) 






Dependent variable Speaker Speaker 
Initial condition 0.0279** 0.0278** 
 (0.00963) (0.00907) 
Lagged dependent variable 0.0203* 0.0206† 
 (0.00870) (0.0105) 
BLOCK -0.00131  
 (0.00142)  
BANZHAFlarge 0.0383  
 (0.0943)  
SHAPLEYsmall 0.0106  
 (0.129)  
Elections 0.0101  
 (0.0116)  
Dissent 0.00245* 0.00263** 
 (0.00101) (0.00100) 
Remuneration 0.0433  
 (0.0325)  
dInsider 0.0305  
 (0.103)  
BANZinsider -0.0254  
 (0.161)  
logSIZE 0.0671† 0.0982** 
 (0.0379) (0.0375) 
_cons 15.77*** 16.67*** 
 (1.957) (1.721) 
N 474 474 
Log likelihood -1145.567 -1147.832 
Note: the table displays dynamic negative binomial random effects panel data models. The dependent 
variable is ‘Speaker’. Bootstrap standard errors are displayed between parentheses: the amount of bootstrap 
replications is 50. The dynamic models are obtained by adding the initial condition and the lagged dependent 
variables to the corresponding static models (i.e., the ‘Wooldridge solution’).  





Static and Dynamic Poisson Distributions (dependent variables ‘PrivateQuestion’ and ‘PrivateSpeaker’) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
























Dependent variable PrivateQuestion PrivateQuestion PrivateQuestion PrivateQuestion PrivateSpeaker PrivateSpeaker PrivateSpeaker PrivateSpeaker 
BLOCK -0.00496  -0.00406†  -0.00131  -0.00259  
 (0.00262)  (0.00313)  (0.00169)  (0.00188)  
BANZHAFlarge 0.222 0.281* 0.334 0.275† -0.0354  0.0904  
 (0.246) (0.116) (0.460) (0.141) (0.188)  (0.174)  
SHAPLEYsmall 0.0962  -0.0250  0.168  0.00713  
 (0.269)  (0.382)  (0.241)  (0.210)  
Elections 0.0259  0.0145  0.0127  0.0142  
 (0.0261)  (0.0229)  (0.0161)  (0.0139)  
Dissent 0.000372  0.000402  0.000829  0.000806  
 (0.00192)  (0.00208)  (0.00158)  (0.00230)  
Remuneration 0.0512  0.0416  0.0721* 0.0751† 0.0642 0.0650 
 (0.0627)  (0.0578)  (0.035) (0.0442) (0.0462) (0.0420) 
dInsider -0.212  -0.103  -0.110  0.0495  
 (0.187)  (0.248)  (0.170)  (0.133)  
BANZinsider 0.283  0.0360  0.191  -0.0648  
 (0.278)  (0.484)  (0.255)  (0.236)  
logSIZE 0.120 0.165 0.133 0.157 0.128* 0.154** 0.0395 0.0828† 
 (0.129) (0.103) (0.123) (0.112) (0.0547) (0.0525) (0.0443) (0.0486) 
Initial condition   0.0195** 0.0194**   0.0528*** 0.0519** 
   (0.00603) (0.00623)   (0.0151) (0.0180) 
Lagged dependent variable   -0.000328 0.000301   0.0288* 0.0297** 
   (0.00181) (0.00148)   (0.0115) (0.0107) 
_cons 2.471*** 2.161*** 2.055*** 1.843*** 1.170*** 1.074*** 0.988*** 0.835*** 
 (0.348) (0.296) (0.344) (0.315) (0.199) (0.138) (0.175) (0.112) 
N 546 559 474 484 546 559 474 484 
Log likelihood -2602.822 -2693.014 -2189.511 -2255.970 -1236.901 -1267.783 -1056.712 -1081.966 
Censored observations 20 21 17 18 20 21 17 18 
Note: The table displays Poisson random effects panel data models. The dependent variable in models 1-4 is ‘PrivateQuestion’ and in models 5-8 this is ‘PrivateSpeaker’. 
Bootstrap standard errors are displayed between parentheses: the amount of bootstrap replications is 50. The dynamic models are obtained by adding the initial condition 
and the lagged dependent variables to corresponding static models. †p < 0.1,  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW 
 
1. MAIN FINDINGS  
Corporate law inter alia aims at mitigating agency problems that exist in the relationship between 
directors and shareholders and between large and small shareholders. Direct collective shareholder 
monitoring is presumed to take place at the AGM. As we have seen, the role of AGMs can be 
generally divided in three functions: the information function, the forum function, and the 
decision-making function. The AGM is considered one of the main bodies of the corporation, but, 
despite this important theoretical role its functioning is generally criticized by scholars. Economic 
theory posits that small shareholders in particular have few incentives to attend the AGM: the 
marginal effect of the vote of a small shareholder is insignificant, they may choose to free-ride on 
the monitoring of other (larger) shareholders, and moreover, small shareholders have the 
opportunity to sell their shares (‘exit strategy’). In addition to low attendance rates, scholars 
highlight the absent relevant dialogue at AGMs and the practice of discussions between large 
shareholders and corporate boards outside the AGM. Furthermore, management resolutions 
usually receive large majorities of the votes in AGMs. These problems undermine the practical 
functioning of AGMs. As we have seen in the introduction of this research, the AGM is considered 
‘dull’ by some, and scholars question whether the AGM has become obsolete and the right to vote 
worthless. Accordingly, in this concluding chapter we answer the main question of our study, 
namely: ‘To what extent does the AGM of listed companies in Europe fulfil its important 
theoretical role as presumed in the currently practiced European legal framework, and how and to 
what extent can this role be enhanced or should it be repositioned?’. 
 
The scope of this research question was further determined with the following subquestions:  
- What corporate (decision-making) rights do shareholders have in listed companies in the 
European Member States and how do these rights compare?  
- What are the main characteristics of AGMs in the European Member States in practice? 
- Which factors contribute to (small) shareholder attendance? 
- Did the introduction of the Shareholder Rights Directive, which aimed at lowering the cost 
of voting, positively affect (small) shareholder turnout rates in the Netherlands, Belgium 
and France? 
- How do small shareholders determine their decision to attend AGMs in concentrated 
ownership structures and how can small shareholder coordination problems be solved? 
- How and to what extent does the AGM serve as a platform for questions and discussions 
between shareholders and board members?  
 
From the findings of this research, we argue that the AGM is not obsolete and offers the 
opportunity for all shareholders to directly monitor the board of directors, retrieve information, 
pose their questions, and exercise their voting rights. However, our research shows that to increase 
its relevance, several steps can be taken. Below, we first provide a brief summary of chapters 1-6 
and a short answer to our main research question. Afterwards we outline our policy 
recommendations. However, before we do this, we first want to stress that on the one hand the 
nature of our hand-collected data offers large scope to analyse an important but under-researched 
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topic, namely the (small) shareholder turnout decision, but on the other hand, the nature of our 
analysis has some important limitations, including the available sample sizes and the focus on larger 
listed companies. It is important to keep this in mind when considering our conclusions and policy 
recommendations.    
 
Chapter 1 
In this research, we explored the characteristics of the AGMs of listed companies in Europe in 
practice. The preliminary step is to determine the legal framework, which we have established in 
chapter 1. Hence, the central question was: ‘What corporate (decision-making) rights do 
shareholders have in listed companies in the European Member States and how do these rights 
compare?’. We investigated these shareholder rights at the European level and for the different 
Member States in this chapter. We saw that few aspects of AGMs are harmonized at the European 
level, and thus, large parts of the analysis in that chapter concerned national legislation. In addition, 
the analysis has shown that there are some significant differences among the seven Member States 
we investigated, including the content of the voting items. We outlined these differences and 
developed a framework of 15 resolution categories for our empirical analyses in chapter 2.  
 
Chapter 2 
In the second chapter, we evaluated the practical characteristics of AGMs to answer the question 
‘what are the main characteristics of AGMs in the European Member States in practice?’  
We demonstrated that, although large differences in total and small shareholder turnout rates 
between Member States exist, there is an overall increase in these turnout rates in the 2010-2014 
period. As we have discussed in our discussion section of the second chapter (cf. supra, chapter 2, 
section 10.2), this finding is not in line with economic theory that suggests that hardly any small 
shareholder will vote in practice. However, it can be the case that shareholders choose to vote 
regardless of whether they can affect the voting outcome or whether other shareholders can benefit 
from their monitoring efforts. At first sight, this may be considered irrational behaviour, but, as we 
have argued, there can be several plausible explanations. To see why (small) shareholders decide to 
attend, we examined the factors that may contribute to attendance rates in chapters 3 and 4. 
We found that ownership structures in continental European countries, especially in Austria 
and Belgium, are also more concentrated, especially in comparison to the UK. We have found that 
small shareholders have less voting power in the continental European Member States as well. 
These findings confirm the presumed stylized fact that ownership concentration is higher in 
continental Europe.  
We also considered shareholder voting behaviour. Although only a small fraction of the voting 
items did not pass at the AGMs in our sample, we found that some resolution categories received 
higher dissent rates than others. These categories include director (re-)elections and say-on-pay 
resolutions. Once we only considered the outsider shareholders, we saw even higher dissent rates, 
and resolutions were dismissed more often. These results indicate that outsider shareholders do 
not blindly follow the proposals of the corporate board. Moreover, important questions can be 
asked following these results, including whether a large insider shareholder should be excluded 
from voting in certain corporate decisions, or, perhaps whether companies should pay more 
attention to outsider shareholder opinions. From these findings, together with the increasing trends 
in turnout rates, we conclude that the AGM is not irrelevant. Nevertheless, we recognize that its 





Van der Elst (2012) affirms the need for an ‘in depth analysis of the needs and requirements of 
shareholders to participate in the decision-making process of the company’ (2012, p. 64). Our 
research focuses on this need. In third and fourth chapter of this research we empirically examined 
the factors that may contribute to (small) shareholder attendance in AGMs, by using Aldrich’s 
theory on political elections as a theoretical framework. Aldrich addresses the problems of voting 
in political elections – that correspond to the shareholder absenteeism problems in the corporate 
governance context – and argues that turnout is a ‘low-cost low-benefit action’. This thinking 
implies that small changes in costs and benefits affect the decision to vote of many; it is a decision 
made ‘at the margin’.  
As stated above, in chapter 3 we considered the factors that contribute to (small) shareholder 
voting at AGMs, thereby focusing on the benefits of the voting decision (subquestion: ‘which 
factors contribute to (small) shareholder attendance?’). These factors are: i) ownership 
concentration measures, ii) voting power measures, iii) ‘the importance of the meeting’ measures, 
iv) type of shareholder measures, and v) several control variables. We found that ownership 
concentration measures have a positive effect on total shareholder turnout rates, but negatively 
affect small shareholder turnout rates. And, when small shareholders have more voting power they 
are more eager to vote. Similarly, when the largest shareholder has more voting power, small 
shareholders are less likely to attend the AGM. Furthermore, our results showed that shareholders 
generally consider the meeting agenda: for instance, when a resolution concerning the 
remuneration report is on the agenda, (small) shareholder turnout will be higher. The number of 
director (re-)elections also contributes to (small) shareholder turnout. In addition, we found that 
small shareholders tend to free-ride on large institutional shareholders and corporate insiders, but 
that the magnitude of this free-rider problem with larger institutional investors is smaller. Small 
shareholders likely consider their votes to be worth less with large corporate insiders. In line with 
the conclusions from chapter 2, focusing on the opinion of outsider shareholders – for example 
by introducing a separate vote for these shareholders on certain matters – can increase the benefits 
for these shareholders when ownership is more concentrated, which will increase their turnout 
rates.  
Our results show that – at least certain features of the AGM – are not meaningless to small 
shareholders, which contributes to our argument that the AGM is not obsolete. To increase the 
relevance of AGMs, policy makers can focus these findings. Increasing the benefits of voting for 
small shareholders, especially in more concentrated ownership structures, will increase turnout 
rates. In this regard, the introduction of a European say on pay that includes approval of the 
remuneration report would be recommended.  
 
Chapter 4 
In chapter 4 we evaluated the effects of decreasing the costs of shareholder voting on attendance 
rates of (small) shareholders. The subquestion that we formulated for this chapter was: ‘Did the 
introduction of the Shareholder Rights Directive, which aimed at lowering the cost of voting, 
positively affect (small) shareholder turnout rates in the Netherlands, Belgium and France?’. This 
Directive – inter alia – aimed to lower the costs of (cross-border) voting. In a d-i-d framework we 
were able to investigate the effects of its implementation on turnout rates in Belgium, France and 
the Netherlands. We found a positive treatment effect on total and small shareholder turnout rates 
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in all countries. The analysis for Belgium also confirmed that the introduction of a shareholder 
vote on the remuneration report had positively contributed to turnout rates, which again shows 
that say on pay increases the relevance of AGMs to (small) shareholders. The findings of this 
research suggest that the proposed revision of the Shareholder Rights Directive is indeed desirable. 
However, one should consider that, although voting costs may be very low, they are never zero. 
This implies that turnout rates may, in general, never be (close to) 100% in practice.  
 
Chapter 5 
In chapter 5 we considered the small shareholder turnout decision in a simple analytical model to 
provide an answer to the fifth subquestion: ‘How do small shareholders determine their decision 
to attend AGMs in concentrated ownership structures and how can small shareholder coordination 
problems be solved?’.  
In the previous chapters, we used the classical voting power indices to consider shareholder 
voting power. These indices contributed to our empirical models as they consider not only the 
ownership stake of an individual shareholder, but also the entire ownership structure. However, 
when we took a closer look at the mechanisms behind small shareholder voting, these classical 
voting power indices seemed to fall short. Consequently, we considered shareholder coordination 
problems; since small shareholders in particular can free-ride on other shareholders' monitoring 
decisions, few small shareholders will exercise their voting rights during AGMs. Thus, large 
shareholders without a de jure controlling stake may become controlling blockholders in practice. 
We investigated the features of small shareholder voting where it is optimal for small shareholders 
to defeat a blockholder’s resolution. The Pareto efficient equilibrium is reached when the 
willingness-to-vote in the shareholder base is sufficiently high, and thus the opportunistic 
blockholder’s resolution will be defeated. For the situations where small shareholders are not able 
to coordinate we propose regulatory solutions. Regulation that facilitates communication between 
small (active) shareholders is likely to enhance the ability of small shareholders to defeat an 
opportunistic blockholder and thus reach the optimal outcome. Online shareholder 
communication platforms, either at the company level like the ‘club des actionnaires’ in France, or at 
the national level, like the ‘Aktionärsforum’ in Germany, may be stimulated. Another option is to 
focus on voting thresholds, since the introduction of lower thresholds such as UK corporate 
governance Rule E.2.2 or the Australian two-strikes rule, may also alter the incentives of small 
shareholders.   
 
Chapter 6 
In the previous empirical chapters our focus was shareholder attendance and decision-making 
rights. However, as discussed in the introduction and in chapter 1 of this research, the role of 
AGMs can be divided in three functions. Accordingly, in chapter 6, we discussed the forum 
function of the AGM. Our question here was: ‘How and to what extent does the AGM serve as a 
platform for questions and discussions between shareholders and board members?’.  
We focused our research in this chapter on the AGM minutes of a larger sample of listed 
companies in the Netherlands. We found that private investors and representatives of (smaller) 
shareholders such as the VEB make use of their forum rights in particular. In contrast to German 
law, Dutch law does not explicitly grant the possibility to limit shareholder speaking rights. 
However, based on our findings, we argue that there is no need for such a provision: we note that 
the Dutch AGM functions quite well in this respect. Moreover, we found that the forum right is 
309 
 
relevant, as this research provides strong indications that most the questions and remarks, including 
those of private investors, involve relevant topics. Our categorization analysis, which was 
necessarily incomplete, determined that at least 54% of the questions that are asked during AGMs 
are relevant.  
We also investigated the determinants of the use of forum rights by shareholders in Dutch 
AGMs. We found that the importance of the meeting generally contributes to the use of these 
rights. One of these variables contains shareholder say-on-pay resolutions, which provides yet 
another indication that an introduction of a European shareholder’s say on pay would increase 
(active) shareholder participation in AGMs. With respect to the number of shareholders (private 
investors) that actively participate in Dutch AGMs we conclude that there is state dependency 
involved: it seems that there is a rather active part of the private investor base in the Netherlands 
that generally attends these meetings.  
 
Brief Answer to the Research Question 
A brief answer to our research question is provided. We found that although economic theory 
suggests that especially small shareholders have no incentives to exercise their voting rights, in 
practice, a substantial part of these small shareholders actually participate in AGMs. In addition, 
not only the voting right is not irrelevant to many small shareholders, also the forum right is not 
meaningless. Small shareholders ask relevant questions in most cases, and there are some dynamic 
effects involved in active shareholder participation. Nonetheless, small shareholder turnout and 
active participation in AGMs can still be improved and our research has shown several possibilities 
for doing this. Besides, in concentrated ownership structures with an opportunistic blockholder 
that can exercise de facto control, small shareholders can use enhanced coordination mechanisms. 
Based on our findings, we do not argue that the role of the AGM should be repositioned, but we 
see room to enhance the AGM’s role. In the next section we summarize our policy 
recommendations.  
 
2. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Our research has shown that the AGM is not dull ritual at all, but problems are definitely present, 
especially when ownership is concentrated. Policy initiatives should be considered to enhance the 
functioning of AGMs. We investigated which shareholder rights would increase the relevance of 
the AGM, whether a reduction in costs would matter and how shareholder coordination problems 
may be solved. Our recommendations are outlined below.  
  
Enhancing Shareholder Rights 
To increase the relevance of AGMs, we recommend adopting a European say on pay that provides 
shareholders in all European countries with a vote on the remuneration report. An advisory say on 
the remuneration report is already included in the adopted amendments of the Shareholder Rights 
Directive (March 2017), and our findings suggest that this new European shareholder right 
enhances turnout rates in several Member States.  
Next, based on our findings, we recommend adopting a rule like the UK Listing Rules 9.2.2AR 
jo 9.2.2ER in the other European Member States. This rule provides a separate vote on the election 
of independent directors in companies with controlling shareholders (threshold is 30%). In chapter 
2 we saw that outsider shareholder dissent in director elections is larger than total shareholder 
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dissent for these resolutions, and that director elections positively contribute to small shareholder 
attendance rates. Moreover, ownership concentration is higher in continental European countries 
and has a negative impact on small shareholder turnout. These findings suggest that such a rule 
may fit the needs of continental European Member States. The rule can be extended to other 
control rights as well, for example to say-on-pay resolutions. In chapter 2 we found that say-on-
pay dissent rates are substantially higher when only considering outsider shareholders. If a vote on 
the remuneration report contributes to the relevance of AGMs for small shareholders, we would 
suggest to consider the adoption of a separate (advisory) vote for outsider shareholders on the 
remuneration report. However, it is important to note that there has not been an extensive 
evaluation of this new UK Listing Rule yet. In addition, it should be noted that disproportionate 
control on the art of minority shareholders should be avoided. The nature of a say-on-pay 
resolution is different than that of the election right of independent directors, since the outsider 
shareholders have a sole interest in the latter, whereas say on pay is relevant to all shareholders. 
This also offers an interesting avenue for future research.    
The earlier version of the European say-on-pay rule included that companies need to explain to 
their shareholders how the voting outcome regarding the remuneration report resolution is taken 
into account. The adopted version, however, does not contain such a requirement. In contrast, the 
new UK corporate governance rule, provision E.2.2, goes one step further, by requiring the com-
pany to explain what actions it intends to take to understand the reasons behind the vote result. 
Our finding that small shareholders may view the AGM not only as a venue for decision-making, 
but also to voice their concerns, contributes to the relevance of such a new rule like provision 
E.2.2., especially in more concentrated ownership structures. However, since small shareholders in 
particular are often unknown in large listed companies, we recommend further research to inves-
tigate the use of this rule and its practical implications.  
To conclude, in the light of our main findings and the discussion above, and awaiting the 
evaluation of the new UK Listing Rule but also the more radical Australian two-strikes rule, we 
propose that Member States may consider opting for a separate vote for outsider shareholders on 
the remuneration report in the national corporate governance codes for those companies with a 
controlling blockholder with the implementation of a European shareholders’ say on the 
remuneration report. In case outsider shareholder opposition is substantial, companies should, at 
the very least, explain how the voting outcome is considered in the next remuneration report.  
 
Redundant Shareholder Rights 
Whereas certain shareholder rights may be enhanced, we recommend to consider diminishing other 
rights. As we have seen in our second chapter, the approval of the annual financial statements is 
just a formality. To increase the efficiency of AGMs and to get rid of formalities, we suggest that 
Member States provide either the supervisory board or the non-executive board members with the 
authority to approve the annual financial statements, in line with the current section 173(1) AktG 
in Germany. If the financial statements no longer require shareholder approval, AGMs will no 
longer have to occur annually, as is currently required. Such a change would further reduce AGM 
costs and it may be the first step to abolish the annual requirement for ‘AGMs’. One should note 
that other voting items, including the approval of the remuneration report and, as a best practice 
in the UKCGC, the re-election of directors, also require an annually vote. Another problem may 
be that removing the annual character of the AGM may limit the yearly opportunity for 
shareholders, and small ones in particular, to ask questions about the company’s matters. One 
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possible solution would be using the Q&A section of the company’s website to (annually) answer 
relevant shareholder questions of shareholders (related to the annual report). In addition, one may 
note that the formulation of the European right to ask questions in article 9 of the Shareholder 
Rights Directive suggests that dropping the requirement for shareholder approval of financial 
statements may limit the right to ask questions for shareholders in practice, though this is not the 
case in the Netherlands and this issue may easily be addressed in other Member States as well. 
Although we surely do not want to advocate it (yet), we recommend conducting further research 
on the (practical) desirability of dropping the yearly requirement. We already see a movement 
towards the use of digital tools including virtual shareholder meetings – although to date the 
physical meeting is still the main forum in a significant majority of (European) countries – which 
offers scope for more innovative approaches to the rather ‘classical’ AGM. Nonetheless, again we 
would like to stress that our research has shown that the position of this long-established format 
is not obsolete.  
In line with the aforementioned efficiency argument to dispose of formalities, we suggest that 
legally mandated amendments that do not offer any room for discretion to the corporate board, 
should not require shareholder approval as well. In our analysis, we saw that voting items regarding 
the amendments to articles of association generally have a negative impact on (small) shareholder 
turnout in the UK, which at first sight contradicts Bebchuk’s assertion (2005) that this shareholder 
right should be enhanced. To be fair, we did not consider the content of these amendments in our 
analyses. We strongly recommend conducting more extensive research on this voting category in 
future.    
 
Reducing Turnout Costs 
We strongly recommend introducing further rules that reduce (small) shareholder turnout costs. In 
this respect, we are in favour of the adopted amendments to the Shareholder Rights Directive. As 
we have seen, these amendments may further reduce the costs of using a chain of intermediaries 
in (cross-border) voting (Zetzsche, 2008; Davies et al., 2011). They cover shareholder identification 
of shareholders (article 3a), transmission of information to shareholders (article 3b) and the 
facilitation of the exercise of shareholder rights (article 3c). From our research, it follows that lower 
voting costs lead to higher (small) shareholder turnout rates, and thus contribute to the functioning 
of AGMs. Moreover, small shareholder coordination problems will diminish as the free-rider 
incentive becomes less severe when less costs are involved.  
 
Enhancing Shareholder Coordination 
We also recommend adopting regulatory initiatives that facilitate communication among small 
(active) shareholders. These initiatives are likely to enhance the ability of small shareholders to 
defeat an opportunistic blockholder (or an opportunistic management proposal) and thus reach 
the optimal outcome. Online shareholder communication platforms, either at the company level 
like the ‘club des actionnaires’ in France, or at the national level, like the ‘Aktionärsforum’ in Germany, 
may be stimulated. We investigated the use of these facilities in the context of opportunistic 
blockholders, but also in cases where small shareholders want to oppose the corporate 
management. In both cases, these tools foster coordination. However, it should be noted that it 
can be questioned that the existing examples of shareholder communication platforms are 
sufficient to foster shareholder coordination, which offers scope for further research on the 
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particular needs of (small) shareholders regarding these communication platforms to establish their 
optimal form.  
The new Shareholder Rights Directive puts more emphasis on the long-term engagement of 
institutional investors and asset managers, for instance with the introduction of transparency 
requirements. These new provisions may reduce small shareholder coordination problems due to 
the possible increased availability of information. In addition, an introduction of a rule like principle 
6 of the UK Steward Ship Code, which requires institutional investors to vote with ‘all shares held’, 
in continental European Member States may also reduce shareholder coordination problems 
substantially. 
Another option to enhance small shareholder coordination is to focus on voting thresholds 
such as qualified majority requirements. We have seen that it is easier for small shareholders to 
coordinate at a lower threshold. In addition to lowering the threshold in the shareholder voting 
game, one may also consider adding an additional, lower threshold. The result of reaching this 
lower threshold may be a lower pay-off for small shareholders (for example, under the UK 
corporate governance Rule E.2.2 or the Australian two-strikes rule), but such a rule may still 
stimulate small shareholder voting.  
 
3. THE LEGAL ROLE OF THE SHAREHOLDER 
In the introduction we saw that, in general, the legal role of the shareholder is similar in most 
countries nowadays: shareholders are considered residual claimants, who have the right incentives 
to be involved in important corporate decision-making. Generally, fundamental decisions and 
transactions require shareholder approval, but other decisions, including those that involve the 
corporate strategy, are delegated to the corporate board. Still, shareholders are ‘fictional’ and their 
incentives may largely differ. Moreover, as Hopt (2007) notes, ‘the line between what is to be 
decided by the board and what should remain for the shareholders is difficult to draw’ (p. 452). 
And, in a later paper, Davies and Hopt (2013) start with: ‘[…] identifying the role that the board 
does in fact discharge in the governance of the large public company and determining to whom it 
is accountable for the exercise of its powers is in fact far from easy. The role and functioning of 
the board are matters of continuing debate among policy makers, academics and others; and the 
rules relating to these matters are never stable’ (p. 3). These considerations indicate that shareholder 
say on executive pay is not a foregone conclusion. Introducing a shareholder say on executive 
remuneration in Europe would increase the relevance of the AGM. The question of whether such 
a decision should be left to the shareholders in the first place remains, however. It seems that 
executive pay is a popular societal subject on which virtually everyone has an opinion. Hence, outside 
the premise that shareholder control of these topics is efficient, we suggest that the European 
policy maker – and the national one – focus on determining the desirable position of Hopt’s line 
before increasing shareholder control rights. In this respect one may also consider the discussion 
of the notion of ‘a shareholder democracy’ in our introduction. In our opinion, shareholder voting 
should never be an end in itself, but, in the words of Bebchuk (2005), a means to increase effective 
corporate governance. We strongly recommend policy initiatives that focus on lowering 
shareholder voting costs and enhance shareholder coordination, no matter how Hopt’s line is 
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